QABILA

Tribal Profiles and Tribe-State Relations in Morocco and on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier

David M. Hart

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David Montgomery Hart
1927-2001

Just before the publication of this book David Hart left us on May 23th. It gives this book a rather sad and nostalgic dimension, because it marks the end of an impressive series of publications on Morocco and the broader Islamic world over a period of nearly half a century.

David Hart has been a leading ethnographer and conducted research from 1953 until 1967 in Berber-speaking areas of Morocco. In particular among the Aith Waryaghar in the Rif mountains in the north and among the Ait'Atta of the Central Atlas range, the Saghru massif and the pre-Saharan oases in the centre and south of the country. In between subsequent research in the Middle and Far East, he spent periodic return visits to both areas since then. He played a prominent role in formulating the structural-functionalist analysis of tribal systems in North Africa and the wider Muslim world. In his later work he turned more frequently to social history than to social anthropology as a disciplinary medium of expression and followed a comparative approach, which enabled him to reach for the specificity of tribal areas and systems in different parts of the Muslim world.

I first met David personally at a conference in London in 1979, organised by the Maghreb Review, but his fame had preceded him. As a freshly graduated geographer I had from 1974 to 1977 been member of a joint Moroccan-Dutch research project into the impact of international migration on the Souss regio in South Morocco and on the Central Rif, especially the provinces of Al Hoceima and Nador in the North. In Al Hoceïma we were repeatedly told of an impressive, berber speaking American researcher who knew the region well and who had studied the region exhaustively in the fifties and sixties. I managed to get hold of Harts magum opus: *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan, the Etnography and History* (1976) of the most important single tribal grouping in Northern Morocco. Together with his publication *Emilio Blanco Izaga: Colonel in the Rif* (1975) it gave me clear insight in the customary law

Afridi. Three generations of Adam Khayl Afridi, plus author (bottom row, second from left), at Darra (1977)

and in the socio-political institutions among this largest and notoriously restless key tribe of the Central Rif. But is did more that: I became hooked on this specific part of Morocco and kept regular contact with David Hart over the years. Moreover, his work on the tribal 'grass-roots' level proved to be also useful and relevant in studying the Moroccan immigrant community of approximately 300.000 people in the Netherlands. Nearly three quarter of them come from Northern Morocco, and a substantial part from the heartland of the Central Rif, more precisely the Ait Waryaghar, more commonly known as the Bni Urriaghel, whom Hart had studied on the eve of their massive migration to Europe.

The idea of publishing this book came during a visit I paid him in June 2000 in Garrucha, Spain, where he lived after his retirement. I was accompanying a team of the Moroccan section of Dutch National Television, who wanted to make a lengthy interview on his life in general, and more particularly on his research in the Rif. He really enjoyed the interview and gave answers to all our questions in his characteristic witty and repartee way. We talked for hours. He was pleased to learn that the second generation Rifians in the Netherlands showed interest in the history of the regions of origin of their parents.

It was perhaps this contemporary interest that made him show at that occasion the manuscripts of four books which were , in his own words '*stuff that sat around for years*' and asked me to help him '*start this material moving*' by finding a publisher in the Netherlands. So we did, and we are glad to have complied with his request.

Paolo De Mas
June 2001



Morocco: Main physical features showing Rif (with Aith Waryaghar inset) and Ait 'Atta territory in crosshatching

The Setting and the Background: The Spectrum of Tribal Islam

The Arabic word *qabila*, with its plural form *qaba'il*, the title selected for this book, is usually translated as 'tribe': it refers at once to a group of people who, often irrespective of their degrees of relationship to each other, make up an entity which is held to be at once social, economic and political. Such an entity is also both temporal and spatial in that it is viewed by its members as being both genealogical and vertical, as conceived historically or in time, and territorial and horizontal, as conceived geographically or topographically, or on the ground, in space.

This is both an oversimplification and a stretching of credulity, in a sense, as what it really implies is that the whole vast community of Islam, the *umma*, as laid down in the Qur'an and in the customs, or *sunna*, and traditions, or *hadith*, of the Prophet Muhammad, is one single tribe. Nonetheless, given the fact that Islam, more perhaps than any other organized, monotheistic world religion, contains the firmament or blueprint of its own social order, located and clearly laid down in just these sources. Given, also, the equality of believing Muslims in the sight of Allah, this statement may not be quite so exaggerated as it looks: it focuses upon faith and creed rather than upon origin or status. But these last two factors are nonetheless of equal importance in determining what the *qabila*, the tribe, is, and what it is all about, in the context of Islam. Here is the essential theme of this book: the Islamic or Muslim tribe, its internal relations, its relations with other, similar tribes, and its relations with the wider regional or national society of which it is a part, as manifested through three particular examples at the western and eastern extremities of the Muslim Middle East, two from Morocco and the third from the frontier region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Here I will say only that the Arabic-Islamic and Middle Eastern concept of *qabila* entails a great many paradoxes: it means different things to different people, to different actors in different situations (or even in the same situation), and perhaps especially, to different anthropologists working in different societies – even if these societies are all Islamic. Tribes may be viewed by

Middle Eastern governments as either the national backbone or the national curse; but whichever it is, the tribe is always, and has always been, distinctive in one way or another, no matter how it may be organized or articulated, and no matter what its relations are with its neighbors or with the wider society and the state. Tribesmen, as culturally perceived by townsmen, villagers or the rest of the national society in general, are different, merely by definition; and they are different from the rest of the society both by their attitudes and attributes, and by their organization. The unity and variety so manifest in Islam as a whole is reflected and paralleled on a smaller scale by the unity and variety of the *qabila* concept, its organization and structure, and its adaptation, whether cultural or structural, to external factors and demands.

I would not only endorse Lapidus' view that just as the Middle Eastern paradigm provides the model for other Islamic societies throughout the world (Lapidus 1988: xxi, 226-237), but would provide it with additional support by saying that the *qabila* paradigm also provides the social base from which Islam evolved in the Middle East: for *Islam* means, literally, 'submission' (to the will of God, Allah) and it may be defined as God's message as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (ca. 570-632 CE) through the Qur'an, its Holy Book. Even though Mecca and Medina, which were to become Islam's two holiest cities, were urban centers and major crossroads of trade even at its beginnings, they were surrounded by desert. This desert was inhabited by Bedouin tribal pastoralists, among some of whom the future Prophet of Islam was to spend at least a part of his youth, in the caravan trade, well before the time of his first prophetic revelations.

As this book is about tribalism, the tribal condition and tribal economic, social, political and religious life in the context of Islam, it is thus essentially anthropological in nature and approach. More specifically, in a geographical sense, it is concerned with tribalism as it exists or as it existed in the two wings of the Muslim Middle East, Morocco in the Maghrib – as Northwest Africa is known in Arabic – and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier in the Far Mashriq, as the Near and Middle East are known in the same language, the most important one in the area in question, for it is the language of Islam itself. These two terms, Maghrib and Mashriq, are derived from *gharb*, 'west', and *sharq*, 'east', referring, respectively, to the western and eastern ends of the traditional world of Islam, which was first and foremost the religion of the Arabs, revealed to them by God (*Allah*), in Arabic, through the medium of the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad, before it became a global religion encompassing much of Black Africa, India, the Soviet Union, China, Malaya-Indonesia and, most recently, even Western Europe and the Americas.

The two outlying points, the Maghrib al-Aqsa or 'Far West' and the Mashriq al-Aqsa or 'Far East' (if I may coin the latter phrase) of the North African-Middle Eastern landmass, are the cardinal ones on our compass, the former with its religious orientation and its *qibla* or direction of prayer (from the same Arabic root, *q-b-l*, as *qabila*) eastward toward the Arabian center of this landmass, and the latter with that same orientation pointing westward. What follows in subsequent chapters will be concerned very largely with the development, through ethnographic and socio-historical description and analysis, of three specific tribal profiles in these two areas, two in the first and one in the second, and with comparing and contrasting them as well. But they cannot be understood properly without some reference to the rest of the enormous and largely arid area which lies between them. This landmass is also 'middle' both latitudinally and strategically: because it is located between the richer and more populous subcontinents of Eurasia, China, India and Europe and because the heartland of Islam is to be found in its center, in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the Arabian Peninsula. It should also be noted here that we follow normal usage by employing the Arabic adjective *Muslim*, meaning, in Arabic, 'one who submits', to refer to persons, groups or peoples, and 'Islamic', referring to *Islam*, literally 'submission' (i.e., to the will of God) to refer to things, concepts and geographical regions or areas.

The point to be made initially is that although at least 90 percent, and probably more, of the whole population of the Middle East, from Morocco to Pakistan, is Muslim, only a very small proportion of this population, 10 percent at most, can be regarded as tribal. However, it must be stated unequivocally at the outset that tribes are, or rather, have been, much more important within some of the nation-states concerned (in particular, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) than in others (for example, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and possibly Turkey). Tribesmen of whatever ethnic group in Islamic Middle Eastern societies (e.g., whether Arab, Berber, Tuareg, Somali, Kurdish, Baluch or Pukhtun) are also apt to be relatively small in numbers as compared to the various national societies as wholes; but as the boundaries of these national societies seldom if ever correspond to those of ethnic groups with heavy tribal populations, the latter, the tribesmen, are conspicuous within the former, the national societies, as a major factor in the promotion of marginalism as they are or were until very recently in their dress and in behavior patterns associated with them by the members of the same wider national societies. By this I mean that they tend to be regarded, and often so regard themselves, as somewhat apart from, and

therefore marginal to (whether in a 'superior' or 'inferior' sense), the rest of these societies.

Throughout much of the Middle East, and certainly in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent and Nuclear Near Eastern region of Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and even Iran, tribes and towns have coexisted since long before Islam. As Altorki and Cole have noted, there were 'complex formations of cities and states which integrated society at much higher levels than those of individual tribes or local communities' – although this was perhaps less true of outlying areas such as the Maghrib or Northwest Africa on one hand and the Far Mashriq, the present Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, on the other. Of course, as the same authors continue, 'at the highest level was Islam, which provided not only an integrating structure of religious beliefs and practices but also a body of rules that, along with customary norms, regulated social relations, commercial transactions and law and order. Islam further provided an ethos which informed and guided behavior. Practically speaking, Islam also tied the Arabian peninsula to a much wider area, large parts of which became Arabized following the spread of the religion' (Altorki and Cole 1989: 234-235). Altorki and Cole also note that although there are no pre-Islamic states still extant today, the origins of the present state of Oman go back to 751 CE, while those of Yemen go back to 882 CE (ibid.: 235). Those of Morocco, we may add, fall in between the two, at 808-809 CE and the foundation of Fes by the Idrisids.

So even in pre-Islamic Arabia the question of whether tribes did in fact dominate towns, or the other way around, is a moot one. It seems safest to consider the two in conjunction with each other, for even in those regions in which tribes were indeed dominant, they never existed in a vacuum. Another thorny and still not satisfactorily resolved issue is that of matrilineal descent during the same period, the *jahiliya* or 'age of ignorance' which preceded Islam (for pro and con views, cf. Robertson Smith, 2nd. Ed., n.d. but ca. 1965, with preface by E. L. Peters; Evans-Pritchard 1981: 69-81, who makes a particularly strong case in favor of patriliny and against Robertson Smith; Mernissi 1975: 19-41; and Chelhod, 3 vols., 1985-85, III: 99-123), while the question of tribal decomposition in Early Islamic times was probably not a new one even then (Watt 1956: 260-302, 1961a, 1961b). It can almost certainly be viewed as a precursor example of some of the major features of Ibn Khaldun's sociological view of Islam in both tribe and town in the later Middle Ages. Tribalism or the tribal condition was indeed the basis of the state almost everywhere in Islam until the fourteenth century, when it was first described by Ibn Khaldun. Both the early Arab dynasties (Umayyad and

ᶜAbbasid, and to a lesser extent the later Umayyads in al-Andalus, Islamic Spain) and the later Muslim empires (Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal) were both supported by and came to blows with heavy tribal populations. But tribalism was later, and by degrees, to become a threat to the state once the latter was itself freed of tribal shackles and encumbrances. It was still a major issue in both Timurid Central Asia (Manz 1989) and in Early Ottoman Turkey (Lindner 1983), as it was in Safavid Iran (Reid 1983).

It is essentially the modern period, however, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the present, beginning with the impact of Western European colonialism on Islamic Middle Eastern civilization, that concerns us here. The reason for this is quite simple: it is only then that we begin to get what can really be labeled 'cross-cultural' documentation on the subject matter at hand, which is to say, documentation both in the recognized written languages of Islam (Arabic, Persian and Turkish) and in European languages. The fact of the matter is that by the time Western European colonialism appeared on the scene, the tribal factor in Islam was already beginning to become marginal. In a way, this marginality was already a sign of alarm – or at least, one of the readjustment of political relations between tribes and states. But the strong cross-cultural resemblances within the Islamic framework were to remain very striking and very real.

In the modern period, too, from about 1850 to the present day, the traditionally perceived and often stereotyped attitudes that central governments and/or nation-states have maintained about tribes have run the gamut from cooperation or the provision of military personnel to hostility. Examples of the former include the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia since the consolidation of the Al Saᶜud dynasty in 1926, the Hashid and Bakil tribes as 'Wings of the Imamate' in Yemen until that country's dissolution and the creation of two Yemens through civil war between 1962 and 1970 as well as their reunification in 1990; and among the Bakhtiyari, the Shahsevan and, to a lesser extent, the Qashqa'i of Iran. Examples of the latter include the Saudi *ikhwan*, most of whom were also Bedouins, and their pre-and post-consolidation rebelliousness throughout the 1920s; the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran; most Moroccan and Algerian Berbers, as well as Pukhtuns in Afghanistan and the once Indian, now Pakistani North-West Frontier Province in both precolonial and colonial times.

The Moroccan, Algerian and Pakistani cases, at the same time, were among the numerous more direct and hostile responses to colonialism, as manifested by the primary resistance to the French of the Algerian tribes under ᶜAbd al-Qadir, from 1832 to 1847, that of the Sanusi religious order of

Cyrenaica and the Cyrenaican Bedouins to the Italians from 1911 to 1932, that of the Muslim Sudanese, under the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, to the Egyptians and the British from 1881 to 1899, and that of the Somali under Muhammad ʿAbdallah Hasan to the British and the Italians from 1899 to 1920.

This enumeration makes no pretense to be exhaustive, for the Muslim resistance to Tsarist Russia in the Caucasus from 1834 to 1859, and later in Central Asia, could also be cited, as well as the early nineteenth century *jihad*-s in Northern Nigeria. Much of this hostility is or was conceived as 'traditional', and is therefore known as 'primary resistance' as opposed to the later 'secondary resistance', normally associated with modern nationalism. It was also a strong factor in the promotion of marginalism. Indeed, a good case can be made for the fact that tribe-state relations everywhere in the Muslim Middle East may be viewed as points on an overall spectrum.

It should also be noted here that, for better or for worse, it was European colonialism that brought the existence of Islamic Middle Eastern tribalism to the attention of the outside world. Muslim tribesmen (and I follow normal usage here by employing 'Muslim' to refer to persons/ groups/people and 'Islamic' to refer to things and concepts) of almost every group or category have often been regarded by colonialism as hardy, independent illiterates; but by their own national governments they have, equally often, been viewed as untrustworthy ones. Over the course of their socio-historical development this fact has been of crucial importance in promoting their marginalism, a process which, particularly at the present time, and given the framework of modern nation-states, seems more starkly defined than ever. Tribesmen are on the way out, and I shall try to examine how and why this is so, for the two wings of the Middle East, after a review of the salient features of tribal life and society in the context of Islam.

Although Gellner (1969, 1981) can probably take the credit for the explicit introduction of the concept of 'marginal tribalism' into the world of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, it is nonetheless very much implicit in the writings of some of his predecessors in the field, notably Coon (1951; 2nd Ed., 1962) and Gulick (1976), both of whom have published general works of great value on the sociocultural anthropology of the area at large. Coon's classic work *Caravan*, in particular, although now superseded in many ways, both in general terms and in specific ones, has an areal command and sweep, from Morocco to Pakistan which is breathtaking and which is not, to our knowledge, to be encountered in any work of more recent date. It is true, too, of course, that since Coon published his book there have been shifts in empha-

sis, from a single, unitary and monolithic rulebook way of looking at Islam to a general recognition of many localized 'Little Islams' all following a single 'Great Islamic' Tradition; but Coon still gives us a picture in the round which has yet to be duplicated. Even if his theory of the Middle East as a mosaic of peoples was much less true in the 1990s than it was forty years earlier, on publication, his account vividly evokes the sounds, sights and smells of the region in a way that few if any others have done.

As for more recent overall anthropological surveys, Patai (1962) has also been largely superseded, if not necessarily for the same reasons, while Gilsenan (n.d., but ca. 1981) and Ahmed (1988) both present purviews which differ considerably from each other, the latter being much closer to that to be provided in this account. I also have differences both of viewpoint and of focus with Geertz (1968) and Eickelman (2nd Ed., 1989), despite the very real value of the works of both of them. This is also the case, but to a lesser extent, with the works of Black-Michaud (1975) and Meeker (1979), whereas Davis (1977) has given us an excellent 'state-of-the-art' volume about Mediterranean society in general, on both its northern Christian and southern Muslim shores.

In this book I will also focus, though less directly, on the unity and diversity of Islam as manifested through the unity and diversity, on a smaller scale, of its tribal systems, situations and arrangements, both in local and in regional contexts, and both temporally (where possible) and spatially. I take the view – one which has most recently and succinctly been expressed by Ahmed (1986: 58; 1988: 4), though it is not original with him – that there is only one Islam, not many islams (El-Zein 1974, 1977; and Eickelman 1989: 261-262), but that its societies are many and varied.

This fact has also had considerable bearing on the concept, the make-up and the group composition of the Muslim or Islamic tribe both as locally conceived, which is to say, as viewed laterally, and as generally or globally conceived, or as viewed from above. For it is with Islamic tribes and their subunits, and the interrelationship of these to each other as groups, and at ground level, more than as individuals, that I am primarily concerned here. The membership of the individual in a group, whether it be tribe, nation or the Muslim *umma* at large, the wider community and brotherhood of Islam, is therefore of cardinal importance.

I will be concerned, further, not only with the concept, structure, workings and ideology of marginal tribalism in the Middle East, but also with its perception by three sets of distinct entities: 1) the tribal actors themselves, 2) the wider national society, and 3) the nation-state and its central and

regional bureaucracies. In the consideration of these questions, I shall also touch on the relations between tribes and towns, of which the stereotype is an abrupt cut-off, while the reality represents more a gradation: examples which come to mind are those of Moroccan Rifians (of both the 'old' and the 'new' categories) in Tangier (Hart 1957), Tetuan and Fes, in the last of which there are also other traditionally resident Berbers, the *izarzayen* porters of the eastern Middle Atlas, as well (Le Tourneau 1949: 194-197); of the Swasa or Susis (Fr. spelling 'Soussis') and their monopoly of both the wholesale and retail grocery and supermarket trade in most major Moroccan cities, such as Marrakesh, Casablanca, Tangier and even Fes (Adam 1951, 1973; Waterbury 1972, 1973); and of the Afridi Pukhtuns in Peshawar (Hart 1985).

There is yet a further marginalism, at least of a historical kind, to be considered in territorial terms: that of the Two Wings or Extremities of Middle Eastern Islam, Morocco and the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, as compared and contrasted with its areal center, the Arabian peninsula and the Nuclear Near East. The striking physical, cultural and socio-structural similarities and parallels between these two strongly traditional tribal wings of Islam have (at least until very recently) greatly outweighed whatever differences that exist between the tribesmen in question, whether they be Bedouin, Berber or Pukhtun. These differences are mainly linguistic: 1) that the Berbers do not speak, natively, the official language of the country in which they live (although since independence in 1956 they must learn it), and 2) that they are nonetheless all one with the 'Arab' majority on a sectarian religious basis, despite Gellner's polarizations of urban and rural Islam (in Morocco) into 'Book', 'Doctor' and 'Protestant' in the first instance and 'Shrine', 'Saint' and 'Catholic' in the second (Gellner 1969: 5-12; 1972; 1984). The Pukhtuns, for their part, all speak the majority language – but of Afghanistan, however, not of Pakistan; and they contain one small but significant enclave which is Shi'a and hence doctrinally divergent from their own Sunnism.

Although the above may make us wonder whether the practice of Islam in tribal societies can be viewed quantitatively, or even qualitatively, a final consideration to bear in mind with respect to the tribal factor in Islamic lands is that of the tribe as the skeleton in the national closet, one which still rattles on occasion, according to the nation in question. This is Gulick's 'peril and refuge' syndrome; and it is a concept well perceived by tribesmen themselves vis-à-vis the governments of the states in which they have come to form marginal minorities (Gulick 1976: 30-52). In some states (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan and even Pakistan), for various reasons, tribalism may be said to be officially favored; but in many others (Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Iran) it is

not. Nonetheless, the stamp and imprint of Islam on the varied and various networks of *qaba'il* that profess and adhere to it have provided broad and striking similarities, both cultural and structural, between them which are best explained sociologically rather than through any attempted historical connections: for all are well aware of the major connection, that they belong to the *umma*, the overall community of Islam. The *umma* of Islam has shaped and stamped them all: although not always applied in exactly the same ways or to exactly the same degrees, its stamp is strong, forceful, enduring and, above all, recognizable enough so that the members of each one, although they might view members of the others as somewhat strange in other respects, would nonetheless recognize them immediately as fellow Muslims.

Finally, it is appropriate to try to define here just what I mean by the term 'tribe' as well as by its Arabic equivalent *qabila*. But this is more easily said than done, and for the moment I can only do it negatively. A standard definition in a well-known but now outdated textbook of social anthropology states that 'a tribe may be defined as a politically coherent and autonomous group occupying or claiming a particular territory' (Anonymous 1954: 66). As I have noted elsewhere (Hart 1973), such a definition is woefully inadequate, because it asks more questions than it answers, namely, how coherent and how autonomous, and what are the relevant factors making for such coherence and autonomy? The definition in question also makes no mention either of the group's relations with similar groups of the same order or with a wider national society, especially one exemplified by having a central government. Therefore, for present purposes, it can be rejected out of hand.

An equally misleading approach was that adopted, for example, by the French colonial administration in Morocco, one also espoused by at least one American political scientist (Ashford 1961: 186). This consisted of totting up all the named tribal groups on the Moroccan map and announcing that there were some six hundred of them. Such a procedure displays a fatal ignorance of the *kinds* of units being totted up: for in Morocco a group which is labeled in Arabic as *qbila* or in Berber by its cognate *taqbilt* may range in size from a tiny cluster of hamlets dotting one or two mountain slopes to a huge – though not necessarily amorphous – unit covering most of a whole province or even spilling over into neighboring provinces. Crucial issues such as the presence or absence of common ancestorship and the generational depth of unilineal descent groups on the one hand or the presence or absence of accreted, aggregated or composite units based on clientship or on territorial considerations on the other, for instance, were completely ignored. It seems, however, that more recently such matters are indeed being given due consideration, par-

ticularly, and interestingly, by latter-day Islamic historians in their own assessments (cf. Maillo Salgado, art. *Qabila*, in idem 1987: 135-136).

It is here that I agree with Gellner on one major point, although I must admit to having recently parted company with him on another related one (Gellner 1963, 1965, 1969, 1973). This is that most North African and Middle Eastern tribes are at once characterized by two qualities: segmentation and marginalism. The first, which should not necessarily be confused with segmentary lineage theory (and it is with respect to the primacy and efficacy of this last as an explication of socio-political behavior that my views have now come to diverge from those of Gellner), is a cultural attribute which is nonetheless capable at the same time of developing structural overtones, while the second, which has already been given some consideration above, is a situational one, with respect to the wider and generally non-tribal society of what has become the nation-state in question.

The first point was never grasped by the French colonial administration in North Africa, although its British counterpart in India did appear to have some perception of it, while the second was until the end of the colonial period only dimly perceived by most anthropologists, who, especially in writing on Black Africa and elsewhere, had become accustomed to treating tribal systems *in vacuo*, so to speak, as final political units and as islands more or less unto themselves. This last, as has by now become all too clear, was of course never the case in historical reality: it must be reemphasized that particularly in any Muslim context, the two factors have always coexisted: tribesmen and non-tribesmen share a common Islamic cultural heritage. The criterion of relevance here is that tribes have always been extremely aware of other tribes, of towns and cities, and of central governments; and *vice versa*. This was just as true in the time of the great fourteenth century Arab-Muslim sociologist and historian Ibn Khaldun as it is today, in our own; while *The Notion of Tribe* (to take the title of a book by Fried 1975) is one which be shown, through three detailed examples, to be just as elastic in its Islamic contexts as it evidently is elsewhere.

The examples in question are all derived primarily from my own ethnographic fieldwork, even though they are framed in a historical context and not couched in a vague and timeless 'ethnographic present'. As such, they form the core of this book. The first two examples focus on Berber-speakers from opposite ends of Morocco, the Aith Waryaghar of the Rif mountains in the north and the Àit ʿAtta of the Central Atlas and Saghru chains in the south; while the third is that of the Afridi, a Pukhtun tribe living entirely within the confines of Pakistani territory but bordered on the west by

Afghanistan. All three groups have undergone tremendous socio-economic and sociocultural change since I finished my fieldwork (1953-1955 and 1959-1965 in Morocco, plus many subsequent visits, and 1977-1978 in the Pakistan North-West Frontier); but I feel that an ethnographic-cum-socio-historical approach, even though fieldwork in these areas may no longer be possible today, yields in-depth information and data on these now rapidly changing tribal societies in a way quite unparalleled by any other. An adequate and effective explanation of the present can only be given through an examination of the not-so-distant past, while attempted invocation in the reverse order can only lead to greater confusion. Tribal politics, political systems and history will form the backbone of the next four chapters, although the undertone of Islam will still be there, to emerge loud and clear in the final one.

Aith Waryaghar. Bride on mule on way to groom's house, Aith Turirth (1960)



Morocco: Linguistic map

Morocco: The Monarchy, the Makhzan and Makhzan-Tribal Relations

The Monarchy, the Makhzan and the Makhzan-Siba Controversy

In 1989, the population of the Kingdom of Morocco was some 24.5 million, whereas in 1912, at the beginning of the Franco-Spanish protectorate over the country, which was to last until 1956, it was less than a quarter of this figure, only about five million. So just in the twentieth century there has been an enormous increase in the country's population. But its overall national political system is and has remained a monarchy since the beginnings of Islam in the country, officially with the foundation of Fes in the early ninth century (808 CE) by Idris II, the second sultan of the first 'national' Muslim dynasty, the Idrisids, but in fact even earlier – given, for example, the establishment of a purely local dynasty of Yemeni origin and of purely secondary importance, the Salihids of the Nakur River in the Central Rif region a hundred years previously, in 710 CE. This stands in sharp contrast to Afghanistan, which effectively became a monarchy only much more recently, remaining one for two and a quarter centuries, 1747-1973; and with Pakistan, which has been a nation only since 1947, the contrast is even greater. The imprint of Islam in Morocco is thus very old, very strong and very lasting, while, furthermore, at the same time, a whole set of circumstances, some of them external, allowed this westernmost of all Arab lands to go its own way throughout the bulk of its history.

For not only did Idris I, the father of the founder of Fes – and both he and his posthumous son Idris II are among the high watermarks in Moroccan hagiography – become the country's first sultan in 788, but it was another major sultan of a later dynasty, the al-Muwahhidun or Almohads, which like its predecessor dynasty the Almoravids and unlike the earlier Idrisids, was of Berber origin, ʿAbd al-Mu'min bin ʿAli, who broke off all relations with ʿAbbasid Baghdad in 1145 to declare Morocco to be the independent Caliphate of Western Islam, and himself to be its caliph, its *amir al-mu'minin*, the Commander of its Faithful (cf. Tozy 1986; Agnouche 1987; Pennell, ms., 1989). The fact that this proclamation held good is borne out not only by Morocco's

total independence from Ottoman Turkish domination several centuries later, but also by the fact that its Sultanate not only persisted but flourished during all four of the following dynasties – the Marinids, the Wattasids (both of which, like the Almoravids and the Almohads, were also Berber in origin), the Saᶜadids (ca. 1511-1659 CE) and the ᶜAlawids (1659-present). The last-mentioned dynasty, in addition, is not only the longest-ruling one in Morocco to date, but it is also the longest dynasty in existence of any existing in the Arab or Muslim world today (cf. Brignon et al., 1967; Agnouche 1987).

This ᶜAlawid dynasty, as well as its predecessor, the Saᶜadids, were also the first to legitimize and above all to institutionalize the *shurfa'* (pl. of *sharif*), or descendants of the Prophet – who are so numerous in Morocco that their supply far exceeds their demand – both as the incumbents of the Moroccan throne and as the leaders of the Moroccan Muslim community, its *umma*. *Sharif*-hood is thus a major constant of Moroccan history and runs through it like a wide red band. Even though Saᶜadid power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provided the basis of the modern Moroccan state through fierce defense of its national territory against Christian (Portuguese and Spanish) incursions on both its Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts (Berque 1982: 43), it was the early ᶜAlawids, Mawlay Rashid (1659-1672) and Mawlay Ismaᶜil (1672-1727) in particular, who were to consolidate that power both by pushing the claim to the sultanate of their own line of descent, their corps of arbiters-to-be (Morsy 1988: 117), from the Tafilalt in the southeastern part of the country on the Saharan fringe, and by distancing themselves, once this was achieved, from the rest of the Moroccan population not only through their special *shurfa'*-hood but through their Saharan origins and their pretorian army (Berque 1982: 266-69). Nonetheless, it must be stated for the record that the earliest dynasty, the Idrisids, had made an attempt, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, to do the same thing with their own northern and still very prestigious *shurfa'* line, the Idrisiyin or Adarisa, from Fes. It should equally be noted that claims for *sharif*-hood were made even for some of the country's several successive Berber dynasties, the Almoravids and Almohads in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the Marinids or Banu Marin and Wattasids or Banu Wattas in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, for genealogists later established the fact that the family of Ibn Tumart, the founder of the Almohads, was related to that of the Prophet (Le Tourneau 1969: 3). Finally, not only is Morocco's present King Muhammad VI the ᶜAlawid dynasty's leading member and representative, but it was his grandfather, the late King Muhammad V (1927-1953, 1956-1961), who in 1957 modernized the image of the sultanate by turning his country into a kingdom.

The fundamental point to be established here is the nature of the sultan's authority, and I use the term 'sultan' rather than 'king' because the context of my analysis is socio-historical. As Burke has noted, his legitimacy lay in his ability to perform the major duties incumbent upon all Muslim rulers: 'to defend the land(s) of Islam against external aggression and to govern justly, according to the stipulations of the *Shari'a*, of Muslim Law as expounded in the Qur'an'; and hence 'his authority derived from his suitability as a leader of the just community, the *umma muhammadiya*' (Burke 1976: 12). It should therefore be added that just as the Sultan of Morocco is the commander of its faithful, the source of his power (apart from the Shari'a which ordains it) and the centerpiece of politico-religious ritual which surrounds his person is, as Lahbabi has correctly stressed (Lahbabi 1957: 41-67), the peculiarly Moroccan institution of the *bay'a*. In the context of Moroccan Islam, what this crucial term refers to is the allegiance to the sultan of the *umma*, the Moroccan Muslim community as a whole, and the recognition by this community of his sovereignty, which is not something he can simply assume unilaterally. It is, in other words, government by consent of the governed, accorded to the sultan by suffrage and provided to him in the name of the people by the *'ulama'*, the learned doctors of Moroccan Islam. The latter were traditionally located in Fes, the spiritual capital of the country before colonialism, but since independence have been in Rabat, which became the capital under the French and has remained so ever since. To this day, the ritual of the *bay'a* is constantly reenacted, and receives equally constant acknowledgement through reporting in the Moroccan daily press (both in Arabic and in French), through delegations, for the most part of local notables, from all parts of the country who come continually to see and pay their respects and obeisance to the sultan, particularly on the occasion of the major religious feasts.

Lahbabi also reaches the threshold of a new interpretation of the now hoary controversy over the division, by the sociologists of French colonialism, of the Moroccan state into two zones, the *bilad al-makhzan*, the zone of governmental bureaucracy, and the *bilad al-siba*, the zone of tribal dissidence or lawlessness (cf. Brown, ms., ca. 1982), a dissidence which both Gellner and I myself have seen as 'institutionalized' (Gellner 1969: 1; Hart 1984[a]: 15, 17): in the first of these, theoretically, the central government ruled supreme, taxes were collected and the law was obeyed. while in the second the government was next to nonexistent and tribes, particularly those of Berber extraction and speech, in the mountains away from the urban seats of government in the plains, dedicated themselves to bloodfeuding and banditry. Coon

summed up this view by referring, colorfully but inaccurately (and probably quite unaware of its later colonialist gloss), to the first as 'the land of order' and to the second as 'the land of insolence', respectively (Coon 1962: 263-264, 309-323). Indeed, following Coon's lead, Barry, much more recently, has entitled a whole book on Afghanistan *Le Royaume de l'Insolence*, in which he also cites Coon both on the Moroccan Berbers and on the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq and Iran (Barry 1984: 98, 166-167).

Lahbabi, however, simply (or perhaps oversimply) put this division down to adherence, in the first instance, to the *bayʿa*, and to non-adherence to it in the second; and therefore in his view the situation was more or less that of the acceptance or non-acceptance of a Rousseauian social contract, with the problem of the *bilad al-siba* being essentially one of decentralization (Lahbabi 1958: 43). Lahbabi's view is theoretically interesting but is deprived of empirical value because the idea of a *bilad al-siba* was in itself, at least in part, a construct of the central government. It was the opposite of *bilad al-hukm* or, in Moroccan terms, *bilad al-makhzan* (with the same meaning). Indeed, Brown (1982) has unearthed textual evidence for the use of the term *siba* which goes back to as early as the eleventh century; and many of the Berber tribal inhabitants of the so-called *bilad al-siba* themselves came to employ this term in both a descriptive and possibly also a retrospective sense (as well as one not entirely deprived of a certain self-irony) to denote, in capsule form, their own pre-colonial socio-political systems, without necessarily dichotomizing these with that of the *makhzan*. I refer here to the frequent use by Imazighen Berber informants from the Central Atlas of the phrase *gi l-uqt n-s-siba*, 'in the time of *siba*', (Hart 1984[a]: 58), as well as the Rifian usage of its equivalent *gi r-waqt n-ar-Ripublik*, 'in the time of the "Ripublik"', in which the obvious neologism refers not at all to the 'Rifian Republican State' of bin ʿAbd al-Krim (1921-1926), but precisely to the period of lawlessness, i.e., of *siba*, which preceded it (Hart 1976: 4-5, 355-368), and with which it is thus coterminous. So there is no question about the antiquity of the terminology or about its usage in Berber speech. What is highly questionable, however, is the use to which the French colonial sociologists put it, beginning with Michaux-Bellaire, who, despite his excellence as a descriptive ethnographer, managed nonetheless to devalue the *makhzan* and, given his colonialist bias, to steer it toward an end of divide-and-rule, as Houroro (1988: 37-40), for example, has demonstrated in an incisive little study.

Thus Lahbabi's ideas marked only the beginning of the abandonment of a now outmoded view, outmoded both because of its gross distortion and its oversimplification of a more complex reality. This view was designed simply

to support the principle and policy of divide-and-rule and to keep the 'Bad Arab' apart from the 'Good Berber', while another discussion which places considerable weight on the issue of territorial limits is that of Cagne (1988: 559-618). As Burke has justly observed (Burke 1976: 12-13), 'given the indivisibility of the political and the religious in Islam, it is therefore misleading to claim ... that the sultan possessed only religious authority over the populations who lived in the *bilad al-siba*, and to insist on the impotence of the government and the independence of the tribes. The European notion of territorial empire ... as the test of a state is an inappropriate measure of an Islamic polity where more personal standards, like submission to Islam and allegiance to the *amir*, held sway. For a Muslim the fundamental fact was membership in the *Dar al-Islam*, the House of Islam, and participation in the ongoing life of the community.'

It should be noted here that the term *makhzan* refers specifically to the patrimonial bureaucracy over which the sultan presided: it consisted of a peripatetic court and army, both of which had a rather tenuous character, with the latter also acting as a tax-gathering force. Despite the fact that it was often weak as well as perambulatory, the *makhzan* also had a major function as an instrument both of arbitration and of legitimization of local authority in regional or tribal disputes (Joffe 1988: 201-228), as Ayache has documented for two nineteenth century cases (Ayache 1983: 159-176) and as Laroui has also noted (Laroui 1977: 163). Morsy has gone still further by discussing arbitration not only as a political institution but as an interpretation of the whole status of the Moroccan monarchy, in which the state itself is derived from and dependent upon the institution of arbitration (Morsy 1984: 52): for the state is Islamic, while Morsy again shows the arbitration process to have been clearly pre-Islamic (Morsy 1984, 1985). The very fact of the retention and shoring-up of this arbitrative faculty on the part of the *makhzan* as well as that of tax-collecting activities on the part of its somewhat ramshackle armed forces underscores the peripatetic quality mentioned above, because before 1912 the so-called 'imperial cities' of Fes, Meknes and Marrakesh were all equally regarded as capitals of the country, and the sultan, his court and his army moved regularly back and forth between them, crossing tribal territories as they did so. This tradition, brought to a halt under the colonial dispensation, was resumed in more modern dress after independence and still continues: Fes, Marrakesh, Tangier and even Ifran, for instance, all have royal palaces, and in this sense they may be regarded as alternate capitals to Rabat, as the King may receive guests and deputations in any of them – while Rabat remains the foreign and diplomatic capital only.

After duly noting Berque's admonition that *makhzan/siba* is one of a number of classificatory systems which should be viewed as being among Morocco's institutions of dissimulation (Berque 1974: 21), as well as Ben Bachir's contention that the distinction between the notions in question was more an administrative than a political one (Ben Bachir 1969: 114), we may turn once again to Burke, who discusses the same fundamental objections to the *makhzan/siba* stereotype at a more fundamental level (Burke 1976: 13): 'To stress the willingness of a tribe to pay taxes and accept *makhzan*-appointed governors is to risk caricature of a situation of much greater subtlety' (i.e., than that prevailing in either of the simple but erroneous tribe vs. town or Berber vs. Arab dichotomies). 'There was in fact a wide variety of the kinds of relations which tribes could have with the *makhzan*, from full-fledged acceptance of government rule, to the exchange of letters, the periodic sending of embassies to court' (i.e., usually for *bayʿa* purposes, but also often with specific petitions in mind), the supply of troops at moments of external threat, and the occasional contribution of gifts at the principal Muslim festivals. According to a particularly keen observer of Morocco, 'even in the most distant parts of *bled as-siba* there is no tribe that is not in relations with the *makhzan*'. These relations continue even while the battle between the tribes and the *makhzan* rages (Eugene Aubin, *Le Maroc d'Aujourd'hui*, 8th Ed., Paris 1913: 241). 'For this reason it is folly to attempt to draw a map of Morocco which seeks to delimit the extent of *makhzan* and *siba* territories. In addition, depending upon the circumstances, the relationship of a particular tribe with the central power varied over time with the differential power of the *makhzan* and the changing fortunes of its leaders. The particular degree of interaction depended a great deal upon the individuals and circumstances involved.'

What is implied by the interaction here in question is that under strong sultans – and the most energetic examples from the present dynasty during the precolonial period were Mawlay Ismaʿil (1672-1727) and Mawlay al-Hasan I (1873-1894) – the whole country was under full sultanic and governmental control, while under weak ones *siba* might extend not only to the city gates but even, on occasion, into the city itself. Hence the *bilad al-makhzan*, where sultanic control was direct, and *bilad al-siba*, where it was indirect but where Moroccan sovereignty applied just as strongly, are seen to have been not so much dichotomous but rather as the two sides of a single coin, and as a pair of catchwords which do not in and of themselves go very far in explaining the precolonial Moroccan political system. This fact is also implicit in the vernacular terminology: in Moroccan Arabic, *sib* is the verb 'to enter into dissidence', while a person who becomes dissident is *sayib*, pl. *suyyab* (with a

Berber equivalent *amghugh/ aghuuwagh*, pl. *imghughen/ighuuwaghen*), while 'to submit, to obey' is *tuuwa'*, and a person who submits is *tayi'*, pl. *taya'in* – although 'to submit to the authority of the Sultan' is awarded a special category in *'ati(h) l-bay'a*, 'giving him allegiance' (Mercier 1951: 180, 185, 244; 1959: 159, 274, 455).

At the same time, the issues that the *makhzan/siba* question raise have been recognized but gravely distorted in other ways by recent Moroccan Marxist researchers who appear to see all socio-political relations of any sort as being reducible to essentially economic ones of production (e.g., Ben Ali 1983: 169-185), a viewpoint which I do not share. But it is of interest, on the other hand, to note that although Salahdine, for instance, has much to say about *makhzan* and nothing at all about *siba*, his work makes refreshing reading, largely because it takes the theses of the majority of his Marxist-oriented contemporaries, including Ayache, Laroui and, in particular, Benali, and shows graphically how they fail to apply to Morocco's traditional socio-economic organization (Salahdine 1986: 65-125).

Finally, it might also be noted that the intermediate condition between *bilad al-makhzan* and *bilad al-siba* which Michaux-Bellaire labeled provisionally as *bilad al-taraf* may have been the closest one to the truth for Morocco at large, given the fact that one and the same group could shift in either direction at different times and under different conditions, favoring allegiance and active assistance to the *makhzan* on one occasion and keeping its distance from it on another. Once again, we are dealing here with questions of bet-hedging, of adjustments made in order to meet given needs and circumstances and to keep options open, even though this may pose a theoretical conundrum with respect to the degree that a given tribe could run with the hare and hunt with the hounds simultaneously.

The Tribal Role in Moroccan History: An Examination

Although statistics are lacking, it is probable that the three major dialects of the Berber language sub-branch of the Hamitic branch of the Hamito-Semitic family (while Arabic belongs to its Semitic branch) spoken in Morocco, Rifian or Tharifith in the north, Tamazight in the mountainous center and southeast and Tashilhit in the equally mountainous southwest, accounted in 1912 for the basic linguistic affiliation of 40 or even 45 percent of the country's population. This figure is probably somewhat lower today, as Arabic, the national language of the country, has gained ground, the reason being that

especially since independence, both through increased schooling at home and through ever more frequent contact with the cities, most male Berber-speakers have learned Arabic, to the extent of becoming bilingual – while an ever increasing number are now learning French as well, to make it trilingual.

This has not generally happened in the case of the women, who stay at home and pass the maternal language on to their children. For the moment, therefore, one might say that the ability to speak languages other than the natal Berber may be sex-linked, but this is not necessarily a guarantee that such a trend will hold good for the future. For Berber, this future also looks to be severely limited, as it cannot compete with Arabic. But at the same time it does not really attempt to do so, for the reasons outlined below. Even so, there have been few or no serious attempts either in Morocco, or in Algeria, for that matter, as there has been among the small minority of Berber-speaking oasis dwellers in Southern Tunisia, to revindicate Arab origin (cf. Albergoni & Pouillon 1976). Nonetheless, the days are long over when a medieval Almoravid sultan such as Yusuf ibn Tashfin, who when asked how he enjoyed the readings in Arabic provided by the poets of al-Andalus, reportedly said that although he could not understand them, he knew that they were begging for their daily bread (Garcia Gomez 1959: 36)!

To be sure, the Berber motivation to learn Arabic, which is above all the language of Islam, of the Qur'an and a written language (for the Berber dialects are not held to be such, despite the fact that they can be transliterated and transcribed both into Arabic and into modern Indo-European languages) has always been strong, particularly for Berber speakers who, for one reason or another, have had, in the past, to leave their own tribal areas in order to migrate toward the cities. But the key to the opening exercise of this section is that the Berber areas are those which have always been regarded, whether rightly or wrongly, as the 'tribal areas', *par excellence*, of Morocco. Traditionally, where one finds Berber speech and Berber people, one finds *qaba'il*, or *dhiqba'ir*, as the Rifians say, or *tiqbilin*, as the Central Atlas Imazighen say: the singular form of the initial Arabic term is, of course, *qabila*, the title of this book, while that of its Rifian cognate is *dhaqbitsh*, and that of its Tamazight cognate, *taqbilt*. Although all these nouns are feminine, the last-mentioned term refers in fact not to a whole tribe, but rather to a single section within it, while its much less used masculine equivalent *aqbil* (pl. *iqbilen*), on the other hand, refers rather to a coalition or confederation of tribes. a situation which, though often attested in Moroccan history, was the exception rather than the norm. As we will see presently, in Rifian the Middle/Central Atlas form *taqbilt* turns semantically into Arabic *r-rbaʿ* (lit. 'quarter'), or section. But it

seems worthwhile to point out some, if not all, of the relevant terminology here, simply because the normally composite character of the Moroccan 'tribe', whether Arabophone or Berberophone, was such that although genealogical criteria can be used with profit at lower levels of segmentary reckoning (i.e., the village- or tent-community and its constituent lineage groups), it is seldom that they can be made to apply higher up, at more all-embracing levels, where factors of geographical contiguity and territoriality come much more obviously into play. Contrary to the position I adopted earlier on the subject (Hart 1976: 1-16), I would now hold that Moroccan tribes exhibit truly segmentary structures only rarely and, when this happens, it does so virtually by accident. Although one such accident, that of the Ait ʿAtta, will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV, it too reveals the qualification of having only a quasi-segmentary structure at its own upper levels (cf. also Hart 1997[a]).

It is, however, probably safe to say it is probably safe to say that although *makhzan*-tribal relations have existed in a *de facto* sense ever since the Idrisid conversion of the Berber Awraba (whose name probably came down to us in Arabized fashion) to Islam in the eighth century, it is not until nearly ten centuries later, and the advent of the eighteenth, that the information available allows us to particularize about them in a fruitful fashion. In the intervening near-millennium, tribal or group names appear and disappear in ways recalled by Berque in his well-known essay on 'What is a North African Tribe?' (Berque 1953, republished 1974: 22-34), names which may have been famous in the later Middle Ages but which in more recent times have been downgraded to refer to small and relatively insignificant units which have survived in a humbler form but whose day of glory has long gone. They are thus mere onomastic emblems on the landscape, which possess in Berque's view an orientation which is basically retrospective. They cannot be understood except as parts of a larger pattern (Berque 1978: 353), while into the bargain, and internally, there are often flagrant contradictions between the individual 'origins' of the various parts of such a group and the wider 'origin' of the group as a whole (Berque 1974: 26-27).

In any event, although our own views about the relative florescence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with respect to documentation on tribalism coincide implicitly with those of Clement in about the same time-frame regarding the clear emergence of urban revolts in Morocco (Clement ca. 1989), it is nonetheless worth summarizing the murky data that we possess for the intervening centuries. It should be stated here that during this whole period – and indeed, up until the establishment of the protectorate and its rap-

idly imposed fixity, through 'pacification', of tribal boundaries – the tribal map of Morocco was in a chronic state of ebb and flow, of flux and reflux.

My views on the matter, too, have been conditioned by the fact that I was personally unable to find, in the field, any Moroccan tribal documentation earlier than a certain land deed, a bill of sale for some land with pomegranate trees, in the Aith Waryaghar highlands of the Central Rif, dated 1136 AH/1724 CE (Hart 1976: 507). Despite undeniably earlier evidence than this from the Western Atlas and the Anti-Atlas, evidence going back at least to the late sixteenth century if not earlier (Berque 1974: 18; Jacques-Meunie 1964: 7), I have grave doubts about the validity of the free-wheeling French colonial interpretations of Ibn Khaldun's classificatory scheme of Masmuda, Sinhaja and Zanata as a kind of 'three-ring circus' attempting to account for the medieval history of the Maghrib (Hart 1982: 361-365).

In any case, too, the gaps in the ethnohistorical and socio-historical tribal record are enormous. This should be clear from the colonialist tendency to see all contacts between large or well-known groups with established names prior to about the fifteenth century as a kind of series of 'home' and 'away' football games. What earlier French scholars, such as E.F. Gautier, attempted to read into Ibn Khaldun is only barely, if at all, similar to what we can infer, for example, from Rosenthal's more recent translation of the latter's *Muqaddima* (Gautier 1942; Ibn Khaldun/Rosenthal, 3 vols., 1958; Ibn Khaldun/Rosenthal/Dawood 1967). The Idrisid foundation of Fes and the establishment of its short-lived power base there was also supported by the Awraba of Zarhun – namesakes and possibly kinsmen of those earlier Awraba in eastern Algeria who had supported the possibly Christian Berber leader Qusayla over a century earlier, at the very beginning of the Muslim conquest of the Maghrib about 681 CE – and by the Ghumara of the western Rif. Nonetheless, both the latter and another group of Berber tribes in the hinterland of what is now Casablanca, the Barghwata, were soon to resist mainstream Islamic attempts at conversion, probably for political reasons; and in the ninth century they produced false prophets like Hamim al-Ghumari and Salih al-Barghwati who drew up their own heretical Berber versions of the Qur'an, profiting from the general Islamic belief, one particularly prevalent among Berbers of the period, in an expected *mahdi* or spiritual guide, the impeccable *imam* who would save Islam and, of course, themselves in the process (cf. notably Farhat and Triki 1988-1989). The *mahdi* in question, however, did not appear until Muhammad ibn Tumart, the equally Berber founder and spiritual bulwark of the unitarian community which developed into the Almohad movement and dynasty, established his headquarters at

Tinmal in the Western Atlas and over its sedentary agricultural Masmuda tribes in 525 AH/1125 CE.

As noted, Ibn Tumart is also held to have been a *sharif*, despite his Berber origins. It was under his aegis that during the Almohad period of gestation prior to their conquest of the rest of the Maghrib and of al-Andalus, started by his companion and successor ʿAbd al-Mu'min bin ʿAli (a Zanatan Berber from Algeria who was to become the first sultan-caliph of Western Islam twenty years later and who had been one of the original members of ibn Tumart's top-level ten-man council), we find, in addition to ibn Tumart's unremitting inculcation of the Berbers in the Qur'an (as well as in his harsh punishment of backsliders), perhaps the earliest genuine historical notification of certain crucial Berber political institutions. I refer here in particular to the existence of an inner circle, or *jamaʿa*, of ten top councillors, who were mostly from ibn Tumart's own tribal group, the Hargha and its Masmuda neighbors, such as the Hintata, the Tinmallal, the Gadmiwa and the Ganfisa (although ʿAbd al-Mu'min bin ʿAli was an exceptionally trusted outsider). This is very probably reflected in the much more recent, though still precolonial, Berber concept of *ait ʿashra*, 'those of the ten', as well as in that of a lower-level outer circle of fifty lesser assemblymen – although it may have been only forty, making fifty all told (Abun-Nasr 1975: 105-106). This last also probably corresponded to another more recent, though also precolonial, Berber concept, that of *aitarbaʿin/aitharbiʿin*, a term which may once have referred to 'those of the forty' in the distant past (and the recent ethnographic record in Morocco shows up no *ait khamsin* or 'those of the fifty', so the correlation here is not total), but which in Rifian usage, at least, came to mean, in a more or less undifferentiated sense, 'people of the people/representatives of the people', or 'tribal councillors' (Hart 1976: 283-284; 1997[a]). As Brignon and his co-authors have noted, the organization set up by ibn Tumart, referred to in contemporary accounts as *tamyiz* ('distinction, preference, discrimination'), was both highly disciplined and numerically precise (Brignon et al. 1967: 103); and it is also worth noting that under ʿAbd al-Mu'min (524-558 AH/1130-1163 CE), Almohad policy was to deal with tribal revolts – which once again were to include the Barghwata – with the utmost severity (ibid.: 109; Montagne 1930: 63-64). In addition, because he needed soldiery to carry on his campaigns in Spain, as well as mercenaries to shore up his own dynasty, ʿAbd al-Mu'min began the so-called Hilalian 'deportation', of Arab tribal groups from the Central Maghrib, ones which had come (or whose forbears had come) in from the east with the Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym, to the Atlantic coastal plains. Thus the Khlut, Sufyan and Bni Malik arrived in

the Gharb, and the Bni ʿAmir and Bni Musa appeared in the Tadla (Brignon et al. 1967: 113).

The Almohads, however, despite their massive achievements in architecture and other domains, were to follow ibn Khaldun's rule concerning the rise, decline and fall of a tribal dynasty over three or at most four generations and over the course of 120 years, just as their Almoravid predecessors had done (cf. de Gogorza Fletcher 1988-1989). They were succeeded by the Marinids, who also never got beyond the tradition of a tribal state with no provincial administration and who also suffered a great deal of internal tribal agitation, both from the nomadic and Bedouin Arab Maʿqil, the successors in southern Morocco and the northwestern Sahara of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym, and from some of the Berbers of the Western Atlas, as from those of the Rif, a region which evinced considerable autonomy and a tendency to maintain relations with al-Andalus (ibid.: 141). Then as later, there was a more or less continuous movement from the country to the cities, with the Banu Marin themselves coming to Fes from the high plateaux of central and southwestern Algeria to bring about the subsequent foundation of Fas al-Jadid, 'New Fes', while the Black Death in the latter half of the fourteenth century took a severe toll in Marrakesh, the former Almohad capital, as it did elsewhere.

More important still were the major moves of full nomads between summer and winter grazing grounds every year which involved the whole of southern and eastern Morocco, as well as an overall push, of a larger number of Imazighen Berber tribal groups from a southeastern to a northwestern direction across the Atlas, a push which probably had its beginnings in Almohad times, through a search for greener pastures. This push was to continue, as Brignon and his associates, as well as Lesne, have noted, until the beginning of the present century (Brignon et al. 1967: 153-154; also Lesne 1966-1967; Hart 1993). In these ways, and for largely economic reasons, real internal population deployments and redistributions of a predominantly tribal character began in late medieval Morocco; and these land-based 'internal migrations', from the Jbil Saghru and the Tafilalt up through the Central High Atlas and on to the Middle Atlas down to the Atlantic coastal plains, hit their peak in the Central/Middle Atlas from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. They were to continue almost unabated until the establishment of the protectorate.

But the arrival of the Portuguese, followed by their Spanish cousins, on the Moroccan Atlantic coast, and hence on Islamic soil, early in the fifteenth century, was the catalyst that awoke Moroccan religious (and incipiently national) resistance to the Christian invader: the development of Sufism, of religious orders (*turuq*, sing. *tariqa*) and their lodges or *zawiya*-s, of sharifism

and of the *ziyara* cult of annual pilgrimages to saints' shrines (*siyyid*, *salih*), all of which are such hallmarks of Moroccan Islam today, all date from this period, i.e., from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. Sharifism is of course much older, but it went, as noted, into an eclipse until the Marinid period, when it came back into favor with the beginnings of urban growth, mercantilism and artisanry as of the eleventh century.

From this point on dynastic rule could no longer be established on the basis of the exclusive domination of one tribal group, as had been the case under the Almoravids and Almohads. The two dynasties which have controlled Morocco since the sixteenth century, i.e., the Saᶜadids and the ᶜAlawids, were both of rural origins but were both elevated into power 'by settled communities with entrenched interests in stability and order, and both were fitted by their sharifian descent to be symbols around which unity could be achieved' (Abun-Nasr 1975: 203). Neither dynasty was tribal, but each had to enlist tribal assistance; and as Sufism gained in importance, and the Portuguese coastal foothold continued, two sharifian families with Sufi connections came forward to lead the Moroccan Muslims against the Portuguese, the *shurfa'* of Mawlay ᶜAbd al-Salam bin Mashish from Jbil ᶜAlam in the Bni ᶜArus of the northwestern Jbala, and, in the south, the Saᶜadids, originally from Tagmadart in the Dra Valley, who then moved to Tarudant in the Sus Valley, and on north to the Haha, finally taking Marrakesh in 1524. Each of these *shurfa'* groups, of course, had numerous tribal client-followers. The great Moroccan victory over the Portuguese in 1578 at the Wad al-Makhazin, a tributary of the Wad Lukkus near the northern Atlantic coast, both enhanced Morocco's international standing. It also allowed Ahmad al-Mansur, who became sultan after his brother ᶜAbd al-Malik (along with the Portuguese king, Sebastian, and a Moroccan pretender named Mawlay Muhammad) died in the battle, to steer the country away from political dependence either on the Ottoman Turks or the Christians – although the Portuguese *presidios* in Morocco were to pass over to Spain after the latter country annexed the former two years later, in 1580. He did this largely by building up a sizeable if motley army, which in 1591 was to undertake an invasion of the Western Sudan.

But by 1620 three separate centers of opposition to the Saᶜadids had surfaced, all of them led by men with politico-religious ambitions: the Zawiya Dila'iya, a Berber state in the Middle Atlas, Abu Hassun al-Simlali in the Sus, and the Andalusians of Bu Ragrag plus the Arab warriors led by al-ᶜAyyashi in the Gharb. Only the Dila'iya leaders, however, made a bid, between 1640 and 1660, to replace the Saᶜadids as Morocco's ruling dynasty (Hajji 1964), though their expectations were belied through uncertain alliances. Regionalism pre-

vailed, principalities fought against each other, and the resulting dismemberment caused the gate to the sultanate to open in 1668 to another line of *shurfa'*, the ᶜAlawids, who, ever since the proclamation of Mawlay ᶜAli al-Sharif in the Tafilalt in 1631, have remained in power to this day. Nonetheless, the modern notion of a frontier was quite unknown, and one can only speak of a moving, shifting front. A city or a tribe recognized the sultan's authority by pronouncing prayers in his name, by paying taxes to him, and by receiving administrative personnel from him or at least by requesting the investiture of its traditional leaders by him – although not all of these conditions were met at the same time (Brignon et al. 1967: 185).

It was not until the ᶜAlawid dynasty was well entrenched, due especially to the long and often turbulent but always notable reign of Mawlay Ismaᶜil (1672-1727), that the peculiarly Moroccan issue of *makhzan-siba* as posed in the previous section came into being, an issue revolving around how much authority a given sultan could bring to bear on his central task of ruling the country. Abun-Nasr, indeed, notes that all other questions, economic, intellectual and social, seemed to depend upon this. Moroccans were agreed at this time that they had no more eligible rulers than the ᶜAlawid *sharif*-s, in whose blessing or *baraka*, patrilaterally transmitted from father to son, they trusted to guide the dynasty's rulers with divine grace. But as Mawlay Ismaᶜil, who himself had some black slave genes, left some 500 sons all endowed with *baraka*, and therefore theoretically fit to rule, such a belief did not bolster political stability. To the contrary, it accentuated conflicts, as most of these *shurfa'* could find either tribes or religious orders which were prepared to back their claims. Mawlay Ismaᶜil's own claim, too, had been effective because he was able to develop the military power necessary to make it so – through his recruitment not only of Arab nomad *gish* units in the Atlantic plains (Le Coz 1965) but also of a black and largely originally slave or *ᶜabid* soldiery garrisoned for the most part in his new capital of Meknes. Nevertheless, at his death Morocco still maintained a negative political legacy, because most of his successors, down to the end of the nineteenth century, were unable to develop either such a military authority or a bureaucracy and representative body politic that was stable enough to ensure continuity in government (Abun-Nasr 1975: 227-231).

The *gish* tribes themselves are worthy of special comment, and attest to a considerable degree of population shift, one noteworthy even among Moroccans, who have never been strangers to the art of travel. After the English evacuation of Tangier in 1684, for example, Mawlay Ismaᶜil restocked the city and its outskirts, the Fahs, with a Rifian garrison, the *gish ar-rifi*, which

drew its membership from every tribe in the Rif (Hart 1957; also 1976: 350-351); while Arab nomads, for the most part, many of them from the Western Sahara (as attested by tribal names like Takna, Awlad Dlim, Barabish and even Rgaybat), were moved north and became integrated into the *gish* units of Marrakesh, Meknes, Fes, Rabat and Sidi Qasim, to join the core groups of the Udaya, Shararda and Shraga which had already been installed in the environs of these cities. But, as the Rifian example from Tangier shows, not all the *gish* tribes were Arab, by any means: another notable Berber exception, commented upon in some detail both by Michaux-Bellaire (1920: 324-326) and LeCoz (1965: 4), is that of the Ait Immur or Yummur, originally a member group of the Ait Yafalman confederacy. They were moved by Mawlay Isma'il from their original home in the East-Central Atlas to the Tadla Plain in 1692, both as a corrective measure for having revolted against him and to guard against other Berber incursions there from adjacent parts of the Atlas. Then in 1765 they were moved again, after a second revolt, up now to the Shararda region in the Gharb Plain, circling Sidi Qasim; and finally, after still further difficulties, they were shifted yet a third time, down to Marrakesh about 1840, to become an element in the Marrakesh *gish*, where they evidently still preserve their Berber speech, which has long since been lost to Arabic by the descendants of the original Rifian *gish* in Tangier, which had been installed and settled in considerably earlier. There were no doubt other Berber contributions to the *gish* phenomenon and institution from other sources, if perhaps less spectacular ones.

By early 'Alawid times, too, we may assume that most of the Moroccan tribal group names already referred to had disappeared into history, and through reformation and reformulation of segments, splinter groups and other elements, new names had come to the fore. For the most part these new names and the units they represent have survived to the present day. The reasons for this state of affairs are many and complex, but two stand out. The first was the fact that by Mawlay Isma'il's time, the watershed at the threshold of the modern period, the great Berber push from the southeast to the northwest, in search of better pasture, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries and from the Saghru across the Atlas to the Atlantic coastal plains, was already underway. The second was that Mawlay Isma'il himself spent a large portion of his five and one-half decades on the throne trying his not inconsiderable best to subdue and pacify at least some of these same Berbers and to stem their avalanche as best he could. The Ait 'Atta of the Saghru, for example, who will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV and who, starting from their homeland, began to spread north to the Atlas and west to the Dra in the late

sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, went so far as to profit from a rift between Mawlay Isma'il's brothers and cousins so as to be able to check the sovereign's progress with a heavy defeat in the Tudgha-Farkla region in 1678-1679, when he lost the control of his troops, who were then further dispersed by a snowstorm at Talwat, at the top of the Tizi n-Tishka Pass over the Atlas, on their way back to Marrakesh (Hart 1993).

Mawlay Isma'il evidently learned his lesson from the Ait 'Atta and did not attempt to bother them again directly, but as a counteraction he nonetheless fostered the development, after about 1645, of a new confederacy, the Ait Yafalman, of which the Ait Immur, mentioned above, were regarded originally as a member group. The Ait Yafalman were destined to check the progress of the Ait 'Atta at the northeastern fringe of the latters' territory and to become their principal antagonists throughout the remainder of their history (Brignon et al. 1967: 243-244; Hart 1984[a]: 55-62). Mawlay Isma'il now administered a tremendous blow to some of the Middle Atlas tribes in 1692-1693, as a result of the major revolt in that region which led directly to the enforced exile of the Ait Immur and to their enrollment in the Tadla *gish*. He was tolerant toward some of the religious orders (Nasiriya, Wazzaniya), but not toward others (Dila'iya, Ahansaliya), mainly on the basis of their acquiescence or resistance to him.

Nonetheless, despite Mawlay Isma'il's legendary reputation as a restorer of law and order, there were, for thirty years after his death, revolutions and anarchy, led by his own black guardsmen: the treasury was empty and the army was opposed both by the city of Fes and most of the Berbers in its vicinity, while the pressure of tribal migration, encouraged by droughts, deforestation, famines and epidemics over the last quarter of the eighteenth century and first quarter of the nineteenth started to move along at an alarming rate. To take a few examples (from Brignon et al. 1967: 259-262), Rifians began to move southwest toward Wazzan, the Wargha Valley and the agricultural lands north of Zarhun and Fes, while two waves of Imazighen Berbers came up from the Central Atlas, one, the Ait Idrasen (who today no longer exist as such), moving north, and the other, the Zayyan, moving west. The first left from the Tudgha, the second from the Asif Mallul, and they both went along the sources of the Wad al-'Abid and the Mulwiya Rivers up toward the source of the Umm ar-Rbi' to invade the central plateau and the coastal plains into the Gharb and Salé – while the Ait 'Atta moved out of the Saghru to take over the Tafilalt and Dra oases. With increasing drought, thousands of argan trees died in the Anti-Atlas, the flourishing Tazarwalt plain became a desert, and the *agadir*-s or collective storehouses of the Sus had their reserves totally

depleted, while further east the 'people of the sun' on the south slope of the Atlas moved north forcibly to become the *ait umalu* or 'people of the shade': indeed probably by the eighteenth century one small northern wing of the Ait ᶜAtta, detached in the Middle Atlas from the main body further south, became known as the *Ait ᶜAtta n-Umalu* or Ait ᶜAtta of the Shade (Hart 1984: 53, 57; Raynal n.d., but ca. 1962: 13-19).

Likewise, overpasturage in the Western Atlas pushed the Masmuda onto the Rahamna in the Marrakesh Plain and the Siksawa down to Shishawa: for plains tribes everywhere had to accept an incursion of mountaineers. The departure of the Bni Hsin, Maᶜqil Arabs from the Mulwiya to Sefru in the seventeenth century, and the Zaᶜir from Khenifra toward Rabat and Salé set off a chain reaction, with the Ait Yusi moving up to the Middle Atlas and the Ait Idrasen moving toward Fes. This movement was stopped, but only momentarily, when Mawlay Ismaᶜil built the *qasba*-s or fortresses at Azru (Berber, 'stone, rock') and ᶜAyn l-Luh (Ar. 'spring of wood') and installed the Imjjat tribe (whose name is also to be found both in the Anti-Atlas and, more importantly for the purposes of this book, in the Rif, as will be demonstrated in Chapter III) on the al-Hajib Plateau. On his death the Berber advance toward the northwest took two main directions. The first was through the Meknes plain: the Zimmur and the Igarwan (or Gerwan) went toward Azru, pushing the Bni Hsin Arabs in front of them, toward Ulmas (Oulmes). At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Zimmur chased the Bni Hsin into the Gharb and the Maᶜmura Forest, while the Igarwan installed themselves north of Agurai. Further east, and north of the Middle Atlas, the Ait Yusi were hemmed in south of Fes by a wave of Ait Saghrushshn.

The second direction, further west, was that by which the Zayyan arrived on the central plateau, pushed the Zaᶜir further toward the Atlantic and established themselves around Ulmas, Mawlay Bu ᶜAzza and especially Khenifra. Lesne, whose graphic description and discussion of this whole issue is the most detailed to date, makes it clear that even by the time the French protectorate was installed the 'Berber' Zimmur were still pushing the 'Arab' Bni Hsin and Zaᶜir into the Maᶜmura Forest and up to the gates of Salé and Rabat, and doing so, furthermore, with strongarm tactics, elbows and muscle (Lesne 1966-1967; Raynal n.d., but ca. 1962: 13-19). This great tribal push might have become a major danger for the dynasty if it had been politically organized and oriented, as Brignon and his co-authors note (Brignon et al. 1967: 262). But it was not: for the reestablishment of an uneasy ᶜAlawid equilibrium, the arbitration of local conflicts and the reenactment of *bayᶜa* allegiance rituals became once again the order of the day.

If by the mid- to late eighteenth century this massive tribal descent toward the plains had become contained, it had by no means been suppressed. The Zimmur continued to advance toward the Gharb, while the Igarwan, spearheading the Middle Atlas groups, moved north almost to Wazzan, and some 25 punitive expeditions from Fes (which after Isma'il's death had once again become the major capital) were needed to reduce them. Even in the sedentary and agricultural though often politically unruly north of the country, there were concerted attempts by tribesmen to move from the Jbala and Rif mountains down into the plains. One such move originated among the Jbala and Ghmara north of l-Qsar l-Kbir in 1793: it was linked both to the shrine of Mawlay 'Abd al-Salam bin Mashish, whose descendants had already caused such disorder in Sa'adid times, and to a recently emerged order, the Darqawa, destined not long thereafter to make their mark on northern Moroccan history, through an attempt at approximately the same time by Sidi Muhammad al-'Arbi al-Darqawi to dethrone Sultan Mawlay Sulayman (1792-1822). Another originated in the Melilla region in 1803, while five years later, in 1808, Mawlay Sulayman even led a tax-gathering *mhalla* right into the Central Rif, subduing the Aith Sa'id, the Thimsaman, the Axt Tuzin and even the redoubtable Aith Waryaghar (El-Mansour 1988: 105).

It should be noted here that although the true Rifian tribes are all 'old', and are cited by al-Bakri as being in more or less their present locations since the eleventh century if not longer (whereas the Sinhaja Srir, Ghmara and Jbala groups are all somewhat later), the mere fact that this whole northern area supports a sedentary and agricultural, but nonetheless tribal, population does not mean, in any sense, that it underwent no population pressures toward evacuation. To the contrary: over a century later, and after a particularly heavy drought in 1945-46, for instance, Rifians and Jbala, all on the last legs of hunger, streamed into all the northern cities, Tetuan, Tangier, al-'Ara'ish and Fes (Hart 1957).

But by the same token the push toward greener pastures had also contained its own internal power struggles, and in a battle at Dar al-Zall, 'House of the Shade', near Sidi 'Ayyad and north of Awli in the Middle Atlas in 1810, the Bni Mgild and their Ait Umalu neighbors crushed the Ait Idrasen confederacy so badly that the latter were finished even as a local historical force (Raynal n.d., but ca. 1962: 17-18). About the same time, too, the Ait Ndhir were forced out of their northern Middle Atlas pasturelands to the al-Hajib plateau, while the Ait Izdig, the Ait Hadiddu and, above all, the Ait Murghad, all elements of the Ait Yafalman confederacy, fought against northward-pushing Ait 'Atta groups in the Eastern High Atlas, and contained them more



Morocco: Push by Berber mountaineers towards greener pastures in plains and plateaux, late sixteenth to early twentieth century

or less effectively. The bid for greener pastures, still unfinished and not fully realized, had been dictated, over a good two centuries or more, almost entirely by economic considerations, and it affected all of Morocco (Brignon et al. 1967: 264); while if El-Mansour is correct, Mawlay Sulayman, at this same time, was determined and eager to make the Shari'a, the Law of Islam, prevail over Berber *'urf* or Custom, which he referred to as *jahiliya*, 'ignorance, barbarity'. For 'subduing zones of dissidence was evidently regarded by this outspoken sultan as a religious duty which differed not at all from the *jihad* against the enemies of Islam' (El-Mansour 1988: 17). Not only this, but 'his attempts to impose outsider *qa'id*-s on the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas was an important factor in the deterioration of *makhzan*-Berber relations', for which he held the Berbers themselves, whom he regarded as 'those (dangerous) monkeys', entirely responsible (ibid.: 21, 164).

As of 1816 the Ait ʿAtta, moving eastward and south of the Central Atlas, took over the *qsur* or adobe villages of the Tafilalt oasis but were pushed back to their point of origin in the Saghru. Even so, soon afterward they began to take over and control the southern caravan trade (Hart 1993). The 1818 Berber revolt in the Middle Atlas, however, had more serious consequences, as an outgrowth of an internal conflict in 1811-1812 between the remainder of the sedentarizing Ait Idrasen (i.e., the Zimmur and Ait Immur) and the Igarwan against the transhumant Ait Umalu tribes, such as the Zayyan and the Bni Mgild, who wanted to displace them, in a classic conflict of newly sedentarized tribesmen against their still-transhumant brothers. The former lost the battle and the Ait Umalu won it, thanks to the help of the Igarwan who went over to their side at the last moment. The Ait Idrasen survivors sought the protection of Mawlay Sulayman, who sent them reinforcements; and these were in turn beaten at Azru and at Sefru. However, thanks to the help of those Ait Idrasen who remained faithful to him, Mawlay Sulayman was able to defeat the Bni Mgild, even though the black *ʿabid* troops of his rearguard were surprised and killed, forcing him to return to Fes, where, even so, he beat the Igarwan, reconciled them with the Ait Idrasen and incorporated them into his army. But by 1818 most of the Ait Umalu tribes of the Middle Atlas had fallen under the sway of a single leader, the Berber *agurram* or saint Sidi Bu Bkar Amhawsh, the head of the holy lineage of the Ait Sidi ʿAli, who was soon joined even by most of the Ait Idrasen who were nominally with the sultan; and at the Battle of Landa north of al-Qbab, one of Mawlay Sulayman's sons was killed, and the sultan himself was captured, although freed after four days and escorted to Meknes. Sidi Bu Bkar now controlled the Middle Atlas right down to Meknes and Fes, which he encircled over the next two years – with the active support of the Darqawa order and the Zawiya of Wazzan to the north – to provoke a dynastic crisis which led to Mawlay Sulayman's deposition and to the accession to the sultanate of one of his nephews, Mawlay ʿAbd ar-Rahman bin Hisham, in 1822.

The Tribal Role in Resistance to Colonialism and after Independence

The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 led to the end of Morocco's isolation by the end of Mawlay ʿAbd ar-Rahman's reign in 1859. During this isolation the acceptance of sharifian authority as a symbol of unity, and the submission to it by the tribes to the extent that only the monarchy and the *makhzan* pos-

sessed the means of coercion, remained the ground rules of the political system. This was the case despite the fact that there were a number of revolts, even by *gish* tribes such as the Sharарda and the Udaya (whose members on these occasions were obviously not going by the rulebook) during the second quarter of the nineteenth century (al-Nasiri 1956: 9: 12-13, 17-24, 32-41, cited by Pennell, ms. 1990). Nonetheless, by the time Mawlay Sulayman had died more stability had been achieved, for the *bilad al-makhzan* had now become consolidated enough to comprise, in essence, the regions of Fes, Meknes and the Taza Gap, on the one hand, and that of the Hawz or Plain of Marrakesh on the other, as well as the whole of the western Atlantic plains. The *bilad al-siba* comprised and had come to refer to most of the northern region of the Jbala and the Rif, usually on an on-again, off-again basis, and on something approximating a more permanent one, part of the Western High Atlas and the Anti-Atlas, and all the Middle Atlas and Central High Atlas regions (the terminology is clumsy but unavoidable) as well as the pre-Saharan oases and much of the Western Sahara itself.

As Abun-Nasr has noted, this consolidation was due more to the fact that strong tribal groups which had managed to descend to the plains after the death of Mawlay Ismaʿil were able to prevent their neighbors behind them from doing the same than to any coercive restraint exercised by the *makhzan* (Abun-Nasr 1975: 284-285). In this connection the importance of the Berber victory at Landa in 1819 lay in the fact that after Mawlay Sulayman the sultans recognized their inability to bring the tribal inhabitants of the *bilad al-siba* under central government authority, and therefore they gave tacit recognition (which was often even explicit, in the form of a *zahir*, a signed and usually dated decree) to the authority of local leaders. Such recognition provided, of course, the ratification of the position and power already held by these local chiefs, and it could now in addition provide them with the 'perks' of office, as they were never otherwise paid. Finally, the confirmations thus effected made them function as links between their constituents and the *makhzan*. As a result, over the nineteenth century, and particularly in its latter half, a number of regional power clusters developed around the persons of individual tribal strongmen in different parts of rural Morocco. Examples were Ahmad al-Raysuni in the northern Jbala just south of Tangier, the Zawiya of Wazzan northwest of Fez (Joffe 1991), the pretender Bu Hmara in the northeast (Dunn 1991), and finally, the three big *qa'id*-ates of Madani al-Glawi, ʿAbd al-Malik al-Mtuggi and Tayyib al-Gundafi in the Western Atlas. When the protectorate came, the French were to make good use of all of these, and the Spanish, of the first- and third-mentioned of them.

The French invasion of Algeria also led to the beginnings, by France and Spain in particular, and even, to a lesser extent, by Great Britain, of chipping away at the economic foundations of Morocco, as part and parcel of the nineteenth-century European colonial power-grab. It was not, however, until the short but disastrous Moroccan war with Spain in 1859-1860, theoretically over the status of the *presidios* claimed by Spain on Morocco's Mediterranean coast, that Morocco's isolation was over forever and that the economic and political breakdown of the country began in earnest. Moroccans everywhere felt the presence of Christian invasion coming in from all sides, while a weak *makhzan* was powerless to stop contraband arms from being smuggled in to the tribes, quite apart from its often unsuccessful attempts at tax collection in the tribal areas.

From 1860 to 1912 Morocco was at the crossroads prior to true colonial annexation (cf. Arnaud 1952). Another highly energetic sultan, Mawlay al-Hasan I, assumed power in 1873, and testimony to the instability of *makhzan*-tribal relations during his reign is the fact that over the course of the decade from 1884 until his death in 1894 he had to undertake at least one punitive or tax-collecting expedition every single year with his army *mhalla*-s either into the Middle Atlas (Raynal n.d., but ca. 1962: 19) or down to the Anti-Atlas and even to the edge of the Western Sahara – where according to Ennaji and Pascon there was in fact more recognition of than resistance to his rule (cf. Ennaji & Pascon 1988).

It was during the last of these expeditions, when he was on the way back to Fes from the Tafilalt after having gone to the latter region via the famous *Tariq al-Sultan* route that he died in Qasba Tadla in the latter year. This final expedition was described by his French physician Dr. F.-J. Linares, who not only accompanied it but who was also a keen reportorial eye-witness to Ait ʿAtta sectional units heading east from their Saghru stronghold on raids and taking over mud and stone *qsur*-villages in the Tafilalt in the most blatantly strongarm manner (cf. Linares 1932). Mawlay al-Hasan's death also followed a shooting skirmish in 1893 between the Spanish and the Rifian tribesmen of the Iqarʿayen on the outskirts of Melilla, over the tomb of a local saint, Sidi Waryash, which Spanish troops had desecrated.

Even though Agnouche assesses (correctly, in my view) the combined and joint Franco-Spanish protectorate which was to take Morocco over officially during the 44-year period from 1912 to 1956 as a 'parenthesis' in Moroccan history (Agnouche 1987: 307-308) – albeit a parenthesis which provided the country with a modern, Western-modeled administration – there was no doubt about the highly unequal proportions in the division of the protectoral

spoils. France got the southern lion's share, which contained all the valuable agricultural land of the coastal plains, while Spain was allotted the jackal's much smaller leftovers, the northern mountain spine and the very southernmost fringe of desert, both almost worthless economically. Also, even though the protectorate was only officially proclaimed in 1912, French forces coming into southeastern Morocco from southwestern Algeria had already begun to curtail Ait ʿAtta expansion eastward as early as 1899 (for details, cf. Dunn 1973, 1977), while their disembarkation at Anfa (later Casablanca) and its aftermath in 1907 interfered with that of the Zaʿir and the Zimmur toward the Atlantic coast. But by this time Mawlay al-Hasan's eldest son Mawlay ʿAbd al-ʿAziz (1894-1908), who liked European gadgetry and who had been unduly influenced by his European colonialist palace instructors, had himself become the target of great unpopularity. He was overthrown by his younger brother Mawlay ʿAbd al-Hafiz (1908-1912), during the course of a long skirmish with a *rugi* or pretender to the throne, now turned warlord, who was known as Bu Hmara, the Man on the She-Donkey. The latter, with material, financial and even military Franco-Spanish assistance, had been operating in northern Morocco and doing his best to destabilize the *makhzan* ever since 1902, from the Taza region and later from his *qasba* at Silwan, near Melilla (cf. Dunn 1980, 1981, 1991).

It is significant, however, that not long after ʿAbd al-Hafiz assumed power, and despite the fact that all the tribes of the eastern Rif had been rallied to Bu Hmara's standard, the large and truculent central Rifian tribe of the Aith Waryaghar decided for once to back the *makhzan*. They took exception to the presence of the pretender's *mhalla* on their eastern border and beat his cavalry virtually into the ground on the banks of the Wad Nkur, the Nkur River, in September 1908 (for details, cf. Hart 1976: 361-368; also Ayache 1981: 134). Although Bu Hmara's black slave general Jilali Mul al-Wudu, or 'Master of the Ablutions', was killed in the fighting, the pretender himself took flight on hearing of the rout, left the Rif entirely with irate if opportunistic tribesmen from all sides baying at his heels, and was captured, caged and thrown to the royal lions by ʿAbd al-Hafiz in Fes the following year.

But, as Abun-Nasr shows, ʿAbd al-Hafiz cut a much poorer figure before the Moroccan people as a sultan than he had done as a rebel against his brother (Abun-Nasr 1975: 302). His only success, in fact, lay in the defeat of Bu Hmara; but the bottom line, so to speak, was that he was unable in any way to oppose European expansion, which was quite unstoppable, given Morocco's total lack of resources. The French had consolidated their Casablanca beachhead as well as coming into the northeast from Algeria, while the Spanish

built railroads linking Ceuta with Tetuan in the northwest and Melilla with Silwan in the northeast. This they did despite savage but sporadic Rifian resistance under Sidi Muhand Amzzyan of the Aith Bu Ifrur tribe in the Iqarᶜayen confederacy, which began in 1909 and ended with the latter's death in battle in mid-May 1912.

As it happened, the latter date dovetailed beautifully with the formal establishment of the dual Franco-Spanish protectorate over Morocco in March of the same year, an establishment which had been coming ever closer to the forefront of political affairs since 1830, as Miege has made abundantly clear (Miege, 5 vols., 1961-1963, 1969). The new protectorate status was capped with the appointment of Marshal Lyautey as the first French proconsul in what had now become the new capital, Rabat, with Tetuan as the smaller and somewhat dingier capital of the northern Spanish zone. Under the protectorate the Moroccan sultan became purely and simply a religious figurehead as far as French policy (which labored under the illusion that it was not interfering with Islamic rights) was concerned, and his cousin the *khalifa* in the Spanish zone became, equally, a sub-figurehead.

Tribal reactions, in the form of prolonged armed resistance to Franco-Spanish penetration, began almost immediately, and the 'pacification' by the respective armies of the two occupying colonial powers was only completed in 1927 in the Spanish Zone and not until 1934 in the much larger French Zone. A summary of this primary resistance, in the name of Islam, a resistance which, it may be added, was carried out for the most part by Berber-speaking groups in both zones, is now in order.

Perhaps the first thing to be noted about it is that it was remarkably free from the influence of the religious orders, the Sufi *tariqa*-s, which, as Martin has convincingly shown, was so characteristic of Muslim resistance to colonialism in so many other parts of Africa, such as Algeria, Western Sahara, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria and Tanzania (cf. Martin 1976, *passim*). This was so because in Morocco the correspondence between tribal distribution, especially in the 'Berber' mountains, and order affiliation, which was strongest in the 'Arab' plains, although not completely lacking, was nonetheless very weak. In any event the Sufi orders never played the major role in primary resistance in Morocco that they did in most of the other Muslim regions of the continent. Indeed, the second wave of Moroccan urban nationalists, the secondary line of resistance, from the late 1930s until independence, accused the orders of collaborating with the French. This accusation was justified if not entirely truthful; but it is another story, and one which gets away from the subject at hand. There was, furthermore, no resistance, or at least no

recorded resistance, of a 'natural causes' kind, like the spectacular forest fires described by Prochaska as a novel means for combating colonialism in the Idugh massif of northeastern Algeria (Prochaska 1986).

In the northwestern Jbala, resistance to Spanish installation after 1912 was carried out on an on-again, off-again basis by a former bandit, Mawlay Ahmad al-Raysuni, who as a legitimate *sharif* of the ʿAlamiyin branch of the Idrisids, and resident in the Bni ʿArus, had ambitions toward becoming *khalifa*, under Spanish tutelage, of the whole northern zone (cf. Hart 1976: 390-393; 1987[a]: 19-26). But his legitimacy as a *sharif* was more than counterbalanced by his consistent bet-hedging and his collaboration with the colonial invaders. Despite his large local following in the Jbala, he was captured there late in 1924 by the far more genuine Rifian resistance leader Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Krim al-Khattabi, who had come to the fore among the Aith Waryaghar (or Bni Waryaghal) of the Central Rif to lead the anti-Spanish *jihad* there in mid-1921. Indeed, Raysuni died in one of bin ʿAbd al-Krim's jails, the first ever in the Rif, in Thamasind in central Waryagharland in April 1925 (ibid. 1976: 392-393; 1987: 23-24).

Bin ʿAbd al-Krim, who was at this point at the apogee of his career, had already managed to unite all the central and most of the eastern Rifian tribes against Spain, even to the point of being able to declare a *Dawla Jumhuriya Rifiya*, a 'Rifian Republican State', early in 1923 after his consolidation of the regional tribal framework in the aftermath of his resounding victory, in one of the heaviest blows ever inflicted on any colonial army, over a large but ill-trained Spanish army corps at Dahar Ubarran during the summer of 1921. This headlong rout, usually referred to as the 'Battle of Anwal', had indeed carried bin ʿAbd al-Krim forward almost to the gates of Melilla. However, it was well after the consolidation of his hold over the Rif and also after his tribal forces had pushed west to rally the Jbala to his cause, that bin ʿAbd al-Krim, no doubt also exulting in Raysuni's death, committed his biggest tactical error: his tribal army, from its poor and overpopulated Rifian homeland base, invaded the breadbasket of the southern Jbala in the French Zone, beyond the Wargha River, in the spring of 1925.

Although the Rifian forces achieved phenomenal initial successes until June-July of that same year, getting almost to within striking distance of Fes, their momentum then came to an abrupt halt. After the enforced resignation of Lyautey, the French were then able to regroup under Marshal Petain and push the Rifians back; and a combined Franco-Spanish offensive on two fronts early in 1926 brought the troops of both colonial powers into the heart of the Central Rif and the territory of the Aith Waryaghar. It also brought

about the surrender of bin ʿAbd al-Krim (to the French, rather than to the Spanish) at the end of May of the same year. Spanish mopping-up operations in the Sinhaja Srir, the Ghmara and the final bits and pieces of the Jbala continued until July 1927, but the major Rifian resistance to Spain had been broken the previous year (for full details, cf. Hart 1976: 369-404, and Pennell 1986).

We shall have a closer look at some of the reforms effected by bin ʿAbd al-Krim in the early 1920s in the context of existing Rifian socio-economic and socio-political institutions in the final chapter of this book. Suffice it to say here, however, that the unified Rifian resistance to colonialism which he engendered on both fronts, Spanish on the northeast and northwest, and French on the south, was quite unique in its supra-tribal, and hence regional, dimension. Elsewhere, and against the French, armed resistance to colonialism was carried out purely and simply on a tribe-by-tribe basis, and 'pacification' proceeded along exactly the same lines. Although Lyautey had gone before 1925 was over, his legacy to his successors in the French proconsulship in Rabat was the famous (or infamous) 'Berber Dahir' (*zahir*) of 1930, over which there were violent counter-reactions all over the Muslim world. By virtue of it the whole Berber-speaking population of the French Zone was decreed to be 'subtracted' from the legal onus of Islamic Law, of the Shariʿa, and to be subject only to local Berber customary law, *izirf* or *qaʿida*. The fact that in all the rural regions of the country the two legal systems coexisted more or less as the two faces of a single coin was totally ignored by a colonial administration already blinded by a 'Good Berber' vs. 'Bad Arab' mythology – which persisted even beyond the end of the colonial period (Hart 1997[b]). As the myth had been imported from Algeria as an integral part of the Colonial Vulgate, it was regarded as a *sine qua non* by the French administration in Morocco well before many of the Berber-speaking regions of the country had been effectively 'pacified' (Ageron 1976). This 'pacification' was, of course carried out by the French in the name of the Sultan – who until 1927 had been Mawlay ʿAbd al-Hafiz' younger brother Mawlay Yusuf, and on the latter's death in the same year, his own son Sidi Muhammad bin Yusuf – who was to hitch his star to a burgeoning nationalist movement and in 1957 to become King Muhammad v).

One of the major pieces of bedrock mythology of 'French' Morocco – and one not duplicated in the Spanish Zone simply because bin ʿAbd al-Krim had already effectively removed the bases for it – was the perpetuation of the idea of the 'Good Berber' herding his sheep, in pastoral contentment, in the 'Berber Park', as Berque (1962: 227-230) has tellingly labeled it, and in what

we ourselves have referred to elsewhere as the 'deep-freeze effect' of customary law (Hart 1973: 46-48). Nonetheless, although a good and more modern sign, evidently worked out considerably later, about 1975-1976 but only actually inaugurated about 1985, is that customary case law seems today to have been given belated recognition, at least in certain particulars, by the Ministry of Interior, and at the local level, where it is administered by local men.

What still seems amazing today, however, is that the 'Berber Dahir' was made statutory by the French even before 'pacification' had been fully completed. In the Middle Atlas the Bni Mgild and the Zayyan under a hard-boiled old resistant named Muha u-Hammu had been forced into submission by the end of World War I. But further south, in the Central High Atlas, the 'pacification' of the Ait Sukhman and of the Ait Yafalman tribes was to continue until the autumn of 1933, while from late February to mid-March of that same year the Ait ʿAtta, in no way 'softened up' through contact with France's leading tribal collaborator Hajj Tahami al-Glawi, staged their final and epic resistance to French conquest under ʿAssu u-Ba Slam at the long-drawn-out Battle of Bu Gafr in the Jbil Saghru (Hart 1977; 1981: 4, 231; 1984: 175-185). One Ait ʿAtta section, the Ait Khabbash, managed to elude the act of surrendering to the French until well into 1934, and they did so, or their last 'dissident' representatives did so, in southwestern Morocco, far from their Tafilalt homeland, and near the borders of the then Spanish, and now, as of 1989, Moroccan, Sahara. In 1934, too, the final year of 'pacification', other camel-nomad tribes in the Western Sahara, especially the large and bellicose group of *shurfa'*-turned warriors known as the Rgaybat, surrendered to, or came to an agreement with, France and Spain once the French had effectively occupied the Anti-Atlas and once the Spanish, equally, had effectively occupied the Tarfaya Zone and the Spanish Sahara (Caratini 1989; Hart 1962, 1987[a]).

The 'Berber Park' policy as outlined in the 1930 Dahir remained in force until Moroccan independence in 1956, when it was immediately and justifiably rescinded (for this and for some interesting recent developments, cf. Hart 1997[b]). It had not been applied in the northern Spanish zone in any case, although this was not through any lack of trying on the part of that protectorate's administration. The interlude of bin ʿAbd al-Krim and the five-year Rifian War had killed its presumed effectiveness: for before he became a *mujahid* or freedom fighter in 1921, bin ʿAbd al-Krim had been a *qadi*, a judge of Islamic law, in Melilla. This fact had a great deal to do with his own views both on resistance to colonialism and on Moroccan nationalism, as opposed to mere Rifian regionalism. He was himself, in addition, personally respon-

sible for the cancellation of many items of Rifian customary law; and few if any of these were reinstated after the war was over.

The role played by the tribes, the Berber-speaking ones in particular, in the spread of secondary, modern-style Moroccan nationalism – in which bin ᶜAbd al-Krim came to occupy his own special niche, well before his death in Cairo in 1963 – was, by and large, negligible. Nationalism remained an urban phenomenon, one soon taken up by a growing urban proletariat as well, until the very eve of independence. It remained so until exactly two years after the French deposed and exiled Sultan Muhammad bin Yusuf and his son Prince Mawlay al-Hasan to Madagascar in August 1953, because of his ever-increasing participation in, and indeed assumption of the leadership of, the nationalist movement. To counter this urban nationalism, the French on two occasions, in February 1951 and March 1953, had organized tribal marches from the 'Berber Park' to Rabat in the name of Hajj Tahami al-Glawi, the Pasha of Marrakesh and their biggest tribal puppet. Although most tribesmen, including the majority of the participants in these marches, did not realize what they were all about, the Ait ᶜAtta evidently did realize what was going on and refrained from participation, even though this was mainly due to ᶜAssu u-Ba Slam's personal detestation of the Glawi (Bidwell 1973: 59; Hart 1984: 190–191). As noted, too, after his triumphant return at independence, Sultan Muhammad bin Yusuf became King Muhammad V, while the Crown Prince Mawlay al-Hasan was to become King Hasan II on his accession to the throne after his father's death in 1961. (The numbers V and II in each instance indicate the number of sultans or kings bearing the name in question since the beginning of the present, ᶜAlawid dynasty).

At almost the tail end of the colonial period, on August 20, 1955, Arabic-speaking Smaᶜla tribesmen near Wad Zem in the Tadla region cut the telephone lines to the town and attacked it, killing 87 Frenchmen out of a French population of 800 in just a few hours. But the French reprisal was furious and at least 500 tribesmen were killed subsequently by French ground and air forces over the next few days. Houses were destroyed, animals slaughtered, and the decimated Smaᶜla made a *t'argiba* sacrifice of a bull in order to bring Foreign Legion retribution to a halt (Eickelman 1976: 174, 261). Then, less than two months later, on the night of October 1–2, 1955, trouble erupted in the Rif and in the Middle Atlas simultaneously, when units of a new clandestine Moroccan Army of Liberation attacked three French posts in the former area (Burid, Aknul and Tizi Usli, in the territory of the Igzinnayen, just south of the Aith Waryaghar and across the French zone border from the Spanish zone, where they had undergone secret training), as well as that of Immuzar

of the Marmusha in the eastern Middle Atlas (for details on the first, cf. Hart 1976: 423-426).

Even though Sultan Muhammad bin Yusuf returned to make his triumphal entry into Rabat in mid-November, the fighting in the Rif continued until June of the following year, 1956, after the independence agreements had been signed with France (in March) and then with Spain (in April) for each of their respective zones. It was only then that the Army of Liberation in the Rif was disbanded and its units either returned to civilian life or were incorporated into the new Royal Moroccan Army. But it was reactivated, nonetheless, in the south less than two years later in order to unseat Spain from its still occupied colonial holdings in the Ifni enclave and the southern protectorate of Tarfaya, which was turned over to the Moroccans in April 1958, after a series of paramilitary engagements beginning in November of the previous year. The Moroccans had in any case now occupied most of the hinterland of Ifni except for the coastal town of Sidi Ifni itself, which was formally relinquished by Spain to Morocco only later, in 1969.

The immediate post-independence period, however, despite a short initial spate of euphoria, was an unsettled one, and most of the remainder of the reign of King Muhammad V was punctuated by a series of tribal revolts (cf. Gellner 1973). One of these, which took place in the Rif again, and among the Aith Waryaghar, who had presented their grievances (several of which were surprisingly modern in tone) to the king in a personal petition in the fall of 1958, was extremely serious – especially in terms of the monarch's 'cruel punishment' to be meted out to the Rifian recalcitrants by Gen. Muhammad Ufqir (Oufkir) and the recently constituted army during late 1958 and the beginning of 1959 if they had not returned to their homes peacefully by the target date set. Ufqir's reprisal on the Rifians was nothing short of ferocious (for details, cf. Hart 1973[b]: 46-51, and 1976: 426-432). Beside this Aith Waryaghar uprising (whose leader, Muhammad nj-Hajj Sillam n-Muh Amzzyan, escaped and was condemned to death *in absentia*, a sentence which still held good in the 1980s), the attempt by ʿAddi u-Bihi, the Ait Izdig governor of the Qsar s-Suq Province (a name later changed to Rashidiya), to buttress his power base north of the Tafilalt in 1956-57 and the short revolt of the Ait Sukhman in the Bni Mallal Province of the Central Atlas in the spring of 1960 appear almost trivial and soon came to nothing, while ʿAddi u-Bihi himself died in jail the following year.

The first nation-wide elections in Morocco were held in May 1960 while the uprising in the Central Atlas was still going on. After King Hasan II succeeded his father on the throne in February 1961, there were, perhaps mi-

raculously, no more revolts which could be truly characterized as 'tribal'. The three (recorded) *coups manqués* against the throne in 1971, 1972 and 1973 were another matter entirely, and were of course of national rather than purely tribal or even regional import. As of 1958-1959, the tribal concept had become subordinated administratively to that of its territorial least common denominator, the rural commune (*jamaʿat al-qarawiya*), a variable number of which make up a circle (and in this micro-sense the old administrative units known as 'fractions' and created in both protectorates have been almost rigidly preserved), with a variable number of circles making up a province; while the council of the rural commune (or *majlis al-jamaʿat al-qarawiya*, even though it has little power, still deliberates on local affairs and issues. This chain of command, in which the local *qa'id* and the provincial governor or *ʿamil* are also enmeshed, goes up to the Ministry of Interior in Rabat, while the judicial chain, represented at the local level by the *qadi*, goes back to another ministry, that of Justice.

A French notion, and a non-Islamic one, of separation of powers thus prevails with respect to the administration of those onetime tribesmen, now for the most part mere peasant-farmers, who seek redress at higher levels for real or imagined wrongs done to them. A significant portion of them, furthermore, are also peasants who have since 1970 been drawn into the currents of labor migration in Western Europe. In this respect the Rifians, who had been labor migrants in French Algeria going back as early as the mid-nineteenth century, have once again taken the lead. Although sheep transhumance still continues in the Middle and the Central High Atlas, the powerful combination of a seven-year drought (1970-1977) and a thirteen-year war, from early 1976 to late 1989, with the Algerian-supported Polisario Front in the ex-Spanish Western Sahara has virtually killed camel pastoralism in that part of the desert. Morocco has nonetheless long had strong historic claims to this area, claims which (as of 1992) she appears very much to have activated successfully, and to have followed up with effective occupation of the territory in question (even though it has most recently been opened to inspection by UN forces).

Once again, although the Rifians, for example, may to some extent still regard the rest of Morocco as populated by *igharbiyen* (Rif., lit. 'westerners', and by extension, Western Muslims or Moroccans, a term which for many years had somewhat pejorative overtones in the Rif, because it stood in opposition to *irifiyen*), they themselves are now part and parcel of the same *igharbiyen*. Hence they can no longer really turn their backs to the rest of the country, much as they might still like to do so. Their future is totally bound up with that of Morocco as a national entity, as is that of all its other former tribesmen.

Ait ʿAtta. Ait Bu Iknifen transhumants at Talmast (1960)



Aith Waryaghar

Northern Morocco, the Central Rif and the Aith Waryaghar: The Ethnographic and Historical Evidence

Toponymy, Origin Mythology and History

It is perhaps best to begin this section with a note of personal admission. The Moroccan Rif is the area where I did our initial but longest in-depth anthropological fieldwork, from 1953 to 1955 and from 1959 to 1965 (cf. Hart 1976, *passim*; 1997[a]: 23-76). Although as of my last visit in 1987 (the first in the intervening twenty-two years) the region had changed almost, but not quite, out of recognition, it remains the area which, of those few that I know in any detail, has had the greatest effect on my anthropological and historical thinking and development. Hence there are sure to be some unavoidable but freely-admitted biases in my presentation of the material here.

The term *rif*, as used today, has come to refer to the whole mountain chain which forms the dorsal spine of northern Morocco bordering the Mediterranean, from Tangier and Ceuta (Ar. Sibta) to Melilla (Ar. Mlilya), both of the last two of which are still Spanish-owned *presidios* on the Moroccan mainland. This area, from 1912 to 1956, also constituted the (northern) Spanish protectorate; and since independence it has been known as the North Zone. But in terms of local usage and ethno-linguistic constitution, only its eastern half, from Targist (Targuist) to Melilla (Ar. Mlilya, Rif. Mritsh), is properly Rifian, inhabited by *irifiyen* who speak *dharifith*, which is to say, Rifians who speak their own variety of Berber and who, until independence, also referred to themselves as *imazighen* and to their dialect as *dhamazighth*, before they discovered that there were other *imazighen* and another dialect called *tamazight* in the Middle and Central High Atlases. The inhabitants of the western half of the chain, from Tangier to Targist, barring two smaller Berber-speaking but bilingual pockets of the Ghmara and the Sinhaja Srir groups, are traditionally referred to as Jbala ('mountaineers', a catchall term for a complex ethnic amalgam), and speak only Arabic.

Targist is not only the ethno-linguistic watershed of the Rifian chain but the main topo-geographical one as well. The highest mountain in the chain,

Adhrar n-Tidighin, at 2456 meters, is somewhat to the west of it, in the comparatively well-watered and well-wooded Sinhaja Srir region, with its stands of cedar, while the Rifian countryside to the east, although much of it is equally mountainous, is much more arid and denuded. The eastern and Rifian half of the chain thereby provides a dramatic ecological contrast with the western Jbalan half, even though it levels out into a more or less open and rolling region east of the Axt Tuzin or Bni Tuzin escarpment on the east bank of the Nkur River. In the central Rifian region, the one of particular interest to us, the two highest peaks are Azru Aqshar ('Bald Rock') in the Igzinnayen or Gzinnaya, at 2010 meters, and Adhrar n-Sidi Bu Khiyar ('the mountain of Sidi Bu Khiyar', the topmost point of the Jbil Hmam ('Mountain of Doves') massif in the Aith Waryaghar or Bni Waryaghal territory, at 1948 meters. The Jbil Hmam massif is also regarded by the Aith Waryaghar, the tribal group on which I shall concentrate here, as the point of origin of somewhat over half its members. Sidi Bu Khiyar himself is the tribe's major saint, and to his domeless shrine an annual *ʿamara* or pilgrimage is made on the day before the ʿAyd l-Kbir, the Feast of the Sacrifice, in the last month of the Muslim lunar year (for details, cf. Hart 1976: 194-197).

The whole northern mountain spine of Morocco, in terms of its human population, is traditionally divided up, in one respect, into four ethno-linguistic groups. Reading from west to east, these are the Jbala, the Ghmara, the Sinhaja Srir (or 'Gunstock Sinhaja', probably so-called because of the one-time gunsmiths of one of their component groups, Taghzut) and the Rifians proper, who are known in their own language, as noted, as *irifiyen* (sing. *arifi*) and in Arabic as *riyafa* or *ru'afa* (sing. *rifi*). In another respect, the same area is also traditionally divided up into about seventy *qaba'il* or named tribal groups, almost all of which are themselves made up, traditionally, of sedentary agriculturalists. Most of the younger adult male population of these groups, the Rifians in particular, have since 1970 also become migrant laborers in Western Europe.

Of these four ethno-linguistic groups, the smaller ones, the Jbala, Ghmara and Sinhaja Srir are all to the west of the Targist line, and the larger Rifian one, which adds up to a total of only thirteen out of the seventy tribes in question to the east of it, if we count the five tribes of the Iqarᶜayen or Qalᶜaya confederacy clustered around Mlilya-Nador as a single unit, and eighteen if we do not (cf. Coon 1931: 3). It may be added that all of these large Rifian 'tribes' (*dhiqba'ir*, pl. of *dhaqbitsh*, the Rifian variant of *qabila*) are in fact either confederacies or named agglomerates of a variable number of sections, as not a single one of them shows any trace of common ancestorship in the patriline.

Origin traditions from outside are the norm and group or section names evocative of territory are just as common, if not commoner, than names evoking pseudo-ancestors.

Indeed, this is true of the area at large, one in which origin traditions show an extreme degree of heterogeneity. As Pehrson has noted for the Marri Baluch of Pakistan, it is easy to think of each Rifian *dhaqbitsh* or 'tribe' as an enormous agnatic lineage, but such thinking would be erroneous, for the striking fact of the matter is that the genealogical charter for such a lineage structure is entirely absent. The structure in question is, rather, one of named groups and subgroups (which tend to assume the character of factions), not of ancestors, while lineage depth is seldom more than four to six generations. We are here, therefore, dealing with a situation of named groups as well as with, usually, their leaders or spokesmen (Pehrson, ed. Barth, 1966: 18-20). But the power of these spokesmen, unlike among the Baluch, was generally kept in check by the sectional council of elders, of which they themselves, as among the equally Pakistani Pukhtuns, were also usually members.

Furthermore, I do not anticipate matters by noting here that a second general feature of the social structure of these Rifian tribes or *dhiqba'ir* is that the only existing in-depth genealogies that they possess are those of *shurfa'*, and specifically Idrisid *shurfa'*, lineages or even whole clans which in some cases form integral tribal sections, *rbuᶜ* (Rif. *r-urbuᶜ*, sing. *rbaᶜ*, lit. 'quarter') : the Imrabdhen of the Aith Waryaghar (Hart 1976: 256-260, 481-497) and the Asht ᶜAru ᶜAisa of the Igzinnayen are excellent examples. In these cases genealogies going back forty-five or more generations to the Prophet's daughter Lalla Fatima – for he had no surviving sons – are a fundamental part of the stock-in-trade of *shurfa* generally. The other qualities which set *shurfa'* off from ordinary tribesmen are held to be the possession of *baraka* and the ability to work miracles, the wearing of distinctive white robes and the adjudication of conflicts among the rank-and-file – although only a small percentage of *shurfa'* exhibit all these attributes at the same time. Otherwise, apart from this and contrary to the position I maintained in my previous work (ibid.: 1-16, 235-278), I am now compelled to recognize that the genealogical factor and, by implication, the factor of segmentation above the level of the agnatic lineage are of minimal importance, for lay tribesmen, at least, even though I would still hold that a segmentary ideology is vigorously maintained (cf. Hart 1989, and for a contrary view, Munson 1989).

There is no point in enumerating all of the Rifian tribes here, to say nothing of their fifty-odd neighbors to the west, as here I shall be concentrating on only one of them, one which is both historically and numerically the most

important one as well, the Aith Waryaghar or Bni Waryaghal ('Beni Ouriaghel'). Nonetheless, where relevant, mention will also be made of their immediate neighbors, the Ibuqquyen (or Buqquya/Baqqiwa), the Aith ᶜAmmarth (or Bni ᶜAmmart), the Igzinnayen (or Gzinnaya), the Axt Tuzin (or Bni Tuzin) and the Thimsaman (or Timsaman). The Aith Waryaghar may be regarded as fully if not exaggeratedly representative of the Rifian increment in Moroccan tribal socio-political structure, even if they also show certain extra complexities which their neighbors do not have. It should also be noted that all these North Moroccan groups, under their present names, appear to be of very respectable antiquity, and Coon was probably correct in his surmise that the Rifian ones, generally, are the oldest of all simply because their origin myths are so much less clear than those of the Sinhaja Srir and the Ghmara (Coon 1931: 19). However, by the same token the origin traditions of the various small tribes comprising these two groups as well as those of the Jbala have not been as thoroughly examined as those of the Rifians.

In the Rif it is normal not only for many or most tribal sections (*rbuᶜ*, sing. *rbaᶜ*, as noted), but also for many or most subsections (again, *rbaᶜ*, for there are invariably more levels of encapsulation than there are terms to express them), for many or most local communities (*dshur*, sing. *dshar*) within them, as well as for many or most lineage groups (*dharfiqin*, sing. *dharfiqth*) within these communities, to claim to have originated or to have come from somewhere else, either from another Rifian tribe or outside the Rif entirely. For the various Central Rifian tribes I have calculated that the mean for the region is 49 percent, or just under half, of the total number of named units, at whatever level, which claim to be autochthonous: in the Ibuqquyen this figure is only 42 percent, in the Aith ᶜAmmarth ('people of the filling-up', implying, not entirely truthfully, that all of them came from elsewhere) it is much less, at a mere 31 percent, in the Igzinnayen it is just 32, only one percent higher. But in the Axt Tuzin it reads 55 percent, in the Aith Waryaghar it stands at 58 percent, and in the Thimsaman, it is way up at 78 percent (though this figure is probably too high); and these last three are all above the halfway mark (Hart 1976: 235-236).

At any rate there is considerable justification for thinking that the group names of the Aith Waryaghar, the Igzinnayen or 'libertines' (also referred to as *Dharwa n-Jallut*, 'sons of Goliath', and, by extension, as *r-ᶜadhawth n-Sidna Dawud*, 'the enemies of Our Lord David'), and the Thimsaman (almost certainly another toponym, for which Rifian *dhimssi*, 'fire', plus *aman*, 'water', represents an explanation regarded by the locals themselves as ingenious but incorrect), if not necessarily the groups that these names represent today, are probably the oldest in the Central Rif. With respect to the Aith Waryaghar, it

is also possible, though unproven, that the toponym *Waryaghar*, which also refers specifically to two mountains designated by probable variants of the same name, Dahar Waryaghar and Thawragh, both located in the Jbil Hmam massif in the southern core region of the tribal territory may itself be derived from Berber *awragh*, 'yellow'. This in turn probably refers to the color of the gold which was long, popularly and falsely held to have existed in the Jbil Hmam, where one local community in the Timarzga section is still known as Bu Maᶜdan, 'possessor of mines'.

All of these tribes are mentioned by al-Bakri, writing in the mid-eleventh century but referring to an earlier period and to the tribes on the immediate outskirts of the Madinat al-Nakur, which even had a Bab Bani Waryaghal, or Aith Waryaghar gate, at its southeastern corner. So the Aith Waryaghar and their neighbors were, in this context, literally the barbarians at the gates, although we should assume that on at least some occasions they participated in whatever spoils of war or conquest were passed around, as well as perhaps sharing in order to help make up regional tax quotas (ibid.: 343-349).

As Coon made clear sixty years ago (Coon 1931: 16-18), there are two major events in the origin mythology of northern Morocco, the first of which refers to a legendary seven years of drought followed by dense fog, foul wind and mosquitoes. These were responsible for chasing out the original and reputedly Susi inhabitants of the Ghmara and Sinhaja Srir regions, who were held to be magicians and discoverers of buried treasure (cf. also Caro Baroja 1957: 123-151, for the Ghmara, and Pascon and van der Wusten 1983: 55-60, for the Western Rif). The second event refers to a major and also legendary war which was held to have taken place between the nine little Ghmara tribes and the other nine little ones of the Sinhaja Srir, once these groups became settled in their present areas, the Ghmara huddled on the foggy northwest coast and the Sinhaja at the highest point of the chain. Not only was every tribe in the Rif said to have been aligned with one side or the other, as both Coon and Blanco Izaga have noted (Coon 1931: 17-18; Blanco Izaga/Hart 1975, II: 252), but as Montagne and some of his French predecessors have also shown, all the tribal groups of northern Morocco, including all of the Jbala down to Fes, were also held to have been involved (Montagne 1930: map facing p. 208; Truchet 1919: 74; and Moulieras 1899: 451-452). These accounts all show a broad general agreement, although they differ in detail; and in all of them except one (Moulieras 1899), the Ghmara alliance group had the greater number of member tribes.

Nonetheless, it is not out of place to state here that in Rifian alliances (*lfuf*, sing. *liff*), our own investigations demonstrate conclusively that no matter

what informants said, one coalition was invariably bigger, in numerical terms, than the other (Hart 1976: 316-320; 1996[b]; 1997[a]: 50). And as Coon also observed, almost certainly correctly, in the traditional Ghmara-Sinhaja conflict, it was the presence and strength of both the Aith Waryaghar and the Igzinnayen on the Sinhaja side which was held to have won the war for them, despite their possibly smaller numbers (Coon 1931: 18). However, perhaps most interesting of all is the fact that by the time I first reached the Rif in 1953, nobody knew anything about or volunteered any further information either about the seven bad years or about the Ghmara-Sinhaja war. This classic case of negative evidence can only mean either that in the central Rifian region, as defined above, these traditions were no longer remembered, or, and more likely, that they had never existed there in the first place. This I assume to be the case simply because most of the earlier sources which cite them note them as originating elsewhere: Coon is quite specific about having elicited his information from the craftsmen (in wood, leather and metal) of the little Sinhajan tribe of Taghzut, who evidently also asked him which side the Americans were on (ibid.: 17). Such information could not have come from either the Aith Waryaghar or the Igzinnayen, as they knew nothing about it!

I now consider briefly what is known of the early Islamic history of the Rif, with the establishment by Salih ibn Mansur al-Himyari, the Yemeni founder of the Salihid dynasty, of the Madinat al-Nakur in 710. It is most probable that his first contacts or those of his successors were with the Thimsaman, and then with the Aith Waryaghar (for whom the southeastern city gate, erected sometime after 760, would be named) and the Igzinnayen, the three groups which remained most closely associated with the dynasty in question. Other tribes such as the Ibuqquyen and the Aith ʿAmmarth had evidently not yet materialized as separate entities, while the Axt Tuzin and most of the eastern Rifian tribes (except for the Aith Saʿid) were only to emerge as recognizable units under their present names at a considerably later point, probably during Almohad times after the Madinat al-Nakur had been destroyed (Hart 1976: 347). In any event, the Salihid dynasty persisted for nearly four centuries, despite the fact that during this period the Madinat al-Nakur was destroyed three times (once by Vikings in 859-860), and then on a fourth and final occasion by the Almoravids under Yusuf bin Tashfin in 1084. There seems little doubt but that the implantation of Islam in the Rif was due to these early Salihid rulers, for here there was no recorded heresy like that of the false prophet Hamim among the Ghmara. The Rifians seem to have become integrated at an early stage, as well as voluntarily, peacefully and completely,

into a rapidly developing Islamic community in Morocco and its equally rapidly developing way of life.

The port of the Madinat al-Nakur was called al-Muzimma, from which today's provincial name of al-Husayma is ultimately derived. It persisted long after the final destruction of the former, even down to the seventeenth century, when the Aith Waryaghar, who may well have been filtering down onto the borders of the surrounding Plain of al-Husayma ever since, set up a guard of *mujahidin* or fighters for the faith at the so-called Burj al-Mujahidin as of 1673, in order to keep watch against the Spanish who had just occupied the little island of al-Husayma which faces the mainland in the bay of the same name. Neither the Madinat al-Nakur, al-Muzimma nor the Burj al-Mujahidin remains today, but the Aith Waryaghar guard mounted at the last-mentioned of these sites was not removed until 1926, with the surrender of bin ʿAbd al-Krim and the effective occupation of the Rif by Spain.

It would seem that both the Almoravids and the Almohads exercised a strong domination and a firm hand over the Rif, but after this time there are embarrassingly large gaps in the historical record, gaps which hopefully may eventually be filled both through local archives and through those of the Royal Palace in Rabat. By the beginning of the present ʿAlawid dynasty, Mawlay Ismaʿil's build-up after 1684 of a *gish ar-rifi* or Rifian Army has already been noted; and he settled it on the outskirts of Tangier both to populate the city and to occupy and garrison the northern Atlantic coastland and the Gharb. Although it seems that subsequent sultans in Fes regularly appointed local men as *qa'id*-s for the Rifian tribes, and provided them with *zahir*-s or decrees attesting to such appointments (which were only ratifications of choices already made at home confirming the top *imgharen* as the local tribal strongmen), as well as paying them handsome emoluments (which made these positions coveted ones), the Rif appears nonetheless to have maintained a distance from the central power which was by no means purely spatial.

The Rif was an area which was not necessarily in *siba*, but it was also one which was not entirely within the orbit of the *makhzan* either, Ayache notwithstanding (Ayache 1981: 27-46). Taxes were almost certainly paid on occasion, but thus far, we have little indication of when and how often such payments were actually made. In sum, the Rif seems to have been left largely to its own devices, devices which translated locally into a great deal of feuding and vendetta. This fact also allowed it to develop its own strong regional personality and distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rest of Morocco, toward which it has also traditionally tended to turn its back; and it did so for the next two centuries with little outside interference. My original position on this issue (Hart 1976:

6-16, 347-353) has shifted considerably since the publication of my *The Aith Waryaghar*, but in the meantime too the concept of *makhzan* vs. *siba* has also become largely eroded as a bench-mark of analysis for Moroccan tribal allegiance, or over any questions, full or partial, of opting in or opting out of the Moroccan political system. We should hence look elsewhere for clues, as this model is yet another which no longer holds up under close scrutiny.

The Rifians had provided active *mujahidin* contingents against Spain in the disastrous Spanish-Moroccan war fought near Tetuan in 1859-1860, as well as further contingents in another short campaign in the east, near Melilla in 1893. The disaster for Morocco was particularly acute because of the enormous reparations exacted by the Spanish victors, which drained the Moroccan treasury completely (Ayache 1983: 97-138). Nonetheless, even so, the Rif as such had first come to the attention of the European public considerably earlier, through the wholesale piratical depredations committed by the coastal Iqarʿayen of the Nador-Melilla region ever since 1830 on European shipping of all nations. This was finally calmed down by 1856 (cf. Pennell 1991), but it reappeared in a considerably more muted form further west, among the Ibuqquyen during the 1890s, with attacks on a number of European steamers, Spanish, French and Italian, which passed by the Bay of al-Husayma. Their respective consulates all complained vociferously, so in 1898 Mawlay ʿAbd al-ʿAziz sent a large *mhalla* under Bushta l-Baghdadi, the pasha of Fes, up to Ibuqquyen territory in order to chastise the pirates. This he did, with a vengeance, luring the Ibuqquyen into a trap and massacring them, with the help of their hostile neighbors of the Aith Waryaghar who were waiting in the wings. Bad feeling between the two tribes over the devastation and burning of Ibuqquyen territory incurred by this punishment, as well as the enforced exile of a large number of its inhabitants, persisted until well into the colonial period as a result, even though the *mhalla* went home and the Ibuqquyen were then given an official pardon in 1899 (Hart 1976: 355-356).

The next two decades, revealing a somewhat wider political horizon, up until bin ʿAbd al-Krim reluctantly assumed Rifian leadership in the major war which began against Spain in 1921, epitomized to Rifians the period known as the *Ripublik*; and it corresponded roughly with both the period and the notion of *siba* in the Atlas. The most noteworthy single event which occurred within this *Ripublik* time frame, from the Rifian point of view, was the smashing of the army of the Pretender Bu Hmara by the Aith Waryaghar, and their allies of the Aith ʿAmmarth, on the banks of the Nkur River at Imzuren in September 1908. This event clearly placed the Aith Waryaghar in a position of tribal ascendancy in the region. Their belief in their own invincibility

may be said to have taken off from this point: they had struck a blow for Islam and the monarchy by routing a warlord-cum-pretender who was getting money from the Christians (Hart 1970: 6-8; and especially 1976: 361-368). After providing some relevant demographic information, I will consider some of the major features of the socio-economic and socio-political organization of these same Aith Waryaghar during this crucial *Ripublik* period, as reconstructed from the lips of many aged (and some not so aged) informants. For what the neologism *Ripublik* really refers to, in retrospect, is a period of relative political autonomy and freedom from outside interference, even though such interference was by no means absent in a *de facto* sense.

Demography and Economy

By juggling the population figures of the 1960 Moroccan census (for no later ones are available to us), we come up with that of slightly over half a million speakers of Rifian in that year in the three northern provinces of al-Husayma, Taza and Nador; and of these, some 221,000 were from the six central Rifian tribal groups (Ibuqquyen – 12,000, in 281 square kilometers of territory; Aith ʿAmmarth – 13,000, in 251 square kilometers of territory; Aith Waryaghar – 76,000, in 1029 square kilometers of territory; Igzinnayen – 42,000, in about 1500 square kilometers of territory; Axt Tuzin – 40,000, in 606 square kilometers of territory; and Thimsaman – 38,000, in 420 square kilometers of territory). But as in the Spanish census of 1929 these same tribes (with the exception of the Igzinnayen, who were located in the French Zone and therefore not recorded) showed a population of only 100,000 (Ibuqquyen – 7000; Aith ʿAmmarth – 7900; Aith Waryaghar – 40,000; Axt Tuzin – 21,000; Thimsaman – 25,000), it is clear that during the thirty-year interim between censuses, the Aith Waryaghar, Ibuqquyen, Axt Tuzin and Aith ʿAmmarth had all virtually doubled their overall populations, while the Thimsaman had become half again their original size. In population density, the Aith Waryaghar at over 160 people per square kilometer in their northern lowland neck (as opposed to only one-fourth to one-third of this figure in their southern mountains) doubled their density figure during the same period, with comparable increases elsewhere (Hart 1976: 17-19).

Today (1992), with apartment buildings now located over all the major *suq* or market centers, the 1960 figures on which I based my original estimates are totally obsolete, while the population explosion that had already taken place by that date has most probably doubled yet again. Kabylia and its Jurjura

mountains in Algeria and the Rif in Morocco are still, and in that order, the two most densely populated areas of rural North Africa. One wonders today only how long they will stay 'rural', as both Kabylia and the Rif have long been areas of intensive labor migration – and, formerly, of bloodfeud and/or vendetta. The analytical distinction between these two institutions will become clear in due course, even though this does not mean that it was necessarily clear to their Rifian practitioners themselves during their heyday in the *Ripublik* period.

It is also clear from the foregoing exercise in statistics that one major factor in the Rifian equation was, and still is, overpopulation, today, of course, more so than ever. But it is an overpopulation which is by no means recent and which certainly dates back to the early nineteenth century if not earlier. For although the great majority of Rifians, then as now, were and are monogamous, a prime bench-mark of power and success in society was for a man to have as many sons as possible, an objective that was best achieved through polygyny. Hence tribal notables often had two, three or, exceptionally rarely, even the legal limit, imposed by the Shari'a, of four wives at a time; and divorce was common. A man's social distinction and esteem, as locally perceived, were also greatly enhanced if he had the wherewithal, possessed only by a very few, to perform the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca. All *hujjaj* (pl. of *hajj*) were not only socially prominent, but most were also politically so, as *imgharen* (sing. *amghar*, lit. 'big man') or council members.

A second major factor in the Rifian equation was and is, as might be imagined, the poverty and infertility of the soil. Arable land was and is a scarce resource, and as we shall see, competition for it, usually expressed through partible or divisible inheritance, was strong. It began at home, where the equal division (*battu* or *dhibdha*) of inherited land between brothers after the death of their father has always been the rule, rather than indivision (*ur ibdhi*), which remains the exception (ibid.: 97-98). Although agriculture has today largely given way to labor migration to the European Economic Community (France and Holland especially), it was and is carried on purely at a subsistence level, with barley and figs as the staple foods. The considerable variety of other fruit and vegetable crops actually grown in the area, most of them under irrigation, is misleading because they are grown in such minute quantities.

The Rifians are, in a word, poor farmers; and in the Jbil Hmam region of the Aith Waryaghar, the keynote of agricultural activity has long been mutual aid in labor (*idhwiren nj-khudmath*), in which two individuals pool their draft animals, in particular, to plow each others' fields (ibid.: 56). Informants frequently complained about their poverty and the worthlessness of their land

(the phrase employed was *dhamurth-nnagh kif walu!*, which translates roughly as 'our land is for the birds!'). It is difficult to describe this potentially explosive situation, one also characterized by an absolute minimum of economic specialization, in any other than Malthusian terms. Labor migration outside the Rif, usually but not always of the type called recurrent or circulatory by Cheater (Cheater 1989: 93), has long been traditionally regarded as one answer to the population problem. There is nothing new or recent about it, for it first began in the Oranie region of western Algeria in about the mid-nineteenth century when French settler-colons started to build farms there, and welcomed Rifian labor; and it was to continue until Algerian independence in 1962, by which time a new focus of migration was already starting to develop in Western Europe. The other traditional answer to overpopulation in the Rif, and without any question the older answer of the two, was the bloodfeud and/or the vendetta. Before we can work up to this, however, a brief overview of traditional Rifian economy and sociopolitical structure, as manifested among the Aith Waryaghar, is in order.

Agriculture (*dhafiddjahth*, from Ar. *filaha*), both with and without irrigation, was until 1970 the economic basis of Rifian life, although since that year the major upsurge in labor migration to Western Europe and the remittances from it that Rifian workers there send home are well on the way to supplanting it if they have not already done so. Even so, we will continue to refer to it in the present tense. It is supplemented by animal husbandry, which plays an entirely secondary role to it: each household has at least a cow, a donkey or mule and a small flock of goats. The Aith Waryaghar and their neighbors are at once tribesmen and farmers who lived in fixed habitations the year round; they have never been pastoralists or transhumants.

If one should fly over the Rif, which from the air resembles a crumpled piece of brown paper, one may see that it is studded with tiny white squares, representing square one-storied c whitewashed houses (*dhudhrin*, sing. *dhaddarth*, from Ar. *dar*, 'house') of mud and stone. These houses are widely dispersed, 'like stars in the sky' (*am ithran g-ugjinna*), as the Aith Waryaghar themselves say: each one is normally not less than three hundred meters from the next, and usually the distance is considerably greater. This distance between dwellings represents the minimum vital breathing space for their owners.

Although the configuration of the landscape and the availability of water play a major role in the selection of house sites, the basic reason for this extreme dispersion of houses is social more than economic: Rifians in general and the Aith Waryaghar in particular keep their women on a tighter and more closely secluded rein than do almost any other Circum-Mediterranean peo-

ples. The structural implications of this fact are of extreme importance and relate directly to Aith Waryaghar notions of honor and shame. The minimal distance between dwellings is constant throughout the area, as true for the lowlands as it is for the highlands. Houses are located here, there, on top of this hill, on the side of that slope, near the bottom of that ravine. Each one, apart from having its own threshing floor nearby, is surrounded by a clump of green which contrasts with the brownness of the landscape: this is the wall of prickly pear cactus which at any altitude up to one thousand meters (above which it will not grow) surrounds every house to insure privacy for those within. The cactus fruit helps to feed the family in summer and the privacy provided by the nearly impenetrable hedge is also underscored by the snarling curs of the owner of the house, whose otherwise open hospitality and invitations to visitors to drink mint tea and eat tasty meat on skewers are a pleasant relief after the hostility of his incessantly barking dogs. Along the mountain slopes, beside or near each house, are the grain fields: for barley, grown everywhere, is the major grain crop, while wheat, generally replaced by rye in the Jbil Hmam, is the secondary one (ibid.: 29).

One important historical addition or adjunct to the majority of Rifian houses, and one which has not existed since 1922, when bin ʿAbd al-Krim ordered it to be dismantled, was a small mud and stone pillbox (*ashbar*, pl. *ishbrawen*), about 2 meters square by 1.50 meters in height, which contained a loophole and which was so placed as to give the owner of the house and/or his sons as commanding a view as possible in order to enable him to open fire on his enemies. A second historical point, too, which should be made with respect to houses is that prior to approximately 1890 there were none at all within the confines of the northern lowland plain of al-Husayma, only in the immediate ascending mountain foothills surrounding it, as the plain itself, which during protectorate times became the most densely populated part of the tribal territory, had previously been used exclusively for agriculture under irrigation, with ditches (*dharga*, pl. *dhargiwin*) emanating from the two principal rivers, the Aghzar n-Ghis (Ar. Wad Ghis, 'muddy river') to the west and the more important Aghzar n-Nkur (Ar. Wad Nkur) to the east, the river which delimits in a natural way a major portion of the eastern tribal border with the Thimsaman and the Axt Tuzin (ibid.: 38, 243).

To conclude this rapid overview of Aith Waryaghar economics on a modern note, these ditches had all been cemented by the early 1950s, and as of late 1987, the Sidd Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Krim al-Khattabi, the Bin ʿAbd al-Krim Dam located on the Nkur at Imnudh, just upriver from the Bni Bu ʿAyyash settlement and *suq*, was finally inaugurated, with some fanfare, by

King Hasan II; but most of its water goes direct to the provincial capital of al-Husayma, and it seems that the local Aith Waryaghar and Thimsaman farmers, who feel cheated, are still squabbling with each other and with the provincial government about the distribution of the remainder. Provided that they dig wells of at least eight meters in depth on their own land, they are entitled to the benefits of agricultural credit through the local banks; but otherwise the Nkur River water is still insufficient for local needs and the amount that the dam project has managed to save is still far short of local expectations.

Feud and/or Vendetta: The Rules of the Game

One of the most striking features about Rifian society (and about Moroccan Berber societies generally) has always been its intense egalitarianism; but it is an egalitarianism which is largely theoretical if not ideological, one in which, in Orwellian terms, some have always been more equal than others. The favored few, as elsewhere, have always been more equal than the rank-and-file. For the power and influence of any given individual are still measured today by the overall resources (financial, territorial, and personal-familial, as well as those of patronage and support) that he can command, while during the *Ripublik* his tangible assets were expressed mainly through the number of men-at-arms, mostly though not entirely members of his own extended family and lineage, especially his own sons and, although less often, his brothers and their sons. Egalitarianism was the ideal (e.g., *nishnin qaᶜ dh-Aith Waryaghar, dh-nishnin qaᶜ kif-kif*, 'We are all Aith Waryaghar and we are all the same'); but any man worth his salt, anyone recognized by his peers as possessing *dhargazt*, 'manliness', and *shaʃᶜath*, 'courage, strength', tried to become at least a *primus inter pares* if not a local strongman in this society in which heavy competition for the above resources, even though generally left unstated as such, was very much an integral part of the local ethic of defense of one's own possessions.

It seems to me that among the Aith Waryaghar and their Rifian neighbors during the *Ripublik* the *leitmotiv* of socio-political organization can be summed up under the three key concepts of *(r-)haqq*, *(l-)liff* and *(r-)ᶜadhawth*, all of which are Rifian adaptations of Arabic terms, with the Arabic definite article given in parentheses. These three concepts themselves formed, in turn, a very substantial part, in practice if not necessarily in name, of the local *qaᶜida* or *ᶜurf*, the customary law which is essentially the other side of the coin of the Shariᶜa, the Divine Law of Islam. Of this *qaᶜida* the *qanun*-s (pl. *qawanin*) or customary

law documents in Arabic originally translated into Spanish by Emilio Blanco Izaga in 1939, and later into English by me with additional commentary in another work, and later still, back into Spanish again (Blanco Izaga 1939; Hart/Blanco Izaga, 2 vols., 1975, II: 266-418; 1995: 267-447; and Hart 1976: 283-312) provide excellent individual examples, in fact the best on record. Indeed, as all three concepts, plus several other ancillary ones, are embodied, either explicitly or implicitly, in most of these same *qanun*-s, all of which date from the *Ripublik*, I shall consider them from this documentary vantage point. Briefly, *haqq* (lit. 'truth, right, reason, obligation') refers to the fine of major proportions which any murderer was forced to pay to the *imgharen* or tribal or sectional council members if he committed his murder in the *suq*, the market, or on any path leading to or from it, on market day (and often on the day immediately before it and on the day immediately after it as well), while *liff* refers to an alliance, coalition or faction of any sort, and *ʿadhawth* (from Ar. *ʿadawa*, 'hatred') refers, without any analytical distinction between them, both to the feud and to the vendetta. It might be added that the mix of all three concepts was thoroughly Rifian, for the Jbala and the Ghmara had no *haqq* at all, while its development among the Sinhaja Srir was only embryonic, a category which also characterizes the status of both alliances and the feud or vendetta among all of the Rifians' western neighbors.

I consider *haqq* first. Herewith, however, a word of caution: the concept of *haqq* among the Aith Waryaghar must not be confused with that of *diya*, bloodwealth, bloodmoney or blood compensation, which they also knew, in its Rifianized form *diyith*, and which was of far less importance to them, both conceptually and monetarily – quite unlike the situation prevailing among the Ait ʿAtta and their Berber neighbors in the South-Central Atlas and the Saghru in southern Morocco, for example, who knew only the *diyit* and had no *haqq*. The difference between the two concepts is of crucial importance first and foremost because the recipients of the money in question were themselves different in each case. Among the Ait ʿAtta the *diya/diyit* as blood compensation was a variable sum, payable by the murderer and his agnatic kinsmen in both money and/or kind (usually livestock), to the agnatic kinsmen of his victim, if they were disposed to accept it and not to continue the feud; and it is or was known by this same name, *diya*, or a similar one (*saz*, for example, is the Pakhtu equivalent on the Pakistan North-West Frontier) among tribal peoples all over the Middle East.

The *haqq*, on the other hand, was purely a Rifian institution – though it had its own equivalents both in the Moroccan Anti-Atlas and in the *nagha* fine among the Afridi of the Khaibar Pass (cf. Surdon 1928: 189; and cf. Hart

1985: 67-69, 73, 193). It was paid almost exclusively in money, and was generally constant in amount as well as prohibitively high, reckoned at 1000 duros *hasani* for murder committed on any path leading to or from the market either on market day, on the day before or on the day after, and double this sum, or 2000 duros *hasani*, for murder committed within the precincts of the market itself, if indeed the perpetrator was not shot on the spot. It was paid by the murderer and his kinsmen to the *imgharen* or council members – who were also collectively known as *aitharbi'in* (Rif., lit. 'representatives of the people', a term which, as I have shown elsewhere, has nothing to do with the number 'forty': cf. Hart 1976: 284) – assembled in *agraw*, in council meeting or moot, at the market. The *haqq* was paid because the act of murder had 'broken the market' or 'broken the peace of the market' (*yarza s-suq, yarza s-sulh nj-suq*).

Even though they may have been screaming for revenge, the agnates of the victim, in theory, at least, received no part of the *haqq* fine, which was entirely the prerequisite of the *imgharen*. If the murderer, who by this time had usually fled into exile to another section or another tribe, as an *adhrib* (from Ar. *tlib*, 'enemy'), and his own agnatic kinsmen could not or would not pay it, the *imgharen* would then descend upon them in a body, burn their houses and fields and confiscate their livestock (ibid.: 288-303; Hart 1996[a]; 1997[a]: 38-46). In order to provide a rough equivalent, given that 5 pesetas equals 1 duro, Pennell notes that in 1919, a year when food was very scarce, a quintal of barley in the Rif cost 60 pesetas, or 12 duros, and one of wheat cost 80 pesetas, or 16 duros (Pennell 1986: 48). By comparison, the *diyith* in the Rif was usually much less in amount than the *haqq*, and was in any case considered of little account: the question of compensation there, as among the Pukhtuns of Pakistan, was academic and seldom if ever came up, because the feud or the vendetta, as the case may have been, was regarded as the only option to be pursued (Hart 1976: 293-294).

I now examine how the *imgharen*, the councillors who received the *haqq* fine collectively, actually divided it up. In this connection, informants invoked two kinds or levels of *haqq* fine: the tribal fine, or *r-haqq n-tqbitsh*, and the market fine, or *r-haqq nj-suq* (ibid.: 295). There was no difference in the amount of the fines themselves. In the first instance, which (allegedly) involved the *imgharen*, the collective *aitharbi'in* of the whole of the Aith Waryaghar, who also (allegedly) met at the Sunday Market of Thisar in the center of the tribal territory to collect it, the fine was (supposedly) divided five ways, for each of the 'five fifths', or *khams khmas* (Classical Arabic *khamsa akhmas*), of the Aith Waryaghar, the five maximal units, or supersections, of the tribe, which were held, furthermore, to have been invoked only in this

context, for *haqq* reception or payment. (A similar 'five fifths' or *khams khmas* organization among the Ait ʿAtta will be discussed in the Chapter IV, but in their case it was used for a very different purpose: the annual election of the top chief of the supertribe: cf. Hart 1967, republished 1984[c], 1981). It should in addition be noted that three of these five fifths, the Aith ʿAbdallah (*khums* II), the Aith Bu ʿAyyash (*khums* III) and the Imrabdhen (*khums* V, which is made up of a whole section or clan of Idrisid *shurfa'*), corresponded exactly to the sections or *rbuʿ* which bore and bear these same names (although in terms of overall alliance, as we will see, the Aith Bu ʿAyyash were split down the middle), but of the other two fifths, one, the Aith Hadhifa (*khums* IV) subsumed two other sectional entities, the Aith ʿArus and the Iʿakkiyen, all three of which were well separated and discontinuous from each other territorially, and the Aith Khattab, the other, final fifth (*khums* I), was the most complex amalgam of all, containing the mutually hostile lowland and midland sections of the Aith Yusif w-ʿAri and the Aith ʿAri, with their territorially discontinuous but also mutually hostile mountain 'brother' sections (or subsections) of the Aith Turirth (allied with the Aith Yusif w-ʿAri) and the Timarzga (allied with the Aith ʿAri).

The argument for the tribal fine should be pursued further, despite the fact that it may only have existed in the minds of my informants (for I was unable to record a single documented instance of it), because it was the urge toward a meticulous division of the spoils, so to speak, which was the real name of the game. Such a division was based as closely as possible on real or assumed sectional size, as well as on entitlement to reception.

Here we may take the full 2000-duro *haqq* fine as an example. This was divided first into five equal shares, or 400 duros apiece, for each of the five fifths. The Aith ʿAbdallah divided theirs in half, or 200 duros apiece, for each of their two constituent subsections (Aith ʿAru Musa and Aith Tmajurth), the Aith Bu ʿAyyash did the same with theirs (200 duros each to the 'True' Aith Bu ʿAyyash and to their enemies the Aith ʿAdhiya), and so did the Imrabdhen (200 duros apiece to the Upper Imrabdhen and to the Lower Imrabdhen). In the case of the Aith Hadhifa 'fifth', the shares were one-third (or 133 duros) for the Aith ʿArus and the Iʿakkiyen jointly (of which the Aith ʿArus got two-thirds, or 89 duros, and the Iʿakkiyen, one-third, or 44 duros), and the remainder (or 267 duros) for the 'True' Aith Hadhifa, which was then divided in half (or 133.5 duros apiece) between their own two subsections (the Aith Bu Jdat and the Iraqraqen). Finally, in the case of the Aith Khattab, the joint Aith Yusif w-ʿAri and Aith ʿAri fifth, the Aith Yusif w-ʿAri received half (200 duros) and the Aith ʿAri the other half (200 duros). The former then gave the

Aith Turirth one-fifth (or 80 duros) off the top and split the rest (120 duros) between their own two subsections (the Aith Ughir Izan and the Isrihan), while the Aith ʿAri, with their share, did exactly the same thing, giving one-fifth (80 duros) off the top to the Timarzga and splitting the remainder (120 duros) into thirds (40 duros apiece) for each of their own three subsections (the Tigarth, the Imhawren and the Aith r-ʿAbbas). The principle of equitable distribution was of paramount importance in the division of *haqq* fines, as the above exercise shows. As I have noted elsewhere (Hart 1976: 291), 'such division was developed into a fine structural art. Indeed, a notation regarding the lowland Ait 'Ari in an unsigned Spanish administrative report dated 1928 indicated that if there was not enough money to go around evenly, matches were bought and the divided up. This case may be apocryphal but it has a authentically egalitarian ring'.

Even if the tribal fine, the *haqq n-tqbitsh*, may itself have also been apocryphal, it seems significant nonetheless that informants always cited it first, as the model to be followed. Very much commoner and more normal, of course, was the market fine, the *haqq nj-suq*, which was levied not only at all six of the major markets then in Waryagharland (Sundays at Thisar, Mondays at Aith Bu ʿAyyash and at Aith Hadhifa, Tuesdays at Aith ʿAbdallah, Wednesdays at Sidi Bu ʿAfif in the plain – these last two long since defunct – and at Tawrirt, or Aith Turirth, in the highlands), but at all the various minor ones as well (e.g., Sundays at Thiddas in Ikhuwanen in the Igzinnayen, and at Izimmuren in the Aith Turirth – the latter now defunct – and Thursdays at Imrabdhen). It should be noted here parenthetically that although the Aith Waryaghar were and are virtually unique in the Rif and in Morocco for the possession of no less than six special but very small women's markets, with one other in the Thimsaman, from which men are rigorously forbidden and the importance of which is far more social than economic (ibid.: 86-88), it stands to reason that as there were no men present , no murders were committed and no *haqq* fines were collected in them, women being in theory, if not always in practice, exempt from the feud and/or the vendetta.

At any rate, the main point about the market fine is that its recipients were the *imgharen* representing sections whose attendance at the market in question was habitual. This point is underscored when we realize that in at least one case, that of the Wednesday Market of Tawrirt, one-fifth of the fine went to the adjacent section of another tribe entirely, the Axt Tuzin, out of consideration for the fact that they had once owned the market site, while in another, that of the small Sunday Market of Thiddas in Ikhuwanen of the Igzinnayen, but right on the border with Waryagharland, one-fourth of the

fine went to the neighboring Aith Waryaghar section of the Timarzga, whose *imgharen* did not collect any share at Tawrirt. So the one case made up for the other, a point which is worth considering in more detail. (The division suggested by Westermarck in a posthumous article of one-fifteenth, 1/15, for the leading *amghar* of the market, two-fifteenths, 2/15, for the remaining *imgharen* and the remaining twelve-fifteenths, 12/15, or four-fifths, 4/5, to be entrusted to a reliable and wealthy man to act as a fund for buying bulls for sacrifice as *ʿar* or shame compulsion upon other sections or tribes whose assistance may have been needed in wartime, or for bribing their *imgharen*, is ingenious but, again, probably apocryphal. It was certainly not recognized by my informants. Cf. Westermarck 1947: 30.)

At the Wednesday Market of Tawrirt, the *haqq* fine, as already implied, was divided into the following five equal shares: one-fifth to the Axt Tsafth section of the Axt Tuzin, because the land on which the market had been set up was theirs originally (for as they had been opposed to the creation of a market there, the one-fifth *haqq* share was allotted to them as compensation); one-fifth to the saint Sidi Hmid n-Sidi r-Hajj Misaʿud, of a locally prominent and resident Imrabdhen lineage, who, because he was honorary top *amghar* or *amghar amqqran*, was allotted the whole share to himself, as an additional gesture of courtesy; one-fifth to the Aith Bu Khrif subsection of the Aith Bu ʿAyyash; one-fifth to the Aith ʿArus (which was again divided into fifths, one for Sammar and Iharunen jointly, two for Aith Yikkur and two for Aith Yikhrif); and finally, one-fifth for the Aith Turirth (which was yet again divided into fifths, one for Aith ʿAmar and Thizimmurin jointly, two for the *liff* alliance group of the Hajj Amʿawsh of Bulma and two for that of the Imjjat or Dharwa Ufqir Azzugwagh of l-ʿAss, about both of whom we shall have much more to say in the next section).

Quite apart from the ever-present and overriding concern for equitable distribution of the fine, we may note that the Aith Bu Khrif, who might otherwise have legitimately received their share of the *haqq* at the Monday Market of the Aith Bu ʿAyyash, to which section they belong, did not do so, both because the Wednesday market of Tawrirt is much closer for them in terms of distance and because they have long been regarded as being among its regular constituents. The same is true of the Timarzga, who would normally have received their share at Tawrirt, but who took it instead at the Sunday market at Thiddas in Ikhuwanen of the Igzinnayen, which is much closer to them in distance even if it is across the tribal border. Here the *haqq* was divided into four equal shares, i.e., one for the Ikhuwanen themselves, one for the Iharrushen,

one for the Asht ʿAru ʿAisa, all of these being Igzinnayen sections, and one for the Timarzga of the Aith Waryaghar.

Finally, although once again no *haqq* was ever actually paid, it seems, at the Sunday Market of Izimmuren, located up the Nkur River from the Wednesday Market of Tawrirt, it too was scheduled to be divided into five equal shares, for five of the most powerful individual *imgharen* in the region: two Igzinnayen men, the Hajj Biqqish of Ikhuwanen and the Hajj Si Muhand w-ʿArab of Asht ʿAru ʿAisa, and three Aith Waryaghar ones, Shaykh ʿAmar nj-Mqaddim of Timarzga, ʿAmar Uzzugwagh of the Imjjat lineage and *liff* group (although the two are by no means synonymous) in l-ʿAss in the Aith Turirth, and Muhand u-Saʿid of the Dharwa nj-Hajj Amʿawsh lineage and *liff* group in Bulma, also in the Aith Turirth (Hart 1976: 297-303). These men would all of course have collected their shares of the *haqq* in the names of the groups or sections which they represented, but how much of it would actually have filtered down into the hands of any other members of these groups is debatable. Indeed, very much so, for any *imgharen* who were themselves absent from, or late in arriving at, the division of a *haqq* fine at the *agraw*, the deliberative assembly or moot of the *aitharbiʿin*, which took place under a big shady tree just off the market site, were out of luck and got nothing. First come, first serve (ibid.: 295-296).

Before I leave the concept of *haqq* fines and their division, a comparison of my own materials on the subject with those of Emilio Blanco Izaga, mentioned above, and as embodied in his various Aith Waryaghar *qanun*-s, seems in order. Blanco very rightly notes, first, that legal teeth were put into any *qanun* by the following fourfold process: 1) the agreement of the *imgharen* on the points at hand; 2) the witnessing of this agreement by a prominent member of a saintly Imrabdhen lineage resident among the various sections whose members regularly attended the market; 3) the drawing-up or 'codification' of the document by the local *fqih* or Qur'anic schoolmaster; and 4) its proclamation in the market by the *abarrah* or market crier, who was always a member of an endogamous occupational group traditionally looked down upon, like blacksmiths, market weighers and ticket collectors, as well as certain kinds of musicians, most of whom are held to have come from the Axt Tuzin (ibid.: 281-283). In this way the listing of 'do nots' became known to all and sundry (Blanco Izaga 1939: 20; Blanco Izaga/Hart 1975, II: 279; Hart 1976: 289).

The *qanun* of the Aith ʿAbdallah section, dated June 1917, which clamps down very hard on any incidents, premeditated or not, that might take place at the now long defunct Tuesday Market of ʿAin Tihalaliyin, is particularly severe. Anyone who kills another person within the market precincts and

who is caught doing so will be shot outright. If he has not been captured and has managed to flee to another tribe, the *imgharen* will impose a fine of 2000 duros upon him and will burn his house down to its foundations; and the same fine will be applied not only to murder on any of the paths leading to the market but also to murder taking place anywhere within the territory of the Aith ʿAbdallah section on market day. In the latter case the murderer will pay the fine if he committed the deed alone, but if several men committed it together, each of them must pay 2000 duros to the *imgharen*. Any man who wounds another will pay 1000 duros and anyone who shoots at somebody else and misses him will pay 500 duros. From here we move down to fines for lesser offenses: 50 duros to be paid by anyone 'who takes justice into his own hands' or who attacks another person on a path leading to the market; 10 duros to be paid by anyone who provokes an incident in the market or who beats another on the head with a stick, causing blood to flow; and 5 duros to be paid by anyone who unsheathes a dagger, or wounds another person by throwing a stone at him, or who in any of the above cases should come to the aid of his brothers. No requests for pardon will be listened to nor will any of the above fines be commuted. For the purposes of the above, Tuesday, market day, begins at dawn and ends at sunset as far as the Aith ʿAbdallah are concerned. With respect to strangers, market day is considered as lasting for three days, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, in order to enable them to come safely to the market and return home with equal safety. Finally, in the event that proof of any of these offenses against a suspected individual is insufficient, he must then swear an oath (probably a collective one, *r-imin* or *dhzaddjith*, with eleven of his close agnates, in the mosque, on a copy of the Qur'an and on a Friday) in order to be acquitted (for details, cf. Hart 1976: 309-312). It is noteworthy that this *qanun* contains no mention whatsoever of theft (Blanco Izaga 1939: 45-51; Hart/ Blanco Izaga 1975, II: 305-313; 1995: 319-327; Hart 1976: 290).

The *qanun* of the Aith ʿAdhiya (one of two subsections of the Aith Bu ʿAyyash), dated April 1914, was drawn up at a meeting of all the male members, the *jmaʿath* (sing. *jmaʿth*), of its constituent communities, 'both adults and minors', who all went together, so the document says, to the shrine of Sidi r-Hajj ʿAmar in one of the communities in question, ar-Rabda. There they sacrificed two bulls to the saint, in order to commemorate an act of reconciliation and truce, or *sulh*, with respect to any future acts of murder, theft, pillage and other violence. In this respect the text of the Aith ʿAdhiya *qanun*, barring the crucial ritual of reconciliation through the sacrifice of bulls at the shrine, approximates very closely that of the Aith ʿAbdallah, even if it appears

a shade less severe. In the event that anyone should contravene this agreement and kill a fellow subsection member outside the market or with no witnesses present, then the members of all the communities concerned shall unite against him and burn his and his agnates' houses and fields and forcibly extract from them a *haqq* fine (although the term used by the *fqih* who drew up this particular *qanun* was *da'ira*) of 1000 duros. In case he should kill someone in the market or in front of witnesses, the procedure shall be exactly the same, except that the fine shall be doubled to 2000 duros. At the end, almost as an afterthought, there is the imposition of a fine of 10 duros for stealing a goat or a sheep and one of 5 duros for stealing barley or broad beans from someone else's land (Blanco Izaga 1939: 53-57; Hart/Blanco Izaga 1975, II: 313-317; 1995: 329-335; Hart 1976: 290-291). One wonders just how long this truce or reconciliation actually lasted: it almost certainly could not have done so up until seven years later and the advent in 1921 of bin ʿAbd al-Krim.

The *qanun* of the lowland Aith Khattab (by which name is meant, jointly, the two traditionally hostile sections of the Aith Yusif w-ʿAri and the Aith ʿAri, and from which is also derived the *nisba* or patronymic *al-Khattabi*, of Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Krim) is earlier by seven years and is dated June 1907. In this one the fines are lower, a fact which does not tally with the statements of our own informants on the subject. They reiterated vigorously that there was a 2000-duro fine for murder in the market and a 1000-duro fine for murder on any path leading to or from it and that the three-day prohibition on murder, including not only market day but also the days before and after it, as stipulated in the Aith ʿAbdallah *qanun*, held good as well. To the contrary, in the Jbil Hmam highlands and at the Wednesday Market of Tawrirt the prohibition was confined only to the Wednesday, the market day itself, no doubt indicating the impossibility of enforcing the additional time sanction in these chronically feud-ridden mountains. In any case, the Aith Khattab *qanun* stipulates only 500 duros for murder in the Wednesday Market of Sidi Bu ʿAfif, where it was drawn up, and 200 duros for missing the target and failing to kill one's man; 50 duros for taking justice into one's own hands (i.e., 'self-help') and returning whatever object was stolen; 10 duros for anyone discovered in the Monday Women's Market at Azghar, and death by shooting for inciting riots with shouts and gunshots, 'as happened to the people of Tafrasth, Aith Musa w-ʿAmar and Ajdir' (Blanco Izaga 1939: 59-68; Hart/Blanco Izaga 1975, II: 317-329; 1995: 337-348; Hart 1976: 291).

Finally, a *qanun* drawn up in the Wednesday Market of Tawrirt, dated February 1918, stipulates a *haqq* fine that may go up as high as 4000 duros for breaking a newly concluded peace between two lineages of the community

of Aith Tzurakhth (in the Aith ʿAdhiya subsection of the Aith Bu ʿAyyash). This agreement had been concluded previously in the (now defunct) Saturday Market of Tazurakhth and was now being reinforced at the Tawrirt market. The reason for this reinforcement was that one of the lineages concerned, the Dharwa n-Siddiq, had broken the peace by killing a member of the other one, the Dharwa nj-Hajj ʿAmar, after the original agreement had been made. The result was that the *imgharen* of the Upper Aith Bu ʿAyyash went for the Dharwa n-Siddiq lineage tooth and nail. The latter, it is stated, opted for surrender on the very real threat of being burned out of house and home. The property that they handed over to the assembled councillors of both markets was assessed at 1300 duros. This sum the *imgharen* gave to the agnates of the murdered man: three sublineages received 300 duros apiece; four smaller ones received a further 300 duros to be split four ways; and a final 100 duros was split in half between the sons of one man. Once again the importance of the principle of equitable distribution, at least as locally conceived, is here dramatically underscored (Blanco Izaga 1939: 21-28; Hart/Blanco Izaga 1975, II: 279-288; 1995: 289-298; Hart 1976: 291). The *qanun*, however, is quite silent about the remaining 2700 duros, which were presumably divided up as equally as possible among the 14 *imgharen* listed by name in the document.

The Rules of the Game: The Alliance Factor

We now move on to the second of the three keynotes of Aith Waryaghar society during the *Ripublik*, that of *liff* (pl. *lfuf*). Derived from Literary Arabic *laff*, 'circumambience, circumvention, subterfuge' (which itself derives from the verb *laffa*, 'to wrap, to envelop'), its wider Rifian meaning of alliance of any kind and at any level provides an appropriate semantic follow-through here, because one of the most consistent features of Rifian alliances, or of the factions that made up alliance groups, was that of shift and change. Where alliance is implied, so is hostility: either one could be forged within a single community (*dshar*) or even within a single lineage group (*dharfiqth*), but at the same time it had the capacity to escalate (theoretically, at least) to the point of involving the whole tribe (*dhaqbitsh*) and even adjoining sections (*rbuʿ*) of neighboring tribes.

The main point is that if cooperation began at home, so did hostility. Any marriage creates an alliance, and one's *idhuwran* (sing. *adhuggwar*) or affines are generally one's allies as well; but by almost the same token, inheritance of land, which was controlled by individuals, not by lineages, may divide one's

aithma or *aith 'azizi* ('brothers', 'children of the paternal uncle'), i.e., one's agnates, the members of one's patrilineage, quite irrevocably into a state of enduring hostility. There was nothing corporate about Rifian lineages and the 'all for one and one for all' principle did not exist. I am therefore compelled to admit that the segmentary lineage model, which I emphasized so strongly in my earlier work (Hart 1976: 1-16, 235-338, and as commented on by Munson 1989: 386-400), also did not exist at the level of practicality, only at that of ideology: for as I view it now, the Rifians in fact stood the model on its head and turned it into one of anti- or counter-segmentation (Hart 1989: 765-769). This point will be investigated more closely when we come to grips properly with feud and vendetta; but it is important to note here that the factions established through *liff* alliances very often cut across genealogical and segmentary lines, often enough so as to take precedence over such lines as well as to underscore their insignificance. Such factions may thus be regarded as the norm. It was equally normal for *dharfiqin* or lineage groups to be split either down the middle or into unequal parts, in terms of alliance, with one half or part of a given lineage in one camp and the other half or part in the other, hostile camp. It might also be noted that there are clear indications from the nineteenth-century *qanun* materials from Kabylia in Algeria that much the same situation prevailed there as well, and that there were violent quarrels between brothers over partible inheritance, even though they were almost certainly less common there than in the Rif (Hanoteau & Letourneux 1893, III: 332, 336, 368, 395-396, 424).

The overall tribal *liff* configuration of the Aith Waryaghar, at those times when informants averred it to have been activated, typically pitted one section or subsection against its neighbor, exactly in the manner of hostility between brothers, *umathen* (sing. *uma*), or close agnates, *aithma* (sing. also *uma*). Thus in this sense the whole of Waryagharland represented not so much a chessboard as a large concentric circle containing black and white segments of unequal size, representing the two hostile factions, because although both *liff*-s were always conceived by informants as equal in size, this was almost never the case in fact, as I have clearly demonstrated elsewhere (Hart 1976: 316-320; 1996[b]; 1997[a]: 50). To pursue the analogy, the larger Aith Waryaghar circle was surrounded on all sides except the seaward one to the north by other, smaller interlocking circles of varying sizes, all representing its neighbor tribes, which all similarly contained their own black and white segments of unequal size (and I do not employ the term 'segment' here with any intended reference to a segmentary lineage model). Each tribal border provided the limits of that tribe's own internal *liff* alignments, because even if cer-

tain bordering sections of a neighbouring tribe might be at times involved, the whole of the neighbouring tribe never was.

One might say, therefore, that the Rifian *dhaqbitsh* or tribe was defined precisely by its overall internal factional network. A *liff* system, or a *saff* system, as it was known in precolonial Algeria, was neither simply a system of classification, as Berque (1974: 21), and, following him, Neumann (1987: 150), have claimed, nor even merely a variant of a segmentary lineage system, as Gellner (1973: 18-19) would have had us believe. It was, rather, a system of institutionalized hostility which was based at once on mutuality and on factionalism (Hart 1996[b]). Of course this does not in itself explain either how often or how far up or down the ladder or scaffolding such systems could be activated, or whether they were generated more by inter-lineage feuds or by intra-lineage or fratricidal vendettas. Nonetheless, a look at how the various sections of the Aith Waryaghar were drawn into their own two major hostile factions or leagues will make this clear; and by indicating also the *khums* affiliation of each section, we will also see how the *liff* alignments cut across these as well.

These two Aith Waryaghar *liff*-s may be labeled as Faction A and Faction B. Inside Waryagharland and within Faction A, *Khums* I, that of the Aith Khattab, was represented by the Aith Yusif w-ᶜAri and their mountain 'brothers', the Aith Turirth; *Khums* II by nobody because it consisted of the Aith ᶜAbdallah who were on the other side, in Faction B; *Khums* III by the 'True' Aith Bu ᶜAyyash as opposed to their 'brethren' of the Aith ᶜAdhiya who were also on the other side; *Khums* IV in its entirety by the Aith Hadhifa, the Aith ᶜArus and the Iᶜakkiyen; and *Khums* V, likewise in its entirety, by both the Upper and Lower Imrabdhen. Inside Waryagharland and within Faction B, *Khums* I was represented by the Aith ᶜAri and their mountain 'brethren' the Timarzga, pitted against the Aith Yusif w-ᶜAri and the Aith Turirth respectively, and of the same *khums*; *Khums* II by the Aith ᶜAbdallah in their entirety, pitted against the Aith Hadhifa of *Khums* IV; and *Khums* III by the Aith ᶜAdhiya, pitted against their 'brothers' of the 'True' Aith Bu ᶜAyyash, in the same *khums*. Outside Waryagharland, Faction A was given aid when needed by the Ijaᶜunen section of the Aith ᶜAmmarth, and Faction B by the Truguth section of the Thimsaman, the Axt ᶜAkki section of the Axt Tuzin, the Izimmuren section of the Ibuqquyen and the Aith ᶜAisa and l-Wadiyin sections of the Aith Yittuft. Hopefully, such outside aid helped to redress the balance between the two internal Aith Waryaghar factions, because our own *liff* estimates based on a Spanish table of command for 1930 gave Faction A almost twice the numerical strength of Faction B, 29,000 as opposed to 16,000, while an earlier esti-

mate of armed warriors for 1928 provided almost the same proportions, 6075 in Faction A as compared to 3750 in Faction B (Hart 1976: 316-317).

Informants maintained that at least one major war occurred between these two factions during the reign of Mawlay al-Hasan I (1873-1894), and that it lasted for seven years. It began over 'a small thing' which came up between the lowland Aith Yusif w-ᶜAri and Aith ᶜAri. The *imgharen* of each section had reached the decision that their women should not attend the Sunday women's market across the Nkur River in the Thimsaman, for they regarded this as shameful: the men of the Aith Waryaghar simply did not want the men of the Thimsaman to catch a glimpse of their women. However, one day two women of Ajdir (which was to become the home community of Muhammad bin ᶜAbd al-Krim al-Khattabi) in the Aith Yusif w-ᶜAri went there. At the time, the top *amghar* or *qa'id* of all the Aith Waryaghar, with a sultanic decree ratifying him as '*qa'id* of *qa'id*-s' in his pocket and with appropriate emoluments attached, was the Hajj Haddu w-ᶜAisa of the Aith ᶜAri – the very same man who built the first house in the plain of al-Husayma, we might add. At the next *agraw* he asked why these women had broken the rule and gone to the market, stating that each of them should pay a fine of one duro. Si Ziyyan r-Khattabi of Ajdir, backed up by the *sharif* Sidi Misaᶜud of the Imrabdhen, countered by saying that they did not intend to pay. An altercation ensued, and when it became heated each party went to get its allies. The result was that the whole tribe finally became embroiled, along the lines indicated above. The Aith ᶜAri *liff* enlisted the aid of the Truguth in the Thimsaman and of the Axt ᶜAkki in the Axt Tuzin; and so the Aith Yusif w-ᶜAri *liff* now paid 3000 duros to the Aith ᶜAmmarth to come in and help them burn the Aith ᶜAri communities of Upper Thamasind, Bu Minqad and Aith Musa w-ᶜAmar. It is evident that at the end of seven years the Aith ᶜAri *liff* was losing but it seems that when Mawlay al-Hasan I sent an emissary to stop the Aith Waryaghar from killing each other all off, they acceded to his request. (Or so tradition has it: a more plausible explanation might be that each side wanted and needed a truce for agricultural and recuperative purposes.)

It is also said that the overall alignment as given above came to an end when Bushta l-Baghdadi and his army came up to the Rif from Fes in 1898 to punish the corsairs of the Ibuqquyen. This is another story in itself, but the apparent result among the Aith Waryaghar was that henceforth until the advent of bin ᶜAbd al-Krim, conflict became even more internalized when, by our count, no less than 193 lower-level factional feuds or vendettas (71 of the former and 122 of the latter), sprang to life all over the tribal territory (ibid.: 319-320; also Hart 1989: 767; 1997[a]: 54). I merely note here that in

one really murderous series of reciprocal killings between two large lineage groups in the Aith ʿAbdallah section, the Aith ʿAmar u-Hmid and the Ibunharen, informants listed the casualties at 365, one for every day of the year (Hart 1976: 323). This is almost certainly an exaggerated figure, but one wonders by how much. In the section to follow I turn to a single case study documented from the Aith Turirth.

The Game as Played: The Case History of the Imjjat Vendetta

We are now in a position to discuss the final key concept, *ʿadhawth*, which, as noted, refers both to bloodfeud and to vendetta without distinction. Both these notions involve process (Boehm 1984: 53), but the difference between them is problematical as well as analytical. It is certainly more than merely terminological, for ideally, in anthropological usage, the bloodfeud normally involves reciprocal killings between different corporate and/or segmentary lineage groups, and not between only minimally effective subunits of these groups or between individuals. It involves a law of exact equivalence (i.e., the person killed in revenge must have exactly the same social standing as his victim), and it can be halted or stopped by some institutionalized means of blood compensation, such as *diya/diyith* (cf. Beattie 1964[a]: 149-150, 175-176; Beattie 1964[b]). Although the vendetta, on the other hand, has been referred to as a conflict, usually short in duration, between individuals rather than between segmentary lineage groups (Peters 1975: xiii-xiv) or between only minimally effective subunits of these groups (to use Beattie's term), its often protracted nature tends admittedly to equate it with feud for all practical purposes. This is so because the vendetta involves a continuous course of reciprocal homicides without any possibility of blood compensation, either because the means for such compensation do not exist or are not resorted to, or because they are rejected outright by the actors concerned (Boehm 1984: 198).

This is precisely the rub. The core of the problem lies in the question of the combination of corporate lineages with institutionalized compensation. As already indicated, agnatic lineages or *dharfiqin* among the Aith Waryaghar did indeed exist (though their existence may no longer be the case today); but they were emphatically not corporate in character, and hence institutionalized compensation was almost invariably rejected. Homicide certainly occurred, and indeed with great, even alarming frequency. It did so, furthermore, very probably most often precisely within the minimally effective lineage subunit or *jajgu* (pl. *ijujga*): for the bonds of the *dharfiqth* as a unit were

very easily broken, and hostility, *ʿadhawth*, between half- or even full brothers and their sons over partible inheritance was not only very normal, but strong and generally violent in nature. We are faced here with a combination of factions, feud, fines and fratricide (to list the components in alphabetical order). Hatred began at home: any bond advertised as existing between agnates, *aithma*, or brothers, *umathen*, was far more fictitious than real, for 'brotherly love' was akin to the *tarburwali* or institutionalized patricousin enmity (said to have 'smouldered like a dung-fire') among the Pukhtuns in that it was instantly and totally dissolvable: it could become anti- or counter-segmentary overnight, when, as Caton has noted, blood descent was turned into bloody dissent (Caton 1990: 91). The unity of even the most minimal subunit was thus turned into a hollow mockery once the least common denominator of that social unit became, by definition, the individual himself. I make this point in some confidence without necessarily meaning to suggest, or still less, to espouse, a dyadic or network theory of inter-personal relationships and interaction. This is so because I have personally documented at least seven such cases among the Aith Waryaghar alone (Hart 1976: 324-325, 329-338; 1997[a]: 54-76; 1997[b]). Although I am not really in a position to comment on their incidence elsewhere in the Central Rif, I believe them to have been the rule among the neighboring tribes as well. By my extrapolations, vendettas outnumbered feuds by almost two to one in Waryagharland, by 122 to 71 (and by 63 to 37 percent, respectively), to reach the combined figure of 193 noted above for the period of the *Ripublik*, or approximately 1880 to 1921 (Hart 1989: 767; 1997[a]: 54). This means an average of eight separate and distinct conflicts going on perpetually during this whole period, within the tribal territory.

Here I will discuss only one such case, but in considerable detail, for it is unquestionably the one on which I have the best documentation: that of the Imjjat lineage located in the little community of l-ʿAss in the mountain section of the Aith Turirth, a feud that became a vendetta (Hart 1976: 325-338; 1997[a]: 54-76; 1997[c]). I should state at the outset my full realization that the repetition of the names of the *dramatis personae*, and the endless recombinations of them, may at times be most bewildering to the reader; but I must beg his indulgence, as this is what happens when one is dealing with a society in which sons are normally named for their paternal grandfathers (i.e., for a father to name his son after his own father) and in which there are only a limited number of names to go around. In a situation as complicated as the one to follow, it is impossible and pointless to assign fictitious names to all the people concerned.

The Aith Turirth section contains no less than seventeen resident lineage groups. Nine of these are demonstrably related to each other genealogically as of a good eight or more generations back; and they can also claim to be both autochthonous as well as descended from a single common ancestor named ᶜAmar (ibid.: 270-274). But they are also held to have bought their land from the adjacent Igzinnayen section of the Asht ᶜAru ᶜAisa. Even so, it was another Igzinnayen lineage group, the Imjjat, the last of a further eight 'stranger' lineages whose ancestors had come into the sectional territory somewhat later, that started off the feud-turned-vendetta in question, one which had major implications not only for the descendants of their key member and point of fission who went to Waryagharland and bought land in the Aith Turirth, but for those who stayed at home in Hibir (Hibil) in the large Igzinnayen section of the Asht ᶜAsim, as well.

The individual who generated this feud was a certain Muhand w-ᶜAri (ᶜAli) n-ᶜAbd r-Harim (ᶜAbd al-Halim), otherwise known as the Fqir Azzugwagh, the Red-Headed Lay Brother – as he was a member of the Darqawa *tariqa* or religious order – who moved north to Waryagharland from his Igzinnayen homeland in Hibir shortly after 1850. The reason for his sudden departure from home was the usual Rifian one of the period: he had had a quarrel with and had killed a *sharif* of the Asht ᶜAru ᶜAisa (who, like the Imrabdhen of the Aith Waryaghar, form a whole section or clan of Idrisid *shurfa*, some of whose members have great local prestige). His physical displacement from the Imjjat, the name of his lineage group, in Hibir in the Igzinnayen to establish a new and territorially distinct line of Imjjat in the Aith Turirth of the Aith Waryaghar acted at once as a sealing of ties and as a guarantee of death by violence across the tribal border.

The Fqir Azzugwagh, by which nickname I shall refer to him henceforth, went first to Bulma, above and east of the Nkur River, where the locally resident and autochthonous Yinn Hand w-ᶜAbdallah lineage group sold him some land and 'gave' him a wife. He settled in Bulma, but later met a Bulma man named ᶜAisa w-ᶜAmar from another local lineage, the Aith ᶜAru Musa, who assured him that the land further up beyond Bulma (which has no water) in l-ᶜAss (meaning 'garden') was excellent. Hence they both went up together to find that the land in l-ᶜAss, at 1400 meters in altitude, was indeed good, and had permanent water. Here in 1870 they jointly bought the land in question from its previous owners of the Ihammuthen and Yinn Hand w-ᶜAbdallah lineages. They built a house beside the mountain stream which ran across the land, and an olive press nearby. All expenses were halved; and to this day the descendants of ᶜAisa w-ᶜAmar, who had only one son, live

down below, beside the stream and the olive press, while those of the four sons of the Fqir Azzugwagh – ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh and Muh Uzzugwagh – live up above, on the grain-cultivated slopes of l-ᶜAss.

After the installation of the Fqir Azzugwagh in l-ᶜAss, his sons grew up and married: ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh and Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh both to women of the Aith Uswir lineage, and Mzzyan Uzzugwagh to one of the Aith Mhand u-Saᶜid lineage in Ignan. But Muh Uzzugwagh, who may in fact have been the eldest son, was killed early on, and his widow was then remarried to his brother Mzzyan in a case of widow inheritance. It should be noted here that both widow inheritance and its opposite number, the sororate, are very common practices in the Rif, and the first, which is not to be confused with the levirate, is particularly so. It is designed primarily to keep property within the family circle and as intact as possible as well as to provide a suitable home for the widow – who is also free to refuse to be so remarried, if she chooses, which few do (Hart 1976: 220-221).

At any rate, the Fqir Uzzugwagh himself continued to live down below with ᶜAmar w-ᶜAisa, the son of ᶜAisa w-ᶜAmar, who had become his son-in-law by marrying his daughter Fadhma Uzzugwagh, while his own sons built their new houses on the upper slope. It was through the support of these sons, all excellent fighters save for Muh Akkuh, that the Fqir Azzugwagh, a stranger, became one of the two most powerful men in all the Aith Turirth. At this point events began to unfold, and I relate them in sequence, numbered as individual and more or less indivisible units of action, or phases of the feud-to-vendetta which developed.

1 There was only one other man in the region who was strong enough to challenge the Fqir Azzugwagh: the Hajj Amᶜawsh of the Yinn ᶜAru Misaᶜud (Hand w-ᶜAbdallah) lineage of Bulma. One day the latter and his agnates, along with some extra men from the Aith ᶜArus and the Aith Bu Khrif, all of whom wanted to cut the Fqir down to size, came up to l-ᶜAss with the intention of burning down his house. But the Fqir, now old and blind, yelled at his sons that they would never again be welcome in his house if they did not start shooting at the unsolicited visitors. So when the latter reached the olive press on their uphill tramp, the Fqir's sons fired on them in a volley, wounding several; and the remainder then fled back along the path by which they had come.

2 Next, about 1884, a paternal uncle of the Hajj Amᶜawsh killed a man from the Iznagen, the leading 'stranger' lineage established in Tigzirin: one of

the dead man's own agnates had wanted him out of the way and had promised the Hajj some land and a woman if he dispatched him. Thus the Iznagen obtained the protection of the Hajj Amᶜawsh, some of whose own sons now moved to their community of Tigzirin; and the Hajj Amᶜawsh gave the woman in question in marriage to one of his own sons.

It should be noted here that the Iznagen had previously fought amongst themselves but not against any of their new allies. Of the various Aith Turirth lineage groups, whether homegrown or accreted, only the very much accreted Ihawtshen, also in Tigzirin, who did not feud and who traditionally buried the dead of the lineages that did, remained apart and outside, despised by all. There was a repeat performance soon after, when another Iznagen man wanted the Hajj Amᶜawsh to kill one of his agnates; and thus the Hajj gained even more land in Tigzirin.

3 At this point the picture became more complicated, for Muh Uzzugwagh was killed in 1897 by one of the members of the Imjjat lineage, one Muh n-Bu Yarij, who had stayed at home in Hibir in the Igzinnayen. Muh n-Bu Yarij now fled as an *adhrib* or exile to Iharrushen (also in the Asht ᶜAsim section of the Igzinnayen), where Muh Uzzugwagh's brothers ᶜAmar and Mzzyan rushed to seek him out and kill him. However, they were prevented from doing so by the Iharrushen locals, who came out and fired a volley at them. Mzzyan Uzzugwagh escaped but ᶜAmar was wounded in the leg and remained lame for life. As it happened, however, he took refuge in the very same house where Muh n-Bu Yarij was hiding. Here he also now received the protection of the wife of its owner through the ritual act of grasping the handle of the quern for grinding grain, a woman's exclusive property, and thereby becoming an *istihurm* (ibid. 330). And here he stayed until he was able to pay a *haqq* fine of 1000 duros imposed upon him by the *imgharen* of Iharrushen.

A week later, however, ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh and his brother Mzzyan went to a wedding at the ancestral lineage seat of Hibir in the Igzinnayen. Here they found Muh n-Bu Yarij whom, under cover of the ceremonies, they dispatched with their knives before returning to l-ᶜAss.

And now their old father, the Fqir Azzugwagh, died peacefully in bed, although not before he had apportioned their allotted and equal shares of his patrimony to his remaining sons ᶜAmar, Mzzyan and Muh Akkuh.

4 Meanwhile, the alliance between the Hajj Amᶜawsh and the Iznagen lineage had become precarious. One day the Dharwa nj-Hajj Amᶜawsh (Rif., lit. 'sons of the Hajj Amᶜawsh') went from Bulma to Tigzirin to cut brushwood, but they started to do so on Iznagen pastureland, and the latter pro-

tested. No shots were fired, but the Iznagen, who were beginning to think that the Hajj's protection was becoming somewhat onerous, went to l-ᶜAss to tell ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh what had happened. ᶜAmar had now become the head of the Imjjat lineage in l-ᶜAss since his father's death, but his leadership was not to remain uncontested for long.

5 For in l-ᶜAss, a rift had already developed between the two full brothers ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh and Mzzyan Uzzugwagh: the quarrel was over a woman and the question of her inheritance, which occurred well after their own inheritance from their late father the Fqir Azzugwagh had been divided up between them during his lifetime. When their brother Muh Uzzugwagh had been killed, it may be recalled that his wife was taken over in proper widow-inheritance fashion by Mzzyan. This woman, however, had already had a daughter, Fattush, by her first husband, the late Muh Uzzugwagh. Now ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh wanted to marry this daughter, Fattush n-Muh Uzzugwagh, to his own eldest son and her patrilateral parallel cousin, Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh. But Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, who had become the girl's stepfather by virtue of having married her mother, was in no way agreed to this. He figured that her share of the inheritance would thereby escape him completely, and that it would all go to ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh. Therefore he denied his brother's request and, as the girl's guardian, he married her off into the Yinn ᶜAri Mqaddim lineage in the Timarzga section. In so doing, he kept her inheritance and gained new allies, at the same time. His brother ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, furious, now saw to the marriage of his second son, Mhand n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, to another girl of the Yinn ᶜAri Mqaddim lineage in the Timarzga, and then to that of his third son, ᶜAllush n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, to a girl in another, neighboring Timarzga lineage, the Yinn ᶜAbdallah, which was hostile to the Yinn ᶜAri Mqaddim. Thus ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh tried to check, but could not checkmate, his brother Mzzyan's moves toward lineage leadership.

6 Even wilder with rage and frustration than ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh was his eldest son Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, who was to prove himself the toughest member of a very tough lineage. If, he said, he could not marry his parallel cousin Fattush, he would not marry at all; and he was thus, aged nearly thirty-five, the only bachelor *amghar* in the *aitharbi'in*. He had gained a reputation as a 'gunslinger' and everyone was afraid of him. He had, no doubt, severe psychological problems as well, for he was his father's first-born son and two of his younger brothers had married before him. He was an excellent shot, and his excuse for carrying two rifles (one of them a much-coveted French Model 1886 Lebel carbine) was that if the barrel of one got hot while he was blasting away in his *ashbar*, he always had the other! He evidently also

took tremendous personal risks in combat, but, until the day he was killed, he was never once touched by an enemy bullet. His name was still remembered by old informants in the 1980s as someone not to be trifled with.

Finally, however, Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh married young Fatima Umrabit ᶜAri of the Shurfa' n-Sidi Hand u-Musa (from the Asht ᶜAru ᶜAisa section of the Igzinnayen, but resident in Kinnirth, near l-ᶜAss, in Aith Waryaghar territory) – she was fourteen, he was thirty-five. Ironically, he produced no sons, only two daughters, as a result of this marriage: one of these died in childhood and the other, as of the period of my initial fieldwork, 1954-1965, was married to a man of the Aith Uswir, one of the nine 'original' Aith Turirth lineages. Even so, Muh n-ᶜAmar had a premonition that he was going to die by violence, and he did not want his child bride to be widow-inherited by any of his surviving brothers. However, this is exactly what happened, not only once, but twice: it was indeed one of only two such cases of double widow-inheritance that I recorded in the Aith Turirth. It is also worth recording that Fatima Umrabit ᶜAri, who only died on July 2, 1985, aged at least eighty, had long outlasted all three of her husbands, by all of whom, I should may add, she had had children: indeed, she survived her last husband, the Hajj Hammadi n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, who had died in 1946, by thirty-nine years.

7 The Hajj Amᶜawsh, waiting on the sidelines, was quick to take advantage of the breach between the full brothers ᶜAmar and Mzzyan Uzzugwagh. So he now allied himself to Mzzyan by 'giving' his granddaughter, Maryim Yighidh nj-Hajj Amᶜawsh, to Mzzyan's nephew Muh n-Muh Uzzugwagh, the only son of the late Muh Uzzugwagh, named, exceptionally, for his father because the latter had been killed while his wife was still pregnant – for, as noted, normal practice is to name boys for their grandfathers. And now, as a reaction, the Aith Uswir, already allied to ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, became doubly so when one of the Hajj's sons, Dris nj-Hajj Amᶜawsh, in the company of Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, ambushed and killed an Aith Uswir man on a path leading to the Tuesday Market of Azraf (Azlaf) in the Axt Tuzin. On another occasion the Hajj Amᶜawsh himself, again with Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, ambushed two Aith Turirth men, from the r-Mquddam Hand w-ᶜAbdallah and the Iznagen lineages respectively, as they were returning home from the Wednesday Market of Tawrirt. Hence these two lineages were now even more solidly in ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh's camp; and so, it also seems, were the Aith Mhand u-Saᶜid, one of whose members had also evidently been ambushed on another occasion by Mzzyan Uzzugwagh on the very same path to the market at Azraf.

At this point the Hajj Amᶜawsh, now very old, made the pilgrimage to Mecca and died there meritoriously after becoming a *hajj*. It is ironic that both he and the Fqir Azzugwagh, between whom the trouble had begun in the first place, should have died of simple old age, when this was true of almost none of the rest of our cast of characters.

8 As a result of all the foregoing events, the two *liff*-s or factions within the Aith Turirth underwent a complete shift in membership. Previously the Fqir Azzugwagh and his sons had been against the Hajj Amᶜawsh and his; but now two of the Fqir's sons, the full brothers ᶜAmar and Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, were pitted against each other. On the side of ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh were the Aith ᶜAru Musa, the Iznagen, the Aith Mhand u-Saᶜid, the Aith Uswir, the r-Mquddam Hand w-ᶜAbdallah, the Ihammuthen, the Aith Ufaran, the Aith Hand u-Misaᶜud and the Aith Yaᶜqub, while aligned with Mzzyan Uzzugwagh were the Yinn ᶜAru Misaᶜud Hand w-ᶜAbdallah (the lineage group of the Hajj Amᶜawsh), the Yinn bil-Lahsin Hand w-ᶜAbdallah, the Itufaliyen or Yinn Tufali Hand w-ᶜAbdallah, the Ibutaharen n-Bulma (also of the Yinn Hand w-ᶜAbdallah), the Aith Yikhrif u-Hand (as enemies of the Aith ᶜAru Musa), and the Yinn ᶜAri Mqaddim lineage of Timarzga. Most if not all of these alliances had been created through marriage and the resulting establishment of affinal ties.

Furthermore, as the Imjjat or Dharwa Ufqir Azzugwagh in l-ᶜAss were now divided, so were those Imjjat who had remained in their ancestral home in Hibir in the Igzinnayen. The Iqudhadhen and the Imrafen backed ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, while the Dharwa n-ᶜAri, of which the Dharwa Ufqir Azzugwagh were themselves a branch, were split in half: the Dharwa n-Mzzyan n-ᶜAri, or sons of Mzzyan n-ᶜAri, were with ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, while Mzzyan n-ᶜAri's own brother Azarqan (Blue Eyes) n-ᶜAri backed Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, as did the Ibinhadduthen and the 'true' Dharwa n-ᶜAri. This last-mentioned sublineage produced the brothers Muh n-Bu Yarij, who had been killed earlier by ᶜAmar and Mzzyan Uzzugwagh jointly, before they split, and Aqshar ('Scabhead') n-Bu Yarij, of whom we will hear more presently.

9 The real crunch was soon to come. First of all, the Aith Mhand u-Saᶜid in Ignan, his own allies, threatened ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh with war if he did not agree to kill his brother Mzzyan (who, it will be remembered, had earlier shot and killed one of their men, Muh Amzzyan n-ᶜAisa, on a path leading to the Tuesday Market of Azraf in the Axt Tuzin, in another, private quarrel). Hence ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh decided to send his two eldest sons Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh and ᶜAllush n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, aided by Muh n-ᶜAmar w-ᶜAisa, who lived in the land down below ᶜAmar Uzzuwagh and his sons in

l-ʿAss, and who was also the latter's own sister's son, to deal with his brother Mzzyan once and for all. The hatred of Muh n-ʿAmar Uzzugwagh for his uncle Mzzyan was intense in any case, and he rejoiced at the thought that it was he who had been elected to put him out of the way. So the three of them went to the fruit orchard in l-ʿAss, where they waited for Mzzyan. In due course the latter came out of his house accompanied by Muh n-Muh Uzzugwagh, the son of his deceased brother Muh, and by his *akhammas* (contractual sharecropper traditionally paid one-fifth of the grain harvest for his services, an institution which was very common in the Rif until the major 1970 labor exodus to Europe). ʿAllush n-ʿAmar Uzzugwagh, hidden, now fired at Mzzyan but only wounded him in the leg. Mzzyan escaped, while ʿAllush, wanting to pursue him, could not find him, and after half an hour gave up and went home. However, at the same moment that ʿAllush had fired, his brother Muh n-ʿAmar also fired a second shot, killing their cousin Muh n-Muh Uzzugwagh instantly and outright. It seems that only the previous day Muh n-Muh had grievously insulted his uncle ʿAmar Uzzugwagh when Muh n-ʿAmar was present, and the latter had sworn to kill him within twenty-four hours. The unidentified *akhammas* wisely fled, never to reappear.

While the noise of rifle fire echoed around the valley, Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh now crept out of his house unobserved. He was on Mzzyan's side because his daughter was married to Mzzyan's son Muh Akkuh n-Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, her patrilateral parallel cousin. Now, still hidden behind his cactus hedge, Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh saw ʿAmar w-ʿAisa emerge from his own house down below to see what the matter was; and he shot him down as soon as he reached the garden. Another man named Muh n-Si Muhand, of the Yinn Mzzyan n-ʿAri sublineage of the Imjjat in Hibir, who was with Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh, was then spotted and shot by Muh n-ʿAmar Uzzugwagh. The latter had now killed two men that day, and he was not through yet.

During the course of this lethal exchange Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, wounded, hid himself in a ravine. ʿAmar Uzzugwagh himself passed by, and thinking that his son ʿAllush had possibly been killed, as he had not seen him return home after wounding Mzzyan, called out to his other son Muh, 'Where is your brother ʿAllush?'

Muh n-ʿAmar Uzzugwagh, who had seen Mzzyan fall and who knew that he was somewhere nearby, now yelled back, 'Father, be careful of Uncle Mzzyan!' At this very moment Mzzyan, who still had his rifle and who was locally famous as a sharpshooter, lifted it up with difficulty, took careful aim and drilled his brother ʿAmar through the head. In so doing, he gave his posi-

tion away to his brother's son Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh. The latter, horrified at his father's death, rushed up to his uncle Mzzyan and with his two rifles pumped no less than eleven bullets into the latter's body. Then he left, thinking that Mzzyan was dead; but tradition has it that even with all this lead in his body, Mzzyan Uzzugwagh lay in that ravine for yet another two weeks before he finally expired.

Thus in one day, ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, Muh n-Muh Uzzugwagh, Muh n-Si Muhand of Hibir and ᶜAmar w-ᶜAisa, the Fqir Azzugwagh's partner from the Aith ᶜAru Musa, all died, and Mzzyan Uzzugwagh was as good as dead, despite the fifteen days of semi-consciousness left to him. Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh had won a Pyrrhic victory; and the members of the Ihawtshen lineage came to take away the corpses and bury them in the Bulma cemetery. If we take the trouble to do the accounting, we may note that the cycle, in Favret's idiom, was still incomplete (Favret 1968).

10 The original feud between the Fqir Azzugwagh and the Hajj Amᶜawsh had now very definitely both expanded and contracted into a strongly factional vendetta, in which the positions of the various lineages and sublineages in the two major *liff*-s of the Aith Turirth now became completely re-crystallized. They were headed by the sons of the late ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh on the one hand and by those of the late Mzzyan (and Muh Akkuh) Uzzugwagh, plus those of the late Hajj Amᶜawsh, on the other. Twenty-five men of the Aith Uswir had also died violently in another and different vendetta between the descendants of two brothers, Tarib (Talib) Hand u-Saᶜid and Muhand Hand u-Saᶜid; but most of the Aith Uswir remained solidly in the faction of the Dharwa n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, the sons of ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh.

11 It was now about 1918, and World War I was coming to an end in Europe; but the grandsons of the Fqir Azzugwagh were at best only dimly aware, if even that, that a larger struggle than their own was about to culminate in an Allied victory. Even though they would doubtlessly have been among the first to denounce fighting within the Muslim *umma* or community (of Morocco or even at large) as hateful in the sight of God, they were far more concerned with their own allies and enemies than they would ever have been over a far-off war among Christian nations.

It was at this point too that Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh contacted Aqshar n-Bu Yarij, the Scabhead from the Imjjat in Hibir, whose brother Muh n-Bu Yarij had much earlier on been killed by ᶜAmar (and by Mzzyan) Uzzugwagh. Muh Akkuh was now the only important and effective member left of Mzzyan's family and faction, as Mzzyan's own sons were still small boys. Muh

Akkuh gave Aqshar the Scabhead money 'under the counter' as a bribe (as *dhazttat*, in Rifian parlance) to kill his brother's son Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh. The sons of the Hajj Amᶜawsh were no longer a major force to be reckoned with and beyond giving Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh their moral support, they had pretty well dropped out of the picture. The erstwhile feud had now very definitely become a vendetta, if this distinction is to be maintained: for the real purpose of the exercise is to show how easily the one can turn into the other.

12 Other things were happening among the Imjjat in Hibir as well. Mzzyan n-ᶜAri, in *liff* with the sons of ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, fled from Hibir to l-ᶜAss as an *adhrib* or vendetta exile. Among those against him was his own brother Azarqan n-ᶜAri the Blue-Eyed, but the man who pursued him uphill and down dale for some ten kilometers to l-ᶜAss and who finally shot him there was a younger brother of Muh n-Bu Yarij and Aqshar n-Bu Yarij the Scabhead, who was still living in Hibir in the early 1960s.

13 Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh had now, by about 1919-1920, been married for three years, and one day he was invited by his father-in-law, the Amrabit ᶜAri of Kinnirth, to have lunch. Aqshar n-Bu Yarij had been invited as well, but after the meal was over, he announced that he had to leave in order to get back to Hibir by nightfall. So Aqshar, who was armed, of course, left the house but only to hide himself in a convenient spot close by, behind a large rock with a towering Aleppo pine tree behind it. Shortly thereafter, Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh came out of the house at a call from his wife's sister's husband, Muh n-bin Haddu, who was also of the same Imjjat sublineage in Hibir as was Aqshar n-Bu Yarij, and who was also in on the plot. Muh n-bin Haddu, up above the rock behind which Aqshar the Scabhead was hiding, called out, 'Oh *Amghar*!' (using Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh's title of councillor). Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh paused in his stride, looked up and replied, 'What?' – and Aqshar the Scabhead immediately shot him through the head. Muh n-ᶜAmar's father-in-law, the Amrabit ᶜAri, had also been implicated in the setting-up of his son-in-law, for Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh had also given him money to invite Muh n-ᶜAmar to his house: *dhazttat* bribery once again, paid by Muh Akkuh a second time, and considerably more than enough to defray the expenses of the meal in question.

14 Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, who had been considered virtually unkillable, was now dead; but he had four surviving younger brothers. Three of them, Mhand, ᶜAllush and Hammadi, went to see the Amrabit ᶜAri three months later, after the mourning period was over. They told him that unless he produced Muh n-bin Haddu, who had fled back to Hibir after the killing

of their brother Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, they would kill him. The Amrabit ᶜAri was forced to comply, so one day he brought Muh n-bin Haddu to l-ᶜAss to eat with Hammadi n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh. After the meal, the Amrabit made the excuse that he wanted to see his daughter Fatima (the fabled young girl who first became the wife of Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh, then of his brother ᶜAisa n-ᶜAmar, and finally, of the brother here in question, Hammadi n-ᶜAmar); and so he left. At this point, Hammadi, hiding behind a door, grabbed a billhook, struck Muh n-bin Haddu with it on the head with all his strength, and killed him. He then called to his brothers to throw the body into the same crevice where Muh n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh had fallen three months earlier.

Meanwhile, Muh n-ᶜAmar w-ᶜAisa (the grandson of the Fqir Azzugwagh's old partner, as well as the Fqir's own grandson through his daughter) and ᶜAisa n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh were plowing on the mountain slope, together with ᶜAmar n-bin Haddu, the brother of the late Muh n-bin Haddu, and his son Muhammad. Hammadi n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh sent a woman up to the field to tell Muh n-ᶜAmar w-ᶜAisa that Muh n-bin Haddu was dead. Immediately on receipt of the news, Muh n-ᶜAmar w-ᶜAisa dropped his plow; and in the same motion he picked up his rifle and shot both ᶜAmar n-bin Haddu and his son, dropping them dead in their tracks. Once again, the Ihawtshen took the bodies to the Bulma cemetery for burial; and the sons of ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh were now very definitely 'one up'.

15 Now Mhand, ᶜAllush and Hammadi n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh called the Iznagen people to come and remove the livestock of their uncle Muh Akkuh Uzzugwagh. But the latter heard what was afoot, so he climbed an Aleppo pine tree with his rifle and perched attentively on one of its branches. When the Iznagen arrived, he fired at them and wounded two. However, at virtually the same time, Mhand n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh shot a woman, his own patri-parallel cousin, Fadhma n-Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, the daughter of his late uncle Mzzyan Uzzugwagh, as well as the latter's goatherd, both with a single bullet, as they were standing in the doorway of Mzzyan's house to watch the proceedings. Thus two for the price of one, so to speak, with the sons of ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh going one (or two) up once again. The killing of this woman was one of the few exceptions to the normally ironclad rule that women were exempt from the male occupation and pursuit of the bloodfeud and/or the vendetta.

16 But Mhand n-ᶜAmar Uzzugwagh was soon to receive his just deserts. While plowing his field on a hot day, he got thirsty, and made the great tactical error of going to the house of his late uncle Mzzyan Uzzugwagh in



Approximate distance between Igharm Amazdar and Ait 'Atta bureaux

Southern Morocco, the Saghru and the Ait ᶜAtta: The Ethnographic and Historical Evidence

Legends and History

The Berber-speaking tribesmen of the Central High Atlas range, the Saghru massif and the Dra-Tafilalt oasis region to the south, in what is known as the pre-Saharan steppe area, are a very different matter from the Rifians: not only do they inhabit another part of Morocco entirely, but they speak a different Berber dialect, *tamazight* as opposed to *dharifith*, and refer to themselves, correspondingly, as Imazighen rather than Irifiyen. Once again, although they number some thirteen large tribal groupings or agglomerations in all (i.e., the Ait Murghad, Ait Hadiddu, Ait Yihya, Ait Izdig and Ait Yumur, all forming collectively a confederacy known as the Ait Yafalman; and the Ait ᶜAtta, the Ait Siddrat, the Ait Sukhman, the Ihansalen, the Ait Massad, the Ait Bu Gimmaz, the Ait Mhand and the Ait ᶜAyyash), as well as a further ten if we include the additional agglomerations in the Middle Atlas and its environs to the north, some of which are also very large (e.g., the Igarwan, the Ait Ndhir, the Ait Saghrushshn, the Zimmur or Ait Zuggwagh, the Iziyyan or Zayyan, the Ishqiren, the Ait Zgugu, the Ait Mgild or Myil, the Ait Yusi and the Imarmushen), I will concentrate here only on the southernmost of these groups, the Ait ᶜAtta. Nonetheless, references to some of their neighbors will be frequent, in particular to the Ait Yafalman confederacy and the Ait Siddrat, with whom their relations were hostile in the extreme. Between 1959 and 1965, I spent a full year, total time elapsed, doing intensive fieldwork among the Ait ᶜAtta and some of these neighbors, with several return visits to the area, notably in 1975 and again in 1986.

Almost all of these Imazighen groupings are of interest in one way or another, but the Ait ᶜAtta are particularly remarkable because of their extreme attachment to their *izirf* or customary law (cf. Hart 1966; 1967, republished with addendum 1984[b]; 1973; 1977; 1981[a]; 1981[b]; 1984[a]; and 1997[a]: 77-149). According to my own interpolation of the Moroccan census materials of 1960, the Ait ᶜAtta at that time numbered a good 130,000, spread out

over seventeen administrative 'bureaux' in three central and southern provinces, Azilal (formerly Bni Mallal), Warzazat and Rashidiya (formerly Qsar s-Suq). There are proverbs to the effect that a census of the Ait ᶜAtta can never be properly taken because they are as numerous as stars in the sky, which is also why other Central Atlas Berber tribes refer to them as *izan*, 'flies', for Ait ᶜAtta men wear black *asilham*-s or burnouses albeit over long white shirts and turbans, while married women wear black robes and a special black triangular headdress, called *tabuqst*, with red and green threads. The total extent of Berber (as opposed to Arabic) toponymy and of sectional and lineage autochthonism among them are much higher than in the Rif, and can be calculated at 99.5 and at 85 percent respectively, probably the highest such figures in Morocco. They have, and quote constantly, two geographical landmark phrases referring to the enormous range of territory that they cover: 1) horizontally, 'from the holly oak (of the Middle Atlas) to the date palm (of the Dra and Tafilalt oases)', *zig tasaft* (or *zig tawkst*) *s-taini* (or the reverse, *zig taini s-tasaft*), to denote this territory in terms of its flora, and 2) vertically, 'from the fish to the mouflons', *zig isilman ar udaden*, to characterize it in terms of its fauna.

These are accurate thumbnail descriptions of a vast section of South-Central Morocco which covers about 50,000-55,000 square kilometers, from the peak of Awujja n-Uzurki (Mt. Azurki) at 3690 meters in the Central Atlas, the fifth highest mountain in the country, snow-covered for nine months of the year, south across the Tizi Mqqurn pass at 3223 meters; then south again to the Dadss and Tudgha River valleys; now uphill once more, though still in a southerly direction, to the lower but very jagged massif of the Jbil Saghru, with its highest peak, the Amalu n-Mansur, at 2712 meters and with the somewhat lower but even grimmer wilderness of the Bu Gafr escarpment, at 1900-2450 meters; from here south to the pre-Saharan oases of the Dra Valley and the Tafilalt; and finally, down to rest at the *hammada*-s and dune desert of Mhamid south of the Dra and of Tawuz and the Kamkam south of the Tafilalt. This huge expanse of terrain runs the gamut from snowy mountains to dune desert, and, as many of the Ait ᶜAtta as well as their neighbors are sheep transhumants, it all plays a major role in their ecology.

But the Ait ᶜAtta are by no means the only people, and still less the only ethnic group, who live within the boundaries of what I shall here call ᶜAttaland. Much of this large area, particularly the southern pre-Saharan oases, was formerly inhabited by a small Jewish minority and is still the home of sedentary date-cultivating negroid Haratin, who represent the oldest population in the region at large as well as one which in large part was until

Moroccan independence under the socio-economic domination of the Ait ᶜAtta and other tribes, both Berber and Arab. This client population, again according to the 1960 census, I have estimated at 430,000 in ᶜAttaland alone. Most of this territory came into Ait ᶜAtta hands by right of conquest: their point of origin and ancestral home, somewhat northwest of the center of the zone thus delimited, is the rocky and savage massif of the Jbil Saghru, almost totally denuded of vegetation, where their former tribal capital of Igharm Amazdar is located. The Saghru was also the scene of their last heroic resistance, under their leader ᶜAssu u-Ba Slam, against the forces of French colonialism at the epic Battle of Bu Gafr in February-March 1933 (cf. Hart 1977, 1984[a]: 159-185).

In order to understand the view that the Ait ᶜAtta retain of their own social structure, we should use as a point of departure their affirmation that they are all descended from a single common agnatic ancestor, a Berber tribesman named Dadda (Grandfather) ᶜAtta, whose simple and unpretentious tomb of mud and stone is located in the secluded gorge of Taqqat n-Iliktawen, north of the Ktawa region (Ar. *l-Ktawa* or Tam. *Iliktawen*) in the Upper Dra Valley. Even though they are unable to 'prove' their descent from Dadda ᶜAtta on a step-by-step genealogical basis (for they have no genealogical charter to justify it), the Ait ᶜAtta nonetheless insist on it, and do so vigorously. Because of this insistence, I regard them not as a confederacy, but as a supertribe (cf. Hart 1981[a]: 1-69; 1984[a]; 1-39). They maintain, furthermore, that Dadda ᶜAtta came from the Saghru down to the edge of the desert and that he was killed in battle against unidentified Saharan Arabs, probably one of the Maᶜqil groups. From this fact must have come the sobriquet 'Ait ᶜAtta of the Sahara', which is so often to be found in the French colonial literature (cf. Spillmann 1936, de Monts de Savasse 1951[a]) but which I view as erroneous and which I feel should more appropriately read 'Ait ᶜAtta of the Saghru': for they are also equally vigorous in their assertions that the Saghru is their point of origin.

It is only through historical inference that the period in which Dadda ᶜAtta lived can be tentatively placed in about the mid-sixteenth century, as a result of his alleged association with the two *igurramen* (sing. *agurram*) who were to become the major and minor saints, respectively, of the Ait ᶜAtta: Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn and Sidi Saᶜid Ahansal. Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn is regarded as their patron saint by all Ait ᶜAtta, but particularly by those who live to the south and east of Bu Maln in the Dadss Valley, which is to say by the great majority. They bring their annual *ziyara* offering every year in February-March to his shrine in the Zawiya Amghariyin (a name which strongly suggests a Berber origin, but one which happens in fact to belong to

yet another line of Idrisid *shurfa'*) at Tamsluht, 20 kilometers southwest of Marrakesh, to be divided up among his descendants there – although he also has other descendants resident in the Saghru. Sidi Saᶜid Ahansal, on the other hand, whose shrine is in the Central Atlas territory of the Ihansalen tribe who claim him as their ancestor (cf. Gellner 1969), receives only the attention of those Ait ᶜAtta, the minority, who live north of the Dadss Valley. Mawlay ᶜAbdallah's death occurred at some point between 1566 and 1592, while Sidi Saᶜid can be only tentatively dated, through the inference of genealogy, to about the late fourteenth century. Dadda ᶜAtta, the eponymous and lay tribal ancestor of the Ait ᶜAtta, is linked mythologically to both these saints; and I will examine some of the legends which justify his connections with them shortly.

The Ait ᶜAtta were, and still are, for the most part, sheep transhumants; and their initial expansion toward the north was certainly connected to their ever-present desire for grass for their sheep. On the other hand, their later deployments to the oases of the Dra Valley south of the Saghru and to those of the Tafilalt to the east were made at the invitation of the resident Haratin, who wanted them to move in and establish contingents there as protection against the incursions of other tribes, whether Berber or Arab. This protected status put those groups of Haratin that had requested it (and by no means all of them did so) into a state of clientage, *raᶜaya*, vis-à-vis the newly installed Ait ᶜAtta contingents. The latter now became their guardians, and received an annual share of their date and grain harvests, a share which showed a certain variation from one part of the Dra Valley to another (and one which, over time, diminished from 1/14 to 1/31); but it was always much less than the traditional one-fifth allotted to sharecroppers all over the Maghrib. This last is indeed the figure that many Ait ᶜAtta, reversing the facts of the case, stated that they themselves turned over to their Haratin (for fuller details, cf. Hart 1981[a]: 211-217, 1984[a]: 123-158 and 1993).

Transhumance (*tarahhalt*) implies both the existence of permanent houses and of seasonal agricultural activity, generally in winter down in the river valleys, together with two well-defined annual moves, up into the mountains (in this case the Central Atlas) in spring for pasturing the sheep while their herders live in goathair tents, and back down into the valleys in the early autumn, before the beginning of the rains and snow. For example, while the transhumance of the Ait Slillu of Nqub or of the Ilimshan (the section or *taqbilt* of ᶜAssu u-Ba Slam) or, formerly, of the Ait l-Firsi of the Saghru, or indeed of any of the seven disparate southern groups of the Ait Bu Iknifen, is indeed very long-ranging, two hundred kilometers or more, this is by no means the

case everywhere. Generally, however, it is the same people in any Ait ᶜAtta local community who continue to transhume or to stay at home every year, although in 1961 the *amghar* at Usikis, an Ait ᶜAtta local community on the southern slope of the Central Atlas, informed me that he now only went on transhumance as far as the 'bureau' at Msimrir, 5 kilometers to the north, on Saturdays, which is market day there!

From the Saghru, where they say that they started out as full-scale sheep nomads, the Ait ᶜAtta first moved north toward the Central Atlas, although this move probably did not take place until the late sixteenth century at the earliest. They only evidently modified this nomadism to a state of transhumance when they discovered the advantages of agriculture from the Haratin as well as those of adopting the three-to-four-storeyed mud-and-stone fortress-houses owned by Haratin and others in the Dadss Valley to the north: these fortress-houses, known as *qsur* (sing. *qsar*) in Arabic and *igharman* (sing. *igharm*) in Tamazight, were built in an architectural style which prevails everywhere south of the Atlas, with inside courtyards, staircases, individual rooms for nuclear families, minuscule window-loopholes and rooftop crenelations.

There are justificatory legends not only for the Ait ᶜAtta interest in sheep, but also for their expansion, both north and south, and for their traditional linkage with both their major and minor patron saints, Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn and Sidi Saᶜid Ahansal, as well as with the descendants of both of them. There are legends too that justify the equally traditional hostility of the Ait ᶜAtta toward certain neighboring lay tribes, firstly toward the Ait Siddrat, and secondly, and more importantly, toward the tribal confederacy of the Ait Yafalman, in particular toward one of its member groups, the Ait Murghad. This last-mentioned tribe is held to have initiated the formation of the confederacy in question as of about 1630–1645, probably at *makhzan* instigation, precisely in order to check Ait ᶜAtta expansion; and indeed the Ait Yafalman were to block, effectively, Ait ᶜAtta progress in the northeast, although only there and nowhere else.

But it is well to remember another image which the Ait ᶜAtta project about their heartland and point of origin: they liken themselves to a horse which is tethered in and to the Saghru by a long rope, for no matter how far from it they may wander, they will always return to it eventually, as it is their home. Much later, in about 1890, they were to solidify their Saghru base by setting up an inviolate zone within it, the Tafrawt n-Ait ᶜAtta, which contains the local community known as Igharm Amazdar (lit. 'lower fortress') that was to become both their tribal capital (*l-ᶜasimt*) and their supreme court of appeal (*istinaf*). This fact, however, provided only the capstone of a good two cen-

turies of Ait ʿAtta expansion through conquest and annexation of occupied territory and, in the Dra Valley in particular, of enforced protection of its resident Haratin.

There are a number of legends which shed light on various aspects of these themes, and we recount five of them here in somewhat abbreviated form (cf. Hart 1997[a]: 88-98).

1 The first, dealing with Dadda ʿAtta and his forty grandsons (cf. my book of the same title, Hart 1981[a]: 10-15), accounts for the traditional enmity between the Ait ʿAtta and the Ait Siddrat, as follows: ʿAtta, a pastoralist in the Saghru, had forty sons whom he married off all at the same time. He also had a man from the Ait Siddrat in his employ as a shepherd. During the nuptials, this shepherd took all the sons' flintlock guns and filled their barrels with water. Then he sneaked off to tell his own fellow tribesmen to come and attack them. They did so, and as ʿAtta's sons were powerless to defend themselves with their waterlogged guns, they were all killed. But they had already spent two nights with their respective brides, now widowed, who all became pregnant and gave birth, in due course, to thirty-nine grandsons and one granddaughter. What happened to the granddaughter is not recorded, but ʿAtta himself, now and henceforth known as Dadda or Grandfather ʿAtta, lived until his grandsons were grown up and able to avenge their fathers', his own sons', deaths. They made near-total war on the Ait Siddrat, chasing them up to the Tizi n-l-ʿAzz pass in the Central Atlas, at which point a mare belonging to the Ait ʿAtta raised her foreleg. This was taken as a sign that they had to return to the Saghru, while the Ait Siddrat also took a long sought opportunity to escape further vengeance. However, from this point on relations between the two tribes remained hostile. Although Ait ʿAtta informants maintained that they could have killed off all the Ait Siddrat had they wanted to, they desisted from doing so because the latter were and are basically weak, as proven by their original sneak attack.

2 The second legend provides us with an account of Dadda ʿAtta's friendship with Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn and with an alternative version of Ait ʿAtta origins. In this one Dadda ʿAtta came from somewhere in the Western Atlas (not, it seems, from the Saghru) and went to Marrakesh, where he became a friend of the great saint Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn. One day, however, he got angry at the latter and quarreled not only with him but with most of the other saints in Marrakesh as well – which for an illiterate lay tribesman was no mean feat. The saints, with blood in their eyes, held a con-

clave with Mawlay ʿAbdallah in order to decide what to do about Dadda ʿAtta; and although Mawlay ʿAbdallah said he would never do anything against him, he admitted that it might be best for him to cool his heels by sending him to the Saghru and thereby keeping him at a safe distance. But afterward, he gave him one of his daughters to wife, and with her and his other wives (unspecified as to number or identity, although it should be noted parenthetically that their ancestor's polygyny stands in marked contrast to the situation among the Ait ʿAtta today, who are monogamous almost without exception), Dadda ʿAtta sired forty sons. He then died in battle against Maʿqil Arabs at Tuna n-Iʿaraben ('wells of the Arabs'), and was buried at Taqqat n-Iliktawen, as mentioned above.

3 The third legend explains the hostility between the Ait ʿAtta and the confederacy of the Ait Yafalman, for the former claim that the Ait Murghad tribe of this confederacy are really named *ait ghurm udi*, 'children of butter-giving' (in a piece of folk etymology through metathesis), because they traditionally gave butter to the Ait ʿAtta. One day an w-ʿAtta – a man of the Ait ʿAtta – came to them and demanded, 'Give me butter, as I want to rub it on my sandals'. The attendant u-Murghad – man of the Ait Murghad – replied that he had none, whereupon the w-ʿAtta picked up his sandals and slapped the u-Murghad across the face with them.

The furious u-Murghad rushed off to tell his fellow-tribesmen and allies what had happened, and so they all decided to form a *liff* or *mhamya*, a coalition, in order to attack the Ait ʿAtta. This coalition included the following tribes: the Ait Hadiddu, Ait Izdig, Ait Yihya (who, like the Igzinnayen in the Rif, are all held to be descended from Jallut, 'Goliath', as Guennoun, quoting yet another legend, would also hold the Ait ʿAtta themselves to be: cf. Guennoun 1939: 217-219), Ait ʿAisa Bu Hmar (whom I have not been able to identify satisfactorily), and of course the Ait Murghad. They all had an agreement drawn up to the effect that they would only find *anafalman*, or peace, through vengeance on the Ait ʿAtta, and that they would never again give them butter. Thus was formed the Ait Yafalman confederacy, and between them and the Ait ʿAtta there has been a state of open warfare and unrelenting hostility ever since.

4 The fourth legend accounts for the other special relationship between the Ait ʿAtta and the Zawiya Ahansal,and my account of it is in full agreement with that provided by Gellner (1969: 174-175). Sidi Saʿid Ahansal, a young Berber saint who had come from the Sus region of southwestern Morocco,

had only just settled in his new home in the Central Atlas and founded the zawiya that bears his name when he began to have trouble with two sets of lay tribal neighbors, the Ait Ughzu (probably mythical, and today nonexistent) and the Ait Wassar (also nonexistent as such today, although they almost certainly existed in the past: cf. Morsy 1972: 26-29). These two Berber groups asserted that the land that a third such group, the Ait Tagilla (who do still exist, but now between Azilal and Tanant), had given to Sidi Saᶜid was not theirs to give; and they remained unmollified despite his attempt to persuade or coerce them through magical means. So Sidi Saᶜid now played his trump card by calling on Dadda ᶜAtta and all his grandsons to come up and help him drive them out.

But Sidi Saᶜid's appeal was telepathic, and Dadda ᶜAtta's response to it was not immediate, as it took him seven years, seven months, seven days and seven hours to arrive. On arrival, too, Dadda ᶜAtta and his party saw that they had to cross the full and roaring Asif n-Uhansal, the Ahansal River. He grew impatient after waiting only three days for the torrent to abate, and he yelled at Sidi Saᶜid that he was about to leave, whereupon the latter reminded him pointedly of how very long he himself had waited. He then tapped with his stick and the river dried up instantly. Dadda ᶜAtta and his grandsons, duly impressed, crossed it dryshod.

Then Sidi Saᶜid and Dadda ᶜAtta made a covenant, *ᶜahd*, as a result of which the latter took up his arms and with no difficulty chased the two recalcitrant tribes out of the region entirely. They were never heard of again, which is obviously why there is no trace of either of them, locally, today. In recompense, Dadda ᶜAtta said that all he wanted was sufficient grass for his sheep for their annual summer transhumance. Sidi Saᶜid readily granted Dadda ᶜAtta and his grandsons full permission, and then asked him to select his preferred site of pasturage, which proved to be the Tizi n-Ilisi pass up to Talmast, Wawrirut and Tasillunt.

Documents to this effect were now drawn up; but although they stated that use of the land in question was to be for grazing only, the realization only came considerably later, well after the deaths of the two principals to the agreement, that Sidi Saᶜid Ahansal had in fact *given* this land to the Ait ᶜAtta. This is a point of major importance which was completely overlooked at the time, and there was, of course, no question of purchase in the original agreement. The result is that *ex post facto* repercussions continue annually and unabated to the present day, in the form of a pasturage brawl every summer between, principally, the resident Ait ᶜAtta of the Ait Bu Iknifen section at Talmast and their southern transhumant namesakes, with the Ihansalen as

interested spectators and one lay-oriented Ihansalen section, the Ait Umzrai, as even occasional participants. Neither the French protectorate administration nor the independent Moroccan one, despite their good intentions, has been able to resolve the issue satisfactorily, and even as of 1986 it continued as a nagging deadlock between the Ait Bu Iknifen sections concerned as well as between the provincial authorities of Warzazat and of Azilal in which each of them is territorially based. This was so despite a confident statement made to me in that year by an otherwise highly competent Warzazat provincial administrator who was directly concerned.

5 Finally, the fifth legend, which, unlike the others, is derived not from my own materials but from two earlier and unpublished reports (Azam 1946 and Niclausse 1954; but cf. also Hart 1984[a]: 40-62), attempts to account for the basis of the protection given by those Ait ʿAtta who moved south from the Saghru into the Dra Valley to the sedentary date-cultivating black Haratin populations long resident in most of the oases there. It also tries to account for some of the inter-ʿAtta dissension which developed in the region in question as a result. It seems that at the time of Sultan Mawlay Ismaʿil (1672-1727), a certain ʿAmamu. the *shaykh* of the Haratin of the Ktawa district near the Dra River bend, was feeling very oppressed by the onerous 'protection' of his nomadic Maʿqil Arab tribal patrons. He was well off and had heard of the powerful Ait ʿAtta of the Saghru, so he rode off to solicit their help. On arrival he asked a blacksmith (*amzil*, also black and also regarded by the Ait ʿAtta as low-class, not only for racial reasons but for occupational ones as well) to shoe his horse. The blacksmith raised the horse's hoof and found a silver horseshoe. ʿAmamu gave him several golden nails for it, saying, 'This is our custom'. The astonished smith called over his equally astonished Ait ʿAtta masters. Bowled over by such magnificence and attracted by promises subsequently made in writing on gazelle skin, the Ait ʿAtta gave their support to ʿAmamu and went to his country with a war party. They pushed back the Saharans without difficulty: the Ghnanma went back to the desert while most of the Bni Mhammad, who had been equally involved, simply submitted.

Then the Ait ʿAtta drew straws to see which of their sections would take over the guardianship of the Ktawa. The Ait ʿAisa u-Brahim section of the Ait Wahlim *khums* or 'fifth' (to which also belong the previously mentioned Ilimshan and Ait Bu Iknifen sections) won and installed themselves in the Ktawa and in neighboring districts to the north and south, the Fazwata and the Mhamid. But after a while, another Arab group, the Ulad Sultan, expelled them. The rest of the Ait ʿAtta returned, crushed the Ulad Sultan and, to

avoid any repetition of the incident, installed another of their sections, the Ait Isful (who belong to a different *khums*, that of the Ait Isful-Ait ʿAlwan), in one of the main *qsur* of the Fazwata.

The Ait ʿAtta zealously protected the Ktawa area although a rivalry soon developed between the Ait Isful and the Ait Wahlim. At the same time another section, the Ait ʿAlwan, surrounded the oasis and took over a smaller domain to the southeast. There was much fighting but the Ait Isful emerged victorious and took most of the Ait Wahlim positions away from them.

It is now worth considering the light that these legends, unconnected though they are, shed on what is known of Ait ʿAtta history. As it happens, they inform and illuminate a number of crucially important points. The Ait ʿAtta, as the southernmost end of the generalized Imazighen wedge pushing northwest toward the Middle Atlas from the seventeenth century on, could not have appeared on the scene any earlier than the mid-sixteenth. They did so, almost certainly, in the person of Dadda ʿAtta himself: the latter's unpretentious lay tribesman's grave forms a striking contrast to the green-roofed, tiled and far more ornate urban style Idrisid *zawiya* of the Amghariyin at Tamsluht, outside Marrakesh, where Dadda ʿAtta's saintly friend and protector Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn is buried (cf. Legend 2, above, and Hart 1984[a]: 53-54, 1997[a]: 94-96). By 1571, when we find the first European mention of the Ait ʿAtta in Luis del Marmol Carvajal, *Descripcion General de Africa* (1571, Vol. III, Chap. XIX: 17), Dadda ʿAtta had probably already seen all his grandsons grow to manhood (cf. Legends 1 and 2, above). It is at about this point, too, that we may postulate that a rapid multiplication and proliferation of these grandsons and their own sons began all over the southeast-central Moroccan landscape.

The first big Ait ʿAtta move was to the north, early in the seventeenth century, after Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn had assured them of three promises: that the Sultan would never exercise any authority over them, that they would always be free from syphilis, and that the Tizi Mqqurn pass, the 'Great Pass', which they had to cross on their way to their summer grazing grounds, would remain free from ambushes on the part of their enemies, the Ait Siddrat and the Ait Murghad (cf. Legends 1 and 3 above; also Spillmann 1936: 68). There is also independent evidence, from various sources, for the formation of the Ait Yafalaman confederacy, possibly at the ultimate instigation of the *makhzan*, but with full Ait Murghad approval, in order to combat the Ait ʿAtta, for the period 1630-1645 (cf., *inter alia*, Mezzine 1987: 26-83).

The next move was toward the south, possibly not until the first half of the eighteenth century, although Niclausse suggests a date as early as 1630 for a

written contract between Ait ʿAtta nomads and sedentary Haratin over the donation by the latter to the former of a *qsar* in the Ktawa (Niclausse 1954). This date also accords exactly with Mezzine's estimate of the date of the *taisa* pact between another saint, a Sidi ʿAbd al-ʿAli, a protege of Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn who acquired some of the latter's *baraka*, who died in 1647 and who is probably buried in the *zawiya* bearing his name north of Tinghir, and the majority of the tribes currently inhabiting the southern slope of the Central Atlas, including the Ait ʿAtta (Mezzine 1985; Mezzine and Hammam 1985). So the silver horseshoe legend and the aid requested of the Ait ʿAtta by the Hartani Shaykh ʿAmamu (cf. Legend 5, above) obviously does not predate these events. Furthermore, it appears that less than half a century later, in 1678, the Ait ʿAtta, still in full quantum expansion, had their first major clash with the ʿAlawid army of Sultan Mawlay Ismaʿil, who had made the mistake, as yet another legend (one not recounted above) has it, of cutting off eighty Ait ʿAtta ears: his forces, in an attempt to invade the Saghru, therefore perished in a blizzard caused through the supernatural agency and the *baraka* of Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn, who was fulfilling his end of the *ʿahd* contract he had made with Dadda ʿAtta by continuing to protect his lay tribal clients a century after the agreement had been made (Hart 1981[a]; 14-15). However, this may once again reflect the Ait ʿAtta version of the event, as another reading of the historical record would appear to show that only the reverse occurred and that, to the contrary, it was Mawlay Ismaʿil who had administered the trouncing to the Ait ʿAtta in 1678 without further repercussions (Hart 1984[a]: 52). In any event, Ait ʿAtta elders have long memories and Mawlay Ismaʿil is not a popular subject with them.

The final direction in which the Ait ʿAtta fanned out was eastward, to the Tafilalt and down to Tawuz and the Kamkam, in the desert. This last move clearly did not occur before the early nineteenth century, for, as Mezzine has noted (Mezzine 1987: 33), the Ait ʿAtta had only established their hegemony over the Rtab (or Rtbat) oasis zone just to the north of the c Tafilalt late in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, although grave threats were frequently posed to the Ait ʿAtta both by the Ait Yafalman confederacy to the north and by the *makhzan* when headed by a strong sultan, such as Mawlay Ismaʿil, the Ait ʿAtta came, over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to epitomize the concepts of tribalism, marginalism and what is probably best described as 'institutionalized dissidence' (Gellner 1969: 1). Their expansion, specially to the south and southeast, was a striking example of 'Berber Imperialism', as Dunn has aptly noted (Dunn 1973; Dunn 1977: 68-78). It may even be argued, on the basis of a late nineteenth-century eye-witness account

(Linares 1932), that it represented a kind of Berber *Wehrmacht* in miniature on the march, albeit less disciplined. *Qsur* were usurped, captured or burned, Haratin were intimidated, *shurfa'* were evicted and the Ait Yafalman were fought at every turn.

Indeed, the only recorded setback the Ait ᶜAtta appear to have suffered was one isolated defeat at the hands of the Ait Murghad at Tulwin near Gulmima in the spring of 1883, as reported by de Foucauld (de Foucauld 1924: 226), in which the former lost 1600 men as compared to a loss of only 400 by the latter. But this sanguinary encounter only took place after a year's truce, well after Gulmima and a number of other nearby *qsur* had been wrested from the Ait Murghad by the Ait ᶜAtta thirty years earlier: for the former, at *makhzan* instigation, had in 1854 murdered the top chief of the latter, one Brahim Izmar, who despite his investiture as *qa'id* had become overly recalcitrant about recognition of *makhzan* authority of any sort (Hart 1984[a]: 60). Ait ᶜAtta expansion was still going on full tilt when in 1899-1901 their Ait Khabbash section had its first sanguinary collisions with the French, as the latter, pushing southwest from the Algerian border, occupied the Tuwat Oasis in 1900. For that matter, Ait Khabbash resistance to France was to continue unchecked until 1934, even after the Bu Gafr battle was over the preceding year.

The secret of Ait ᶜAtta success was due, simply, to a remarkable degree of organizational cohesion. This was based not only on the recent establishment of a tribal capital and repository of customary law at Igharm Amazdar in the inviolate zone of the Saghru, a protected area which had no counterpart elsewhere in the region at large (to say nothing of the Rif, where the concept was entirely absent); but it was also, and more fundamentally, based on the discontinuity and reduplication of sections which had been building up the territorial base of the tribe, on the crucially important ideology of *khams khmas* or 'five fifths' and on a lineage structure which, as Gellner has observed, 'must represent one of the world's masterpieces in segmentary organisation' (Gellner 1981: 228). The implications of these questions, and of Gellner's interesting but exaggerated and questionable comment, which needs major qualification at the upper and more inclusive levels of this so-called segmentation, will form the substance of the remainder of our ethnographic evidence.

Ait ᶜAtta Cohesion: The Tribal Capital

The socio-political cohesion of the Ait ᶜAtta must be viewed to some extent retrospectively. The year 1890, more or less, heralded the inauguration, effec-

tively if not publicly, of the community of Igharm Amazdar as the Ait ʿAtta supertribal capital. It is with the implications of this event that I am now concerned. However, as already noted, I should first sweep away two persistent cobwebs which have long bedeviled the French literature on the subject: the Ait ʿAtta are not a 'confederacy', in my view, but a supertribe; and their point of origin is not – as usually and vaguely defined – the 'Sahara', but the Saghru. (A prime example of the latter error, at least, is embodied in the very title of Spillmann 1936, while he commits the former in his text.) The Ait ʿAtta certainly moved into parts of the northwestern Sahara, to be sure, but they did so from already established bases, first in the Saghru and later in the Dra and the Tafilalt. Such is the view of the Ait ʿAtta themselves, and it is certainly a more accommodating one structurally.

The structural argument has already been partly commented upon above, but it may here be recapitulated and elaborated as follows: all the Ait ʿAtta claim patrilineal or agnatic descent from Dadda ʿAtta (and hence the legend of his forty grandsons), but they are quite incapable of tracing such descent genealogically on a step-by-step basis. They have, therefore, no genealogical charter, something which in Morocco is to be found only among *shurfa'* or *igurramen* groups, and not among lay tribesmen. Thus we may speak of all these groups, or arrangements of groups, posterior in time to Dadda ʿAtta, which nonetheless make vigorous claims to such otherwise unsubstantiated descent, as sections, or even subsections, both of which are rendered in Tamazight as *tiqbilin* (sing. *taqbilt*, and equivalent to Rif. *dhaqbitsh* and Ar. *qabila*). On the other hand, descent that is actually traceable, on a step-by-step basis, is only to be found at the lower level of the patrilineage or *ighsan* (sing. *ighs*, lit. 'bone'), which have a normal depth of only four generations, and into which each of these sections or subsections is itself segmented. It is therefore only at this lower level that one can truly speak of a lineage system which is both corporate and segmentary, despite the quasi-segmentary appearance of the sectional (and non-genealogical) scaffolding at the top, to which we now turn.

In the case of the Ait ʿAtta, as well as in that of certain other Moroccan tribes, including the Aith Waryaghar of the Rif, when the proliferation and carrying capacity of sections came to be too great, for whatever reason, even including that of *makhzan* classification for tax purposes, there was traditionally one very definite superordinate organizing principle, located structurally at the level immediately below that of the supertribe as an aggregate (*aqbil*, although the Ait ʿAtta did not employ such a term), which is to say, the Ait ʿAtta as a whole. This principle, as stated earlier, was and is known as *khams*

khmas or 'five fifths', and in the case here under study, it is called *khams khmas n-Ait ᶜAtta*, 'the five fifths of the Ait ᶜAtta'. As noted, I have discussed elsewhere both the structure of this type of organization as well as the ideology behind it (Hart 1967, republished 1984[b]), and certainly in the three well-authenticated instances outlined in that article, i.e., the Aith Waryaghar of the Central Rif, the Ait ᶜAtta themselves and the Dukkala of the Atlantic Coastal Plain, it served both clearly defined and widely differing functions in each case. The Aith Waryaghar usage of the concept for the division of *haqq* fines among the *imgharen* after a murder in the market has already been examined above, at some length, while it should be noted for the record that in the Dukkala case, the concept was imposed upon this group from above, and outside, by the *makhzan*, for facilitating the mobilization of paramilitary *harka*-s on horseback from the tribe in question. The Ait ᶜAtta case, however, is quite different.

Documentary evidence has recently been discovered by Mezzine to the effect that the Ait ᶜAtta have not always had a *khams khmas* organization or ideology. The implication is strong, in the *taisa* document of Asul, dated approximately 1070 AH/1660 CE, and describing a pact of mutual protection and alliance between the Idrisid *sharif* Mawlay Abu Yaᶜqub bin ᶜAbdallah Amghar and most if not all of the tribes of the Central High and Middle Atlases (Mezzine 1987: 104-128), that the Ait ᶜAtta were at that time divided into three thirds, *tilt tlat*, i.e., the sections of the Uzligen, Ait l-Khilf and Ignawen, to which were later added, separately, that of the Ait Yᶜazza (ibid.: 122, notes 67-70, and 194-196, note 36). All of these names still remain today as Ait ᶜAtta sectional or subsectional names, but none of them has yet moved up a further notch, so to speak, to become the name of a fifth. It is quite clear, given this original organization, of what was to become a supertribe, into either thirds or fourths (for if the Ait Yᶜazza were allotted equal status with the other three sections, which is not made clear either in the Arabic text or in Mezzine's translation, it would seem logical that three thirds eventually became four fourths), that the organization into five fifths or *khams khmas* which so characterized the Ait ᶜAtta in the immediate precolonial period only came about through a kind or 'horizontal segmentation' resulting from their expansion in all directions after 1660. Indeed, it may well have occurred only in conjunction with the consolidation of Ait ᶜAtta power and the establishment, around 1890, of Igharm Amazdar as the supertribal capital. I discuss the implications of this fact before turning to the enumeration and function of the five fifths of the Ait ᶜAtta, which will thereby be placed in their proper context.

Igharm Amazdar, the 'Lower Community' or 'Lower Storehouse', evidently did serve originally as a storehouse for the Ait ʿAtta to deposit their gear when they went on transhumance (de Monts de Savasse 1951[a]). It is situated in the northern Saghru 25 km. northeast of Ikniwn and 25 km. south of Tinghir, in the Warzazat Province, and it differs in no way from the great majority of Ait ʿAtta local communities or settlements, made up of several-storeyed fortress-houses, except in its more tumbledown appearance. But until Moroccan independence in 1956 it was a site of primordial importance to the Ait ʿAtta, as their supertribal capital, *l-ʿasimt n-Ait ʿAtta*. One waggish informant referred to it as the 'United Nations of the Ait ʿAtta', *umam l-muttahida n-Ait ʿAtta*, and another even compared it to Paris, London and Washington – without, interestingly enough, making any reference to Rabat.

Igharm Amazdar is situated in a wide but shallow basin, ringed by mountains, and the area around it, known either as the *Tafrawt n-Igharm Amazdar* or as *Tafrawt n-Ait ʿAtta*, the 'bowl' or 'basin' of Igharm Amazdar or of the Ait ʿAtta, was the political heart of ʿAttaland and the repository of Ait ʿAtta customary law. The inviolable character, the *hurm*, of the Tafrawt n-Ait ʿAtta was underwritten by the fact that no murders could be committed within its precincts and no shots could ever be fired. Even attempted killings within it would have led to the physical death of the would-be perpetrator, or to a prohibitively heavy fine, or to his social death through banishment from ʿAttaland forever.

This sacrosanct area contained four major points of interest: 1) Admam, the site of the annual election, by the twin processes of rotation and complementarity which Gellner has defined for other Central Atlas tribes (Gellner 1969: 81–104) and which will be discussed below, of the top chief or *amghar n-ufilla* of all the Ait ʿAtta; 2) Igharm Amazdar itself, the site of the main Ait ʿAtta *istinaf* or Supreme Court of Appeal; 3) Tin Iwurshan, where a locally based holy lineage of the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn, descended from the ʿAtta patron saint buried at Tamsluht, carefully guarded the Ait ʿAtta battle flag, *mushiddad* or *ʿalam*, as well as – supposedly – the documents, in Arabic, of the *shrut n-khams khmas n-Ait ʿAtta*, the 'contracts' or 'stipulations of the five fifths of the Ait ʿAtta', said to be written on camel skin, documents which I was not allowed to consult (Hart 1966); and 4) Timjraj, a cairn (*axarxur*) where before about 1900 and the consolidation of Igharm Amazdar as capital and as seat of the court, the Ait ʿAtta came to swear collective oaths. All four sites, however, were subsumed under the name and rubric of Igharm Amazdar, which still in the 1960s was the symbol to the Ait ʿAtta of their

recent and well-remembered power, pride, political cohesion and general uniqueness.

But, as de Monts de Savasse suggests, it was not always thus, for Igharm Amazdar only came into its political hegemony a decade or so before the end of the nineteenth century. His thesis on the subject is quite ingenious. Every year on March 24 (Julian calendar), before summer transhumance began, the assembled *ajmuᶜ* or council of the five fifths of the Ait ᶜAtta convened at a spot in the Saghru near the Wad Ragg known as Talmut n-Ujmuᶜ n-Ait ᶜAtta, 'the grassy field of the Ait ᶜAtta council', near which is the Timjraj cairn , where Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn himself once stopped to pray. Here all the Ait ᶜAtta came formerly to take oath, as noted, but later, 'under the influence of Islam' and after a major meeting in the Saghru about 1900, they decided to abandon the cairn in favor of the tombs of local saints. The Talmut n-Ujmuᶜ n-Ait ᶜAtta and the Timjraj cairn are thus regarded as the 'high places' of the supertribe, 'as venerated in the past as the tomb of Sidi ᶜAli u-Burk between the Tudgha and the Dadss, that of Sidi Mhand n-Ifrutant in the lower valley of the Ragg, that of Dadda ᶜAtta himself at Taqqat n-Iliktawn in the Lower Dra and that of Sidi Saᶜid Ahansal at Zawiya Ahansal in the Central Atlas' (ibid.).

It was thus, formerly, that the top chief of the supertribe, the *amghar n-ufilla*, elected for a year, collected the herdsmen of all the constituent Ait ᶜAtta tents before their departure northward to the Central Atlas on summer transhumance. To establish the order of the *khams khmas*, the five fifths of the Ait ᶜAtta, lots (*grat illan*) were drawn by using pieces of wood. But those going on transhumance did not take everything they had with them, only what they needed. They left the rest of their belongings in the Saghru with kinsmen to guard at home. It was probably this custom of using those at home as a physical repository for possessions and goods not immediately needed which gave rise to Igharm Amazdar, the 'lower storehouse' or the 'storehouse in the bowl of the Ait ᶜAtta'.

Two major ᶜAtta sections, the Ait Wahlim and the Ait Yᶜazza, which, once established in the Saghru, became grouped together for the sake of convenience under the joint designation of Ait ᶜAisa, proceeded to move a certain number of their *tashatin* (sing. *tashat*, properly *takat*, pl. *takatin*, lit. 'hearth') or nuclear families into the basin of the Asif n-Ishim in order to guard the impedimenta that they had left there during estival transhumance. As a result of this arrangement there came into being a new local group whose own life needed a correspondingly new organization: for these families built a *khattara*, or underground irrigation ditch, became sedentarized, built an

igharm or *qsar* and became the permanent guardians of this part of the Saghru. They evidently divided up the cultivable land into 188 *tiggura* (sing. *taggurt*) or irrigation plots, which they then portioned out. This *khattara* (Tm. *l-khattart*), common to all the newly amalgamated Ait ʿAisa, was henceforth called Tʿaisat, and a rule was established whereby one guardian was set up for each plot. This guardian was called *arssam* (pl. *irssamen*), 'drawer-out, apportioner', and as de Monts has it, 'he became the first New Man of Igharm Amazdar'.

For these *irssamen* collectively became the *ajmuʿ* (Ar. *jmaʿa*), the top council of the Ait ʿAtta. Little by little the quality and the stability of this council won it great renown all over ʿAttaland, and soon it came to be referred to for pronouncements of final settlements in all local litigations. It was this second and highly original function which turned the *qsar* of Igharm Amazdar into the repository of Ait ʿAtta *izirf* or customary law. After any meeting of the supertribal council to inaugurate some matter of custom, the new ruling was then sent to the Ait ʿAisa n-Igharm Amazdar, as the residents of Igharm Amazdar had come to be called: they ratified it, adopted it and applied it.

The importance of Igharm Amazdar now became so great that two more major ʿAtta sections, the Ait Isful and the Ait Unibgi, sought to instal their own representatives there: the former dug a second *khattara* called l-Khattart n-Ait Isful, creating some 67 *tiggura*, of which 13 were turned over to the Ait Unibgi, who, as it happens, remained for the most part in the Rtab, the Tafilalt and points south, never becoming at all numerous or well established in the Saghru beyond this token representation.

Even though the Ait Wallal section, held by the Ait ʿAtta themselves to be their oldest one (although their view is contested by the evidence of Mezzine 1987: 122), had formerly created an analogous situation at Ikniwn and at Jumaʿ n-Ugulzi, one which did not persist into modern times, they too were permitted to leave their property and members of certain of their constituent lineages at Igharm Amazdar. At this point, it seems, a special status, which was still very much in force when the French arrived, was accorded to the inhabitants of the *igharm*: they were exempted from all participation in tribal *harka*-s and in general tribal corvees. They did not bear arms and they were not allowed to be criticized by those who did about the decisions which they made during the course of intratribal litigations. Sheltered from the internal conflicts of the various ʿAtta sections, which were to become more and more numerous over time, the Ait ʿAisa of Igharm Amazdar were also always sheltered, by the wall constituting the northern face of the Saghru, from attacks coming from the north, in particular from those of the Ait Murghad. They lived thus in an island and in a climate of

peace which was, as de Monts correctly observed, eminently propitious for their mission.

This new local group, known as the Ait ᶜAisa n-Igharm Amazdar, was divided into three sections, of which two, the Ait Hassu and the Ait Zimru (or Zimrui), were affiliated with the Ait Wahlim *khums* or fifth, and the third, the Ait Yᶜazza, with that of the Ait ᶜAisa Mzin (and will soon become evident, the names of most of the five fifths or their constituent sections have already emerged in the text). These three sections divided up the rest of the arable land along the Asif n-Ishim basin and dug three new *khattara*-s: the Ait Yᶜazza, that of Timit ('navel'), with 71 *tiggura*; the Ait Hassu, that of l-Khattart n-Iqaddaren ('ditch of the potters'), with 72 *tiggura*; and the Ait Zimru, that of Tin Iwurshan, with 102 *tiggura*. At both Tin Iwurshan and at Igharm Amazdar they admitted some families of the *igurramen* or saints of the Ait Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn, the lineage of their patron saint, for whose descendants they reserve a share in the course of any division simply 'because they are the intermediaries of the Ait ᶜAtta with the Almighty'. For the *baraka* of Mawlay ᶜAbdallah is great, and from him, as noted, the Ait ᶜAtta obtained a special assurance 'until the end of time' of their possession of the Tizi Mqqurn, the crucial pass which leads transhumants to the north, as well as freedom from two curses, namely, syphilis 'for all humans' and dependence on the Sultan 'for all Imazighen Berbers'. These claims are, indeed, eloquent testimony to the special patron-client relationship between all the Ait ᶜAtta and Mawlay ᶜAbdallah. To cap this, de Monts concludes, the *amghar* of the Tafrawt n-Ait ᶜAtta was elected every year, and over and above his temporal powers he was also 'president of the judiciary college' for the duration of his term in office.

As it happens, the frequent intersectional rivalries alluded to above led to the Ait Yᶜazza, the Ait Wahlim and (possibly) the Ait Isful to create, about 1890, a zone where any murder, theft or even dispute would thenceforth be forbidden. This zone, estimated by one informant to be some 29 square kilometers in surface area, is precisely that of the Tafrawt n-Ait ᶜAtta or the Tafrawt n-Igharm Amazdar. It was also a truce zone (*tamazirt n-s-sulh*) par excellence, and de Monts even observes that a whole section might arrive there on transhumance if it were not at war with another one. Logically, this is entirely correct, for the Tafrawt was most certainly an area of asylum, one which had absolutely no equivalent among the Rifians of the Aith Waryaghar. If one man even attempted to kill another within its borders to avenge a murder, the members of the *istinaf*, the supreme court at Igharm Amazdar, made him pay a fine (*izmaz*) of one hundred sheep, gave him a three-day period to collect his lineage-mates, his *ait ᶜashra* (lit. 'people of ten') or *imyisaten* (sing.

amyisa), and forced them all to leave ʿAttaland for good. In such a case the would-be murderer and his agnates had to flee to the territory of an enemy tribe, which for the Ait ʿAtta invariably meant either that of the Ait Siddrat or, perhaps more often, that of the Ait Murghad or some other Ait Yafalman tribe. After a further ritualized delay of three more days, the would-be killer's agnates were allowed to return home, but he himself was exiled forever. Should he actually succeed in killing his enemy in the Tafrawt, he was himself killed immediately, in return, with no questions asked. This underscored the fact that Igharm Amazdar, where firearms were *streng verboten*, was even more a place of peace than the Aith Waryaghar markets.

These facts, known to all and unquestioned by all, underscore the more central fact that the Tafrawt was *hurm*, sacred and inviolable ground. An additional buttress here is the presence of the *shurfa'* or *igurramen* lineage of the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn in the community of Tin Iwurshan (or Tin Iwurkan). A major traditional role of saintly lineages resident in Moroccan tribal territories was one of adjudication of disputes and fights; but while the local branches of the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah were always ready to settle internal flare-ups within ʿAttaland (as between the two Ait Wahlim subsections of the Ilimshan and the Ait Bu Iknifen, for example), they could do and did nothing about wider inter-tribal wars with the Ait Yafalman tribes which, in any case, had their own adjudicating *igurramen*. The state of war between the Ait ʿAtta and the Ait Yafalman was conceived of as permanent.

The other crucial function of the *shurfa'* of the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn, at their local *zawiya* or lodge at Tin Iwurshan, was the fact that as they are said to have provided the Ait ʿAtta with their battle flag, they also acted as the guardians of this flag, which is reputedly kept in their *zawiya* as are, again reputedly, all the major Ait ʿAtta documents in Arabic. The *igurramen* live largely from donations (known elsewhere as *ziyara* but among the Ait ʿAtta as *l-ʿada*) of money, animals and grain, given them by lay Ait ʿAtta tribesmen. Each *tashat* or nuclear family freely gives what it can annually, and the amount is not fixed. It is all collected and transported in late winter or early spring to the main *zawiya* of the Arabic-speaking Awlad Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn at Tamsluht, near Marrakesh, and this is how the 'national' Ait ʿAtta donation is paid up. The eight local branches of the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah in the Saghru, however, all collect theirs at Igharm Amazdar in late summer once the harvest is in.

Igharm Amazdar in the 1960s was physically unimpressive, ramshackle and tumbledown; and its ugliest little building was a one-room schoolhouse, which had been built by the French in 1938. At the time it was built, how-

ever, it represented the French attempt to shelter the Ait ᶜAtta Supreme Court, the *istinaf*, from wind, sand, rain and sleet: for prior to its construction, the members of the court had always met on the same site in the open air. Hence the building, dilapidated as it was and reflecting to a more acute degree the dilapidation and decay of Igharm Amazdar as a whole, has a very noteworthy past, as the center of ᶜAtta pride, cohesion and power. It was the political heartbeat of ᶜAttaland (Hart 1981[a]: 20-29).

Ait ᶜAtta Cohesion: The Khams Khmas Ideology and the Lineage Structure

The function of the institutionalized organization known as the *khams khmas n-Ait ᶜAtta*, the five fifths of the Ait ᶜAtta, was, as noted, to provide every year, through the dual elective process of rotation and complementarity, the top chief or *amghar n-ufilla* of the whole supertribe at Igharm Amazdar. However, since the establishment of Igharm Amazdar as the tribal capital only occurred after the consolidation of ᶜAtta power, de Monts de Savasse (1951[a]) has suggested that the original function of the *khams khmas* system may have been quite different: to divide up the agricultural and irrigable land in the Saghru into five parts for the five fifths through, once again, the drawing of lots (*grat illan*). Hence it would seem clear that the institution already had an economic function before it acquired its later political one. This economic function also had clear repercussions in terms of the transhumance of ᶜAtta sections to the Central Atlas.

First, however, the division of these lots is of interest in that it not only serves to introduce us to the names of the fifths but also to provide an idea of the numerical strength of each one in proportion to the others. At the outset, according to de Monts, the *khums* constituted by the two section-aggregates of the Ait Wallal and the Ait Unir were allotted one share, and the remainder was then divided into five. Now a second *khums*, made up of two more section-aggregates, the Ait Isful and the Ait ᶜAlwan, were allotted their share, and the remaining four-fifths (4/5) was then redivided into five. At this juncture a third *khums*, that of the Ait Unibgi (*anibgi*, 'guest', i.e, 'people of the guest'), with its two constituent sections of the Ait Khabbash and the Ait Umnasf (*amnasf*, 'half', i.e., 'people of the half'), took two shares, while the final three-fifths (3/5) was allotted to the remaining *khmas* or fifths of the Ait Wahlim and the Ait ᶜAisa Mzin (with the latter containing one large section, the Ait Yᶜazza, and three much smaller ones, the Ait Khalifa, Ait l-Firsi and

Ait Khardi), in the respective proportions of three (3) to the former and two (2) to the latter. In this way a whole unit of 625 *tiggura* plots was divided up, so de Monts informs cus, as follows: 125 for the *khums* of the Ait Wallal-Ait Unir; 100 for the *khums* of the Ait Isful-Ait ʿAlwan; 160 for the *khums* of the Ait Unibgi; 144 for the *khums* of the Ait Wahlim; and 96 for the *khums* of the Ait ʿAisa Mzin. These figures are accurate reflections of the relative size and strength of each *khums*, while the parallel in this case with the division, by the Arab nomads of the Dwi Maniʿ, in the Moroccan-Algerian confines area, of arable land in the flood plain of the Wad Gir into *khams khmas* for agricultural purposes is also striking (cf. Dunn 1977: 50-60).

Finally, after each *khums* had received its share of the relatively rich pasture lands in the Saghru, the people of Tafrawt n-Igharm Amazdar were ratified in their rights to the land irrigated by the *khattara* canals which had been dug, while those individuals from the first Ait ʿAtta lineages were confirmed in the possession of the water points they had developed, such as Tanut n-Haddu w-Ishshu, 'the little well of Haddu w-Ishshu', named for the man who dug it originally. At this point, it appears, all the rest of the Saghru was duly recognized as the collective land of the whole supertribe. No clauses or rules limited the use of the land for transhumance; and if certain zones were more particularly or more habitually occupied by certain sections at certain times of the year, this did not give them any individual or preemptive rights to the land in question. This fact may well be at the bottom of the annual brawl between the resident and the transhumant Ait Bu Iknifen sections, mentioned earlier, over summer pasturage at Talmast in the Central Atlas.

The point of the above exercise is that it now seems evident that the organizing institution of five fifths had an economic function prior to or as well as its political one of providing the supertribal chief through annual election at Igharm Amazdar. This fact also doubly underscores the importance of the institution as well as stressing its paramount status in ʿAtta ideology. Although de Monts de Savasse's central thesis is that the most original feature of their highly original socio-political system resided in their system of land tenure, with its principal objective of rigid exclusion of all non-ʿAtta, I would, however, maintain that *all* facets of the Ait ʿAtta structural and institutional whole were equally original, or, rather, that they were employed in equally original ways toward equally original ends: the land tenure, the top or supertribal chief, the political capital, the supreme court *and* the institution of *khams khmas* which gave rise to all of them. What is particularly crucial in the Ait ʿAtta case is not so much the existence of this institution, for at least another

score or so of Moroccan tribes can or could boast the same (Hart 1967, republished 1984[a]), as the uses to which it was put.

By contrast, it is curious to note that the tribes of the Ait Yafalman confederacy, which collectively outnumber the Ait ᶜAtta by nearly two to one, never hit on a similar idea, or took a leaf from their enemies' book, regarding the consolidation of their own power. One looks in vain for any specific structural originality or degree of cohesion on a par with that prevailing among the Ait ᶜAtta: for a tribal confederacy, a mere coalition of unrelated tribes organized toward a specific end, is hardly an original institution, either in the history of Morocco or indeed anywhere else.

The five fifths of the Ait ᶜAtta reveal therefore not only an ideology of power, but the concept itself also represents the central and superordinate organizing principle which stamps their political structure. Regarding the annual elective process of rotation and complementarity, on which more below, I will only say here that the top chief from any one fifth in any one year was elected, in theory, by the assembled notables of the other four fifths. Hence it must be stressed again that the political role of the institution became in time the primordial one, and the striking territorial discontinuity of each fifth – which in three cases, at least, out of five overtly subsumed a duality or even a plurality of section-aggregates – on the ground, within ᶜAttaland, was compensated for by its highly integrative role in the election of chiefs.

Transhumance, a strong corporate lineage organization operative at lower levels of segmentation, and a tendency toward expansion were all present among the Ait ᶜAtta since their beginnings, but the conscious alignment into five maximal or first-order units conceived to be of more or less equal size (even though in fact they are not so at all) for specific ends, as well as the subsequent establishment of the capital at Igharm Amazdar gave the Ait ᶜAtta a cohesion and a driving force quite unparalleled in southern Morocco. This cohesion was, furthermore, cast within the dual idiom of kinship and segmentation.

It is possible, and indeed probable, that the inability of the Ait ᶜAtta to trace their descent genealogically and on a step-by-step patrilineal basis not only from Dadda ᶜAtta but also from any of the putative sectional ancestors may have been partially responsible for their subsequent (re)alignment into five fifths. Nonetheless, and consistent, too, with Ait ᶜAtta ideology, this alignment is conceived in genealogical fashion: for the *khams khmas* themselves are the Ait Wahlim (*khums* I), the Ait Wallal and the Ait Unir (together forming *khums* II), the Ait Isful and the Ait ᶜAlwan (jointly forming *khums*

III), the Ait Unibgi (*khums* IV), and the Ait ʿAisa Mzin (*khums* V, consisting of one large section, the Ait Yʿazza, and three much smaller ones, the Ait Khalifa, Ait l-Firsi and Ait Khardi). Each and every one of the sections making up each *khums* or fifth is in turn divided into subsections, and it is these last or even their own subsubsections which may correspond to the *tiqbilin* alluded to above. For example, *khums* I, that of the Ait Wahlim, is divided into two sections, the Ait Zimru (or Zimrui) and the Ait Hassu: the former have four constituent *tiqbilin*, the Ait Bu Iknifen, the Ait ʿAisa u-Brahim, the Ilimshan (one lineage subsegment of which, the Ait Bu Tghuratin, or 'people of ululations', provided the *aʿallam* or standard bearer who always carried the Ait ʿAtta flag into battle as well as the great resistance leader ʿAssu u-Ba Slam), and the Ignawen; and the latter have five, the Ait Bu Dawud, the Ait ʿAli u-Hassu, the Ait ʿAttu, the Ushshn (lit. 'jackal', probably because of its ancestor's craftiness) and the Uzligen. The last four are all small, and are only to be found in one locality apiece, while the same is true as well of the three final subsections of the Ait ʿAisa Mzin (in *khums* V); but the very large *taqbilt* of the Ait Bu Iknifen stands at the other end of the scale, showing the most extreme degree of territorial discontinuity and reduplication of any Ait ʿAtta segment by being represented in no less than ten different localities within ʿAttaland, while the Ait ʿAisa u-Brahim, the Ilimshan and the Ignawen, all of which, the Ilimshan in particular, have well deserved reputations as fighters, fall in between these two extremes.

The same is true, in general, of most of the other four fifths, and their constituent sections and subsections – although, again, the great majority of the Ait ʿAlwan, for example, are in the Mhamid area of the Lower Dra, while the great majority, equally, of the Ait Unibgi are in the southeast, the Rtab, the Tafilalt and the Kamkam desert near Tawuz. All of these sections and subsections are, of course, named; and the names go right down to the level of the agnatic lineage or *ighs* – which among the Ait ʿAtta, unlike among the Aith Waryaghar of the Rif, is indeed segmentary and corporate in character – and beyond it, to that of the nuclear family as well. However, as I have already discussed the whole structure and the naming system within each of the *khmas khmas n-Ait ʿAtta* in detail in a previous work (Hart 1981[a]:29-63), there seems little point in doing so here.

The often exaggerated degree of territorial discontinuity and reduplication of *tiqbilin* at any sectional level within ʿAttaland indicates the elasticity of the whole *taqbilt* concept, which may be further defined in terms of its relationship to the local community or *tamazirt* (pl. *timizar*, lit. 'land'). To have elements of two or more *tiqbilin* represented in one local community is not at

all uncommon: Igharm Amazdar and Usikis, on the southern slope of the Central Atlas north of the Dadss gorges, are both good examples, with three major subsections each, plus minor resident pockets of others: Ait Zimru, Ait Hassu (both Ait Wahlim, as noted), and Ait Y^{c}azza in the first instance, plus a few resident families of Ait Isful; and Ait Bu Iknifen, Ait Y^{c}azza and Ait Unibgi in the second, plus a few resident families of Ait Isful, Ait Bu Dawud, Ilimshan and Ignawen.

Although in no case can any (sub)sectional or *taqbilt* ancestor be genealogically traced, this is clearly not true for the various component agnatic lineages, or *ighsan*, of the section or subsection in question. These lineages are seldom more than four generations deep, from the lineage ancestor to his present living and effective descendants, while a fifth generation subsumes the latters' sons. There may still be a tendency to telescope or foreshorten the lineage genealogy in individual cases, where the name of the lineage ancestor is simply substituted in conversation for the name of the man's actual grandfather, particularly if members of other lineages are present. Thus a man of the Ait Dahmun lineage (which happens to be one of six Ait Y^{c}azza lineage-groups resident at Usikis) may simply be known in a wider and telescoped context as Muha w-^{c}Addi n-Ait Dahmun, whereas his real name might be Muha w-^{c}Addi n-Ait Brahim u-Lahsin. This is of course linked with Gellner's 'Occamist' principle that undue multiplication of ancestors, in the context of lay tribal lineage structures, is pointless and unnecessary (Gellner 1969: 38). This same principle, it might be added, also seems to show close correspondence to the equally useful distinction made by Winter, for the Amba of Uganda, between 'social genealogy' and 'actual genealogy' (Winter n.d., but ca. 1956: 211).

The concept of 'the lineage system' of the Ait ^{c}Atta as a whole is of course an anthropological reification, for it really refers to dozens of lineage systems within every local community in ^{c}Attaland. Each named segment at a lower level of articulation is encapsulated or 'nested' within the appropriate segment on the next level up, until all five fifths have been encompassed: for in the 1960s there was not an w-^{c}Atta (sing. of Ait ^{c}Atta) alive who was not consciously, actively and proudly aware of his own position and that of his lineage in the overall structure. Nonetheless, four generations is the effectively maximum depth before lineage fission can be expected to occur. This depth may even be slightly less than that in some Aith Waryaghar lineages, but the major distinction between the two lies, as we shall see, in the corporate character of the Ait ^{c}Atta lineage, which is so conspicuous among the Aith Waryaghar by its absence.

Lineage ideology is always kept alive through a man's full name, which indicates to all and sundry his lineage affiliation – for example, ᶜAli *u*-Dawud *n*-Ait Lahsin *u*-Brahim, Muha *u*-Yidir *n*-Ait Mhand *u*-Hammu or ᶜAddi (Saᶜid) *w*-Ishshu *n*-Ait Hmad *u*-Hsayn. The man's name is followed by *u*-, 'son of', and his father's name, followed in turn by *n-Ait X* or *n-Ait Y*, 'of the people or children of X' or 'of the people or children of Y', in which X and Y refer, ideally, to the man's paternal grandfather and/or paternal great-grandfather. In fact it is not unusual to skip one or more generations so that in truth *X-u-Y* really refers to a more remote ancestor in the patriline, one with perhaps greater social utility. The lineage depth is thus telescoped and foreshortened to the ideal of three to four generations: at Usikis, at least, the smaller lineages have a depth of only three generations (i.e., Ait Zuhu, Ait Hmadush and Ait Jabir lineages of the Ait Yᶜazza section), while the larger ones retain the normal four-generational depth (i.e., Ait Simu, Ait Habbik and Ait Dahmun lineages, of the same Ait Yᶜazza section). The fifth generation encompasses only unmarried children.

Unlike the non-corporate and anti-segmentary lineages of the Aith Waryaghar, the lineage organization and social units of the Ait ᶜAtta are not characterized by the 'I against my brother' clause which begins the famous Arab proverb; but they do approximate more closely its wider extension 'I and my brothers against our cousins, ourselves and our cousins against the rest of the section, our section against the other sections of our tribe, and our tribe against the world'. Whatever may be the case elsewhere, these principles, until recently, at least, acted as something of a yardstick (even if a loose one) for Ait ᶜAtta social behavior, and the model of it that they provide is inherent within the overall structure of the *khams khmas*.

As the fifths themselves represent a compromise between segmentary and territorial considerations, and as they also provide the fulcrum for the reduplication and discontinuity of their constituent sections, how does the local community or *tamazirt*, itself ultimately a territorial rather than a social grouping, and at the local level an expression of the ᶜAtta lineage system as it exists on the ground, fit in with the verticalized structure of nested segmentary units?

In fact the fit is really quite adequate, under the circumstances. However, in general, if only one section is represented in any community, the sectional name is prefixed or suffixed to the community name (e.g., Taghzut n-Ait Yᶜazza, Tabsbast n-Ait Isful); but if more than one section is locally represented, the community takes the name of the supertribe in order to avoid any misunderstanding. There is only one significant exception to this: that pro-

vided by the three pacific and law-administering sections localized in Igharm Amazdar, which, as we have seen, are known collectively as the Ait ᶜAisa n-Igharm Amazdar rather than as the Ait ᶜAtta n-Igharm Amazdar.

The Ait ᶜAtta sincerely believe that the territorial reduplication and discontinuity of their sections has led to exchanges of brides between members of the same sections in two different localities (and parallel cousin marriage with the father's brother's daughter is stated as the preferred form, although among the Ait Yᶜazza of Usikis its actual incidence was only 16 percent) and to mutual inheritance expectations. They are to some extent correct over bride-swapping, although it is certainly not as common statistically as they might have us believe. Mutual inheritance expectations are another matter: all tribal sections everywhere in ᶜAttaland which bear the same name are of course 'brothers', *aitma*, in a classificatory sense; but this does not mean that they are true brothers, as the annual pasturage brawl between the Ait Bu Iknifen resident in Talmast and those other Ait Bu Iknifen who come up from the south on transhumance very clearly reveals. All it really means is that two groups bearing the same name in two different localities have common pasturage rights and sometimes even common rights to cultivation. Even though the belief in mutual inheritance expectations between the members of two different territorial segments of the same section is a fiction, the continued belief in it is one of the many factors which continue to reinforce the social fabric and to underscore social cohesion (Hart 1981[a]: 71-76). So too is the prevailing trend toward property indivision (*ur ibdi* or *mann*), designed primarily to keep out strangers, a fact which has led to the maintenance of the extraordinarily high average of 85 percent of resident males who are agnatic members of the lineage or lineages associated with any given territory (ibid. 104-105).

Ait ᶜAtta Cohesion: Rotating Chieftainship

The top chief of the supertribe – *amghar n-ufilla n-Ait ᶜAtta*, lit. 'the top chief of the Ait ᶜAtta' – as well as all the sectional and local community chiefs within ᶜAttaland were elected annually by their constituents through a process known as rotation and complementarity. This process also appears to have existed among all Central Atlas Berber tribes with the possible exception of the Ait Siddrat (who may have been a *makhzan* tribe originally) and the Ait Hadiddu. However, together with the institutions of 'five fifths' and the political center and election site of Igharm Amazdar, it came to have a special significance

among the Ait ʿAtta. Indeed, the purpose and function of the *khams khmas* was, as will now be shown, precisely that of election of the top chief.

Rotation and complementarity insured two things: the electors could never elect themselves and its annual repetition was a built-in check against any abuse of power by the incumbent. In theory, it worked as follows: if, as suggested above, the Ait ʿAtta 'fifths' may be numbered I, II, III, IV and V, then, when it was the turn of I to provide the top chief, II, III, IV and V did the electing. Next year when the turn of II came up, I, III, IV and V elected the top chief from II; then when it was III's turn, I, II, IV and V elected a chief from III; and so on. It must be noted that exactly the same process was followed at the level of the subsection or subsection and/or that of the local community.

Rotation is the more obvious of the two features of the process, and has indeed been reported by a number of French observers, including Spillmann (1936: 57); but only Gellner (1969: 81–104) and subsequently I myself have noticed the crucial fact of complementarity, which in essence means that candidates for office did not have the vote. Hence the whole system, through continued transience, mitigated against the emergence either of any dominant individuals or of any dominant groups, at least in theory. As Capt. de Monts de Savasse so rightly observed, a constant preoccupation of all Berbers is never to let one turbanned head rise above the rest (de Monts de Savasse 1951[b]); and this may be labeled the '*jmaʿa* syndrome', the syndrome of collectivity.

One legitimate question is how and when the different sections in any ʿAtta fifth containing more than one section provided candidates. One might assume that they also rotated every ten or fifteen years within the turn of the fifth concerned. But such does not seem to have been the case, and this is amply borne out by looking at a list of names and sectional affiliations of actually elected top chiefs. Every five years the constituent maximal-order units of each *khums* were pooled together for election purposes, and the candidate might be anyone from the total aggregate.

The election of the *amghar n-ufilla* theoretically took place every year on March 17 (Julian calendar), prior to spring and summer transhumance, at Admam ('hawthorn'), within the inviolable territory of the Tafrawt n-Ait ʿAtta, not far from Igharm Amazdar. Some informants, however, maintained that as a top chief may have lasted a year and a half or even longer in office if his luck or *aduku* (lit. 'slipper') were good, and/or if there were a war going on and hence no opportunity for a new election, the election time was not fixed. At any rate, all the Ait ʿAtta were sent warnings when a new election was impending, and each fifth sent its contingents to the Tafrawt, either as the

one *khums* containing the pool of candidates or the other four whose members were to do the electing.

The ritual which the election involved was of considerable interest. Once all five fifths as well as an officiating *agurram* or group of *igurramen* from the holy lineage of the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn were assembled, the latter in order to ensure divine benediction, and after a recitation of the *fatiha*, the opening chapter of the Qur'an, by all present, the election began. The candidates from the incoming *khums* sat down on the ground and waited while the electors from the other four fifths went off to discuss the choice of the man to be elected. As he was chosen by men of the other fifths, the deliberation rarely took long because, again in theory, none of the electors 'had any axe to grind'. Once the vote was decided, the electors came back, walked in a circle around the assembled candidates and finally touched one of them with a finger on his head, or even jerked him unceremoniously to his feet. This was the man about to take office for the following year.

Although there was no real oath of office, there was a badge, which was administered to the new incumbent either by his outgoing predecessor or by the *agurram*. The new chief sat down and then his predecessor or the holy man placed either a single blade or a tuft of grass in his turban, to symbolize the hope that his year would be bountiful, that the harvest would be good and that the sheep would wax fat. The *agurram* now gave the chief some milk to drink and, while he was drinking, pushed up the jug so that the milk spilled all over his face and shirt. This act, which symbolized the fragility of his power and the fact that he was no better than anyone else, also underscores the Ait ʿAtta (and general Berber) love of horseplay: for the chief was just another notable risen from the tribal ranks. Then the *agurram* gave him some dates to eat, for the combination of milk and dates given to all important guests is still symbolic of Moroccan hospitality generally. Finally, to stress the equality factor once again, the *agurram* would then give a little milk and one date each to everyone present. Save for the transfer of still pending tribal accounts by the old chief to the new one, the ceremony was now over.

Out of a detailed listing which I compiled of 24 Ait ʿAtta top chiefs from about 1900, or shortly thereafter, through to 1933 (and to ʿAssu u-Ba Slam, the final one), no less than eleven (11) men listed were from the *khums* of the Ait Wahlim, far outnumbering the chiefs from any other fifth (Hart 1981[a], Appendix 2: 229-232). In other words, in a *de facto* sense, rotation and complementarity hardly seems to have functioned adequately. Perhaps so: but not only were all the informants in this case themselves Ait Wahlim men, and hence with a vested interest in underscoring the importance of their own

fifth, but the numbers of chiefs recorded from the other four fifths were also far more uniform and in keeping with each other. It seems likely that informants from any other fifth would similarly have overblown their own fifth's importance as well.

In any case, this material supports some of Spillmann's observations about the election of the top ʿAtta chief, but it invalidates others (Spillmann 1936: 57). It is true, for instance, that in *khums* III the Ait ʿAlwan never provided a top chief, while in *khums* V the three small second-order units of the Ait Khalifa, Ait l-Firsi and Ait Khardi never did so either. These relatively smaller and numerically weaker groups were, after all, precisely the ones which would not have been expected to be on a par, politically, with the majority. Indeed, one essential feature of Berber tribal societies, whether they are segmentary or anti-segmentary, is that egalitarianism among segments or sections, so stressed in theory as well as by the tribesmen themselves, is seldom if ever absolute in fact: Orwell's Law prevails, and some segments are invariably and inevitably more equal than others.

At the same time, Spillmann's claim that the Ait Unir ceded their rights to provide the top chief to their Ait Wallal fifth-mates in *khums* II is not only contradicted by the evidence but seems unfeasible in terms of the relative population of the two groups in question: for the Ait Unir are somewhat the larger one. His further claim of alternation between the Ait Khabbash and the Ait Umnasf in the Ait Unibgi fifth, *khums* III, so that two out of every five times the top chief was elected among them, is negated by the fact that each fifth containing two or more major sections always pooled these sections for election purposes.

The rights and duties of the top chief were just what might be expected. His voice was preeminent in any decision-making affecting the supertribe as a whole. He was the man principally responsible for the defense of tribal territory and common interests. It was he whose hand guided the settlement of disputes between diverse ʿAtta groups, ultimately regulated relations with neighboring tribes, and had the responsibility for declarations of war: for if he showed himself to be unfailingly successful as a war leader, he might even remain in office for several consecutive years.

If a war was unsuccessful, or if his luck, his *aduku*, was deemed bad – invariably the case when the harvest was poor or when many sheep died – the *amghar n-ufilla* was out, generally before his term of office was up. There were very definite limits to his power; and the best and often the only way he could earn the respect of his constituents, and hence sometimes stay in office beyond his year, was through temporary victories over those perennial

enemies the Ait Yafalman and the Ait Siddrat. As for remuneration, in theory he had none – 'he was paid by *walu*, by nothing', as one Ait Unir informant from Nqub put it. But in practice, he did obtain a portion of the fines levied for various infractions, from theft of livestock to murder. Hence what income he received came through 'kickbacks'.

Top chief and war chief were thus synonymous, and were ideally embodied in one and the same individual. A number of informants even expressed the view that the top chief was only elected when war was imminent. Once his election had taken place, however, it was not questioned, at least for the time being. On one occasion, among the Ait Y^{c}azza of Alnif, when a council member lost his temper at the chief and was about to hurl a stone at him, the chief yelled out that there were plenty of witnesses. The would-be stone thrower, quick on the uptake, replied that he was merely performing his *tayammum*, his ablutions prior to prayer – performed with sand or stone when water is unavailable. This evidence shows the frailty in the chief's authority, to cite Gluckman's well-known phrase (Gluckman 1954: 27). Not only did Berber egalitarianism limit him, but he had to be a natural leader if he were to succeed. The transience of the chief's office rendered him, as Gellner says, a 'lame duck' (Gellner 1969: 82). Although he had to have a forceful personality, the chief would nevertheless be quite unable, in one year, to build up anything resembling a real power base before his time was up.

In short, a chief might be excused virtually anything if his *aduku* were good; but if not, out he went. If it were good, the chances were that he could coast sufficiently upon his reputation to the point that he might not even have needed to turn the tribal accounts over to his successor. In any case, should there have been a serious deficit in these accounts, he would generally have had to stay on in office in order to rectify the error. Misfortunes or even acts of God which might occur during his tenure were generally attributed to him directly; and hence Fortes' distinction between office and office-holder is strikingly apparent in this case (Fortes 1962: 53–88).

The top chief was, for his year, hardly even a *primus inter pares*, as there were many other *primi inter pares* located below him on the quasi-segmentary scaffolding. There was, however, no chief of the fifth, the *khums*, because by its very nature a *khums* is too dispersed territorially to support one. Hence the next level below that of the *amghar n-ufilla*, the top chief, at which a lower chief was always to be found was that of the local community or, as often happened, the localized section. This chief was (and is) known either as *amghar n-tmazirt*, 'land chief, section chief', or *mukallif*, 'man in charge', according to the area and the group concerned. The former designation is usually

employed in areas and among groups where sedentary agriculture predominates over transhumance, and hence the accent is on 'land', while the latter is used among groups where transhumance predominates, and hence the accent on being 'in charge'. Many informants said that the *mukallif* also acted as chief of transhumance, an office which among groups more prone to sedentarism was held by an *amghar n-irahhalen*, or 'chief of transhumants', who was generally appointed by the land or section chief.

This land or section chief was elected in the very same way and through the same process as was the top chief: through rotation and complementarity. The same stigmata, exactly, applied to him and resulted in the same transience of his office. Ideally, indeed, the election of the local or section chief was then ratified by the top chief.

Once he was elected, the land chief then nominated the lineage or subsectional headmen, called *idbab n-imuren* (sing. *bab n-umur*, lit. 'owner of a part, owner of protection'), for the various lineage or subsection groupings in his constituency, at the relevant level of segmentation. Whether such a grouping had, for example, one or two (or more) *idbab n-imuren*, the number was always an accurate reflection of its numerical strength. Nonetheless, many informants insisted that the *idbab n-imuren* were not appointed by the land chief but were selected by the members of their own lineages. The point seems of little structural importance: what is of relevance is the relationship between them and the land chief. How this appointment of *idbab n-imuren* by the land chief worked is of great interest.

There are two typologies of rotation and complementarity among the Ait ʿAtta at the local community level, a normal or standard one, with ratification of appointments on descending segmentary levels, which accounted for no less than 18 out of 28 such cases examined, and another that leapfrogged at alternate levels, and which accounted for seven (7) of the remaining ones. A third model, and a most elegant one, provided by an Ilimshan informant from the Saghru, combined, very neatly, the two sets of elections at different levels, that of the top chief and that of the land chief, each of whom then appointed his own *idbab n-imuren* three levels down, into a single unbroken line, in a highly symmetrical segmentary lineage framework. The system on all levels was kept as much as possible in a state of equilibrium and, as noted, the number of lineage representatives on the lowest level, which might be as many as six or seven, was invariably an accurate reflection of the manpower of the lineage in question. Given the discontinuity and reduplication of sections all over ʿAttaland, this suggests immediately why chiefs would not have been adequate at the *khums* level. The local community was and still is the most

effective and visible unit to be represented by a chief; and even the father of ᶜAssu u-Ba Slam was only the chief of the Ilimshan *taqbilt* or section.

Except from kickbacks through fining, the land or section chief was as unpaid as the top chief was, and he was just as hedged in by the restrictions of office as was his structural superior. He was also just as much of a lame duck, and was just as liable to impeachment before the end of his year if his *aduku* was bad or if he had made a patent showing of powerlessness. Then he was considered to be *am tamttut, am ut-ᶜAtta*, 'like a woman, like an ut-ᶜAtta' (fem. sing. of *Ait ᶜAtta*). But by and large lineages known to have a bad *aduku* were passed over at election time.

The duties and decisions of the local community chief were those of internal administration and of external relations with other local communities, other *timizar* (pl. of *tamazirt*), or other localized sections, other *tiqbilin*, of the same order, relations which affected his own group as a whole and in which he acted as their representative. He was as much a mediator as an administrator, because in the normal course of events the notion of 'external relations' revolved very largely around fighting, and around whether or not the group which he represented should declare war on any neighboring group. Hence he was responsible for the levying and mobilization of his sectional *harka* or war party, and it was he too who divided up the spoils taken from the enemy. Normally too, of course, he had to refer any major disputes which occurred within his jurisdiction to the top chief, by whom he was ratified and in some cases even appointed.

Although a special transhumance chief, *amghar n-irahhalen*, was sometimes appointed, as was a pasturage chief, *amghar n-igudlan*, for the collective pasturelands – which in the Central Atlas have rigid opening and closing dates – the sectional chief of a highly transhumant grouping such as the Ilimshan often combined all these functions in himself; or the land chief might also act as field chief, *amghar n-igran*, or irrigation chief, *amghar n-tirugwin*, or even as market chief, *amghar n-s-suq*, depending on whether or not there was a market nearby or one to which the group in question had exclusive rights. If not, such chiefs were simply appointed on an *ad hoc* basis. The rotation and complementarity principle was inoperative in these cases of simple appointment, mainly because one and the same man who had already been locally elected by it was held responsible for policing markets and/or collective pasturelands as well.

The powers of all of them were as severely held in check as those of any of the other chiefs, for if egalitarianism was a guiding theoretical principle of the system, its concomitant, that some are always more equal than others, of

course held uncontested *de facto* sway. An appointee was liable to have his appointment revoked by the group council or moot, the *ajmuʿ*, at any time. But the low man in the system, if there can be said to have been one, was the appointed lineage headman, the *bab n-umur*, as the following evidence from Igharm Amazdar clearly illustrates.

On election day any quarrels or disputes were held in abeyance until right after the new chief had been elected: for, as one informant put it, that day was the one day of the year when there was no chief! After the election ritual of grass-in-turban and milk and dates was over, an *amqqran*, a 'big man' or notable who was a member of the new chief's lineage then chose the *idbab n-imuren*. He would call out the name of each one, in very deliberate tones, three times. If the man was present, the notable would then put some lucerne on his head. If, however, he was absent, the notable would then pick up a stone, lick it with his tongue and hold it up in the sun to dry. Then, if the prospective *bab n-umur* had still not yet arrived, he had to pay two *mudd* or decaliter measures of barley on arrival.

The licking process with the stone was now repeated, and if the man had sill not yet appeared, his fine was doubled to four *mudd*. Then, after another licking and drying, or if the man did not want to pay, the fine was redoubled, as well as changed in kind, to eight sheep, which were then tested by having them jump over an irrigation ditch. If they could not do so, they were considered old and no good, and had to be replaced. If the prospective and hard-headed *bab n-umur* still refused to pay, his fine was again redoubled to sixteen sheep. And if he continued to be adamant in his refusal to pay up in the face of all this pressure, the fine apparently went all the way up to 764 sheep! (Or such was the figure quoted by informants, even though it does not in fact represent an accurate and continued arithmetical redoubling of the fine in question.) If such a number was arrived at, the man's agnates were always sought, as they naturally had to pay if he could not or would not do so. There were apparently cases of individuals who were forced to leave the country forever through this kind of destitution, which was indeed equivalent to social death.

As elsewhere in Berber Morocco, any able-bodied male w-ʿAtta was eligible or liable to participate in either council meetings or elections, both of which were referred to as *ajmuʿ*. However, members of holy lineages, *igurramen*, even those most highly regarded such as the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn, on the one hand, and black potters, *iqaddaren*, and blacksmiths, *imzilen*, as well as Haratin everywhere, on the other, were barred from participation (the latter, in particular, were political non-persons), although an

agurram might officiate. The great bulk of informants' accounts of what went on at moots revolved around quarrels and disputes which came up while the deliberation was in session. The Ait Isful of Tabsbast, for example, said that if anyone tried to attack an *amghar* during a meeting, the latter could either order him to leave the territory with all his property or to go through the stone-licking ritual, with concomitant redoubling of fines each time. It might come to as much as 100 *mithqal*-s in money (1 gold or silver *mithqal* weighed about 4.25 grams), at which point the chief would send everyone out to pillage his attacker's house if the latter could not pay.

Fines, *izmaz*, were the *amghar*'s one source of remuneration, often a lucrative one and the 'perk' of office. The stone-licking ritual was also observed by the Ait Unir of Birnat, a northwestern advance guard of Ait ᶜAtta on the watershed of the Middle Atlas. Here the fine imposed on anyone who got angry at the chief might run, again in money, to 500 *duros hasani*. Non-payment resulted in total despoliation: the *ajmuᶜ* marched to the offender's house in a body (just as the Aith Waryaghar *imgharen* did to a murderer who could not pay the *haqq*), slaughtered all his sheep and ate them, and divided up all his movable property. But fines were most often levied in sheep, not in money, because to most Ait ᶜAtta wealth is on the hoof, and sheep *are* money. One informant not only stipulated that the instigator of a quarrel during a council meeting had to pay 75 sheep but that they had to be *iguryan* (sing. *aguryan*), or rams just one year old. Once, he added, at a council meeting, a very wealthy man did succeed in striking the chief with a stone. The chief was enraged but the man said that he would give him pieces of silver until he started to laugh. The chief grudgingly agreed, and the rich man let the money drop into his hand coin by coin. Sooner than he expected, the chief began to chuckle at the sight of the money – and the rich man was not only very little out of pocket, he was also in a position of psychological advantage. He now announced not only that as the chief had laughed, this was enough and he would pay no more, but that as he had also just paid the chief's *diyit* or bloodwealth, he figured he could kill him with impunity. And this story of the remuneration of a straw man with money which might have gone toward buying him a shroud seems a fitting note on which to conclude this section (Hart 1981[a]: 76-93).

Customary Law and Collective Oath

The stress which the Ait ʿAtta place upon their customary law (Tm. *izirf*, Ar. *qaʿida*) is intense, or was so in the mid-1960s, perhaps more so than among any other single Moroccan Berber group. Despite the official abolition of Berber customary law at independence in 1956, the Ait ʿAtta referred constantly to their Custom as *izirf-nnagh*, 'our way', the central guidepost around which all their jural relations revolved. They also often referred to it as *(sh-)shrut n-khams khmas n-Ait ʿAtta*, 'the provisions/contracts of the five fifths of the Ait ʿAtta'. This phrase is even more suggestive, since it implies that Custom is as integral a feature of ʿAtta sociopolitical life as is the concept of *khams khmas*. Despite the claims of informants in different localities that there were specific Ait ʿAtta customary law documents, written in Arabic and on camel skin, which were kept in the custody of the Ait Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn at Tin Iwurshan in the Saghru (who also guarded the ʿAtta battle flag), I myself was never able or allowed to see them. The efforts of French officers to find them previously had also evidently proved fruitless, which makes me wonder if they really existed at all...

This fact is important, because the rarity of such documents underscores the crucial fact that *izirf* or custom is almost always oral in character, and not written. The oral character of customary law has been largely responsible for the infinite small variations in the *izirf* from one part of ʿAttaland to another. In fact, a written *izirf* would have resulted in 'deep-freezing' and standardizing custom as the French administration had wanted to do, notably through the infamous 'Berber Dahir' of 1930, which formed part and parcel of their divide-and-rule colonial policy in Morocco. However, Ait ʿAtta customary law was a living thing to its practitioners: its vitality lay precisely in its oral character, easily transmissible from one generation to the next. It could also evolve to fit particular circumstances, as is shown by the decision at Timjraj to allow daughters to inherit along the lines stipulated by the Shariʿa, with two daughters equalling one son – a stipulation which was very probably honored in the breach more than in the observance. The very lack of written documentation in a society of totally illiterate tribesmen is one of the most striking features of ʿAtta customary law, of which I was able to discover and publish only one *qanun*, an undated but obviously recent copy (in a notebook) of an Arabic original from Igharm Amazdar (cf. Hart 1966, and 1981[a], Appendix 1: 219-228). Equally striking is the fact that the Ait ʿAtta, one and all, young and old, really know their *izirf*; and as they themselves say, 'The old men have nothing to teach the young ones!'

There is nothing about Ait ᶜAtta customary law as such, or as distinct from the customary law of any other Berber tribe, which can be said to be unique. It is rather that the *izirf* of the Ait ᶜAtta, with their supreme court of appeal at their supertribal capital of Igharm Amazdar, has been a factor which, like the concept and ideology of five fifths and of sectional discontinuity and reduplication, greatly promoted internal Ait ᶜAtta cohesion. This proved to be the case quite independently of the 'deep-freeze' effect engendered by the Berber Dahir.

There are indeed some basic differences between Ait ᶜAtta Custom and Muslim Law, but the Shariᶜa and the *izirf* worked at different levels in society. They were by no means as diametrically opposed to each other as the French claimed. In reality, the opposition between them was more a question of dialogue and of different modes of the same thing. They were two sides of a single coin, and in Milliot's idiom one was 'consubstantial' to the other and maintained a spiritual kinship with it (Milliot 1932: 130).

Nonetheless, Muslim Law is held to be divinely inspired, with the Shariᶜa functioning as a central feature of the Qur'an itself, while tribal customary law is held by its practitioners to be secular although not at variance with the Shariᶜa. The point is crucial, for tribespeople virtually everywhere in the Muslim world have until very recently had their jural relations regulated not by the Shariᶜa but by *ᶜurf* (Ar., 'custom') in one form or another. Hence this particular legal dialogue is hardly one which is unique to Moroccan Berbers, and the issue is not one of secularity as opposed to divine inspiration: for each is complementary to the other. However, there is one very clear and observable difference in form, and two others in content.

The difference in form is that while orthodox Shariᶜa Law is administered by a specialized and highly trained judge, the *qadi*, customary law was administered by an entirely lay body of men, a tribunal of lay 'experts', called *inahshamen* (properly *inahkamen*, with sing. *anahsham*, properly *anahkam*) among the Ait ᶜAtta. Like any jury in the Western world, they were normally elected or nominated for each particular case. At the supertribal capital of Igharm Amazdar they were also known as *tiᶜaqqidin* (sing. *taᶜaqqit*), 'specialist in customary law', a term derived, through metathesis, from Arabic *qaᶜida*, or as *ait l-haqq*, 'people of the truth'. Illiterate in Arabic though they may have been, these men were deemed to have a very sure knowledge of ᶜAtta *izirf*.

One of the two major differences in content relates to the issue of whether or not daughters inherit and whether women may institute divorce proceedings. On the first the Shariᶜa says yes, and on the second it says no. Custom tended to hedge on both issues but usually tilted against the Shariᶜa. But in *siba*

times, before cases deemed by the French to be criminal were handled by French courts during the colonial period, Ait ʿAtta penal practices provided the third major difference between Custom and Muslim Law: the institution of trial by collective oath (*tagallit*, pl. *tigulla*).

Collective oath was perspicaciously labeled by Marcy as the cornerstone of Berber customary law (Marcy 1939, republished 1954). Indeed, to the Ait ʿAtta at large, the concepts of *izirf* or *qaʿida* and of collective oath or *tagallit* were virtually coterminous and coextensive. A generalized Berber proverb, and one well known to the Ait ʿAtta, claims that *tigulla ggant izuwran n-l-qaʿida*, 'oaths are the roots of custom'. Most of the rest of this section will be devoted to demonstrating the truth of this assertion: for the basis of the oath resided, until 1956 and the rescinding of the 'Berber Dahir', in its collective character. Those who swore it were known both as *imgillan* (sing. *imgilli*), 'co-jurors', and *ait ʿashra*, 'co-jurors' and 'people of the ten', a Berber term which, as noted earlier, may go back to Ibn Tumart and the Almohads (Brignon et al. 1967: 103), or more generally as *aitma, imyisaten* or *imkusa*, all terms which refer to the agnates which an individual accused of any crime, from stealing a chicken or a sheep right up to murder, had to produce in order to attest to his innocence.

It follows, therefore, that the institution could only have functioned properly in a segmentary society (or in a segmentary lineage society), as was indeed the case here. The procedure also fulfilled a crucial dual role in establishing the truth or the falsehood of any accusation and, in consequence, ending the dispute that so often arose from it. It is the collective character of the oath that is of particular interest, for under normal circumstances – in a mosque and on the Qur'an, or in a Muslim law court – only the accused may swear and co-jurors are not admitted. But Berber oaths in the Middle and Central Atlas regions, and Ait ʿAtta oaths in particular, were noteworthy because they were rarely if ever sworn in mosques. The most common locality was a shrine, a saint's tomb (*s-salih*), where supernatural sanctions were held to be more easily invoked. Unlike the situation prevailing in the Rif where, even though co-jurors existed, prior to bin ʿAbd al-Krim, the *fqih* administered the oath in the mosque, on the Holy Book and on a Friday (Hart 1976: 309–312), the Qur'an played no part as a divine sanction among the Ait ʿAtta: for perjury was deemed to be more than sufficient without it. Orthodox Muslim oath was held by Berbers to represent, in fact, an easy way out, whereas the *tagallit* was in every sense a trial, often by ordeal. In its aims it was not unlike the ordeal by fire described by Ahmed for the Bugti Baluch of Pakistan (Ahmed 1986).

By its very nature collective oath was a highly public affair. Any oath was sworn on a predetermined day and hour, and at a predetermined shrine, the choice being that of the plaintiff or accuser, called *bab n-d-dʿawt*. The accused, at oath, was called *imikar* (lit. 'thief'), while his co-jurors, in order of inheritance, were, as noted, his *imgillan* or *ait ʿashra*. Finally, there was the lay oath administrator, the *anahsham*, who had to come from a neutral lineage and who was changed for each oath. His duty was to pronounce the oath before the accused and his co-jurors could swear it in the doorway to the shrine.

The number of co-jurors varied according to the gravity of the offense, generally from five for theft of small livestock to twenty for rape or the murder of a woman, and on to forty for the murder of a man, without witnesses. Many situations, especially those related to land, required ten co-jurors (de Monts de Savasse 1951[a]), and hence the generalized use of the designation *ait ʿashra* for them. The accused himself was invariably counted as the first co-juror. When as large a number as forty co-jurors was involved, it was seldom that an accused individual could supply them all himself. Hence he had to make up the requisite number by sacrificing a sheep to the members of a related lineage who would thereby be obligated to help him fill his quota.

Fines for theft from a house or an *igharm* were high, and were generally based upon the number of doors of the *igharm* at a rate of ten sheep per door. Among the Ait Yʿazza of Alnif there was a fine of one sheep per furrow for plowing anyone else's land. If the thief of an animal was identified, the distance it had traveled to his house was measured by the number of hoofprints, and a fine of 100 duros per hoofprint plus 100 duros per night spent by the animal in his house was then levied. Among the Ait Usikis, in a case of suspected rape, there was a fine of 25 sheep for every hair of the woman's head, if she were unwilling or cried out, while if she were a virgin the rapist had to marry her immediately. Also, for the next four days he had to invite eleven passers-by to eat at his expense. If the girl wanted to divorce him afterwards, she was free to do so.

Fear of supernatural sanction, in the minds of the co-jurors, was of course the most effective deterrent to perjury at oath; but there were other factors involved as well. In the case of any co-jurors who were found to be missing at oath, either they or the accused himself had to pay, unless they had a valid excuse, such as illness or unavoidable absence. Given the public character of oaths, and at the stipulation of the plaintiff, onlookers could and often did heckle the accused and his co-jurors precisely in order to trip them up over the pronunciation of the oath formula. Indeed, in precolonial times the *tagallit n-nhah* oath-cum-ordeal was practiced over much of ʿAttaland, particularly in

the Saghru. Here a circle of stones was placed around the shrine, and the accused and his co-jurors, either blindfolded or made to wear the hoods of their jillabas or silhams over their faces, had to move around it counter-clockwise while either stepping on each stone or avoiding it. During these maneuvers the plaintiff and the other onlookers would yell 'Hah! Hah! Hah!' or 'ʿAw! ʿAw! ʿAw!' in order to distract the participants. If any of them either uttered a word or fell off a stone, the oath was 'broken' (*irza tagallit*). In such a case, of course, the defendant had to pay.

A further refinement was the existence of accusing oaths (*ilkumen*, sing. *alkum*) as well as the normal oaths of denial on the part of the defendant. The *alkum* was an oath of accusation of the part of the plaintiff, with the same number of co-jurors required as in the ordinary *tagallit* of denial. It was most frequently resorted to when murder was suspected, with the full complement of forty co-jurors. It was the aggrieved party's ace, for where the accuser had a really strong case, the *alkum* put it to the test. The real point behind the *alkum*, and indeed behind the whole phenomenon of collective oath, is that *iniyan*, witnesses, normally overrode *imgillan*, co-jurors, and that accusation seldom occurred without reasonable foundation. Normally, witnesses had to be neutral but the mechanisms to ensure that the accused did not escape scot-free were reinforced through the *alkum*.

A second refinement, known as *u-tikhsi* (lit. 'he of the sheep'), was perhaps more a consequence of oath than a variant of it. By this modality a man who became angry with his own lineage-mates for any reason had the option of changing to another lineage or co-juring group simply by sacrificing a sheep to them and without, apparently, losing his property rights in his lineage of origin. But he did forfeit his rights to water, to his cubicle in his group's collective storehouse and to any preemptive *shfaʿa* rights he might have had to land or women in his original lineage. In fact, it was normal for him to take a new wife from his new co-juring group even if he still had another at home: for the new marriage acted as a guarantee of his participation in the jural affairs of the new group. But provided he had no children, it was his original lineage which inherited from him at his death. Here a shared stake in property cut across a shared legal responsibility. Just like any other long-term absentee, an *u-tikhsi* lost his rights at home because of his absence – though he could return to his own group without additional sacrifice if he did so before the forty years required to complete his naturalization had passed. Nonetheless, although in theory an *u-tikhsi* suffered from no social or political disability as a result of his action and could even become chief in his new group, this was indeed as hypothetical as the once celebrated claim that 'Any American Can Become

President'. What it does, in fact, through the rarity of its occurrence, is to highlight the Ait ᶜAtta contention that any man who cannot get on with his agnates is a fool. The proof of this is that men who were incorrigible offenders were generally killed by these same agnates (Hart 1981[a]: 154-166).

Finally, it should be stressed again that Muslim Law does not recognize the existence of co-jurors. The notion of co-juror is rejected by the Shariᶜa, which substitutes for it that of witness. In this connection, when independence came to Morocco in 1956, the oath was decollectivized, a fact which was never understood and which was always queried strenuously by ᶜAssu-Ba Slam in his later years. He had remained in office as *qa'id* of the Ait ᶜAtta of the Saghru ever since his appointment to this position by the French in February 1939, six years after the epic resistance he had led against them at Bu Gafr and one year after the building of the Igharm Amazdar courthouse, right through the rest of the protectorate until his death in August 1960. His incomprehension of the Shariᶜa was equalled only by his heroic qualities as a *mujahid* and by his boundless knowledge of Ait ᶜAtta *izirf* or customary law. Without the benefit of their *izirf* to guide them, he maintained that the Ait ᶜAtta would remain in a deep dark fog.

The Supreme Court of Appeal at Igharm Amazdar

The Ait ᶜAtta *istinaf* or supreme court of appeal at Igharm Amazdar is of very great interest, particularly because of the stress the Ait ᶜAtta placed on its efficacy as a judiciary body. Before we discuss it in detail, however, mention should also be made of a lesser known intermediate court at Tiraf n-Ait ᶜAlwan in the Ktawa region of the Lower Dra. This court was originally set up to iron out disputes between the localized Ait Isful and Ait ᶜAlwan sections resident in the area, disputes that were mediated by the equally localized Ait Wahlim. However, the Tiraf court evidently turned into a jural safety valve, because not only were disputes that could not be settled there referred to the supreme court at Igharm Amazdar, but any matter that the latter could not settle after three days of profound deliberation was then passed back to Tiraf n-Ait ᶜAlwan, whose *anahsham* as mediator and ten *imuqqrann* or 'big men' as jury had the final say.

Even though Igharm Amazdar became the Ait ᶜAtta capital relatively late, we cannot stress enough that its symbolic value was twofold: as the site of the election of the top chief and as the site of the supreme court. The *istinaf* at Igharm Amazdar became, so to speak, the jural rock in the center of the

whole Ait ʿAtta 'snowball state', to use Barnes' expression (Barnes 1967: 29-63) – although the 'snowball' factor proved to be of greater significance in this case than that of the 'state'. As far as the court was concerned, an eye-witness report by Lt. Thet (1951) notes that during protectorate times Igharm Amazdar, which was still far away from any urban center or important communication links, was nonetheless the scene, at more or less regular intervals, of an intense activity for periods of two or three days at a time, with Ait ʿAtta coming and going regularly from as far away as the Ktawa or the Tafilalt. This was, of course, because the Supreme Court was in session.

Thet notes further, and somewhat naively, that this top-level ʿAtta tribunal was one of a very few such tribunals which the French did not have to fabricate *ex nihilo* after the 'pacification', an eloquent testimony to the *divide ut impera* technique of the French Berber policy. But it is also a testimony to the jural uniqueness of the Ait ʿAtta, in devising such a court and having located it in such a relatively central and inviolate a site as their Tafrawt, their Saghru heartland. Despite Thet's hints at other Berber tribal supreme courts elsewhere, he does not name them. Instead there was a remarkable degree of originality inherent in the Ait ʿAtta political system, for they were able, consciously, to adapt, modify and improve upon their own and, by extension, their neighbors' political institutions during the course of full-scale territorial expansion. No other tribal group, and certainly no confederacy of comparable size in Morocco could boast a capital, a supreme court, a supertribal battle-flag or an inviolate heartland – where the use of firearms was entirely forbidden, thus making the other four institutions possible. In terms of ideological symmetry, therefore, the concept of 'five fifths' seems to have been operative on more than one level, even if only subconsciously.

A consideration of the structure, function and organization of the Ait ʿAtta *istinaf* itself is limited by the fact that the bulk of the available material (and of informants' reconstructions) dates from the protectorate period only and and hence does not go very far back into the long period of *siba* which preceded it. There is thus the distinct probability that the French administration froze the ʿAtta *istinaf* into position. Nonetheless, as all accounts of the court are virtually identical, the jural procedure involved, whether or not deliberately frozen by the French, was simple, effective, based on majority rule and, in keeping with the whole tenor of Ait ʿAtta socio-political life, strikingly egalitarian.

As already noted, the guardians of Ait ʿAtta Custom at Igharm Amazdar were known as *ait l-haqq*, 'people of the truth', or, more often, as *tiʿaqqidin n-Ait ʿAisa*, 'Ait ʿAisa customary law specialists': for it was those Ait ʿAtta resi-

dent at Igharm Amazdar, the Ait ᶜAisa, who acted as the *ait izirf*, the repositories of custom. For any given case, six *tiᶜaqqidin* were chosen, two from each of the three Ait ᶜAisa sections, the Ait Zimru (of the Ait Wahlim fifth, with one *taᶜaqqit* each from the resident lineages of the Ait Bu Iknifen and the Ait ᶜAisa u-Brahim), the Ait Hassu (also of the Ait Wahlim fifth) and the Ait Yᶜazza. In no two consecutive cases were these *tiᶜaqqidin* the same individuals, as they were always changed afresh for each case.

It is not entirely clear exactly how the *tiᶜaqqidin* were chosen. They may have been nominated in each instance by the *amghar n-tmazirt*, the local section or land chief, or elected by the sections themselves according to the rotation and complementarity principle, or indeed there may even just have been a simple process of selection by each section. If the rotation and complementarity principle was employed, one major difference between the selection of *tiᶜaqqidin* and the election of chiefs was that the turnover of the former, almost on a daily basis, was far greater than the annual turnover of the latter. After all, a chief theoretically lasted in office for a year, but a *taᶜaqqit*, in his role of *anahsham*, lasted at most only a few hours, the duration of his case. A second major difference is that no *igurramen* officiated either at the selection of the *tiᶜaqqidin* or at the meeting of the court, as they did when top or sectional chiefs were elected. The court was entirely a lay affair and *baraka* played no part in the proceedings.

It goes without saying that all the men of the Ait ᶜAisa n-Igharm Amazdar – except for the Ait Isful, who never furnished either a sectional or land chief or any *tiᶜaqqidin* – had to have a thorough grounding in customary law, for at any time they might be called upon to act as *inahshamen*. Indeed, the *tiᶜaqqidin* were also *inahshamen*, specialist *inahshamen*, whose function was the adjudication of any jural issues or trouble cases which had remained unresolved in the home areas of the disputants from any part of ᶜAttaland.

These six *tiᶜaqqidin n-Ait ᶜAisa n-Igharm Amazdar* formed the *istinaf* under the *amghar n-tmazirt*, the land chief of the Ait ᶜAisa, who had, so to speak, the 'chairman's casting vote'. The procedure involved was very well thought out: if the court was tied on the verdict at three votes to three, six new *inahshamen* were selected from the same sections, and in the same proportion. Then, if they too reached a three-to-three deadlock, a third set of *inahshamen* was chosen. If this third set should also arrive at a draw, all eighteen *inahshamen* were reconvoked; and if the verdict was still nine to nine, it was up to the land chief's vote to decide the issue. The verdict was final and without appeal.

In French times the verdict of the court was arrived at in the little courthouse, the *istinaf* building, with the French *Affaires Indigènes* officer presiding,

while the plaintiff and the accused waited outside (Thet 1951). Here there was of course no question of co-jurors. In *siba* times the members of the court deliberated in the open air, and according to an Usikis informant there were ten rather than six *tiʿaqqidin*, chosen from all five fifths, and they sat in a circle. Just outside it, on one side, were the *amghar n-ait l-haqq* and the *anahsham*, while at the other stood the plaintiff and the accused. No co-jurors were allowed; and when all were present the *amghar* picked up a stone and announced, first, that anyone who spoke out of turn would pay a fine of 500 duros, and afterward, that initially the plaintiff and then the defendant had the floor. Each spoke in turn and then left.

Now the *anahsham* asked each member of the *ait l-haqq* for his opinion. A clear majority verdict obviously won, but if the vote was tied the *amghar* then asked the *anahsham* for his opinion. Again there was the casting vote principle, to make the vote six to five, and whichever side the *anahsham* supported won the case. At this point the *amghar* would check the decision by asking the *anahsham* and the court members three times, 'Are you sure?' If there was no dissent this ended the matter. However, if the *anahsham* did not agree with either party or with the members of the court, the case had then to revert back to the intermediate court at Tiraf n-Ait ʿAlwan, where the same procedure was repeated exactly and where the decision was now final.

Between these two accounts there are differences in detail: ten *tiʿaqqidin* instead of six, allegedly chosen from all five fifths (which seems dubious) instead of on a rotational-complementary basis among the members of the Ait ʿAisa n-Igharm Amazdar; the *anahsham* rather than the land or section chief acting as 'chairman'; the lack of reference to three separate bodies of *tiʿaqqidin* who met, deliberated and rendered their verdicts in succession in the case of stalemate (which may have been a French contribution: cf. de Monts de Savasse 1951[a] and Thet 1951, both of whom refer to the members of the court as a *collège supérieur*); and the reversion to the court at Tiraf n-Ait ʿAlwan for a final decision if Igharm Amazdar ended in a draw. This latter point is not mentioned in any French account and had possibly fallen into disuse by protectorate times. No doubt the Cartesian logic of the French would have led them to look with disfavor on the idea of two courts doing the work of one, even if the lower court acted only as a safety valve.

The members of the supreme court, whatever their ages, clearly had to have a knowledge of Ait ʿAtta *izirf* which was greater than that of the average tribesman. In this particular tribal society in which virtually everyone has (or had, in the 1960s) considerable knowledge of customary law and in which litigation, as elsewhere in Morocco, is not only a cheap but an agreeable pas-

time, such knowledge demanded a high degree of accuracy and sensitivity to local variations in *izirf* on the part of the *tiʿaqqidin* of Igharm Amazdar. The judicial efficacy of this highly egalitarian political procedure, and indeed of the whole supertribal tribunal at Igharm Amazdar, was remarkable (Hart 1981[a]: 167-172).

Pacts

Politics to the Ait ʿAtta was to a considerable extent directly contingent upon a system which combined quasi-segmentation at its upper levels, in lieu of the genealogical charter which it lacked, with a genuine segmentary system of corporate agnatic lineages at its lower levels. Political relations of peace, neutrality, truce, feud or war between ʿAtta sections and fifths or between the Ait ʿAtta and the outside world depended equally upon the same system. The extent to which the Ait ʿAtta as a whole achieved their ideal of unity in the face of outside enemies was considerable and, on occasion, even total. This was particularly so at the height of ʿAtta expansion when such internally directed bloodfeuding as there may have been had perforce to be subordinated to externally directed warfare. The reasons for the lack of ʿAtta unification at a later period, as on the eve of the French conquest, can be attributed to external factors, particularly that of the Glawi's intervention in the area. Before this occurred, however, pacts and alliances were an essential part of Ait ʿAtta life.

First of all, however, the matter of *liff*-s or of any kindred system of factional alliance should be clarified, for although Ait ʿAtta informants claimed to know all about them, the question seemed to be of little importance to them. This was markedly unlike the precolonial situation that prevailed either in the Rif or in the Western Atlas and the Anti-Atlas. The notion of *liff* did exist among Central Atlas tribes, but what is striking, particularly in view of Montagne's original findings in the Western Atlas (Montagne 1930), irrespective of whether or not they were correct in other respects, is, as Gellner has noted, their strongly *ad hoc* character (Gellner 1969: 66). Among the Ait ʿAtta the notion of *liff* had no particular ritual significance and, unlike other areas and tribes, involved neither sacrifice of animals nor ritual exchange, either of goods or of services.

Ait ʿAtta preferences in pacts of protection and alliance took three rather different forms, known as *tazttat*, *tada* and *tafargant*. The first differed from the other two in that it involved money payment by a client to a patron or protec-

tor, while the last two were pacts between individuals or groups of equal status, with no money changing hands. Indeed, many Ait ʿAtta view *tada* and *tafargant* as identical, even though in fact this is not so.

The *tazttat* was a pact of protection, usually for a traveler in hostile territory. It was not a pact of alliance, and this is the crucial distinction. Furthermore, unlike the theoretical lifelong validity of the *tada*, the *tazttat* was valid for one journey only, and always involved a cash payment by the client, the *mzattat*, to his protector, the *amzttid*. The institution received considerable attention from early twentieth-century European travelers in Morocco, simply because they had to pay the *tazttat* as a kind of toll fee each time they crossed into the territory of a different tribe. The object and the essence of *tazttat* were its use in seeking the protection of the most powerful local individual, generally the *amghar* of the tribe through whose land they were to pass. At the tribal border, when the traveler paid his *amzttid*, he was turned over to another powerful man in the next tribe and the process was repeated until his journey was ended. The responsibility of the *amzttid* to his protege ended at his own tribal frontier. The *tazttat* was a highly necessary institution, and among all Central Atlas tribes, including the Ait ʿAtta, anyone who intended to visit only the market, the *suq*, of another tribe had to pay it. In theory, therefore, nobody was exempt. Exactly the same system prevailed in the precolonial Rif, where exactly the same name, *dhazttat*, referred to exactly the same institution, and where it also still refers today to a bribe one may try to pay the *qadi* to influence a legal decision in his favor. But in the Rif attendance at other tribes' markets did not require payment of *dhazttat* (Hart 1976: 306-309).

Despite these arrangements the crossing of territory of another tribe was absolutely forbidden if the members of the tribe making the crossing were driving animals. If one tribe drove its sheep into the territory of another, the shepherds of the victimized tribe had the right to kill and roast the invading sheep until the offenders retreated. The same applied between shepherds of different fifths or *khmas* if an *agudal* or collective pasturage was the subject of trespass. The wars in the Usikis-Msimrir area between the local Ait ʿAtta and the Ait Murghad and Ait Hadiddu further north indicate that incidents of this kind were commonplace. There is, in addition, the annual and permanent pasturage brawl at Talmast which continues to this day, despite all the efforts of both earlier French colonial and later Moroccan provincial administrators to put a stop to it. It was precisely to counter problems of this kind that *tazttat* and *tada* relations were developed. Both existed typically for two mutually hostile tribes and even for two mutually hostile sections of either one of them.

The major factor was less the size or sectional/segmentary level of the units concerned than the degree of hostility between them.

Normally an *amzttid* was totally responsible for his protege while the latter was in his charge, and he had full and integral responsibility for bloodwealth or *diyit* payment should the client be killed, whether by fellow tribesmen or by bandits, while under his protection. In addition, the derivation of the term *tazttat* is not without interest. Laoust has shown that it is derived from the Berber root *ztt*, 'to weave' (Laoust 1920: 125-126). The word originally described a distinctive woven garment, a *silham* or *jillaba*, which the protector lent his client to identify him to fellow tribesmen who would then refrain from firing at him. Only later did it come to refer to the act of protection itself, passing into Moroccan Arabic as *zattata* (even the term for 'protege', *mzattat*, is an Arabic one) and also coming to mean 'bribe', as it does today in the Rif.

Despite the neat schematization proposed by Bruno and Bousquet (1946), the conceptual difference between *tazttat* and *tada* does not appear to have been rigid. The main distinction was one of payment: the *amzttid* was paid and the *u-tada* (pl. *ait tada*), the co-sponsor, was not. *Tazttat* was a relationship of protector and protege based on money, the amount paid depending on the status of the *amzttid*. *Tada*, however, was a permanent and enduring relationship between equals, two men of different tribes, a relationship normally transmitted to their offspring. Its nature was such that groups were as easily drawn into its orbit as were individuals. Any man of intelligence had an *u-tada*, a man of equal status in a reciprocal *tada* relationship to him, in every neighboring tribe. The *u-tada* and his family were *ait tada* to the man in question, who also referred to all his individual *u-tada*-s in different tribes as his *ait tada*, even though the network was entirely Ego-centered and not transitive. In other words, if Ego enjoyed reciprocal *tada* relationships with, say, two other individuals independently, it did not follow that, in consequence, a similar *tada* relationship automatically existed between the other two independently of Ego. Characteristically, in fact, it did not.

However, both *tazttat* and *tada* were optimally involved in traveling: *tazttat*, to ensure safe arrival at the house of an *u-tada*, and *tada*, for security while there. *Tazttat* and *tada* were both always made with one's enemies, as a personal safeguard. Among Central Atlas tribes generally, there was, to the best of my knowledge, no body of ritual connected with the *tada* concept as was the case in the Middle Atlas, where garments, silhams or jillabas, and, in particular, slippers or sandals, of the right foot only, were objects of ritual exchange between all members of the two contracting groups (Lesne, n.d.

but ca. 1962: 59-68). Indeed, at least one Middle Atlas group, the Aith Ndhir, according to Marcy, gave the label of *tadha* to co-lactation pacts which among the Ait ʿAtta would unfailingly have been referred to as *tafargant* (Marcy 1936). For the Ait ʿAtta, too, at least, the ritual dimension was saved for the *tafargant* pact. *Tada* was more a kind of 'mutual back-scratching' based on the idea that maximization of friendly contacts in alien sections or tribes did much to improve chances of survival. It did not entail any intermarriage taboos between *ait tada*: for this prohibition was a hallmark of that most characteristically Ait ʿAtta pact, the *tafargant*.

The etymology of the term *tafargant* is not absolutely certain, although it is probably derived from the Arabic root *f-r-q*, 'to separate, divide'. However, the existence of an identical institution elsewhere in the Central Atlas, the *sar aghu* or 'mixing of milk', makes its significance immediately clear. As noted, *tafargant* was the Ait ʿAtta term for what the French literature describes as the 'pact of co-lactation' (Marcy 1936, Bruno and Bousquet 1946). The *tafargant* pact was both more specific and more binding than the *tada*, and was almost invariably sealed on an intergroup rather than on an inter-individual basis. It was based on an exchange of lactating babies between nursing mothers of the two groups involved. If no nursing mothers were available, then milk had to be taken from two cows, one from each group, and placed in a single bowl, from which everyone drank. The ritual exchange of infants caused a subsequent taboo on intermarriage between members of the groups concerned, for they were now *ait ughu* or *aitmaten n-ughu*, milk brothers. This intermarriage prohibition held good even if the *ait tfargant* were parallel cousins. Thus it overrode even the *shfaʿa* priority rights of agnates over land and women, for parallel cousin marriage is a major structural desideratum among the Ait ʿAtta, even though its actual incidence (16.6 percent at Usikis) is lower than the emphasis given it by informants would lead one to believe (Hart 1981: 148-151). Yet *tafargant* did not entail or grant mutual inheritance expectations. *Tafargant* pacts were designed to patch up differences, or to cement existing friendships. There is still a prohibition on marriage between the Ait ʿAisa u-Brahim and the Ignawen, both of the Ait Wahlim *khums*, as the result of *tafargant*, and a *tafargant* bond with ensuing incest taboos also exists between the Ait Isful and the Ait Unir, who belong to two different fifths, further south. The Ait Khabbash in the southeast also made *tafargant* in the late eighteenth century with the Bni Mhammad, after a big war, but in this case the latter became junior partners to the former (Dunn 1973).

The concepts of blood kinship and milk kinship exist at different levels and are important in different ways, but the former is the more inclusive and

has the wider application in society. *Tafargant* or *sar aghu*, the process of milk kinship, and *aitma n-ughu* (or *aitmaten n-ughu*), the participants in that process, only have structural relevance in the specific contexts of individual foster-brotherhood and, much more rarely, of mass foster-brotherhood. The agnatic principle through unilineal blood kinship is both more extensive and more intensive. This is because of genealogical reckoning of descent through the patriline, because of inheritance principles in which milk half-brothers are excluded, because of the political organization with its associated system of trial by collective oath, and because of the dominance, both terminological and actual, of *aitma* (brothers) over *istma* (sisters). To borrow a term from advertising, any tendency toward uterine descent seems to be at best 'subliminal' (Hart 1981: 188-189, and 1984: 63-65).

Feuding

The Ait ᶜAtta counterparts to pacts and protection were, of course, feuding and warfare. Until considerably after the turn of the twentieth century, the *khams khmas n-Ait ᶜAtta* were always turned outward in full-scale aggression against their neighbors in a clear and long-standing case of 'Berber Imperialism' (Dunn 1973: 83-107). Although they may not always have been as irresistible as they claim, their neighbors and enemies had good reason to respect them if not to fear them.

Even though the invincibility of their five fifths is universally believed by the Ait ᶜAtta themselves, it is difficult to identify a single instance in which classical corporate segmentary action in the form of a supertribal war against their time-honored enemies of the Ait Yafalman and the Ait Siddrat actually occurred. Although it was held to have happened regularly, it could not really have done so because different fifths, sections and even segments or subsections of the same section were all expanding in different directions. Partial mobilization against a common enemy on any given front would not have been difficult, but general mobilization on all fronts would have been a very different matter. In addition, and as noted, the evidence suggests that Igharm Amazdar only became the supertribal capital and supreme court seat after Ait ᶜAtta expansion hit its peak. Thus its effect as a centralizing and cohesion-promoting force in the overall system of Ait ᶜAtta politics came quite late.

The biggest fissure in the Ait ᶜAtta self-image, one which they ruefully admit, is the fact that once new lands had been conquered, the conquerors then fell to fighting among themselves. Although not universal, the practice

was general enough for the bloodfeud to reach a very considerable development at the inter-sectional level. It even occurred on occasion between lineages of the same section in a given locality. The feud between the Ait Bu Iknifen lineage groups resident at Msimrir which resulted in some of them being forced to move further south to Imi n-Warg, near Usikis, where they built an *igharm* or house helped by other local Ait Bu Iknifen lineage groups resident at Usikis, who also aided them in continual fighting against their brothers at Msimrir, is one such example. The annual summer pasturage brawl at Talmast between yet two further sets of Ait Bu Iknifen, the local residents and the transhumants up from the south (the latter including contingents from both Usikis and Msimrir as well) is another. But feuding, or vendetta, never occurred at the intra-lineage level, as it did so strikingly often among the Rifians of the Aith Waryaghar and as commented on at length both in the previous chapter and elsewhere (Hart 1965; 1970; 1976: 313-338; 1997[a]: 54-76): for among the Ait ʿAtta, the strength of the *ighs*, the agnatic lineage, was always rock-hard. The situation at the top was one of quasi-segmentation, whereas at the bottom it was genuinely segmentary. Indeed, the bloodfeud, *tamaddit*, among the Ait ʿAtta was merely the logical consequence of a series of anti-social acts that had their own hierarchy of gravity: theft and its concomitant, banditry; then woundings and, finally, murder. An appraisal of these forms a necessary introduction to the feud itself and to warfare.

Theft nearly always involved livestock, and was punished by a fine, either in terms of sheep or of *duros*-s or *riyal*-s *hasani*, the then current currency: both the *duro* and the *riyal* had the same nominal value, and each was made up of 5 pesetas. If the theft occurred within the local community, the thief paid the *amghar n-tmazirt*. If it occurred outside the community, he paid the top chief at Igharm Amazdar. Fines varied throughout ʿAttaland, and the *izirf* or custom of the Ait Yʿazza of Alnif had the ultimate refinement of an 'escape clause' counterprovision. If, after the Ait ʿAtta had decided that they had worked out all the necessary rules and regulations required by their *izirf*, and had nonetheless forgotten to include anything, however small, within it, anyone taking advantage of this apparent loophole would be fined 100 *duro*-s *hasani* on the spot! This provided an interesting counter to Jerome Frank's telling observation that '... it is part of the rules of any group to break some of its own rules ...' (Frank 1933: 277-278, cited by Hoebel 1964: 29-30).

There seems to be little evidence in ʿAttaland for organized banditry except perhaps among the Ait Khabbash, whom the French unjustly accused of being large-scale *iqattaʿn n-ibriden* (lit. 'cutters of roads'), or highwaymen. In any event, the only case history known to me of purely Ait ʿAtta banditry

comes not from the Ait Khabbash at all, but from the Ait Bu Iknifen of Talmast (for details, cf. Hart 1981: 196, and 1987: 30).

Ait ᶜAtta *izirf* was very precise on the subject of murder. Generally a murderer had to flee at once to another tribe, preferably a hostile one, accompanied by his nine *ait ᶜashra*. This would enable him to escape the vengeance of his victim's agnates, who, as soon as they knew what had happened, would set after him in ritual pursuit. Thus there were two sets of *ait ᶜashra* involved, that of the murderer, known as *imzwagen* (from Ar. cognate *z-w-g*, 'to implore protection'), and that of his victim, *inighi* (from Berber root *n-gh*, 'to kill', and hence also *bu inighi*, 'killer'). The agnates of the latter could, and typically did, take vengeance either on the person of the murderer himself or on that of any of his *ait ᶜashra*.

Thus the *ait ᶜashra*, the agnatic lineage, remained the core social grouping in feud, in the collective oath ('the continuation of the feud by other means') and over property matters. Naturally vengeance was ideally taken by the agnate nearest the victim in terms of inheritance – his son, his father or his full brother – preferably on the person of the murderer himself, although any of his agnates would do. Hence the immediate flight of the murderer and his own *ait ᶜashra*.

The most likely place of refuge was among those old adversaries of the Ait ᶜAtta, the Ait Murghad or the Ait Hadiddu and the Ait Siddrat. Other neighboring tribes of equal status would also serve but it was quite unthinkable for an w-ᶜAtta to take refuge among Haratin or any client group. The murderer and his *ait ᶜashra* would always be received openhandedly, for the situation was reciprocal, particularly for the Ait Murghad.

The rules governing ritual pursuit varied from region to region and it was not universally practiced. However, in ᶜAttaland the murderer's *ait ᶜashra* stayed away for a three-day period. They then returned to treat for peace by offering an *aᶜaban*, a peace offering made to the agnates of the victim and consisting of a white sheet on which was placed some green grass, several loaves of bread, some sugar cones and a baby. If this offering was accepted, the negotiations over bloodwealth payments or *diyit* (pl. *diyat*, from Mor. Ar. *diya*) could be initiated. Those who accepted it and worked toward an amicable solution were now known as *ait l-khayr*, 'people of the good'. However, if the countervailing opinion of the *ait l-ᶜar*, or 'people of the shame-compulsion', who to the contrary worked toward vengeance, triumphed and the *aᶜaban* was rejected, the murderer's *ait ᶜashra* had to scatter fast, for a bloodfeud had now begun.

The killer himself was still an *amzwug*, still in exile. He could only return if the *aᶜaban* offered by his *ait ᶜashra* had been accepted. Otherwise he had to

remain in exile for many years, if not for life. He would then sacrifice a sheep to the lineage-group which had received him in order to become their *u-tikhsi*. If he died childless, his property went to his new agnates by adoption; otherwise his children inherited after the standard Islamic deduction of one-eighth for his widow. If the murderer were pardoned, his return followed a pattern similar to the specific practice of the Ait Unir of Birnat, for whom the *diyit* consisted of one hundred sheep. Before the sheep were handed over, the killer's agnates had to feed one hundred persons for two days, as *afanigg*, which amounted to the same fine as the penalty for a broken oath. They then made an *aʿaban* offering, in the usual manner, and sacrificed a sheep. Only then was the *diyit* turned over to the dead man's agnates and only after its acceptance could the murderer return.

The amount of the *diyit* varied, but it depended on the victim's status, the pressure his agnates could exercise on the killer and his own agnates, and on the latters' relative wealth and status. In such an emphatically agnatic social system as this, the killer neither could nor would shoulder the total burden of the *diyit* alone: normally he paid half and his *ait ʿashra* the other half. Likewise, the victim's closest agnates received half, and his remaining agnates were allotted the other half. (Another variant had it that *diyit* received went first to the parents of the victim; if they were dead, then his brothers received it; and if he were married, his widow received her customary and legal one-eighth.) Just as collective oath involved corporate action, so did the bloodfeud.

Unlike collective oath, however, there was no formal time limit on payment of the *diyit*, for as the bloodwealth was generally very high, the killer had to sell a large percentage of his livestock, or surrender it entirely, in order to meet the cost. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that *diyit* was paid for accidental deaths or even for manslaughter.

Diyit payments amongst localized Ait ʿAtta communities were frequently variable, depending on discussions between the victim's agnates, the *ait l-khayr* who were present and mediating, and the killer and his *ait ʿashra* or *imyisaten*. Payment was offered in money, in kind or in both. It generally consisted of livestock – sheep, goats, cattle or camels (one cow equalled 7 sheep and one camel 25 sheep in the Saghru). In individual cases, rifles or real estate, convertible into hard cash or livestock at the local going rate might be offered; while the degree of flexibility in the *diyit* seems to have depended on the degree of sedentarization of the community involved. The Ait ʿAtta of Usikis, for example, expected a *diyit* of 1000 *riyal-s hasani*. This *diyit*, since it was expressed in money rather than in sheep, was couched in a sedentarizing rather than in a fully transhumant idiom and corresponded exactly to the amount

required by the equally sedentarizing Ait Bu Iknifen of Talmast. The Ait ᶜAtta of the Saghru and the Ait Slillu (Ait Unir) of Nqub seem to have counted their *diyit* payments solely in livestock, reflecting a greater accent on transhumance. The Saghru figure at 150 sheep and 150 goats corresponds quite logically with that of the neighboring Ilimshan of the same region who required 300 one-year old sheep. But their other neighbors the Ait Yᶜazza of Alnif gave a figure four times as high, reflecting, no doubt, a much larger average flock size. The Ait Isful of Tabsbast also had a high *diyit*, involving a camel and a black slave woman in addition to 500 sheep, while the Ait Unir of Birnat required a much lower figure of only 100 sheep. The Ait l-Firsi of the eastern Saghru, who are poor, considered this lower sum to have been the Ait ᶜAtta norm. They themselves, given their largely enforced sedentarization through poverty, did not require a *diyit* payment anywhere near this latter figure, and asked only 100 *duro-s hasani* in cash.

Although two southeastern Ait ᶜAtta groups, the Ait Khabbash (Ait Unibgi) of Tawuz and the Ait Unibgi of Awfus, claimed not to have had any *diyit*, other evidence suggests that they did. The Ait Khabbash claimed that it was very rare for an exiled murderer ever to be pardoned, but they did admit the concept of *amnasf n-d-diyit* or 'half-*diyit*'. This was the same as the bloodwealth due if the victim were a woman, and it was also equivalent to the Shariᶜa regulation over inheritance. (The *diyit* due for a pregnant woman, however, was paid according to the sex of the unborn child, which was presumably determined by cutting her womb open for examination before burial. The *diyit* for a married woman was paid to her husband if she had had children by him and was not divorced; otherwise, it reverted to her parents or agnates. We may note that among the Ait Hadiddu the *diyit* for any married woman, with or without children, went to her husband; but this was not the case either among the Ait ᶜAtta or the Ihansalen, if she were childless.) The Ait Unibgi at Zwala (Awfus) required an initial sacrifice from the *ait ᶜashra* so that they might return after the usual three days, with the killer staying in exile, and a further sacrifice a year later before he might return. Should these sacrifices not be accepted, the killer's exile was permanent. The Ait Umnasf (Ait Unibgi) from Qsar Ait Isful only required four agnates to flee and in addition demanded a small *diyit*.

The notion of fractions of the normal bloodwealth total was also used in other situations. Everywhere in the region it was held that a half-*diyit* had to be paid for shooting at a man and missing him, whereas full *diyit* was claimed if the would-be killer took aim but then refrained from pulling the trigger. The logic was quite simple: a *de facto* miss was recognized by the *izirf* and was

charged accordingly, while the intent to kill was considered as tantamount to an actual killing, The same principle applied to knives as well as guns, for the intent to act was unequivocally equated with the act itself.

Any man who wounded another had first to kill a sheep for him as a request for pardon and then feed and care for him until he was cured. However, if a bone was broken and the marrow was exposed, some money had to be paid. In addition, for a broken left hand, a *diyit* double that stipulated for a broken right hand was exacted, for it is with the left hand that one performs one's ablutions prior to prayer. On the other hand, the right eye was held to be worth twice the left eye, as it is normally the one kept open to aim with when shooting.

Indeed, the *diyit*, despite its variability, was the standard form of blood compensation all over the Atlas, where, as noted, there was no equivalent to the heavy *haqq* fine used to control murders committed in or near markets in the Central Rif. It was normal, in fact, to deposit arms with a guardian just outside the market precincts. Each market had two or three such guardians, *imhadan n-s-suq*, who also acted as policemen for the market *amghar*. If a murder was committed in a market, everyone scattered, for the victim's agnates would kill the murderer at once if they caught him. This would end the matter, but if they were unsuccessful, a state of feud would then formally be declared: for just as truce (*s-sulh*) or peace (*l-hna*) concluded between two groups was always announced by the *abarrah* or market crier, so too was the *awttu*, a state of chronic general hostility (Hart 1981: 194-202; 1984: 65-71).

Warfare

In *siba* times most Ait ʿAtta sections, irrespective of size, were involved either in small scale feuds with their immediate neighbors or in larger scale wars with neighboring tribes. It must have seemed from the outside that war would swamp the whole region, for while peace or a harvesting truce or even a taboo on feuding during Ramadan might be declared in one district, *awttu* hostilities might flare up again in another one. Only Jews, Haratin and members of other despised socio-occupational groups, all clients of the Imazighen, did not bear arms or fight.

Even though the Ait ʿAtta themselves might have regarded a distinction between feud and warfare as artificial, it will aid in clarifying the ways in which they coped with the confusion that *siba* apparently implied. Beattie (1964[a]: 175-176; and 1964[b]: 267-268) makes an initial distinction between

the two in terms of scale, for feuds tended to be smaller in scale and to involve fewer people. The feud also involved the principle of *lex talionis* and, in theory, of exact equivalence (Beattie 1964[a]: 175), as well as some institutionalized means for compensation or settlement other than reciprocal murder. For the Ait ᶜAtta this was the *diyit*. In short, the feud aimed not so much at punishing the guilty as at restoring a disrupted balance through exact equivalence, for the agnatic lineages of both the killer and his victim were equally involved and equally liable. This was so important that, if the victim's agnates did not feel strong enough to pursue the murderer and his *ait ᶜashra*, they would rent 'imported talent' in the form of hired killers such as the infamous bandits w-ᶜAbbu and u-Khuya of the Ait Bu Iknifen of Talmast (for details, cf. Hart 1981[a]: 196; and 1987: 30) to do the job for them. This tactic was quite often employed by *igurramen* who wished to preserve the illusion of pacifism. In fact, the principle of exact equivalence provides a major distinction between feud and war. In the feud hostility was either finite or intermittent because of the possibility of compensation, while in war it was permanent because no such compensation was possible, for the law of exact equivalence did not apply.

When hostilities take place between whole societies and not merely between segments of a single society, they acquire the characteristics of warfare. A continuous pattern of reciprocal killings, without compensation, between two societies or even, on a smaller scale, two closely related segments of the same society turns such a pattern into a vendetta, as shown for the Aith Waryaghar, amongst whom factions headed by two full brothers could easily be pitted against each other. Thus in a sense the wheel has turned full circle. Thus, too, the Ait ᶜAtta describe their relationship with the Ait Yafalman or the Ait Siddrat not as *tamaddit*, 'feud', but as *l-ᶜadawt*, 'hatred', or as *l-girra* (neologism from French *guerre* and Spanish *guerra*), 'war'. Even here, however, the exact equivalence factor could well apply within Ait ᶜAtta society itself. It was inherent in the division of spoils or booty, *l-ghnimt* (from Mor. Ar. *l-ghanima*, and it is worth noting the existence of a subsection of the Ait ᶜAlwan called Ait l-Ghanima, 'people of the spoils') resulting from full scale warfare, which took place in the Saghru after a battle.

Warriors returning from the battlefield laden with booty had to wait for three days outside the limits of the Tafrawt n-Ait ᶜAtta, so that the whole Ait ᶜAtta fighting force could participate in the division of the spoils. This was directed by the top chief, who was also the warchief just outside the Tafrawt limits, as inside them no weapons were allowed. It was made in terms of the number of warriors who had participated in the engagement and in terms of

the type of armament each man carried; and it applied to all types of plunder, from enemy arms to livestock.

Generally a man with a *bu shfar* or flintlock received a smaller share than a man with a modern rifle. The largest amount of one and one-half (1 1/2) shares went to a warrior who had a repeating rifle such as a *tatsaʿit* or 'nine-shot' repeater – usually the French model 1886 Lebel magazine rifle. During *siba* times this was the most prized firearm in tribal Morocco, and had usually been smuggled into the country. A man who carried a *sasbu* or 'Chassepot' – the French model 1874 Gras single-shot rifle – received one and one-quarter (1 1/4) shares. A man who had only a *bu shfar*, a flintlock, received only a three-quarter (3/4) share, because it was held that the smoke from the *bu shfar* would betray its user during battle. A man with only a knife or dagger received just a half (1/2) share, as he would not normally be a frontline combatant. Nonetheless, these ideals for feud and warfare were more honored in the breach than in the observance, while the rulebook ideology of exact equivalence was by no means always adhered to in practice.

The historical record illustrates very well the nature of feud and warfare in Ait ʿAtta society until 'pacification' and French occupation. A four-year feud, alluded to above, between neighboring groups of Ait Bu Iknifen at Usikis and Msimrir, for example, only stopped in the late 1920s or even in 1930-1931 because all concerned had to unite against the French. In fact, it was really subsumed into the wider struggle against the 'pacification', for it became a confrontation between Sidi Mah n-Ait Sidi Mawlay, the leading 'political' *agurram* at Zawiya Ahansal, with Ait Usikis support, and Muhaddash u-l-Hajj Faska, of the Ait Bu Iknifen of Imidar, who was supported by the Ait Msimrir and who in turn supported Hajj Tahami l-Glawi, the Pasha of Marrakesh. The latter, aided and abetted by Marshal Lyautey, had major designs on ʿAttaland for his own purposes.

In the early stages of this feud, an Ait Brahim (Ait Bu Iknifen) lineage had been chased out of its original home in Msimrir to Imi n-Warg. From there, its members naturally turned to their kinsmen, the Ait Bu Iknifen of Usikis, together with the neighboring localized Ait Usikis sections of the Ait Yʿazza and the Ait Unibgi. Sidi Mah of Zawiya Ahansal also gave the Ait Usikis 100 muskets and two mules loaded with cartridges for an attack on Muhaddash and the Ait Msimrir. So the war began, with an initial defeat and the loss of almost 2600 sheep for the Ait Msimrir. The latter then sought allies from their traditional enemies the Ait Murghad and the Ait Hadiddu, plus two sections of the Ait Sukhman, to avenge themselves on the Ait Usikis (who were later to become our informants on the matter) and regain their sheep. But their

attack was unsuccessful, despite the small numbers defending Usikis and the massive forces that the Ait Msimrir had assembled. My Usikis informant, then the local *amghar* from the Ait Y^{c}azza section there, even told me that his father had killed four men of the invading Ait Bu Iknifen force in one day. Peace was finally arranged, not through the *igurramen* of Zawiya Ahansal, tainted by the involvement of Sidi Mah in the affair, but by the more neutral lineage of the Ait Mawlay ^{c}Abdallah bin Hsayn. Later, of course, what had begun as a feud became part of the greater struggle for control of the Ait ^{c}Atta, when ^{c}Assu u-Ba Slam, the future leader of ^{c}Atta resistance to the French at Bu Gafr in 1933, led his Ilimshan in thwarting the ambitions of Muhaddash and the Ait Bu Iknifen, as well as those of the Glawi who was behind him.

Wars could also de-escalate into feuds, and it is for this reason that there are no lineages of the Ait Unibgi *khums* in the Saghru. Once the Ait ^{c}Atta had a big war with neighboring Arabs (unspecified as to group), and the other fifths asked the Ait Unibgi to supply a contingent of men to fight. The Ait ^{c}Atta forces won the war as a result, but at the cost of heavy Ait Unibgi casualties. Nonetheless, the Ait Unibgi still stubbornly wanted to fight their old enemies the Ait Siddrat, and they asked the other ^{c}Atta fifths for help. The others, having just won one war, were most reluctant to start another, and denied the request. As a result the Ait Unibgi, furious, left the Saghru and went to the southeast where they are found today.

With neighboring tribes attitudes were ruthless and the benefits of military success considerable. The Ait ^{c}Alwan of Mhamid fought a great deal with the neighboring Arab camel pastoralists of the ^{c}Arib and the Rgaybat. On one occasion they chased the Rgaybat all the way down to the latters' point of origin in the Sagiyat al-Hamra, and granted an armistice only on condition that 40 camels be supplied to them every year as tribute.

Within the Ait ^{c}Atta alliances were variable and varied, for although the notion of *liff* was not unfamiliar to them, it was never conceived of as stable or enduring. The Ilimshan, it is said, were so powerful, compared with other sections, that they acted as the pivot of the *liff* system at the sectional or *taqbilt* level. On one occasion, all the rest of the Ait ^{c}Atta ganged up against the Ilimshan in a war which lasted for seven years (a suspect figure). Then alignments changed again, although it had nonetheless taken the combined forces of the Ait Bu Iknifen and the Ait Y^{c}azza to subdue them. The Ilimshan, the section of ^{c}Assu-Ba Slam, always say that they were invariably at the top of the Ait ^{c}Atta heap and that they acted as the mill which kept the other ^{c}Atta sections ground down – or, in a more modern version, as the 'gasoline in the Ait ^{c}Atta car' (*l-essence n-tumubil n-Ait ^{c}Atta*).

A classic example of Ait ʿAtta warfare, which again de-escalated into feud, is provided by the traditions of the Ait Bu Iknifen at Talmast. Their main enemies were the Ait Is'hha of the Ait Massad confederacy, and they once killed fourteen Ait Is'hha in a fight over pasturage. However, their more constant local adversaries seem to have been the Ait Bu Iknifen n-Iqibliyen, the Ait Bu Ikniwen groups from further south. The latter differed with their northern brethren when these last began to adopt sedentary ways, and then differed with them still further when they began to use part of the Agudal n-Tlmast, the Talmast pasture zone, as arable plowland. It was this incident or others like it that started the famous annual pasturage brawl at Talmast.

For the Ait Bu Iknifen further south at Imidar, however, their principal enemies were, of course, the Ait Murghad, the Ait Siddrat and the Ait Is'hha. They considered the Ait Bu Iknifen at Talmast as an outpost against the latter. They too recalled a war between the Ait Unibgi and all the rest of the Ait ʿAtta, almost certainly the same one mentioned above, and another between the Ait Zimru and Ait Hassu sub-fifths of the Ait Wahlim *khums*. In this war, they claimed, 45 men named Saʿid died on the Ait Zimru side (their own) alone. This is a standardized form of casualty listing in such traditions and is a shorthand way of indicating the heavy losses which were often involved in battle, for 25 men named Yusif were also held to have been killed in the Ait Unibgi war with the rest of the Ait ʿAtta.

A final example describes how on one occasion the Ait ʿAtta, more or less as a single unit for once, took two mules loaded with *duro-s hasani* as their annual donation to their patron saint, Mawlay ʿAbdallah bin Hsayn at Tamsluht. On the way a man of the Ait Hassu named Saʿid n-Ait Ful made off with both mules and the money. This act precipitated a war within the ranks of the Ait ʿAtta which lasted for fourteen years (twice seven, again a suspect figure). The principal antagonists in this long drawn-out conflict were the Ait Hassu and the Ilimshan. On the side of the former were the Ait ʿAisa u-Brahim, the Ait Bu Iknifen, the Ait l-Firsi and the Ait Khardi, while on the side of the latter were only the Ignawen and the Ait Unir.

No doubt many of these accounts are really myths, reports distorted by oral tradition so that the same event reappears with different actors and events themselves become telescoped together. Nonetheless, such myths contain their own inner reality and demonstrate the salient features of warfare within Ait ʿAtta society – and with neighboring tribes. Unstable alliances, mutual suspicion, eternal grudges and arrogant domination of their neighbors, and of their clients, form the *leitmotiv* of the Ait ʿAtta past, together with a sense of permanent balance through eternal violence.

Ironically, there does seem to have been some inherent rough-and-ready equivalence about Ait ʿAtta warfare. The outcomes of their many wars were, on balance, probably about equal, so that the usual result was a stalemate. Indeed this was a major feature of tribal warfare in general. When either or both groups decided that their manpower or even their livestock had become depleted to a critical level, then *l-hna*, truce, was proclaimed in order to allow them to recoup their losses before starting in on a second round. In this second round it was quite in order, and considered normal, for the configuration of alliances to shift and change. Nonetheless, feuding at the intratribal level was one thing and warfare with the Ait Yafalman or the Ait Siddrat, enemies among whom killers at home could receive asylum, was quite another. This was underscored in the wider socio-political field, as the Ait Yafalman and the Ait Siddrat were the tribes which were generally apt and/or held to have the tacit support, at least, of the *makhzan*.

Ait ʿAtta relations with the *makhzan* were characterized by a triangular combination of resistance, armed neutrality and bet-hedging. It was the additional combination, equally triangular, of five fifths, an annually elected top chief and a political capital, plus transhumance and the eternal search for greener pastures for their sheep, which underpinned the homogeneity, cohesion, power and aggressiveness of the Ait ʿAtta. This combination, furthermore, provided the means for the Ait ʿAtta to mass against their neighbors until they represented an irresistible force. Fights between the sub-fifths of the Ait Zimru and the Ait Hassu, therefore, only kept the Ait ʿAtta limbered up for larger scale warfare against the Ait Yafalman. According to their own view of the situation, while *imluqten* or 'mixed' tribes composed of heterogeneous sections were apt to feud internally, they themselves, as non-*imluqten* claiming descent from a common ancestor, saw as their major concern warfare with an external enemy, rather than domestic feuds. These, after all, were facts of life, while warfare was an act of will (Hart 1981: 202-210, and 1984: 72-84).

Nonetheless, Ait ʿAtta resistance to the French and to Hajj Tahami al-Glawi, the Pasha of Marrakesh who had been installed by them, was in their pay and was anxious to annex ʿAttaland to his Glawa fiefdom (which he was never to succeed in doing), far from being concerted and corporate, was of a decidedly piecemeal character. Even as early as 1918, when the Glawi won over Muhaddash u-l-Hajj Faska of the Ait Bu Iknifen of Imidar, whose enmity with ʿAssu u-Ba Slam of the Ilimshan dates from that period, the Ait Wahlim *khums* alone became irretrievably split between these two factions, the Ait Bu Iknifen, who were pro-Glawi, and the resistants of the Ilimshan. In the late 1920s and early 1930s various other Ait ʿAtta sections whose leaders

were bribed or persuaded to go over to the French included the Ait Slillu (Ait Unir) of Nqub under Bassu u-Mimun, the Ait Bu Dawud (Ait Wahlim) of Tazarin under Hammu u-Lahsin u-bin Murghi, the Imsuffa (Ait Wallal) of Zagura under Yidir u-Saʿid Amsuffi, and the Ait Isful of Tabsbast under ʿAddi u-Khiyi. Meanwhile, ʿAssu u-Ba Slam collected the resistants from all the fifths who wanted to join him and headed for the Saghru to stage the last epic battle at Bu Gafr.

Many Ait ʿAtta informants, not least of whom was the son of ʿAssu u-Ba Slam, Qa'id ʿAli – for whom the Bu Gafr battle in February-March 1933, when he was only a boy of fifteen, was to remain the high watermark of his life until his death in March 1992, almost sixty years later – held the firm opinion that if the Ait ʿAtta had been unified, they could have beaten the French at Bu Gafr. This must remain problematical; but the presence of some 650 southern Ait ʿAtta partisans from the Dra in the ranks of the French (which were far superior numerically), men from groups in the Ktawa and the Tazarin which had only submitted late in 1932 (and who in some cases tended only to fire paper cartridges at their brethren among the Bu Gafr defenders), did much to drive a wedge into the nearly 1200 fighting men and their families on the Bu Gafr escarpment. After more than a month in the front line, ʿAssu u-Ba Slam was persuaded to come down and surrender on March 25, for the ammunition of his men, who had sustained losses of over 2000 (including 500 fighting men) out of an original estimated 7000 defenders, was almost exhausted. There was no question in anyone's mind, least of all among the French, but that ʿAssu u-Ba Slam had acquitted himself with great honor on the battlefield. This was so despite the fact that the historical reality of Bu Gafr calls into very serious question, if it does not actually demolish, the earlier issues of Ait ʿAtta cohesion and unity that the capital at Igharm Amazdar and the rotating top chieftainship among the fifths had done so much to promote (cf. Hart 1977; 1984[a]: 176-183; 1997[a]: 142-149).



Territorial boundaries of Khaybar Afridi Sectors

Eastern Afghanistan, the Pakistan North-West Frontier Province and the Afridi: The Ethnographic and Historical Evidence

Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier and the Pukhtuns

A good account of what is known of the spread of Islam in what is now Afghanistan may be found in Dupree (1980: 312-341). However, given the fact that between the time the first Arabs, under Muhammad bin Qasim (known as al-Thaqafi, 'the Cultivated'), coming from Damascus at the peak period of the Umayyad caliphate (661-750 CE), reached Sind about 711 CE – indeed in the very same year that Tariq ibn Ziyad, whose name was to be given to Gibraltar, crossed into al-Andalus from what is now Morocco – and the consolidation of the Ghaznavid empire in eastern Afghanistan in the early eleventh century under the Turkish conqueror Mahmud Ghaznavi (988-1030 CE), who led at least seventeen successful raids into northern India in order to loot and smash Hindu temples, it can be said with certainty that the beginnings of Islam in the Far Mashriq were only slightly later than they were in the Maghrib, and that over the last millennium, the influence of Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier on the remainder of the northern half of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent has been far greater than it has the other way round. Where any remaining vestiges of Roman or even locally inspired Christianity rapidly melted before the Muslim conquest and settlement of the Maghrib, exactly the same thing happened to what remained of Buddhism and, to a lesser extent, Hinduism (which came to present other problems that are not germane to our inquiry) in the Far Mashriq. The only difference of importance was that to the best of my knowledge no major heresies occurred in Afghanistan after the implantation of Islam, unlike the two or three important ones recorded in Morocco before or about 1200 CE, heresies which themselves represented local repercussions from the wider Fatimid schism.

But unlike the virtually seamless face of Sunni or mainstream Islam across the Maghrib (except for the small, Kharijid-derived pockets of Ibadism in the Libyan oasis of Jabal Nafusa, the Tunisian island of Jerba and the Algerian oasis settlements of the Mzab), Sunnism in Afghanistan and northern India,

here of the Hanafi rite, as in Turkey, rather than of the Maliki one followed in the Maghrib, came to be not quite so seamless and uninterrupted as in the latter area. Over time, a number of clusters of Imami and Isma'ili Shi'ism emerged to disrupt the pattern, most probably after the declaration of the former as the state religion of Iran by Shah Isma'il the Safavid (1501-1524).

The biggest of these clusters was (and is) that of the Hazarajat, the central upland massif of Afghanistan which contains some of the country's highest mountains: its Hazara inhabitants, the most Mongoloid of all ethnic groups in Afghanistan, are locally but possibly incorrectly held, despite the closeness of their non-Turkic Hazraji language to Persian and to its archaic form known as Dari which is spoken in Kabul, to be descended from the soldiery of Jinghiz Khan (who created more havoc and slaughter in Afghanistan than anyone else prior to the Soviet invasion of 1979), as their establishment in their present home has been demonstrated to have taken place over the two centuries following his death (Bacon 1951, 1958). The Hazara are also deemed by Afghanistan's major ethnic group, the Pukhtuns, to occupy the lowest social niche in the country. There are further offshoot Hazara communities both in Khurasan, in eastern Iran, and in Quetta, in Pakistani Baluchistan (Bacon 1959: 3-44); but there is also a pocket of Imami Shi'ism in the Pakistan North-West frontier, in the Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies, with the Turi of the former entirely Shi'a, the Bangash, also in the former, partly so, and the Orakzai in the latter partly so as well (White King 1900, 2nd Ed., 1984: 84-85). The reasons for the presence of Shi'ism among this particular cluster of Pukhtun tribes, which is surrounded entirely by other, Sunni ones, have never been adequately ascertained and still remain obscure. The current of Isma'ilism to be found both among these northern and predominantly Sunni Hanafi Tajiks and in the Hazarajat as well as in the Baltistan region of Gilgit, in the Karakoram branch of the Pakistani Himalayas (which also boast the presence of K-2, at 8611 meters Pakistan's highest mountain and the world's second highest) is also due to yet other factors again and is beyond our purview here (cf. for example Emerson 1990).

As of 1979, the official (as well as the last reliable) overall population figure for Afghanistan was 17 million, of which about 6.5 to 7 million were Pukhtuns, the dominant ethnic group, all of whom speak Pakhtu, and all of whom, with the exception of the Shi'a Turi, Bangash and Orakzai just mentioned, are entirely Sunni Hanafi in sectarian affiliation. Then come the Tajiks, from 3.5 to 4 million, who speak Dari and who are also mainly Sunni Hanafi but have some Isma'ili Shi'a in the north; then half a million Farsiwan, Persian-speakers and Imami Shi'a, in the west; then a million Hazara, as already noted;

another million Aimaq, who also speak Dari, but whose language has many Turkic loanwords; another million Uzbak, also Hanafi Sunni but entirely Turkic-speaking, in the north; 200,000 Turkmen, again Sunni Hanafi but with a Turkic language, in the northwest; 100,000 Baluch and twice that number of Brahui in the southwest, who speak Baluchi and the Dravidian-derived Brahui language respectively; 100,000 formerly heathen Nuristani, now Sunni Hanafi after their enforced conversion to Islam by Amir ʿAbd al-Rahman Khan in 1896, who speak Kafiri dialects; and assorted Kohistanis, Gujars and 'Arabs', also all Sunni Hanafi; and finally, small urban pockets of Sikhs and Hindus. Dupree's list (Dupree 1980: 57-65) is considerably longer than this, but as only the Pukhtuns are of central concern to us here, there is little point in spelling it out completely. It might be added that in Pakistan the Pukhtuns are not only the exclusive ethnic group in their own tribal agencies, of course, and the dominant one in the North-West Frontier Province, although they also form a strong minority in Baluchistan. In the other two major provinces of the country, Punjab and Sind, they are only a very small minority, although they are becoming a large one in the latter's major city of Karachi. And since 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, their ranks have been swelled by a good three million additional Pukhtun refugees from that country, mostly in camps in the North-West Frontier Province, but with some elsewhere (notably in Baluchistan) as well.

In the midst of the ethnic diversity of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the relative cultural and structural homogeneity of the Pukhtuns, bordered as they are on the west, generally, by the Hazara, on the south by the Baluch, on the north by the Himalayan Kohistanis of Baltistan and on the east by the Panjabis, is striking and stands out sharply. I refer to their tribal organization and values, and to the fact that they tend to look alike, dress alike, talk alike and to project, very consciously, the same set of images. These are embodied by the triad of Islam, patrilineal descent and its concomitant of segmentary lineage organization, and *Pukhtunwali* or Pukhtun Custom, as Barth, in particular, has noted (Barth 1969, 1981). We shall look first at Islam as known and understood by Pukhtuns and then at the overall Pukhtun genealogical charter, both of which help to provide us with the necessary historical background.

Most of the Pukhtun tribes of today, and especially those straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, who refer to themselves collectively by the Arabic plural *qaba'il*, were held by Victorian anthropologists to have been in more or less their present locations not only since the beginnings of Islam in the region, but well before, since the time of Herodotus. This has been sug-

gested by the Greco-Bactrian name equivalences of Paktuike = Pukhtun or Pushtun (the hard northern *kh* and the soft southern *sh* being simply a matter of dialect variation), Aparutai = Afridi, Paskapuros = Peshawar and Sattagudai = Khattak (Dani 1969: 31-32, 53). But such evidence is, nonetheless, implicitly rejected by the Pukhtuns themselves, for it is not only pre-Islamic but non-Islamic; and as we shall see, the Pukhtun genealogical charter goes back no further than the beginnings of Islam. This is the case whether or not the name equivalences may be valid, despite Caroe's impressive arguments in their favor (Caroe 1958: 25-42). The whole conglomerate encompassed by Greco-Bactrian-Buddhist-Hindu traditions, whether Gandharan from the Peshawar valley and Swat or Kushano-Sasanian as at Bamiyan in east-central Afghanistan, with its two enormous Buddha reliefs carved into the rock, is simply seen by Muslim Pukhtuns as evidence of onetime *kafir* occupation, occupation by non-believers who were not even *ahl al-kitab* or People of the Book, as Islam holds Christians and Jews to be.

Therefore, for all practical purposes, this set of traditions is ignored by Pukhtuns, exactly as Berbers in North Africa reject 'Portuguese' traditions and ruins, as locally perceived (and which may also subsume Roman or Vandal ones), as something both pre-Islamic and non-Islamic, and hence alien to them and to Islam. In any event, if we are to take these identifications of Herodotus seriously, we are then faced with a problem of another sort, how to account for a major historical time gap between the age of Herodotus and Alexander the Great (presumably 327 BC) – whom the Afridi accuse of not having wanted to pay them their obligatory toll fees when he came through the Khaybar Pass (!) – and when the Pukhtun tribes as known today appear full-fledged on the historical scene, as recorded by the first Mughal emperor Babar in his *Babar-Nama*, in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

Over the course of that same century, which witnessed the Mughal invasions of India and their concomitant establishment of their seat of empire at Delhi, succeeding a previous Afghan dynasty, the Lodis, historians such as Hodgson (1974, III: 1-161), Spear (1978, 1990: 52-53) and others have stressed the three-way Muslim balance of power throughout the Mashriq and indeed the Maghrib, with the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia, much of the Near East, Southeastern Europe and the coastal fringe of the Maghrib up to Morocco, the Safavids in Iran and Western Afghanistan (including Qandahar but not Kabul) and the Mughals in Eastern Afghanistan (Kabul and Peshawar) and in North and Central India. Although Afghanistan as such was not to come into being for close to another three centuries, a major distinction was soon to be made by Hindus in the Indian subcontinent between the minority of foreign-

born Muslims as defined by the four allogenous categories of *sayyid* (a very small 'Arab' uppermost level, referring to a religious aristocracy claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad but one infinitely less numerous on the ground than the *shurfa'* of Morocco), *shaykh* (another small category consisting of non-Arab, non-Mughal and non-Pukhtun Muslims present in India before the Mughal conquest), *mughal* (derived from 'Mongol' and hence re-ferring to conquerors of Turkic origin) and *pathan* (i.e., Pukhtun, both in a wider and a more watered-down and 'defused' sense than that employed here), on the one hand, and the great mass of indigenous converts to Islam from Hinduism on the other (Qureshi 1962: 80–81). Although, as Qureshi correctly notes (ibid.: 81), the classification as rendered was an oversimplification accepted uncritically by earlier Western scholars (for the Baluch, for example, are entirely left out of it), I would hold that its base was ethnic rather than racial. The major feature that these four foreign, 'old' and non-converted categories of Muslims have in common is their Middle Eastern, as opposed to subcontinental Indian, origins, and to the fact that they all originated from points west of the Indus River. Qureshi, who, judging from his own name, is an obvious *sayyid*, is right, however, on a further point, namely that these ethnic barriers were rarely crossed by those who erected them.

Although Caroe suggests that the Pukhtuns embraced Islam at the time of Mahmud Ghaznavi, or about 1000 CE (Caroe 1958: 10), Dani has observed, and we concur, that this is clearly at variance with Pukhtun tradition as evinced through its master genealogical charter, which recognizes their ultimate ancestor in the patriline to have been a certain Qays ibn ʿAbd al-Rashid, some 25 to 30 generations ago – a genealogical depth which should almost certainly be greater than is actually recorded (Dani 1969: 63). However, what is of particular importance is that this Qays, said to have come from Ghur in central Afghanistan, evidently went west to Medina (al-Madina) in Arabia. While there, and in the company of the Prophet Muhammad's general Khalid ibn al-Walid, he is said to have met the Prophet himself, to have joined the new faith of Islam, to have been named ʿAbd al-Rashid as a result, and to have married Khalid's daughter, one right after the other. Thus the very first Pukhtun of all time became a Muslim, and did so in the earliest infancy of Islam. Hence Islam and Pukhtun-ness are perceived as coterminous: the identification of the one with the other is total. Given this framework of belief, there is no room whatever for any conjecture either about local pre-Islamic origins or about nebulous Old Testament ones, such as that postulating descent from the Hebrew King Saul, as a specious but persistent nineteenth-century Victorian argument tried to prove (Caroe

1958: 7-8). For that matter, even the name of the famous Khaybar Pass is almost certainly derived from that of Khaybar, near Medina in the Arabian Hijaz.

In any case, for our purposes here the major features of the master genealogical charter are quickly summarized. As Qays ibn ʿAbd al-Rashid's move to Arabia and his subsequent conversion to Islam and marriage to the daughter of Khalid ibn al-Walid are believed to have taken place over thirty generations ago, one can only conclude that the longevity of the members forging the immediate ancestral links in this master genealogy must have been incredible or, more likely, that considerable genealogical telescoping and foreshortening took place, in order to weed out the less consequential or productive ancestors as well as to reduce the burden on the memories of elderly informants at the present day. In any event, according to one version of the overall genealogy (and there are several), this ʿAbd al-Rashid, or Qays ibn ʿAbd al-Rashid, left three sons, from whom most of the Pukhtun tribes in Afghanistan are descended, including the Mohmand (cf. Ahmed 1980) and the Shinwari on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

But there was, ironically enough, also a foundling involved, named Karlanr, who was accreted or grafted onto the genealogy as a fourth son. This Karlanr himself left two sons, and *Faridun*, one of the grandsons of the first son Koday, became the ancestor of the *Afridi*, while Wazir, one of the grandsons of the second son Kakay, became the ancestor of the Wazir and the Mahsud (Caroe 1958: 3-24; Ahmed 1983), whose bitter enmity between each other ever since might well be the result of an original *tarbur* instance of agnatic rivalry. It is these tribes more than any others which have become the prototypical Pukhtun tribes of today. It may be significant that Dani, who holds that the Arab conquests could hardly have left Afghanistan untouched, in an interesting inversion also associates the three lines descending from the three true sons of ʿAbd al-Rashid with the Timurids, 1380-1400, of Turkish origin, and that of Karlanr, the foundling, with the Arabs (cf. Dani 1969: 70-71.)

The point of this rapid genealogical summary is simply to point out what is already clearly set forth in Caroe (1958): that of all the eastern Pukhtun tribes traditionally regarded in the literature as 'archetypal' or 'classical' – and by these are meant the tribes on the Pakistani side of the border or those which actually straddle the border and live in the unencapsulated political situation traditionally referred to as *yaghistan*, 'land of rebellion', or by the Arabic term *ghayr ʿilaqa*, 'without attachments', and subject to no higher authority (Ahmed 1977: 60), as well as those which came most often into bellicose contact with the British – only the Mohmand, the Yusufzai and the Shinwari are

descended from any of ʿAbd al-Rashid's true sons. All the others, almost without exception, are descended from the foundling Karlanr. As noted, these include the Afridi, who along with the Pakhtu-speaking Mohmand to the north (Merk 1898, 1984, Ahmed 1980) and the Pashtu-speaking Wazir and Mahsud (Howell 1931, 1979, Ahmed 1983) in Waziristan to the south, are regarded as the most representative of these border tribes, whose political system represents an epitome of non-encapsulation.

It is appropriate here, however, to make a brief notation on linguistics. Pakhtu (or Pukhtu) and Pashtu (or Pushtu) are of course one and the same language, belonging to the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European family, along with Kurdish, Persian and its variant Dari, spoken in Kabul and by the Tajiks; but the *kh* and the *sh* correspond to a north-south dialect difference, in which the Afridi, Mohmand and Yusufzai fall into the former group, and the Wazir and the Mahsud into the latter, which is generally considered to have been the older and 'originating' one. It might be added that there are cultural differences between these groups as well: traditionally, northern Pukhtun men shaved their heads and did not dance, while southern Pushtun ones wore bobbed or long hair and still do dance. It should also be pointed out that the *p* to *f* disparity in the name *Apriday*, by which the Afridi designate themselves, and that of *Afridi*, by which they have come to be known to the outside world, has its explanation in the tribal genealogies. There is no *f* in Pakhtu, but there is in Persian (as in Arabic), and the genealogies, without exception, were written and recorded in Persian, the language of the Mughal court both in Kabul and in Delhi.

The main source of Pukhtun traditions is the *Makhzan-i-Afghani* (lit. 'Afghan Storehouse': *makhzan* does not refer to 'government' here as in its Moroccan usage, while *Afghan*, to the contrary, retains here its original meaning of *Pukhtun*, not its modern one of a present-day Afghan national) of Niʿmat Allah, a scribe of the court of the Mughal emperor Jahangir, completed about 1612 and translated into English by Bernhard Dorn in 1829. This and other such works, as Caroe notes (Caroe 1958: 4), were written by 'uprooted' and literate Pukhtuns from Afghanistan who had become court chroniclers in Muslim India and whose knowledge both of the Pukhtu language and the area which came later to be known as the North-West Frontier were limited, as were their connections with the 'uncouth' hill tribesmen whose virtues they nonetheless greatly admired. But the genealogies themselves are very much living documents, in the sense that to this day Pukhtuns can and do recite those parts of them that are applicable to their own tribal groups, and do so in a variety of contexts. It is for this reason that we have

chosen to retain the traditional albeit Persianized orthography of *Afridi* rather than the more true-to-life Pakhtu orthography of *Apriday*, for *Afridi* is commonly employed as a denotative tribal 'surname' or *nisba* in the North-West Frontier Province and the tribal agencies today, while *Apriday*, unknown to non-Pukhtuns, is not (cf. Hart 1985: 6-13).

Pukhtunwali and its Cultural and Structural Supports

The act not only of speaking Pakhtu but of doing Pakhtu is what constitutes the core of the *Pukhtunwali*, the Pukhtun code of behavior, which, as Ahmed has noted, rests on four crucial concepts, rather than on just three, as most accounts would have it (Ahmed 1977: 39-41; and for a similar view based on data from the Khost Valley in the Paktya Province of Eastern Afghanistan, cf. Steul 1981). These are: 1) *malmastiya* (or *maylmastiya*), the obligation to show hospitality to all visitors without any hope of remuneration or favor; 2) *badal* (lit. 'revenge', but also 'exchange', from the Arabic root *b-d-l*, 'to change, exchange'), the exaction of vengeance, irrespective of time or place, in order to right a wrong or an injury; 3) *nanawatay* (or *nanawati*, from a Pakhtu verb 'to enter'), asylum, when a vanquished individual or party is prepared to enter the house or *hujra* (guesthouse) of the victors in order to beg their forgiveness, although this condition cannot exist when the dispute involves *tor* (lit. 'black', as in 'blackening the face of someone', i.e., shaming him) or injury to women; and 4) *nang* (lit. 'honor'), the most important of all, which serves as an overall rubric covering the whole conglomerate of points listed below that any Pukhtun tribesman must observe to insure that his honor and that of his family are upheld.

These various aspects of *nang*, which in Steul's view (1981: 129-177) are all aspects of Pukhtunwali itself, are as follows: a) *tor*, or cases concerned with the honor of women which can only be converted to *spin* (lit. 'white', as in 'whitening the face of someone', i.e., removing the source of shame so that his honor is recovered) through death; b) *tarbur* (lit. 'father's brother's son'), the root of the enmity and rivalry between male patrilateral parallel cousins which is known as *tarburwali* and which is such a structural regularity of tribal life; c) *lakhkar* (or *lashkar*), the tribal army or armed force which implements the decision of the council (point e, below); d) *tshalwayshti* (or *chalwayshti*), a tribal force theoretically consisting of every fortieth man of the subsection(s) or section(s) concerned; e) *jirga*, the moot or council of elders itself, convened for declaring war or for composing tribal or intertribal peace; f) *tiga* (lit.

'stone'), a fixed date for the suspension of hostilities between warring factions, so called because it is evidently derived from a pre-Islamic Rajput practice of writing an agreement on a large stone and putting this in a prominent place selected by the tribe (White King 1900: 49; 1984: 103-104); g) *nikat* (from *nika/nikoh*, 'grandfather', so-called probably because of its hereditary character), the specific distribution of profit and loss that each tribe and its constituent sections must bear, which assumes a character of hereditary rights and obligations; h) *badraga*, an armed tribal escort for travelers through tribal territory, which if violated leads to war or feud; i) *hamsaya*, non-Muslim (i.e., Hindu or Sikh) client or dependent groups which attach themselves to strong tribal *malik*-s (lit. 'king' in Arabic, but in Pakhtu merely 'man of consequence, local notable') for protection; j) *qalang* (lit. 'rent, tax'), the fee taken by a landlord from his tenants; k) *malatar* (lit. 'tying the back'), members of a group who will actually join a fight on behalf of their leaders; l) *muwajib* (lit. 'obligation', from Arabic root *w-j-b*, 'to be necessary'), the annual or bi-annual allowances still paid to the majority of tribes and their sections by the political authorities (in Peshawar); m) *lungi*, allowances given to individual *malik*-s by the same political authorities, over and above the *muwajib* (point l, above); n) *nagha*, tribal fine imposed upon a malefactor, by force if necessary, through the mobilization of a *lakhkar* (point c, above), in which the burning of the offender's house frequently occurs, just as it did traditionally in the Moroccan Rif before 1921-1922 (cf. Hart 1976: 228-303); o) *rogha* or *rugha*, dispute settlement between fighting factions; and p) *hujra*, village guesthouse for male guests, where visitors and unmarried young men sleep, and located adjacent to the mosque. Most of the points listed here will come up in greater detail in sections to follow.

At this point only one more general observation may be made, before we consider some of the major features of Afridi socio-political organization. As a central thread of his argument, one to which we also subscribe, Ahmed makes a distinction between the two major economic and socio-political categories in the Pukhtun world, the *nang* or 'honor' category (Point 4, above) of the tribal areas and agencies and the *qalang* or 'tax' category (Point 4(j), above) of the khanates of Swat, Dir, Bunayr and Bajawr, all located just to the north of these same tribal agencies, between which that world oscillates. The difference between them is the difference between the *nang* society of an egalitarian (and often near-anarchical) tribal democracy and the *qalang* society characterized by an often detribalizing stratification.

These may be listed, with their major bench-marks, as Ahmed lists them (1977: 20-22), in the two contrasting paragraphs below:

Nang: 1) *Economic*: 1) Hill areas; 2) largely unirrigated; 3) pastoral tribal economy; 4) no rents or taxes. II) *Social*: 5) Mainly 'achieved' status of elders; 6) illiterate, oral tradition; 7) acephalous tribal society organized in patrilineal and segmentary descent groups; 8) scarce population dispersed in 'fortlike' hamlets and settlements; 9) emphasis on *nangwali* (code of honor). III) *Political*: 10) Outside or juxtaposed to larger state systems; 11) *jirga* represents interests of entire tribe (the vast majority of the population); 12) warriors' participation in raids; 13) egalitarian social organization.

Qalang: 1) *Economic*: 1) Plain areas; 2) largely irrigated; 3) agricultural feudal economy; 4) rents and taxes. II) *Social*: 5) Mainly 'ascribed' status of *khan*-s; 6) literate, orthodox, written tradition; 7) autocephalous village organization under *khan*; 8) dense population in large villages and tendency to urbanization; 9) emphasis on *tarburwali* (agnatic rivalry). III) *Political*: 10) Encapsulated within larger state systems: members of civil service, district boards, etc,; 11) *jirga* members represent landowners; 12) warlords organizing battles; 13) hierarchical organization based on autochthonous population.

Ahmed adds that these two sets of typologies 'are merely symbols to differentiate and define two types of Pukhtun tribal social structure' and that '*nang* values in themselves may be of equal importance in *qalang* societies (and vice versa)' (1977: 22). To this we will only add here that the Afridi, and all the other tribes descended, in particular, from the foundling Karlanr, represent in their overwhelming majority a *nang* society. In this connection we quote an apt proverb cited by Ahmed in two other works (Ahmed 1975: 7; 1976: 71), 'Honor (i.e., feuds) ate up the mountains and taxes ate up the plains', *ghar nang aw khur daman qalang aw khur.*

The point is, of course, that this same set of typologies and paradigms bears a close resemblance to the other similar, though not identical, set at the other, western end of the Muslim Middle East. This, as noted, is that derived from the ethnographic and socio-historical evidence posed by the Moroccan Berbers, both in terms of their internal organization and its oscillation between the two sociological forms or poles of small democratic (or near-anarchic) tribal republics on the one hand and strongman politics, in which the tribal council tends to become a cipher, on the other, as discussed by Montagne for the Western Atlas (Montagne 1930), and in terms of the relations between these same social forms and the *makhzan*, as also noted (cf. Hart

1985: 13-16). Sociological similarities, when compared, can only be accounted for in sociological terms. We propose now to examine Afridi and Pukhtun ethnography, first, and then socio-political history, afterward, for parallels and points of divergence with respect to the Moroccan materials covered in preceding chapters. The Afridi of the Khaybar Tribal Agency and the Kohat Frontier Region in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan provide a prototypical example of the maintenance of Pukhtun identity. Indeed, in terms of legend, song and story it is probably the most famous type case in the region.

The Afridi of the Khaybar Tribal Agency and the Kohat Frontier Region

Economics

The Afridi live entirely within the confines of Pakistani territory, although two of their immediate tribal neighbors, the Shinwari to the west and the Mohmand to the north, also extend across the border into Afghanistan. The Khaybar Agency, established by the British in 1878-1881 during the course of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, with its headquarters not within the agency itself but in Peshawar Cantonment, is the senior of what in colonial times were the five (Khaybar, Kurram, Malakand and North and South Waziristan) and today the seven (the above, plus Mohmand and Orakzai) Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATAS) of the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan. Although the Afridi are not the only tribal group located within the Khaybar Agency (for the eastern Shinwari and several other much smaller groups share it as well), they are unquestionably the dominant one, with a population of about 350,000 in an area of 2465 square kilometers, according to the *Pakistan Census* of 1972, while an additional 38,000 in an area of 415 square kilometers – and all from one major section, the Adam Khayl – were centered in that same year in the Kohat Frontier Region, mostly in and around Darra Adam Khayl (lit. 'The Pass of the Adam Khayl'), where, as of 1977-1978, the majority of the two to three hundred or more Afridi rifle factories were located. The Khaybar Agency accounts for the other seven major Afridi sections, and the seniority of the agency alone is a source of Afridi pride.

Despite administrative differences between the Tribal Agencies on the one hand and the Frontier Regions on the other, differences which go back

to colonial times (and virtually to the creation of the North-West Frontier Province as a province of British India separate from that of the Punjab under the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon in 1901), Afridiland is not geographically discontinuous, but forms a single unit. The Khaybar Pass is located at its northeastern neck, and the North Tirah, the cool and well-watered Afridi heartland, totally forbidden and inaccessible to all non-Afridi, where most of the tribesmen spend the summer in order to get away from the heat, with its Maydan and its congregational mosque at Bagh (lit. 'garden'), the Afridi 'capital' (although not in quite the same sense nor to the same structural degree that Igharm Amazdar functioned as capital to the Ait ʿAtta), is at its west-center and at a height of 1800-2100 meters. To the southwest are the Khajuri Plain, the Bara and Bazar Valleys, Waran, Rajgal and the Kohat Pass, or Kohat Darra, all of which are also Afridi territorial holdings.

The central fact of Afridi history is thus guardianship and control of the famous Khaybar (or 'Khyber') Pass as far back as adequate historical records go or even as adequate historical memory exists – 'as far back as Alexander the Great, Dhu l-Qarnayn, who did not want to pay his toll fees', as tribal wags like to say, pointing out at the same time that even Mahmud Ghaznavi paid them in 998, after which the Afridi were pleased to join his Muslim armies to help wreck the Hindu temple at Somnath! (cf. Hart 1985: 95). Because the Afridi, and no one else, can always fall back on their North Tirah heartland – for the South Tirah is held by their southern neighbors the Orakzai – they have literally been able to force any would-be conqueror coming through the pass to pay toll. The most notable single historical example was probably in 1672, when under the leadership of an Adam Khayl *malik* named Aymal Khan they decimated a Mughal army under the Emperor Awrangzeb.

The toll system, levied on any form of transport, whether human, animal or mechanical, was still very much in effect until at least the beginning of the Russo-Afghan War at the end of 1979. The fee may have been minimal (in 1977-1978 it was Pakistani Rs. 6.- per person, less than $1 US, if coming by bus, and Rs. 12.- per person if coming by private conveyance); but it was still unfailingly collected by armed Afridi *khassadar*-s (a tribal paramilitary service like that of the Moroccan *mkhazniya*), both as a matter of principle and as a matter of augmenting the tribal allowances, paid them both by the British in colonial times and by the Pakistanis since Independence and partition, on a bi-annual basis: for the tribal agency Pukhtuns pay no taxes, now or ever. Not only this, but the Afridi are able to back up their Khaybar toll-fees through force of arms, for every able-bodied Pukhtun tribesman, the Afridi of course included, carries a rifle (*topak*) and is exceptionally adept in its use. As another

proverb has it, 'a gun is part of the landscape'; and I quote this despite my own reservations about proverbs, i.e., that generally speaking, and no matter in what language, they are simply too numerous, too reflective of particular situations and hence, as a rule, too contradictory to be of any real value as barometers of social structure. (A perusal of even Westermarck's superb collection of proverbs in Northwestern Moroccan Arabic should make this point clear, that proverbs can be trotted out and exhibited to justify virtually any occasion: cf. Westermarck 1930.)

A notable feature of the Tribal Agencies in general is the very feeble development in them of anything resembling urban life or settlements. The Khaybar Agency is in this respect atypical only in that the Political Agent's residence (which still looked in 1977 exactly as it had in Edwardian times) is located in the Peshawar Cantonment, only a short distance by motorized rickshaw from the North-West Frontier provincial capital. Even so, the Political Agent must hold meetings in Landi Kotal, at the west end of the Khaybar Pass, in summer, as Peshawar is too hot and most of the Afridi are then in their Tirah heartland in any case.

The fact that the Afridi move up into the Tirah in spring and down into the Peshawar valley in the autumn without ever leaving their tribal territory is the answer – called *dwa kora* or 'two houses' –, which in common with other tribal agency Pukhtuns, they give to the dictates of their ecology and climate: for all of them have houses both in the Tirah and in the various valleys to the northeast. Neither this fact nor their bi-annual moves back and forth, however, makes real transhumants out of them. They are in fact semi-sedentary agriculturalists with too little land to cultivate, and their permanent holdings both in arable land and in movable livestock are slender in the extreme. Such cultivated land as there is (*zmaka* or *jaydad*, producing mainly wheat, maize and potatoes, the latter being the local cash crop) falls invariably into the category of *milk* or individual private property, while hillsides are generally used as grazing land by meager flocks of goats and sheep. and some scrawny zebu cattle, half the size of the big zebu oxen and the water buffaloes to be seen pulling immensely heavy cartloads in Peshawar. Rice is cultivated under irrigation in the Bara Valley, the only part of Afridiland where irrigation exists at all.

The small fields under cultivation are close to the villages (*kilay*), which are to be seen scattered here and there through the Khaybar, at least as viewed from both the macadamized road and the heavily switchbacked mountain track of the double-locomotive train (which does not follow the same route as the bus) going through the pass itself: for, once again, no non-Afridi is allowed to trespass beyond a one hundred-meter limit on either side of the

road or the railtrack. Indeed, owing to the war in Afghanistan the pass was closed to all unauthorized traffic in 1981. Stark, fortified mud-and-stone house compounds, with feud towers (*burj*, *tapu*) three or four storeys high, blend right into the rocky landscape. If big enough, they are divided into quarters (*kandi*), each one with its separate *hujra* or guesthouse. But the village, which is generally named for its *malik*, its headman, who is usually also its senior agnatic lineage member (as for instance in Malik Sarwar Khan Kilay in Darra Adam Khayl or in Malik ᶜAli Manshah Kilay near Fort Jamrud, at the eastern entrance to the Khaybar), although it may be the unit of residence, is not that of kinship. For, just as in the Moroccan Rif, there is none of the mystique here of a peasantry in deep association with agriculture or with any of its attendant ritual. Generally speaking, too, the winter village in the plain, apart from the fact that some Afridi sections live in caves in the Khajuri Plain near Peshawar when they go there in autumn, is more or less a replica of the one in the mountains, and, as the Afridi are not overencumbered with livestock and are generally not accompanied by their animals on their moves from the one to the other, and as they never live in tents, they disqualify as transhumants even more than they do as purely sedentary agriculturalists.

The Afridi have therefore an imperative need to supplement their income. The legitimate means for doing so have long been through toll fees and tribal allowances, while the less legitimate means have also long been through raiding and contraband. In addition, and in more recent years, the Tirah has also become notorious for opium poppy cultivation, as is also the case with other areas reserved for the same purpose in other tribal agencies (Pakistan Narcotics Control Board 1975). Indeed, by the early to mid-1980s, right in the middle of the Russo-Afghan War, it is both alarming and sad to have to report that while the Shinwari had become among the major opium growers and processors in the province, their Afridi neighbors had equally become numbered among its major heroin smugglers and those of Pakistan at large. A graphic portrayal of a sanguinary encounter between tribal Afridi smugglers and a Pakistani police narcotics squad can be found in Moorhouse (1984: 201-225), who witnessed it in 1983, five years after I left the field, and who observed that by early that same year, the Pakistani police had broken the then world record for heroin seizures (ibid.: 207). More legitimate additional supplements, however, have been provided in recent years through the transportation industry (for trucking- and bus-lines in Pakistan are almost entirely in the hands of tribal Pukhtuns), labor migration to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Amirates and, for the more prosperous, ownership of considerable urban real estate in Peshawar itself.

Segmentation and Localized Descent Groups in Historical Context

Among all Pukhtuns, and not only among the Afridi, a fundamental characteristic of their segmentary organization is that each tribe, at whatever segmentary level, has its common patrilineal and patrilateral ancestor. Even if tribesmen may foreshorten the genealogical distance and depth separating themselves from him, this fact in no way invalidates their claim to such descent. As Barth and Pehrson have both noted, this factor is the critical one in the difference in political structure between Pukhtuns and Baluch, for that of the latter is based on contracts of political submission of commoners under chiefs and subchiefs (Barth 1969: 124; Barth 1981: 110; and Pehrson 1966). It may be added that such a form allows freely for reorganization, assimilation and accretion of personnel, while the historical evidence for the growth of Baluch tribes through processes of confederation and of the accretion of individuals and small groups is well documented.

The second characteristic of the segmentary organization of Pukhtun tribes is that they are segmentary in their composition. Here we have another of those not uncommon occasions when the concept of segmentation pure and simple, as opposed to that of segmentary lineages, is very useful. This is to say that the whole corpus or body of the tribal society is made up of segments or sections which are related to each other, or, to express it in their own idiom, their genealogical lines resemble branches of a tree which lead to its main trunk. This crucial and fundamental point may be explored more closely by looking at the internal composition of one of the eight Afridi maximal sections: the Adam Khayl, Aka Khayl, Kuki Khayl, Qambar Khayl, Malik Din Khayl, Kamar Khayl, Sipah and Zakha Khayl. It is upon this last-mentioned section that I shall focus here.

Before doing so, however, I should note in passing that the term *khayl* (which in Arabic is a collective plural signifying 'horses', and hence the semantic connection with its present meaning in Pakhtu remains unestablished), denoting a lineage segment at virtually any genealogical level, permeates the whole pyramidal scaffolding of Afridi social structure and has been referred to by Ahmed as an integral feature of *nang*-type ('honor-type', as embodied by free tribesmen in the agencies), as opposed to *qalang*-type ('tax-type', as embodied by the strongman khanates to the north, Swat, Dir, Bajawr, etc.), Pukhtun tribal systems. The suffix *-zai* (lit. 'son', such as in Yusufzai, Barakzai, Ghilzai) is generally identified with the *qalang* end of the scale on which Pukhtun socio-political structure perpetually oscillates, while the use of the *khayl* suffix clearly puts the Afridi into the *nang* category. This

fact is confirmed independently by most if not all other features of their socio-political organization (Ahmed 1977: 20-22; 1980: 58).

The example to be pursued in greater depth is that of the Zakha Khayl, for historical reasons which will soon become apparent, as they reflect integrally, in microcosmic form, the macrocosm of the whole Afridi segmentary system. If the Afridi as a whole may be regarded as Segmentary Level I, then the eight maximal sections, the Zakha Khayl among them, may be looked upon as Segmentary Level II. There is no need to give here the full details of even the Zakha Khayl genealogy, to say nothing of those of any of the other sections, as I have done this elsewhere (Hart 1985: 49-54; 1990: 8-12). I should note, however, that they are divided into three major subsections, all named for their respective ancestors, as is true of every single named segment in the genealogy at no matter what level. For the record, these subsections are the Budai, Nasr ad-Din and Shan Khayl at Segmentary Level III. There is, however, is little point in following them all down to further sub-sectional or lineage names at Levels V and VI, because the names to be commented upon in the text will reappear in due course in the context of some trenchant historical reporting by Major (later Sir) George Roos-Keppel, the British Political Agent for the Khaybar Agency and later Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, reporting taken from the India Office Records in London and dated as of the decade immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I.

Secondly, I should also note that there are only minor disagreements between my own materials as presented here and those provided by Ridgway (1910: 57-71), for example, on Zakha Khayl Afridi subsegmentation. But Ridgway does not comment on the frequency of such segment names as *Drai Plaray*, 'three fathers', or *Pinzuh Plaray*, 'five fathers', each of which occurs twice in the context of Zakha Khayl subsegmentation, with similar instances occurring as well among other Pukhtun tribes on the frontier. First of all, the names in question should not be taken too literally; but even so the Zakha Khayl data underscore the usage of the term *plaray* (plural of *plar*) as referring not only to pater but to genitor, as well as to the exact number of segments concerned. Of less significance is the suffix *-ai*, which seems to crop up in Zakha Khayl usage as much as *khayl* itself and which has the same meaning of patrilineal descent group. In any case the descendants of these three or five 'fathers' or ancestors up the line are too far removed from each other structurally to count even as classificatory patri-parallel cousins or *tarburan* (pl. of *tarbur*), to say nothing of real ones. All that these 'number' terms seem to do – and it does not matter whether the numbers are odd or even, as Ahmed has reported even-numbered segment names among the Mohmand (Ahmed

1980: 132) – is to place an arbitrary outside limit on segment size at any given time.

Of greater significance, however, is the statement, categorical as it may sound, made by our eldest Zakha Khayl informant to the effect that not only were the wives of all the individuals whose names are perpetuated in the genealogy themselves Zakha Khayl, but also that they were, whenever possible, the female patri-parallel cousins of the men in question. If this statement can be taken on faith, then it is truly remarkable. For the same informant, in talking of the point of fission of his own lineage, the Darya Khayl (Level VI) of the Durar Khayl (Level V) of the Khasrugai (Level IV) Nasr ad-Din (Level III), noted that in about 1875, when one of Darya Khan's two sons, Jamal Khan (from whom the informant himself was descended, seven generations further down, i.e., at Level XIII), had a guest in his *hujra*, two of the sons of his brother Mir Khan cut off the tail of the guest's horse, thereby violating the law of hospitality (*maylmastiya*), which, as noted, is a cardinal feature of the Pukhtunwali. Jamal Khan himself then killed two men of the Mir Khan Khayl sublineage (whether or not they were his actual father's brother's sons is not recorded, but it seems probable) for having thus insulted his guest; and the vendetta was on. It was still on a century later, as of late 1977, and no less than 61 men on both sides had been killed in it as of that date – a rate of 0.6 men per year (wrongly recorded as 1.6 in Hart 1985: 53; and 1990: 12).

A better example than this of persisting hatred between *tarburan* could hardly be found, yet I was assured in virtually the same breath that this was no bar to parallel cousin marriage. It is nonetheless unfortunate that further information on both the Darya Khayl vendetta and on Darya Khayl marriages were not forthcoming, for an in-depth comparison with the savage intra-Imjjat vendetta in the Aith Turirth section of the Aith Waryaghar, which I have examined in detail in Chapter III, would certainly be illuminating. Even Tapper refers to the existence in Afghanistan of anti-segmentary communities at certain levels of organization and the formation among them of bloc alliances (Tapper 1983: 70). For the Afridi, these will be considered in the next section.

Another important reason for having selected the Zakha Khayl as my segmentary (if non-corporate) yardstick is the fact that early in 1908 the British carried out against them the last of a series of at least eight (since 1853) major 'punitive expeditions' undertaken against the Afridi at large. (These were very much like the French 'pacification' of the Ait 'Atta and their neighbors in the Moroccan Central Atlas and the Saghru. Interestingly, there is considerable evidence for the fact that British political agents in the North-West Frontier Agencies, as of the 1930s, at least, paid attention to the advice

given by Lyautey to his A1 officers in Morocco: cf. Durnford 1934, 'Spingirai' 1935 and 'Shiggadar' 1935.) Prior to this 1908 expedition the Zakha Khayl had been raiding the settled districts around Peshawar with more than their normal wont, kidnapping rich Hindus and looting their shops. Although this final set-to was in fact only a postscript to the major tribal conflagration and *jihad* of 1897-1898, when the British had actually managed to invade the Afridi heartland of the Tirah, where they encountered by far the most savage resistance they had experienced on the frontier up to that time, what is noteworthy about this expedition is precisely that it was directed against the Zakha Khayl alone.

The other seven Afridi sections were themselves fed up with the attitude of the Zakha Khayl, who in any case had never even made a token surrender to the British in 1898. In a major council meeting or *jirga*, numbering 600 men from each section except for the Adam Khayl and the Aka Khayl, or 3000 men all told, on February 28, 1908, they agreed to hold themselves jointly and severally responsible for the future good behavior of every subsection and sub-subsection of the Zakha Khayl. In cultural translation, this was a masterpiece of the principles both of tribal justice and of segmentary organization. As it may well be the only such example on record, it is worth spelling out in detail (*India Office Records*, L/P&S/10/46, Political and Secret Department, Separate Files, No. 1776, Part 2: NWF: *Zakha Khayl Affairs*, 1904: No. 249, Roos-Keppel, PA Khyber, to Willcocks, *Report on Completion of Zakha Khayl Settlement Made at Walai*, 28 February 1908. Also ibid., No. 8-37, Roos-Keppel to Mullaly, 3 March 1908).

This *jirga* visited all the Zakha Khayl settlements and finally returned to Ft. Jamrud, at the eastern end of the Khaybar, on April 3. Except for one particularly notorious Zakha Khayl raider named Multan, who had taken refuge as a *mafrur* or proclaimed offender across the Afghan border in Jalalabad, they brought with them every other Zakha Khayl raider of the day as well as all the loot (rifles, jewelry and money) that they had forced them to disgorge, to the tune of Rs. 53,039/4/9. Now the fine which had been imposed on the Zakha Khayl for their share in the much more serious 1897-1898 uprising was Rs. 9000.-, which was eventually paid for them by the other sections, whose members had never recovered any of it. This fact in itself was an indication of their success in doing so on this occasion. The *jirga* deposited with Maj. Roos-Keppel some 13 rifles, valued altogether at Rs. 5000.- to 6000.- (i.e., at an average of Rs. 420.- per rifle), as a guarantee that it would not allow Multan to return to the Tirah until he had been properly punished. On April 19, they made a written statement to this effect, again in *jirga*.

Now comes the point of particular interest, as well as that at which all the names of the Zakha Khayl subsections and sub-subsections come into play. At the same original *jirga* of February 28, the spelling out of the shared responsibility for the future good conduct of the Zakha Khayl at large meant that: (1) the Malik Din Khayl Afridi were to be responsible for the Sahib Khayl (Level V) half of the Anai (Level IV), the Pa'indai (Level IV) and the Jamal Khayl (Level V) Khasrugai (Level IV) Nasr ad-Din (Level III), all of the Zakha Khayl; (2) the Qambar Khayl Afridi were to be responsible for the Shan Khayl (Level IV) Zakha Khayl of Bara and the Tirah; (3) the Kuki Khayl and the Niki Khayl Pakhai (Level IV) Afridi – the latter evidently Zakha Khayl themselves as well – were to be responsible for the Muhibb Khayl (Level V) half of the Anai (Level IV) Budai (Level III) Zakha Khayl; (4) the Sipah Afridi were to be responsible for the Ziya d-Din (Level IV) Budai (Level III) Zakha Khayl; (5) the Kamar Khayl Afridi were to be responsible for all the Khasrugai (Level IV) Nasr ad-Din (Level III) Zakha Khayl subsections save the Jamal Khayl (Level V), mentioned in Point (1) above; and (6) the Khaybar Pakhai (Level IV) Budai (Level III) Zakha Khayl Afridi were to be responsible for the Bara Pakhai (Level IV) Budai (Level III) Zakha Khayl, who are members of the same subsection in a different location. For the Zakha Khayl as well as all the other Afridi sections show territorial reduplication and discontinuity within Afridiland, despite the fact that the latter makes up a single bloc of territory.

Apart from indicating that probably two-thirds of the Pakhai Zakha Khayl subsections, located in the two different sub-areas of the Khaybar and the Bara Valley, were innocent of the charges leveled at them and the rest of their fellow section members, this division of internal tribal responsibility provides us with an unrivaled example of balance and opposition at work and in action in a highly segmentary social system. Aside from the fact (which is not of very great importance) that Roos-Keppel's information on Zakha Khayl subsegmentation is not entirely in agreement with my own, there is, unfortunately, no indication in the report about how long this shared responsibility may have lasted. It appears worth, however, hazarding the guess that it was probably unique in the annals of North-West Frontier history.

Roos-Keppel notes, finally, that there was a deposit of 563 rifles in the Zakha Khayl *jirga*'s petition, and that these had to be extracted from them, 'a tedious exercise, as each person was most anxious that his brother's rifle, and not his own, be given up, while efforts were also made to induce the British to accept arms of local manufacture, with a very small market value' (ibid.). This last reference is to the output and production of the local Afridi rifle factories

at Darra Adam Khayl, which came into being at approximately 1890, and certainly well before the end of the nineteenth century (Hart 1985: 59-62). He concludes his report on the proud but paternalistic note that during the expedition not a man of the all-Afridi Khaybar Rifles deserted, even though brother may have been fighting brother. It should be added that the Khaybar Rifles had been organized originally by Roos-Keppel's predecessor Col. Sir Robert Warburton, whose mother had been a Barakzai Pukhtun and a niece of the Afghan Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1836-1839, 1843-1863: cf. Warburton 1900). It would be of interest in this context to have further details on the exact composition of the Khaybar Rifles at this critical time, especially with respect to the proportion of Zakha Khayl sepoys as compared with those from the other sections; but unfortunately Col. Warburton died just before his book was published.

But then, quite unlike the conflagration of 1897-1898, the events leading up to the expedition against the Zakha Khayl hardly constituted a millennial uprising, and if any *mulla*-s (Qur'anic teachers and readers) were involved at all, they were far from the center of the stage. It was, rather, a totally secular exercise in chastisement, fully approved by the other sections, as is shown by the active participation in it of all of them save the Adam Khayl and the Aka Khayl, which were both too far away to have been affected. They felt that they had a legitimate grievance against the Zakha Khayl because the latter had wriggled out of paying their share of the collective fines accrued from the 1897-1898 uprising, and that they had been left holding the Zakha Khayl baby.

Here the matter might be said to have ended, and certainly from this point on the Kiplingesque references in the colonial literature and archives to the propensity for theft and raiding among the Zakha Khayl drop sharply. Indeed, it is pleasing to note that in the post-colonial period they have died out completely, to the extent that the individual Zakha Khayl Afridi may even be regarded today as just one more Pakistani going about his business. But, as Roos-Keppel well knew, few matters of this sort ever ended among the Afridi, particularly at the time in question; and he provides a somewhat unexpected denouement, dated June 1912 and referring us to Yar Muhammad Khan, one of the 'big men', one of the leading *malik*-s, of the Malik Din Khayl (*India Office Records*: L/P&S/10/200, Political and Secret Department, Separate Files, No. 46, Part 1: *Afghan and N-W Frontier Diaries* (1912-1913), P-2947, 1912: Source: Lt.-Col. G.E. Roos-Keppel, Memorandum of Information Received During June 1912 at Khaybar Agency, and signed A.H. Grant, Deputy Secretary to Government of India).

Early that same month one Safdar of the Malik Din Khayl attempted to poison an entire dinner party assembled at the house of ʿAbd al-Rahman, also of the Malik Din Khayl, the rival and enemy of Malik Yar Muhammad Khan of Tshura in the Tirah. (Whether or not this ʿAbd al-Rahman stood in a *tarbur* relationship to Yar Muhammad Khan is not indicated.) One of the dinner guests was ʿUsman (ʿUthman) of the Jamal Khayl subsection of the Khasrugai Zakha Khayl, described in the report as a prime cause of the British expedition to Zakha Khayl territory in 1908, a notorious raider and the most trusted Afridi agent of Amir Habib Allah of Afghanistan (1901-1919), to which country a later Zakha Khayl *malik* in post-Independence times was also to defect, over the 'Pukhtunistan' issue, the Afghan claims to which were not and are not recognized by Pakistan. However, the poison failed to have fatal effects and therefore Safdar quickly took refuge with Yar Muhammad Khan, to whom the instigation of the crime was widely (and probably correctly) attributed. On June 13 ʿUsman was killed at Tshura by Yar Muhammad Khan's men, who also put an end to Safdar himself shortly afterwards. ʿUsman's murder caused considerable excitement among the Zakha Khayl of the Bara valley and aroused much animosity against Yar Muhammad Khan. Yet nothing could be actually proven, and as attested by Molesworth (1962: 99-109), Malik Yar Muhammad Khan was still very much alive, as well as far more anti-British than he had been earlier, at the time of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, after which, however, he may well have perished when the British blew up his fortress through air bombardment in September of that same year. Yet the case here under review shows him to have been a master in the art of killing two birds with one stone: a dangerous Zakha Khayl raider, possibly in order to win British approbation at the time, and a lower-order lineage-mate or sectional or factional hanger-on who knew too much and whose presence might therefore have proven embarrassing. The whole scenario and script, indeed, would also have won the approval of a certain Sicilian organization which shall remain nameless (Hart 1985: 120-126; 1990: 6-15).

Councils, Factions, Alliances and Feuds

I have dwelt at some length on the segmentary organization of the Zakha Khayl Afridi, as it illustrates a number of cardinal points about that of Pukhtun tribesmen in general. But aside from the fact that an extraordinarily high percentage of Afridi (certainly over 90 percent, higher even than the 85 percent general average for the Ait ʿAṭṭa) are resident male members of whatever agnatic lineage or lineages are associated with the territory in which they live,

another major characteristic of Afridi society, as of Pukhtun tribal society in general, is its acephaly, which stands in such sharp contrast to the leadership orientation of the Baluch. As Emilio Blanco Izaga sagaciously observed about the very similar Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif, 'in a region where everyone is a personality, only a political order based on masses and not on individuals can produce results' (my translation: Blanco Izaga 1939: 67; Hart/Blanco Izaga 1975, I: 75, II: 328; 1995: 347).

The same is the case here, and very much so, for the Afridi and their neighbors, the *jirga*, the council, which may literally consist of all the tribesmen, and certainly of all the able-bodied ones, is the repository of power. Every family headman regards himself as a *malik* and is so regarded by others, even though there are only two hereditary *malik*-s officially recognized as such by the Pakistani administration of the North-West Frontier Province for each of the Kuki Khayl, Malik Din Khayl and Kamar Khayl sections in the Khaybar Agency while the Qambar Khayl and the Zakha Khayl each had three until, as noted, one of the Zakha Khayl *malik*-s defected to Afghanistan in the 1960s as a result of the 'Pukhtunistan' issue – which was overtaken by events after the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979 and does not seem to have resurfaced even in the Afghan civil war which began after the Soviet pullout almost a decade later. The Aka Khayl, Sipah and Adam Khayl sections resident in the Khaybar Agency, on the other hand, only have one official *malik* apiece. The full Afridi *jirga*, however, does not go to quite the same extremes that the Mahsud one in the South Waziristan Agency does or did, for a Mahsud proverb has it that if that tribe traditionally had 18,000 warriors, it also had 18,000 potential *malik*-s (Howell 1931: 48; 2nd Ed., 1979: 96, n. 2). As the Mahsud expressed it to the British, 'Either blow us all up with cannon or make all eighteen thousand of us *nawab*-s'; but Howell reckoned this traditional figure to be only two-thirds of the total as of 1929.

Yet the 3000-man *jirga* of 1908 referred to earlier is nothing if not representative. It bespeaks an almost absolute state of egalitarianism, an egalitarianism rendered all the more striking by the fact that among the Afridi as among other Pukhtun tribes there is not a single man able to bear arms who does not bear them. Everyone is armed, and to the teeth, even if the great majority, as of the time of my fieldwork, obtained their weapons only from the two to three hundred little factories which line both sides of the Peshawar-Kohat road as it runs through Darra Adam Khayl. Just as the Aith Waryaghar and the Ait ʿAtta did in Morocco at about the same period, the Afridi provide a very close approximation to a popular (and inaccurate) American image of 'All Chiefs And No Indians'!

All major Afridi *jirga*-s are held in the Jumᶜa Masjid, the Friday Congregational Mosque, at Bagh, in the Tirah, right after the communal prayer at noon and after the swearing of any pending oaths, which must be taken on the Qur'an by any individual accused, with one of his agnates present to support his claim to innocence. An elderly and respected spokesman, a *mashar* as opposed to a *kashar* or 'young hothead', is always selected in advance by the participants in order to officiate at any *jirga*. Attendance at *jirga* is compulsory: nobody may refuse to do so, for if he does a *lakhkar* or raiding party is formed at once to descend on his house and burn it. This stark fact insures a one hundred percent participation. Likewise, any murders which break a general truce or peace, *tiga* (equivalent to the Rifian *sulh* or the Ait ᶜAtta *l-hna*), are heavily sanctioned by the *jirga* through the levying of prohibitively heavy fines, *nagha* (the Afridi equivalent to the *haqq* of the Aith Waryaghar), on the murderer or the burning of his house, and sometimes both.

Contending parties to any dispute sit apart from each other but near the main body of the *jirga* in order to air their grievances. When each side has done so, the *jirga* appoints some ten to twenty of its members as arbiters, and when they come to an agreement, the number of arbiters is then generally reduced to four or five. They now inform the *jirga* of their decision; and this decision is final. *Jirga* members are of course all armed, usually with the Darra-made imitation of the Enfield .303, but no one would dare to fire his rifle or even threaten to do so. The Afridi take their *jirga*-s very seriously.

Each contending party has also had to give a certain number of rifles as security or *damana*; and if either party does not accept the decision, it forfeits these rifles. Every individual at feud has in his own interest a *damin*, or guarantor, exactly as was the case among the precolonial Aith Waryaghar. This man is someone whom he can trust and who represents him when he cannot be present himself. The guarantor is unpaid, but if he sees some default in the surety, he may then collect. He must also avenge the death of the individual whom he is sponsoring should the latter be killed.

It is here worth introducing another concept, that of *sarishta*. This refers to the executive branch or arm of the *jirga* once a decision has been made; and it is formed either from among the members of a single section, in the regulation of its internal affairs, or from several or indeed all eight of the Afridi maximal sections jointly, in order to enforce collective decisions of importance, especially those with respect to other sections or other tribes. The *sarishta* is appointed primarily to maintain the *tiga* that the *jirga* has established. A *jirga* meeting over the hostility between two *tarburan*, for instance, is made up of men from other neutral lineages or communities, and it makes

its collective decision after hearing and weighing each contending viewpoint.

Tarburwali may even have been a factor in a priceless episode, cited by Howell, which occurred during World War I, involving two Qambar Khayl Afridi brothers, Mir Dast and Mir Mast, who were both in a British Indian regiment on the Western Front. Mir Dast was awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry in action, while his brother Mir Mast, after deserting to the Germans, was evidently also awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, by them under similar circumstances, in reverse. (Cf. Howell, 2nd Ed., 1979: 67, n. 1; and Hart 1987: 51.) We might add here that a common motive for Afridi in joining British Indian Army regiments in any case was in order to desert with their arms so as to be able to pursue a feud or vendetta at home. Indeed, this was not only true of Pukhtuns, as Coon devoted a whole novel to a Rifian from the Igzinnayen who joined the French Moroccan Tirailleurs during World War I for precisely the same purpose, and who was able to bring his quest to a successful conclusion by bringing home no less than ten rifles (Coon 1933).

A truce or *tiga*, realistically regarded by the Afridi as temporary in character, may be effected in any area contested by two hostile factions. The *jirga* arranges it and then appoints a neutral but strong individual to see that the truce is kept. At the same time the *jirga* also establishes the amount to be paid to the *damin*, the guarantor of the truce. Should anyone break the *tiga* by committing a fresh murder, the *damin* and the victim's agnates must jointly take vengeance on the killer's lineage, and the amount agreed on in the *tiga*, known as *mutshalga*, is then paid by the killer's lineage-mates to the *damin*. However, if retaliation has already been exacted, the *jirga* then usually reduces the amount of the *mutshalga* by about half. But if the victim's agnates are willing to accept *saz* or blood-money, and usually they are not (it amounted to Rs. 20,000.- to 30,000.- in 1977), then the full amount of the *mutshalga* is insisted upon and is generally paid. Both the Kuki Khayl and the Kamar Khayl sections were pointed out as invariably insisting on the full amount even if vengeance has been taken.

Some commentary on factional hostility is now in order. Factions are known as *gundi*, and informants were unanimous in saying that at some unspecified time in the past, all eight of the Afridi maximal sections as well as all fifteen of those of the Orakzai were grouped around the bitter rivalry between the Malik Din Khayl and the Qambar Khayl, and were either on one side or the other. It should also be noted that the Malik Din Khayl and the Qambar Khayl are both held to be descended from brothers who were themselves sons of a single father, Miramat Khan, and hence they are both, logi-

cally, Miramat Khayl. However, with the passage of time, the two brother sections, in good *tarburwali* style, began to fight bitterly against each other. What happened was that two *gundi*-s were formed as factional clusters around each of the participants, exactly like the overarching *liff* factions within the Aith Waryaghar. These factions acquired names: *Gundi* A was the *Samil* faction which crystallized around the Malik Din Khayl, and included, among the other Afridi sections, the Zakha Khayl, the Sipah, the Aka Khayl and the Kamar Khayl, as well as, among the Orakzai sections, the ʿAli Shayrzai, the Mulla Khayl, the Shay Khan (Khayl), the Fayruz Khayl, the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Khayl and the Bar (or Lower) Muhammad Khayl (who are Shiʿa), and finally, in the Settled Districts, the Mohmand of Peshawar in Landai and Arbab. *Gundi* B was the *Gar* faction which crystallized around the Qambar Khayl, and included the two remaining Afridi sections of the Adam Khayl and the Kuki Khayl, as well as the remaining Orakzai ones, the Mamuzai, the ʿAli Khayl, the Masuzai, the A-Khayl, the Mani Khayl and the Sipaya (both the last of whom, again, are Shiʿa), and the Sturi Khayl, and finally, in the Settled districts, the Khalil of Paykan.

These two factions, the Samil and the Gar, were conceived as permanent and as existing, under different names, all over the present-day Pukhtun tribal territory, again, evidently, like the near-mythological Sinhaja and Ghumara *liff*-s in northern Morocco and the variously named long-term chessboard patterns described by Montagne for the Western Atlas. In Waziristan and that part of the Paktya Province in Afghanistan which is immediately adjacent to it, the Samil faction is said to have been known as *Spin Gund*, 'white faction', while the Gar faction is referred to as *Tor Gund*, 'black faction', thereby recapitulating the white-black dichotomy which is most crucially embodied in the concept of female honor, even the attempted violation of which is punishable by the death of both parties.

At any rate, such is (or was) the situation as presented by informants. To what extent it actually corresponded, whether totally or partially, to a real situation on the ground may very well be another matter. Here a further consideration is in order: that of size, or perhaps of scale. If we go by the 1910 population estimates given by Ridgway at a time when these factions may still have been active (Ridgway 1910: 50-56), it is patently obvious that in the Afridi case the manpower of the Gar faction (with three sections and 13,700 men) was only two-thirds that of the Samil faction (with five sections and 19,200 men). As for the involvement of the Orakzai, although the number of sections was almost equal on each side, informants specifically stipulated that two-thirds of their total manpower was pulled into the Samil orbit, with only

one-third in the Gar one. So whatever may be said of the *de jure* equality, plus the question of balance and opposition of sections between the factions, this was certainly not the case in any *de facto* sense.

Nonetheless, even if the seemingly all-inclusive Samil-Gar factionalism is today only a memory, there is still little love lost between the maximal sections of the Malik Din Khayl and the Qambar Khayl. As late as 1967, they had a clash over land ownership in Arjali Nadi, in the Khajuri Plain near Ft. Bara. According to the Malik Din Khayl, the land in question was acquired illegally by the Qambar Khayl in colonial times, when they had already begun to build houses on it. It was the housebuilding in particular that the Malik Din Khayl contested – much in the same vein as the annual summer fracas in the Moroccan Central Atlas between the resident Ait Bu Iknifen (Ait ʿAtta) at Talmast and the Ait Bu Iknifen n-Iqibliyen, their southern cousins who come up on transhumance. The Qambar Khayl villages were or had been regularly attacked and set on fire, and during the colonial period the British often had to intervene, not through choice but because the scene of battle was dangerously close to the Settled Districts (to which are attached the small Frontier Regions of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dayra Ismaʿil Khan). But since Independence many tribesmen have purchased land in the Settled Districts and go back and forth to their Tribal Agency houses as per the *dwa kora* or 'two houses' principle. It might also be added that the Settled Districts were also a major point of refuge if either side were getting the worst of it in a feud, for it was normal to send women and children there if a feud were raging. Indeed it was from Kohat that the two Adam Khayl Afridi bandit brothers ʿAjab Khan and Shahzada achieved great notoriety in 1923 by raiding the cantonment, killing Maj. Archibald Ellis and his wife and kidnapping their seventeen-year-old daughter Mollie, who was soon returned unharmed, after which her kidnappers escaped to Afghanistan, where as proclaimed outlaws or *mafruran* they died in exile in Mazar-i-Sharif many years later, and after many further adventures (for details, cf. Hart 1985: 131-135; 1987: 52-55).

Any permanent alliance, as conceived by informants, of the sections within the Samil faction *vis-à-vis* those of the Gar faction by no means completely precluded fighting within each faction. At about the end of World War II, internal Afridi alliances had changed again, and heavy fighting broke out between the Zakha Khayl and the Aka Khayl over the Matrai area, a pass between two mountains which borders a big forest and which is hence of some strategic importance. What seems in fact to have happened is that the stronger Zakha Khayl had simply 'muscled in' on the territory of the weaker Aka Khayl, who were not strong enough to fend them off. Nearly fifty people

were killed and the case was only settled about 1950-1951 by a full-scale tribal *jirga*. But in the settlement of the dispute, the Zakha Khayl wound up with the lion's share, two-thirds of the Matrai forest as opposed to merely one-third for the Aka Khayl. I might add that the Zakha Khayl informants who were present at the interview grinned when this was mentioned. Consistent with the above is the fact that, wherever possible, a major objective in feud is to capture one's opponent's water supply (Ahmed 1977: 27; 1980: 5).

A further note on feuds (though not a final one, as the subject is interminable, even if an individual feud may not be) is that my Malik Din Khayl informants – and the Malik Din Khayl are generally regarded as the most peaceful and level-headed of the Afridi sections – estimated that there is normally only about one death resulting from them every six months. They opined that the same is true of all other Afridi sections save the Zakha Khayl, among whom the death rate through violence and feud or vendetta may be somewhat higher. But at the same time they were careful to point out that death by violence is infinitely more common in the Settled Districts and in Peshawar itself than it is anywhere in the Tribal Agencies.

This is not just an assertion, for it is abundantly documented by Mohammad Ali (1966), a onetime Prime Minister of Pakistan who as prosecuting attorney in the Peshawar Advocate General's office, 1921-1961, discusses, in the 29 chapters of his book, no less than 47 cases of homicide which fell under his jurisdiction. Of these only one, the Ellis murder and kidnapping referred to earlier, was perpetrated by Tribal Agency Afridi; all the rest, without exception, occurred in the Settled districts or in Peshawar itself.

In any case most feuds are intra-village in that they are restricted to the village of the participants but become vendettas when they occur between men who stand in a *tarbur* relationship to each other. As among the Rifians of the Aith Waryaghar, when once that fragile and ephemeral desideratum of lineage unity is broken, if indeed it ever existed in the first place, a feud has turned inward to become a vendetta. Inter-village feuds, those between two villages, occur but are less common: for the wider any dispute becomes, the longer it takes to settle. Quite often a vendetta may break out between two full brothers, of the same mother and father. It is indeed the norm for it to do so between the sons of these brothers. While in no way impeding parallel cousin marriage, at least in theory, the problem, with its core issue of 'We marry our enemies', can certainly become a major dilemma for the actors involved. The uterine kinsmen and the affines of the members of a feuding lineage or sublineage only tend to give it moral support rather than active support – unless the affines in question also happen to be agnates through Father's

Brother's Daughter marriage. In this case the involvement of all parties concerned is automatic and total.

One informant, however, noted that the agnates of the victim make it, typically, a practice not to gun down the killer himself but rather the most influential or wealthy member of his lineage group. They recognize the stipulation by the Shari'a that the law of talion may be exercised and that the original killer should be killed in return; but often some license is taken here, thus underscoring the thoroughly agnatic character of the feud and, when *tarburwali* prevails, of the vendetta. Indeed, even in a western Pukhtun tribal society, the Ishaqzai northeast of Herat in Afghanistan, Nancy Tapper notes that quarrels between brothers are both endemic as well as a travesty of social norms, and that as one of her informants remarked with respect to a long-standing dispute, 'There is Afghanistan for you. A man loses his gun and the first person he accuses is his brother' (N. Tapper 1991: 126).

Wounding is indemnified according to the gravity of the wound, while threatening a person with a knife or drawing a bead on him and then not pulling the trigger is considered *sharmana*, shameful on all counts. It is made good only by enforced hospitality, in which the *jirga* forces the guilty party to slaughter one or more sheep in order to ask his would-be victim for pardon. In the Moroccan context, this would fall under the rubric of *'ar*. The number of sheep required for sacrifice is directly proportional to the number of council members present at the *jirga*, as all must eat.

Among the Afridi, fines or *nagha* have always been imposed and are payable in hard cash, in contrast to the situation prevailing among the Wazir and the Mahsud, among whom they may also be levied in rifles, livestock or any other marketable commodity, thereby allowing theoretically for greater latitude. But as stressed above, if any fine stipulated as such is not paid, an assembled *lakhkar* burns the house of the offender, and indeed may even do so, using its own discretion, if the fine *is* paid. In a society such as this one, there is no need to belabor the point that sanctions must be inordinately high, exactly as they were among the Aith Waryaghar – although the Moroccan system of tribal markets (as public places where the peace might have been disturbed by gunshots) is conspicuous among Pukhtuns by its absence. Nonetheless, the Afridi, by and large, up until the Soviet-Afghan War and the great increase in the narcotics trade, one result of which is that the hold that their *Pukhtunwali* had over them now seems to be slipping somewhat, met its demands and adhered to the letter of its law. As noted above, Afridi informants in 1977-1978 uniformly maintained that there were more criminal cases committed or recorded in Peshawar City in two weeks than there were in the Khaybar

Agency in a whole year! The guns that they all carry thus serve more as preventive medicine than as cure (Hart 1990: 16-22).

Clientship, Islam and the Rifle Factories of Darra Adam Khayl

Like all tribal Pukhtuns, the Afridi have Hindu or, more often, Sikh clients-in-residence, called *hamsaya*, who are not economic or occupational specialists but who run errands for their patrons and protectors, carry out commissions for them and the like, and who are totally exempt from *Pukhtunwali* and all that it stands for. As the proverb has it, 'They do not carry guns and exist only to serve us', *na garzai aw zamung khidmatgaran di* (Ahmed 1980: 160). Their Afridi protector or *naik* is always a powerful individual, and their houses are always huddled next to his; but should he not be particularly so, then his section assumes the *naik*-ship collectively.

The position of these Sikh *hamsaya*-s in the Khaybar Agency is very analogous to that formerly occupied by rural Jews in the Berber communities in Morocco: a situation of safety in humility, partly because of the religious difference, as well as one of total dependence, which in the Jew's case meant dependence on the local *amghar* (i.e., if anyone from the Ait A should assault or kill the Jew 'belonging to' the *amghar* of the Ait B, this meant war), but with the additional factor of economic specialization, for rural Moroccan Jews were traditionally silversmiths and makers of packsaddles for mules and donkeys. As for the comparison between these situations and the relationship of protection between the Ait ʿAtta and the Haratin, the latter existed at a somewhat different level: here there was of course no religious difference, but its place was taken by a 'racial' one, while at the economic level the share-cropper factor, absent in both the Berber-Jew and the Pukhtun-*hamsaya* relationships, assumed paramount importance. Indeed, in Ait ʿAtta-Haratin relations racial, economic, social, and political inequality all became fused.

Ahmed has likened the Islam of the Pukhtuns to the 'muscular Christianity' of the Victorian era, and not only does the image fit the Afridi, but it also accommodates, nicely, that of the Aith Waryaghar of the Rif and the Ait ʿAtta of the Saghru: 'a laic, uncomplicated surface reaction to an inherited tradition that is suspicious of dogmas, debates and formalized priesthood' (ibid.: 168). We need only recall the story, no doubt apocryphal, that Pukhtuns still recount as a joke against themselves (and against the Afridi in particular) about the *mulla* or *pir*, the holy man who once went to the Afridi of the Tirah and reprimanded them for not possessing a single saint's shrine or *ziyarat* (a term which in Morocco, as noted, refers to the visit or offering made at the shrine

rather than to the shrine itself, which is known as *siyyid* or *salih*). The solution arrived at by the Afridi to this problem was to kill the *mulla* on the spot and to build over his remains the first such shrine in the region (Oliver 1890, 2nd Ed., 1977: 64; Ahmed 1977: 50). Today, however, such *ziyarat*-s abound all over Afghanistan and Pakistan: they are small mud-and-stone structures with cupolas (*qubba*-s), very much like the great majority of Moroccan shrines, but with the conspicuous addition of wooden poles planted beside the cupolas from which brightly colored rags are suspended as votive offerings by the largely female clientele visiting them, most often, perhaps, in the hope that the saint in question will cure their barrenness.

Herewith a personal note: I confess to having been particularly impressed by the spectacle – as well as by the spatial and cultural juxtaposition and confrontation – of several small, unassuming but fiercely Islamic *ziyarat*-s set up at nicely strategic intervals to challenge and virtually to surround the two gigantic Buddha reliefs in the mountain rock at Bamiyan, in east-central Afghanistan. One would have to search far to find a clearer case of culture clash, or rather, of a more total rejection by a later culture of its predecessor, than this. The brightly colored rag-bound poles associated with these shrines pointed unmistakably toward the sky like the *shahada* or witness-bearing forefingers testifying to the existence of God and to His Messenger Muhammad that they are intended to represent – in the face of a Buddhism that was without any question long gone from the area even when they were implanted (Hart 1985: 87, 94). In this same connection, and returning to Morocco again, I cannot resist citing Coon's telling observation to the effect that before the Spanish landings on the beach at Ajdir of the Aith Waryaghar in September 1925 and bin ʿAbd al-Krim's final surrender in May of the following year, any Spanish prisoner who swam ashore from the penal colony that Spain maintained on al-Husayma Island, facing the mainland, would find Rifians with cocked rifles waiting for him on the beach. Already briefed by his fellows who had learned it from Rifian traders allowed on the island, all that the Christian had to do was to raise the forefinger of his right hand and recite the Muslim profession of faith, *La ilaha illa' llah wa Muhammad al-rasul Allah*, 'There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God' – and he would then be allowed ashore unmolested. Some indeed were even given complete sets of clothing, houses, wives and jobs (Coon 1962: 104-105).

With respect to the Afridi and their neighbors, in colonial times *mulla*-s and *hajji*-s or pilgrims to Mecca could and often did become millennial and charismatic, though ephemeral, leaders of the Pukhtun *jihad* against the Brit-

ish, and this was particularly the case in the conflagration of 1897-1898 (cf. Ahmed 1976). But since Independence and Partition in 1947 their influence has dwindled to the village-level proportions where it originated and where, just as rural *fqih*-s do in Morocco, they teach the Qur'an to the village boys and participate integrally in the religious aspects of rites of passage – such as birth, circumcision of boys, marriage, and the washing and preparation of corpses before burial.

There are at least three shrines of some importance today in the Khaybar Agency: those of Shaykh Mali Nikoh, who died in the eighteenth century and is buried in the Bara Valley in Qambar Khayl territory, Wali Baba, buried in Malik ʿAli Manshah *kilay* in Kuki Khayl territory near Ft. Jamrud, and Ghaybi Nikoh, buried in the Tshura Valley in Malik Din Khayl territory. There are also at least two major mosques, the Friday congregational mosque at Bagh in the Tirah and the ʿAli Masjid mosque on the bus route through the Khaybar Pass.

No non-Afridi has ever seen the Tirah mosque, it would appear, but the mosque at ʿAli Masjid is an appealing little structure in the Mughal architectural tradition (bulging dome and slender minarets with bulging apices, and a green tile roof), located right at the bottom of a Khaybar valley. The mosque is certainly not over a century old, as photographic evidence reveals it not to have been there at the time of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881) – at the end of which, as noted, also came the creation by the British of the Khaybar Agency itself, as well as their payment to the Afridi *malik*-s and notables of *muwajib* and *lungi* allowances. But lack of antiquity does not necessarily mean lack of attraction; and the mosque in question commemorates a spot where the Caliph ʿAli, the son-in-law of the Prophet, is alleged to have stopped to pray, thereby, incidentally, once again linking Pukhtun Islam virtually to the beginnings of the faith in Arabia. Otherwise, it is only in the Khaybar Agency that Afridi villages also have small village mosques. Elsewhere, and especially in the Tirah, everyone prays at home, particularly at night, so as not to have to leave the safety of his own house. The exception is, of course, the canonically decreed communal prayer on Fridays at noon in the mosque at Bagh and the *jirga* meeting which follows it, at which prayers are always said for the success of whatever task the *jirga* has undertaken. But we have already seen how religion leads into the politics engendered by council meetings.

All tribal Pukhtuns seem to have a strong business acumen, which may result in part from the fact of their very slender ecological resources, almost exactly as is the case among Rifians and Swasa in Morocco. As noted, since

Independence the transportation industry of Pakistan has been taken over by Pukhtun tribals, and a sizeable chunk of urban real estate in Peshawar is now owned by wealthier Afridi, while in recent years there has been much migrant labor to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Amirates or UAE, not all of which has worked out happily, as Ahmed has shown in his description of at least two incidents in one of the amirates involving clashes between Pukhtun labor migrants and local Arabs (Ahmed 1988: 181-183). There is thus a permanent necessity for trade, business and a somewhat laissez-faire attitude on the part of the government toward, for instance, contraband and drugs, which are regarded by the Afridi, perhaps unfortunately, as just one more aspect of business in general. Except perhaps for the noticeable beginnings of an erosion of the precepts of *Pukhtunwali*, social change among the Afridi cannot yet be described as galloping, but there has, however, been a considerable increase in economic opportunities. Barring, therefore, a final discussion of the historical evidence for the concepts of *yaghistan* and encapsulation, I will end this section with a descriptive account of what has now become a very traditional Afridi business: the rifle factories at Darra Adam Khayl.

These factories are not only intrinsically interesting, but they date back well into the last century: they are well attested historically certainly from 1890 on, and possibly they may even go back as early as 1860-1870, for the colonial literature is replete with references to them. They are almost entirely owned and operated by the Adam Khayl, and they did not evidently arise in response to any particular urge on the part of the Afridi as *mujahidin* to combat the British. They did so, rather, for the economic reasons just mentioned and also simply because the making of rifles and small arms appealed to Adam Khayl ingenuity. As of the end of 1977, when I visited Darra Adam Khayl (and I employ the past tense here, especially as arms production there both increased and diversified greatly as a result of the Soviet-Afghan War), the Adam Khayl gunsmiths dealt exclusively in small arms and sidearms: rifles, pistols (even including a lethal little model disguised as a ballpoint pen and labeled either 'Made in Etaly' – *sic* – or 'Made in Iran'), shotguns and even Sten guns. They did not, however, manufacture any automatic rifles, for the all-manual tools with which they worked (hammers, chisels, vises, drills, hand-lathes, etc.) were simply not designed to produce them. The production of automatic weapons, even though it may not have been beyond the competence of the Adam Khayl specialists, was clearly beyond their financial resources; and the various parts of each individual weapon were up in the empty lots behind the two to three hundred shops which lined both sides of the main road.

With respect to the division of labor, five or six men were needed to produce a rifle. One man made the wooden stock and provided finishing touches and decorations to the other parts; another made the bolt and trigger units out of crude iron; a third made the sight; and a fourth made the barrel (or body). 'Re-browning', in order to obtain the rich walnut hue of the stock, was then done by a fifth man once the rifle was assembled; but knowledge of how to do this was a trade secret and there were perhaps only five men up and down the whole length of the street who were able to perform the work involved. It took only three or four days to produce a rifle, as all the necessary parts were available in the bazaar, while only one man was needed to produce a pistol or a Sten gun; but here again one of the local experts had to do the 're-browning' job. The shops were generally one-man or at most two-man operations and were by no means necessarily 'family businesses'. Success generally depended on a combination of practice, seniority and experience.

In 1977 a British-style Lee-Enfield (known locally simply as 'Enfield') .303, the standard Darra-made rifle, cost a minimum of Rs. 1200.- (in that year the currency equivalent was Rs. 9.75 per $1 US), although it was the boast of the Darra gunsmiths that they could copy any rifle presented to them. One elderly informant even said that at one point during World War II, at a time when Afridi enrollment in British Indian Army units had fallen off sharply, the Darra factories were supplying small arms to the army during a period of acute shortage (which, if true, is certainly a commentary on free private enterprise and on Afridi industry for the Afridi...). These rifles were, at the time, much in demand at the time, and turnover was quick; but informants either chuckled or groaned when asked the leading question about the extent to which the Darra weapons could compete with standard Pakistani Army issue. In any case, as of July 1980, very early in the Russo-Afghan War, the BBC Overseas Service reported that the whole of the Darra output was being turned over to the *mujahidin*, the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, in their struggle to oust the Soviet invaders of their country. In this same connection, a wonderful remark made to me in October 1977 by a Kuki Khayl Afridi, who also happened to be a retired major in the Pakistan Army, to the effect that 'We are Tribesmen First and Muslims Second' (said while brandishing his own Darra-made pistol) might just possibly, for current purposes, have to be given a priority reversal (Hart 1985: 59-62; 1990: 22-25).

Over the course of the 1980s, however, it seems that a large amount of outside money, from various sources, including the US and the Punjab (which although it is part of Pakistan is still considered 'outside' by Pukhtuns), was poured into the Darra factories, with the result that they expanded their

operations enough to include the manufacture of an imitation Russian-style Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifle, which was also prominently displayed all over the Tribal Agencies, the Frontier and Afghanistan. This of course also reinforced the already existing link with at least some of the various Afghan *mujahidin* groups which was forged at the beginning of the Soviet invasion. Whether this was done directly, or through Afghan refugee organizations in Pakistan, or through any of the seven discrete Afghan resistance groups still headquartered in Peshawar as of 1990, well after the Soviet pullout early in 1989, is not quite clear: it is probably a combination of all three. The whole network then became a multi-stranded and multiplex web of relationships through the additional strong financial link afforded by the drug traffic (principally in heroin, processed locally from the opium in the Tirah and elsewhere), which was epitomized by such shadowy Afridi figures as Wali Khan Kuki Khayl, a local heroin baron who has been in and out of Pakistani jails for the last decade: Anwar makes it clear that he was dealing both with Babrak Karmal and the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Kabul as well as with the Government of Pakistan in Islamabad as of 1985-1986 (Anwar 1989: 221-222). Through these operations alone the Afridi and their rifle factories can be said to have achieved an international reputation. The industrious though relatively sleepy little village that Darra still was in 1977 is now fully on the international map, due to the three new dimensions provided by automatic weapons, the link with the Afghan freedom fighters and the drug trade (verbal information from Akbar S. Ahmed, October 5, 1990).

Yaghistan, Encapsulation and the 'Great Game': A Historical Overview

Such history as has thus far been presented in this account of the Afridi of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has been selective rather than general or chronological, as well as oriented to some extent toward the illustration and elucidation of certain anthropological principles. It therefore behooves us now to fill in some of the historical gaps.

Although the explosion of Islam into the region and its implantation in the Pukhtun highlands between Iran and India may go back well before 1000 CE, if we take into consideration the Pukhtun traditions on the subject, the beginnings of the modern nation-state of Afghanistan only occurred very much later, in 1747. Although it was also traditionally an area through which armies, even as early as that of Alexander the Great, passed on their way to

other locations, Afghanistan did produce its own homegrown empires, of which the Ghaznavid, from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, was the most important, both culturally and from the standpoint of military conquest. After this came a long period of political instability as a result, first, of the Mongol invasions and then of the Timurid ones of the next two centuries, the thirteenth and fourteenth, when local wars put an end to the Silk Route trade, and finally with the beginnings of European navigation to the East in the fifteenth century.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries two Muslim Asian empires, the Safavids of Iran and the Mughals of India, contended for Afghanistan until the last Afghan empire itself rose in the name of the Durrani Pukhtun dynasty under Ahmad Shah Abdali. The Mughal period, it may be noted, was also that which saw the florescence of the greatest of all Pukhtun poets, Khushhal Khan Khattak (1613–1689). Khushhal Khan wielded the sword as skillfully as he did the pen, and his tribute to the fairness of the girls of the Adam Khayl Afridi is matched by his contempt for what he regarded as the superficial Islamic practices of the members of the same tribe. But his hatred for the Mughal emperor Awrangzeb, who had jailed him, was such that he came actively to Afridi aid in Aymal Khan's battle against the Mughal forces on the Loargai Plateau at the top of the Khaybar Pass in 1672 (cf. Howell and Caroe 1963: 6, 19; MacKenzie 1965: 10, 91–92, 102–103, 246; and Martin 1984: 21).

Ahmad Shah Abdali was invested as *amir* in Qandahar in 1747 to the accompaniment of a local *darwish* placing a blade of grass in his turban (Dupree 1980: 333; Barry 1984: 129), a ritual gesture on which we have already commented in connection with the elections for top and local chiefs among the Ait ʿAtta. Dupree, however, disagreed with most of his colleagues with respect to the year 1747 marking the beginning of modern Afghanistan, which in his view did not occur until 1880, for the simple but cogent reason that until the latter year, the process of alternating fission and fusion dominated the Afghan political scene. Here he has transposed what has been generally regarded as a primary characteristic of segmentary lineage societies into the arena of regional and even national politics, and he defined the process as follows (Dupree 1980: xix): 'a charismatic leader arises in a tribal society and, by military power, intrigue and judiciously arranged marriages, unites several tribes into a confederation, which spreads as far as its accumulated power permits, creating an empire, not a nation-state. With, or sometimes before, the death of the emperor, fission occurs, and the empire ... once again segments into a multiplicity of tribal kingdoms. Later, another charismatic leader arises and the process is repeated'.

The lesson, nonetheless, is more that of Ibn Khaldun than of Louis Dupree, for this is but an echo of Ibn Khaldun's three-to-five generation theory of the rise and fall of Muslim dynasties. For in Dupree's view, Ahmad Shah, who now changed his *nisba* from Abdali to Durrani as the first *amir* of Afghanistan, created a Durrani empire and not a nation-state. Even before his death, tribal wars and struggles for personal power within the various branches of the ruling family (especially the Saddozai, 1747-1818, and the Barakzai, 1826-1973) began, and they continued well into the twentieth century. The Amir, as a Pukhtun and as a member of the dominant lineage within the country's dominant ethnic group, was a very much more recent dynastic creation than the Moroccan Sultan. His monarchical status was more a result of rule through right of conquest than through any ascribed status of *sharif*-hood (which he did not have in any case) or through renewals of allegiance through the *bay'a*. This is so because what Afghanistan represents or represented in a *de facto* sense was a subjugation by the Pukhtuns of a loosely tied set of other ethnic minorities which have already been mentioned earlier (Roy 1985[a]: 21-45; 1985[b]: 13-29).

As Dupree also noted, 'fratricidal tribal wars' (1980: xix) – and it would be interesting to trace the extent to which these were actually based on *tarburwali* politics – and the intrusion of European imperialism into the region were hallmarks of nineteenth century Afghanistan. The latter is normally assumed to have begun in 1839 with the beginnings of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842, with a British victory in the first year followed by a major Afghan one in the last). Barry (1984: 133), however, dates it back to 1809, with the arrival at the court in Peshawar, then the winter residence of the Amirs of Kabul (which by 1775-1776 had become the Afghan capital instead of Qandahar), of the British envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone, who later became Governor-General of India and whose *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies* (1815, 2nd Ed. 1972) is still an unparalleled classic of Afghan ethnography. Not long thereafter, however, began the advances of the first Tsarist Russian armies eastward into the territories of the Muslim khanates of Central Asia; and the 'Great Game' – between Tsarist Russia and Imperial Britain, over the point of convergence of their respective colonial empires (in the event, Afghanistan), the first of which began in Moscow and the second in Calcutta and Bombay – was now underway, even though it had yet to be formally designated as such.

There seems little point in delimiting the various stages of the Great Game, as the focus of this book is on tribalism, not on international relations; but some mention of it cannot be avoided, as Afghanistan was the central

pawn and the 'buffer state' (or so conceived by the colonialists) within its orbit. Again, whether the Russian threats to British India which led to both the First and the Second (1878-1881) Anglo-Afghan Wars, the latter beginning with an British victory and ending with double British and Afghan ones, were real or imagined, the land of *yaghistan* was determined, despite its myriad internal *tarburwali* games, to keep out the Christian invader, no matter what his national colors were. This was of course easier said than done, but while the external colonial powers, Russia and Britain, drew Afghanistan's external boundary lines, of which the eastern one, the Durand Line with British India, was that which had the most tangible effect on the Pukhtuns. Amir ʿAbd al-Rahman Khan (1880-1901), the founder and most important ruler of modern Afghanistan (cf. Kakar 1979) spread his influence, if not always his control, over the many ethnic and tribal groupings within the confines of the kingdom. This, a kind of 'internal imperialism' (Dupree 1980: xix), turned in fact into a careful redistribution throughout the country of Pukhtun lineage groups which were potentially hostile to the dynasty, to the cold Turkic flatlands on the Russian border north of the Hindu Kush as well as to the west, to the environs of Herat and points south. These regions were traditionally not Pukhtun ones, and the maneuvering was done precisely in order to keep the Pukhtuns well removed from the center of power in Kabul (N. Tapper, in R. Tapper, Ed., 1983: 233-261).

Kakar notes, furthermore, that prior to ʿAbd al-Rahman's very real efforts at consolidation, the Afghans – and here he means, of course, the Pukhtuns – referred to their area variously as Kabulistan (the area south of the Hindu Kush to the Indus River), Zabulistan (or Khurasan, now eastern Iran, and including the Hindu Kush, Qandahar and Herat) and Turkistan (north of the Hindu Kush and east of Herat: cf. Kakar 1979: xv-xxiv). Apart from his pacification and crushing of the Hazara in 1891-1893 and his conversion to Islam by force of the pagan Kafirs of the Hindu Kush in 1895-1896, with the resultant bestowal of the name of Nuristan, 'land of light', upon their region and of Nuristani upon themselves, his foreign policy, as Barry puts it, consisted both of betraying the Russians who had helped him into power and of allying himself with the British whose departure from his kingdom he had hastened on his accession to the throne. He thereby defended the territorial integrity and the absolute political autonomy of his kingdom and in so doing became the prototypical ruler of *yaghistan* (Barry 1984: 168). This is so because up until his time there is no question but that the tribes, the Pukhtun *qaba'il* of *yaghistan* or *ghayr ʿilaqa*, had dominated the *hukumat*, the government, rather than the other way around. In ʿAbd al-Rahman's case, despite some forty revolts

against him, many of them from disaffected Pukhtun groups such as the Ghilzai of the Qandahar-Ghazni region, the shoe was decidedly on the other foot, and for the first time ever: he is well remembered as one of the harshest rulers in Afghan history.

It is worth examining here the concepts of *yaghistan* and of encapsulation and non-encapsulation rather more closely. As Barry has noted (1984: 98, 166), there is certainly a strong resemblance between the Afghan *hukumat* and the Moroccan *bilad al-makhzan* on the one hand, and the Afghan *yaghistan* and the Moroccan *bilad al-siba* on the other: it is the story of the Plain and the Mountain. But as Tapper has warned us, these are cultural categories which refer to perceptions of particular places at particular times, not objective conditions (Tapper 1983: 51). Even so, in 1880 the British violated one of the cardinal rules of the game: the despot in the plain, no matter how tight his control over a settled and easily reachable peasantry, cannot impose his direct physical rule over the tribal populations in the mountains, for a mountain leader who is too easily at the beck and call of the plains despot is intolerable in *yaghistan*. But ʿAbd al-Rahman in the same year became a ruler subventioned by a foreign power, and thus paradoxically, he was a resistant and a collaborator at the same time, once the despot in the Plain of India had become British. He had to do everything he could to make the occupying power vacate the premises, and in so doing, he was a resistant. But at the same time he became the occupation's privileged spokesman, deemed worthy to receive financial aid from them, and in so doing he became a collaborator.

This contradiction illustrates the fundamental nature of *yaghistan*: it must resist the despot of the plain, but its economic poverty turns it first into that same despot's economic parasite and then into his political parasite as well. Only the merest handful of tribal leaders were able to resolve this dilemma, through finding the means both to resist and to nurture their own power as economic parasites as well without, however, necessarily appearing to be political parasites too strongly committed or allied to the despot (the terminology is taken from Barry 1984: 166). Such regions as these almost never achieved true political independence – and here once again we may look at what has been said earlier about Berber Morocco, or at Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian Kurdistan, which is beyond the scope of this book. They simply remained marginal zones of dissidence. It should be added, even so, that recent studies on Afghanistan have not thrown up any further nuances or extenuating circumstances with respect to the *hukumat-yaghistan* dichotomy, as they have over the *makhzan-siba* controversy in Morocco. This may be due at least in part to the fact that references to it in the British colonial literature are far

less frequent than are those in its French counterpart to *makhzan* and *siba* in Morocco. However, Moroccan-style matters over the relevance of tax payments and of temporal and spiritual allegiance to the ruler notwithstanding, this leads us directly to the closely allied issue of encapsulation versus non-encapsulation. In this connection, even though the question has already been touched upon, some further background information on British administration in the Indian North-West Frontier and its recognition of the problem through the creation of special Tribal Agencies will be helpful.

The question of encapsulation versus non-encapsulation is really that of *hukumat* versus *yaghistan* in a new key and designated by another name. Although Peshawar was under the (at least nominal) control of the Amir of Kabul when Elphinstone first visited it in 1809, by the time the British formally annexed it and the surrounding area to their Indian dominions forty years later, in 1849, it had been for five years under a Sikh overlordship the sole interest of which was in tax collection. The tribal Pukhtuns had not recognized the fact of Sikh control and now, just because this control had changed hands from, in their eyes, heathen infidels to Christian ones, in the shape of the British, they saw no reason for any change in their own views. As noted, between 1853 and 1908 there were no less than eight separate British 'punitive expeditions' sent out against the Afridi, or against different sections of them, alone, and almost certainly just as many against each of the other major tribal groups. If 'pacification' as effected by the French in Berber Morocco had been a very piecemeal process, it was hardly even that as effected by the British on the North-West Frontier: it was more a question of 'containment'. By the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, however, after which the Khaybar Agency was formally inaugurated in 1881, the first such agency to be so, with its Political Agent and its concomitant formal establishment of regular bi-annual *muwajib* allowances for the tribesmen, as well as their right to collect toll fees on all traffic through the Khaybar Pass, plus special *lungi* emoluments for the *malik*-s and, in addition, the setting up of much the same stipulations for the other tribal agencies to be created later, two widely divergent administrative schools of thought had emerged, about the question of tribal control. These were known, respectively, as the Close Border System and the Forward Policy.

The Close Border System, which was in the ascendant from about 1850 to about 1880 and which has also been referred to as a 'period of masterly inactivity', held that the government of British India should not assume responsibility for any area it was unable or unwilling to administer, in the event the western border of the Peshawar and Kohat Divisions inherited from the

Sikhs. Even so, one viceroy, Lord Lawrence (1863-1868), was ready to revert to the Indus River as the natural and cultural boundary that it remains to this day (even though it flows right through the middle of the state of Pakistan), not only between Pukhtuns and Punjabis, but between the Far Middle East, the Far Mashriq, and the Indian Subcontinent. As noted, the Pukhtun tribes might not always be controlled this way but they could be contained.

On the other hand, the Forward Policy, which succeeded the Close Border System initially in vogue, aimed at pushing the international boundary between British India and Afghanistan as far north and as far west as possible – and hence, of course, the designation of a North-West Frontier. Finally in 1890 the British pushed their bases beyond the Close Border through the advances of Col. Sir Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan. The following year an expedition against the Orakzai declared the Samana Ridge overlooking the Miranzai Valley and the Orakzai Tirah as the *de facto* boundary by establishing a picket on it. In 1892 pickets were extended up the Kurram Valley, aided by the Shi'a Turi who faced the prospect of extinction in a *jihad* waged against them by all their Sunni neighbors, while a British Political Agent was placed in charge of the valley and the Kurram Agency was thus the second one to come into being (Spain 1963: 117; Hart 1985: 107).

The next step was Amir 'Abd al-Rahman's reluctant agreement to the demarcation by himself and Sir Mortimer Durand of the famous Durand Line in 1893, which remains the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan to this day. In the middle of the negotiations the Mahsud in South Waziristan attacked and burned the British Boundary Commission Camp at Wana, and episodes of this kind brought the conflict between the Close Border System and the Forward Policy into sharper focus. For the no man's land between the two of them was precisely the area of the new tribal political agencies, of which the Khaybar was the senior one – even though the actual agency headquarters in Peshawar were not built until after the formal inauguration of the North-West Frontier Province, as distinct from the Punjab, in 1901. The Kurram Agency in 1892 was next, while the Malakand Agency and those for North and South Waziristan were set up in 1895-1896. Since the independence of Pakistan, the Mohmand Agency was created in 1951, while in 1973 the Malakand Agency's name was changed to Bajawr and the Orakzai Agency was created.

As Ahmed has observed (1976: 24), these agencies were often set up with little regard or sensitivity for tribal and ethnic affiliations, configurations or boundaries, with the result that tribes which had always been hostile to each other found themselves locked into the same agency. The major case in point

is that of the Wazir and the Mahsud in South Waziristan, for the North Waziristan Agency is populated almost entirely by a great many more additional Wazir. Still worse was the cutting in half of other tribes by the Durand Line, as happened with two Mohmand sections, both chopped in half by the frontier. But the Forward Policy advocates were also keen exponents of the 'Great Game', which although now more restrained, was to continue after the Russian Revolution of 1917 right through the British departure from India and the creation of Independent India and Pakistan in 1947, on through the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 until their 1989 pullout.

The Forward Policy advocates seemed to gain the upper hand until the great tribal uprising of 1897-1898. This was by far the most serious revolt to take place on the Frontier in the whole of the nineteenth century, involving, as it did, more than 60,000 British regular troops just to preserve the fingers of the 'strong right hand' of British power, a hand ready to turn into a fist to smash any Russian advance into India, one it could almost certainly not have contained. The 'bloody stalemate' (Spain 1963: 119-120) of 1897-1898 which engulfed the whole of the Frontier from the Malakand in the north to the Tochi Valley in North Waziristan to the south, and in which the Afridi became embroiled in a most spectacular way, was to usher in Lord Curzon as viceroy (1899-1905) during the High Noon of Empire and to cause a considerable reevaluation of the Forward Policy, which tribal Pukhtuns clearly and rightly saw as an outright invasion of their land, property and homes. This is a crucial point made and commented upon by Davies many years ago (Davies 1932: 86), but no harm is done by repeating it here and by stating that he also places greater weight on the economic grievances of Pukhtun tribesmen than does any other contemporary source (ibid.: 94-97). However, his charge of 'fanaticism' should be reread as *jihad* by the tribesmen in legitimate if localized defense of Islam (Hart 1985: 108-109).

At any rate, the nub of the issue of encapsulation versus non-encapsulation is the continued existence, to this day, of the Tribal Agencies, now known in Pakistan as FATAS, or Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The term 'federal administration' provides a major clue to how and whence the tribal agencies are administered. In British times, and despite their 'no man's land' location just west of the North-West Frontier Province properly speaking, they were not technically administered through the provincial government at all, but directly from New Delhi, and, since Independence and the partition of Pakistan, directly from Islamabad. The tribal agencies themselves are probably quite unique in the world because at least theoretically, their non-encapsulated status and hence their *yaghistan*-like condition and situa-

tion are total. Even during the colonial period their spiritual links to the Amir of Afghanistan in Kabul were at best extremely tenuous, though both sides could invoke them; and since independence they have snapped completely in a *de facto* sense barring only the Afghan attempt to keep them up through activation of the 'Pukhtunistan' issue.

Agency tribesmen also paid no rents or taxes to the British and the same is true today with respect to the Pakistanis. They are subject to no higher political authority than their own government by *jirga* and their own *Pukhtunwali*, and only the presence of the Political Agent linked them tangibly to the rest of British India before 1947 and links them today to the rest of Pakistan. Indeed, the present-day Pakistani administration is almost a complete carbon copy of the colonial British one – which was itself based largely on that of the pre-colonial Mughals (Spear 1990: 13). Nowhere is this more the case than on the Frontier and in the Tribal Agencies with, however, one major difference: the British administration both of the Frontier Province and of the Settled Districts (created after the formal inauguration of the province as such) on the one hand and the Tribal Agencies on the other was very largely military while that of Pakistan today is very largely civilian. This is so despite the presence of a large number of Pukhtun tribals as high-ranking officers, including generals, in the Pakistani Army. Nonetheless, the list of Political Agents engraved on a wooden board on the wall of the Khaybar Agency headquarters in Peshawar gives names and dates for each British Political Agent from 1849 to 1947, and then, without a break except for the announcement of 'Pakistani', the names of all Pakistani *potikal*-s (as they are neologistically called in Pakhtu) since the latter date.

The fact that since 1970 the Pukhtun tribesmen have been 'coming down' to Pakistan in ever-increasing numbers rather than seeing Pakistan 'go up' to them has, of course, been a major feature in the decolonization of the region, added to the fact that unlike the British, the Pakistanis are at least fellow Muslims. In addition, increasing economic opportunities both at home and 'in Pakistan', outside the agencies, have caused the Tribal Agency Pukhtuns to regard Afghanistan's repeated calls, voiced particularly during the premiership (1953-1963) and later presidency (1973-1978) of Muhammad Dawud, for a united transborder 'Pukhtunistan' with considerable misgivings. The whole issue was, however, brought up short by the Communist coup and assassination of Dawud in Kabul in April 1978, and even more so by the Soviet invasion of that country at the end of 1979 (cf. Shahrani and Canfield, Eds., 1984). But that is another story, to be considered shortly. Here we move back to Afghanistan at the turn of the twentieth century.

The combination of British and Russian imperialism managed to block Amir ʿAbd al-Rahman Khan and effectively prevented him from spilling over into India, Iran and Central Asia, and thereby recreating the Afghan empire of his predecessors the early Durranis. The British, with tacit Russian consent if not connivance, controlled Afghan affairs with other countries until 1919, when the Afghans under ʿAbd al-Rahman's grandson King (now with this title rather than that of Amir) Aman Allah gained the right to conduct their foreign affairs as they saw fit and without foreign interference after the Third Anglo-Afghan War. To them the year 1919 is the one in which they really became independent of foreign domination, and the first year free of British interference since 1839. But the aftermath of this very short war led not only to a much more serious tribal conflagration against the British among the Mahsud in South Waziristan from 1919 to 1922 but also to King Aman Allah's overhasty and disastrous attempt to reform and modernize a largely tribal, very largely traditional and extremely recalcitrant Muslim society far too fast and far too soon. He had wanted to emulate the example of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, two countries to the west of him, without realizing what a grievous mistake he was making (for details, cf. Poullada 1973). The result was his hasty abdication and escape in 1929 just before a nine-month bloodbath began under an illiterate Tajik who styled himself Batsha-i-Saqqaw, 'Son of the Water Carrier'. The sobriquet may well have reflected a social reality in this particular individual's case. More importantly, however, it corresponded to an age-old tradition of social mobility in the Middle East in which, at any point, the water carrier may become king (Coon 1962: 296). In this latter day case it happened precisely that way.

But in exactly the same vein, the Son of the Water Carrier was, figuratively, King for a Day. To put it bluntly, the long dominant Pukhtuns were psychologically and empirically unable to tolerate an upstart Tajik on the throne, particularly one who sported a rifle, pistol and cartridge belts, all items regarded by Pukhtuns as being exclusively their own prerogative. So Gen. Muhammad Nazir Khan, of the same Barakzai Durrani section as ex-King Aman Allah and his grandfather Amir ʿAbd al-Rahman, reinvaded Afghanistan from the east, with British connivance and help as well as with a large tribal force mainly of Wazir and Mahsud, though it included some Afridi, as well (Anwar 1989: 23, 255–256). The latter looted all the Kabul shops, and the Son of the Water Carrier was hanged on November 1 of the same year.

Nazir Khan then assumed the kingship of Afghanistan as Nazir Shah, only to be assassinated himself in 1933, when he was succeeded by his son Muhammad Zahir Shah, who ruled for a very long and relatively quiet forty-year

period. During the 1950s his Prime Minister Muhammad Dawud made the mistake of calling in the Soviet Russians to help develop the country after it became apparent that the Americans were not interested in doing so. Dawud, who continued at the same time to push for the creation of a 'Pukhtunistan' embracing both Afghanistan and the Pukhtun and Baluch provinces of Pakistan (and thereby, through Baluchistan, gaining an outlet to the Indian Ocean), was able to depose his king very quietly in 1973 when, without fanfare, he declared the Republic of Afghanistan, with himself as president. Barry, not without some justification, refers to the whole period of 1919-1978 as that of 'false independence' (Barry 1984: 190), of which Dawud, with his wheeling and dealing, is perhaps the best example. He lasted until his murder following the first Communist coup during the so-called 'Saur Revolution' (1978-1979) under Nur Muhammad Taraki in April 1978 (Hart 1985: 135-136). Taraki and his successor Hafiz Allah Amin, who in turn murdered him later the same year, brought in Russian advisors and military personnel in large numbers. Then Amin himself was murdered and his place taken by the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal, as the fullscale Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan began in late December 1979. This in Anwar's view brought the revolution to an abrupt end (Anwar 1989: 198). The invasion provoked a fearful holocaust which was not to end until nearly ten years later, in February 1989, with a pullout of the Soviet army decided upon by a new and rather differently oriented administration in Moscow, after their dismissal of Karmal and installation of another man, a Moscow-trained Pukhtun named Muhammad Najib Allah, in Kabul.

Quite apart from its fearful casualties, the prolonged Soviet-Afghan conflict was responsible for the presence of over three million Afghan refugees, mostly themselves Pukhtuns and mostly Sunni, in Pakistan (for details, cf. Edwards 1990), as well as another million, consisting mostly of Hazara and other assorted Shi'a, in Iran. It also led to the creation, in Peshawar, of no less than seven Afghan *mujahidin* resistance groups – quite apart from the *mujahidin* commanders in the field in Afghanistan (such as Ahmad Shah Mas'ud in the Panjshayr Valley) who bore the brunt of the fighting – whose only real point of agreement among themselves was over the fact that the Russian invaders of their country had to be expelled. Over everything else, including interpretations of Islam, whether mainline Sunni, mainline Shi'a or fundamentalist versions of either through influences from the contemporary Islamic Revolution in Iran, they were all literally at sixes and sevens. Indeed, although he does not mention it by name, Anwar provides virtually conclusive evidence that the *tarburwali* factor is at the bottom of this hopelessly tan-

gled situation. Pukhtun resistance groups, whether big or small (and within Afghanistan the evidence is overwhelming that many of them consist or consisted of only a mere handful of members), simply do not tolerate Tajik or Hazara ones, while equally certain is the fact of total mutual distrust (Anwar 1989: 241-243).

As for the Tribal Agencies on the eastern side of the Durand Line after the Third (and final) Anglo-Afghan War, there is little more to be said. As a result of the British curtailment of the short-lived *Khuda-i-Khidmatgaran* (lit. 'Servants of God') or 'Red Shirt' movement fomented by the Yusufzai ʿAbd al-Ghaffar Khan, a Muslim follower of Gandhi (and one who was to become an active proponent of 'Pukhtunistan' after independence and hence to spend much time languishing in Pakistani jails), in 1927-1930, there were two successive Afridi raids on Peshawar in the latter year. But the biggest trouble that the British ever had on the Frontier was to come from the Faqir of Ipi in North Waziristan, from mid-1936 to early 1939, at which time well over half the entire British Indian Army was garrisoned at the Waziristan fortress of Razmak, where the RAF took an active part in bombing Wazir villages. As it happens, the Faqir also became another exponent of an independent 'Pukhtunistan' and hence after 1947 until his death in 1960 he was almost as much of a headache to the Pakistanis as he had been earlier to the British (cf. Hauner 1981).

Independence and inheritance by Pakistan came quietly enough to the Tribal Agencies in August 1947, without any of the bloodbaths that occurred in the Punjab, the reciprocal massacres of Hindus and Sikhs moving east into India and of Muslims moving west into Pakistan after partition. But only two months later in October came the famous Kashmir *jihad*, in which over 10,000 armed Pukhtun tribesmen, driven to the disputed Kashmir border by truck, participated, as they themselves said, 'independently of Pakistan' (but almost certainly with full Pakistani connivance), until an Indian Army counterattack the next spring, to which Pakistan retaliated by sending its own regular troops to 'relieve' the tribals in mid-April 1948.

Since then Pakistan has had its ups and downs, a fragile state with major centrifugal problems because of ethnic strife, and more often than not run by its army in a virtually perpetual state of martial law; but no matter what the case may be, say, for the Baluch or the Sindhis, the Pukhtuns, generally speaking, have not fared badly and have tended to reject Afghanistan's 'Pukhtunistan' propaganda if only for economic reasons alone. But the current prospect of over three million Afghan refugees, albeit mostly Pukhtun tribesmen themselves with a common language and culture, who are still, in very large part,

Ait ʿAtta. Notable of Ait Yʿazza at Usikis (1965)

physically unable to return to a home currently rent by civil war following the ten-year attempted occupation of the country by the Soviets, indicates in itself that the prospects for the immediate future are not bright ones. The regional drug trade and traffic, almost all of which emanates from Afghanistan as well as from the Pakistan tribal agencies, scarcely helps the image; and neither does the fact that it is the opium poppy which has now become the tribal agency cash crop. At the same time the possession of automatic weapons by all and sundry has not only entrenched existing *tarburwali* values immeasurably, but has provided them with a bigger scope than ever before (Anwar 1989: 243). When in 1985 my old Rifian friend and former assistant, as well as the leading living member of the Imjjat lineage of the Aith Turirth, remarked that present-day Afghans are just like precolonial Rifians, his observation was truer than he realized. Since then, and as of their takeover of Afghanistan in 1997 after three years of combat against the guerilla forces remaining from the civil war which followed that with the Soviets, power in that country has been held by armed Qur'anic students, again mostly Pukhtuns, who call themselves *taliban* and whose religious views are strongly Islamist, and hence fundamentalist. Thus the immediate future there looks black indeed.



The Dawla Jumhuriya Ratiya, the Rifian Republic State of 'Abn al-Krim: mid-1925

Islam, National Sovereignty and the Future of Tribalism in Morocco and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier

Social Change in the Context of Tribal Islam

The Shari'a and the Customary Law in Berber Morocco: Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Krim al-Khattabi

Prior to the Islamic Revival which burst into world consciousness with the advent of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Islam as such or in itself had never been perceived in or by the West as a major agent or force of socio-economic change. Quite the contrary: it was regarded as hidebound and traditionalist, while such change as had happened had been viewed as coming in spite of Islam rather than because of it. That this view was erroneous is now all too clear; and equally erroneous was an allied view, held even by many members of the Western academic community, about the monolithic character of Islam, its impermeability and rigidity. In addition, it could not account for the fact that Islam is not just a religion, or even just a religious system, but a total way of life, one which, everywhere on the globe that it is followed, has an infinite capacity both for adaptability and self-renewal without ever sacrificing an iota of its essential core of dogma, ritual, belief and institutions as expressed through the Qur'an, the *sunna* and the traditions of the Prophet and the Shari'a or canonical law.

But then – and without going into details – this has been the case all along, and well before the Islamic Revival and the 'fundamentalism' that it engendered, probably the clearest and most outstanding example of such self-renewal in modern history, at least, was the reform movement known as Salafiya. It began largely as a reaction to European colonialism in the mid-nineteenth century and which was epitomized by Jalal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) in Iran and by Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905) in Egypt. Salafiya reformism had an impact in one way or another in almost all the Muslim lands of the Middle East. Morocco was by no means unaffected, and after the end of World War I there is little doubt but that the Rifian leader-to-be Muhammad

bin ᶜAbd al-Krim al-Khattabi, from the lowland Aith Waryaghar community of Ajdir in the section of the Aith Yusif w-ᶜAri, had become one of its leading localized exponents (although he may not yet have seen himself as such) as a result of his exposure to its influences in 1903-1906 while pursuing his studies to become a *qadi* at the Qarawiyin University in Fes.

This exposure was to increase quite dramatically during the period 1906-1919, most of which bin ᶜAbd al-Krim spent in the Spanish coastal enclave of Melilla working first in the Arabic news translation section of the local daily newspaper *El Telegrama del Rif*, and then in 1914 moving up into the position of top *qadi* for the Melilla region, which, as a result of the establishment of the northern Spanish tier of the joint Franco-Spanish protectorate over Morocco in 1912, encompassed the whole of the Eastern Rif. But as of 1915 he evidently also began to make political pronouncements in the same paper to the effect that Spain should not extend her domains on the Moroccan mainland past her historic spheres of interest over the coastal *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla. For these mildly nationalistic views he was imprisoned, but after breaking a leg in an attempted jailbreak, he was reinstated two years later, only to take alarm early in 1919 over Spanish actions, at French behest, with respect to an extradition case. He was able to obtain home leave and thus went back to Waryagharland, never again to return to Melilla (cf. Hart 1976[a]: 371-373; 1996[c]).

The foregoing has been sketched in to show not only that bin ᶜAbd al-Krim's formative years and career up to early middle age were very different from those of the great majority of his fellow tribesmen, but also to indicate that he remained friends with the Spanish up until almost the last minute, only reluctantly taking command after the initial and major Rifian victories had been gained over Spain at Ighriben, Dahar Ubarran and Anwal in the summer of 1921. It should also be indicated that in the context of Moroccan nationalism his was to become a unique position, neither fully 'traditional' nor fully 'modern'. This too was largely a result of his Salafiya inclinations: for after 1921, when the *qadi* of Ajdir became a *mujahid*, it was his internal reforms, those which he promulgated and effected upon Rifian society as the result of what was to become in 1925 a two-front war against both Spain and France, which make him a figure of such great interest (Hart 1976[b]). We note herewith the more important of these reforms below.

Between January 18 and February 1, 1923, came bin ᶜAbd al-Krim's promulgation and proclamation of the *Dawla Jumhuriya Rifiya*, the 'Rifian Republican State', the Arabic text of which has been discovered and translated by Pennell (1986: 246-251), who refers to it as a *bayᶜa*, in other words, as

a document worded along the same lines as the continually reiterated oath of allegiance taken by all Moroccans to the Sultan. Some of my own informants disputed the terms *dawla* and *jumhuriya*, substituting *jibha*, 'front', for them, and thereby emphasizing the wartime and emergency character of bin ʿAbd al-Krim's government in resistance. It was a government in which he himself was of course *ra'is* or president, although he is on record as having announced in 1925 at the height of his power that if the Rifians won the war he would step down from office and hand his presidency over to a successor (Hart 1976[a]: 377). This of course was not to happen.

Two things above all, however, are immediately noteworthy: although bin ʿAbd al-Krim rejected the title of Sultan and discouraged his followers from addressing him as *Sidna*, 'Our Lord', a term reserved for the Sultan alone, he set up his own *makhzan* or government on the Moroccan Sultanic model, with his kinsmen and friends from Ajdir and the Aith Waryaghar lowlands as its cabinet of ministers. He placed himself above it and in effect above the Rifian political system as a whole by nominating himself as president both of the new Republican State and of its assembly (or *barlaman*, a neologism for 'parliament), which was little more than a full-scale *agraw* of the *aitharbi'in* under a new name. Although he rejected firmly any claims to the Sultanate, and although informants stressed that prayers were never said in his name, he made no attempt to refute the title, acquired later, of *amir*, by which he was to become known for the rest of his life, especially after his installation in Egypt in 1947, far from the Rif. Although, too, in his later years, he denied emphatically that his was a religious war and referred to its objectives as modern and nationalistic, to the great bulk of the 'faithful', the Rifian, Sinhajan, Ghmaran and Jbalan tribesmen of northern Morocco who fell under his hegemony, the war against two sets of Christians was indeed a religious war and was so proclaimed in the tribal markets. Finally, and irrespective of whether or not bin ʿAbd al-Krim made any claims to the Sultanate (and we are strongly inclined to take him at his word here and to believe that he did not), the presence of a single strong individual, i.e., himself, at the top of a new crystallization of power, even if only on a wartime footing, was absolutely crucial, if he were to shift away from the political patterns of the *Ripublik* by centralizing authority in himself and by placing himself above the system while still remaining an integral and pivotal part of it and while his own Aith Waryaghar remained that system's most favored tribe.

Bin ʿAbd al-Krim's reformism was of course directed primarily toward the wartime objectives at hand, but the point of significance here is that the great majority of his numerous reforms, great and small, lived on after he himself

had departed from the scene of action. The proof of the wartime pudding was to be in the eating during the protectorate and on into independence. It is also highly significant that because he was a *qadi*, many of these reforms were oriented either toward the abolition of *qaʿida*, of Rifian customary law, or, in instances where this was not possible, toward bringing it more into line with the Shariʿa. He refused, first of all, to take personal vengeance on the individual held responsible for poisoning his father, and he followed this up by abolishing the bloodfeud and the vendetta on penalty of death, once the consolidation of his power had been achieved. He then ordered the demolition of all *ishbrawen*, the small loopholed mud-and-stone pillboxes beside almost all Rifian houses which had served their owners as snipers' enclosures during feud. Those who continued to feud in defiance of his decrees were usually executed summarily in the markets by members of his bodyguard (*huffaz*) acting as a firing squad. The same punishment was meted out to all those found guilty of collaborating with or defecting to the Spanish – and these included at least two prominent notables from the Aith Waryaghar section of the Imrabdhen, Sidi ʿAbdssram Bu Rjila and Hammu nj-Hajj ʿAisa, both of whom were stoned to death, as it was deemed to be not worthwhile wasting valuable ammunition on them (Hart 1976[a]: 380-381).

A third major reform effected by bin ʿAbd al-Krim probably as soon as the *Jumhuriya Rifiya* was proclaimed was his decollectivization of oaths (*r-imin* or *dhzaddjith*), which must have been anathema to him as a *qadi*. According to strict Shariʿa regulations, he decreed that only an accused individual could take oath, thereby rendering the latter's agnates as co-jurors redundant at a stroke. This prohibition was to remain so much in effect that younger informants even in the earlier period of my fieldwork in the 1950s had no idea that oaths had ever been collective. This was indeed one subject on which I was able to acquire information only after prolonged and close questioning. In brief, the Rifian oath as exemplified by its Aith Waryaghar modality was rather less well developed and less interesting than that of the Ait ʿAtta. Unlike the ʿAtta oath, the Rifian one was taken on Friday in the congregational mosque just after the noon prayer, and on a copy of the Qur'an: it was never sworn at a shrine. In these respects it was exactly like the Pukhtun oath, as well. There were six co-juriors (the accused and five of his agnates) for minor offenses such as theft of irrigation water or damage to property, while twelve (the accused and eleven agnates) were required for murder. The testimony of witnesses of course overrode any oath of denial sworn by the accused or his co-jurors, while the testimony of a notary (*ʿadl*) or assistant to the *qadi*, for instance, was equivalent to that of six ordinary witnesses. While dire con-

sequences attended anyone who perjured himself at oath, enough has been sketched in here on the Rifian oath to show that its ties with the Shari'a were considerably closer than were the oaths of the Ait 'Atta. The time, place and circumstances of the Rifian oath make this quite clear (Hart 1976[a]: 309-312). The mediation of conflicts by *shurfa'* and/or *imrabdhen* was likewise ruled out, and the 'Parliament' became the surrogate for the tribal councils.

As for the fourth major item, how bin 'Abd al-Krim dealt with the *liff* alliance system,it is quite evident that he viewed the whole phenomenon with as much distaste as he did the feud, the vendetta and the collective oath. But he also saw all four of these, realistically, as inextricably linked to each other. Hence he was certainly not above manipulating factional alliances to suit his own purposes. He assured himself of the support of the Imrabdhen section, from which his mother had come, for instance, by taking his first wife from one of its lineages, even though this support did not prevent him from decreeing the execution of the two treacherous Imrabdhen *imgharen* mentioned above. In creating commands not so much for the picked men of his Regular Rifian Army, but for his far more numerous tribal levies, bin 'Abd al-Krim was careful to award *qa'id*-ships of equal weight to men of tribal sections which had previously been in *liff*-s hostile to each other, such that not only did the Aith Turirth and the Timarzga each have their own *qa'id* in the Aith Waryaghar highlands, for example, but the old *liff* balance, or assumed balance, was maintained as scrupulously as possible not only throughout Waryagharland but throughout all the Central Rifian tribes where the *liff* network held good.

In almost all cases, too, these newly invested *qa'id*-s were merely former *imgharen* by another name, and all of them headed up tribal levies or *harka*-s consisting of their own section members. At the zenith of bin 'Abd al-Krim's power in 1925, there were nearly 60,000 of these *harkawi*-s all told, two-thirds of whom were Rifians (with some 15,000 or more Aith Waryaghar, 6000 Thimsaman, 5000 each from Axt Tuzin and Igzinnayen, and 2000 each from Aith 'Ammarth and Ibuqquyen) and the rest, Sinhaja Srir, Ghmara and Jbala. All of them, the Aith Waryaghar in particular, were seasoned fighters or soon became so under combat conditions, and most served in rotation in the western, eastern and southern fronts of the war, the first two against the Spanish and the last against the French.

But the cream of the crop were the units of the Regular Rifian Army which at maximum strength numbered no more than 3000 men, divided, most probably (as accounts and recollections differ), into five *tabur*-s or 'battalions' of five hundred men each. Each *tabur* was headed by its own *qa'id*

t-tabur, and was in turn subdivided into five subunits or *miya*-s, of one hundred men each, under a *qa'id l-miya*. These were again divided into further subunits of fifty, under a *qa'id l-khamsin*, of twenty-five, under a *qa'id khamsa w-ᶜashrin*, and of twelve, under a *qa'id t-tnaᶜsh*, with the military hierarchy and chain of command based entirely on that of the Moroccan *makhzan*, as was bin ᶜAbd al-Krim's whole governmental model. The first three *tabur*-s were entirely Rifian in composition, but the fourth and fifth were mixed, and the last mentioned consisted largely of machine-gunners. The insignia and stripes worn by the *qa'id*-s were of the same colors as those of the 'Rifian Republican' flag, which consisted of a white diamond in the center of a red background, with a green crescent moon below a six-pointed star of matching green inside the diamond. Finally, bin ᶜAbd al-Krim's personal bodyguard or *huffaz* consisted of fifty regular soldiers, all Aith Waryaghar, under a *qa'id l-khamsin*. It was stationed permanently in Ajdir, where his headquarters and one of his three prisons were located, the other two being at Aith Qamra, also in the Aith Waryaghar lowlands, and at Thamasind, in the exact center of the tribal territory.

It should also be noted that the establishment of prisons was another of bin ᶜAbd al-Krim's major innovations, for they had never before existed in the Rif (cf. Hart 1976[a]: 383-388). Much was made at the time of his ill-treatment of his Spanish prisoners at Aith Qamra and Ajdir, but some of this was certainly overblown, and the treatment accorded to Rifian or Jbala prisoners in the Thamasind jail, such as the famous *sharif* and ex-bandit Mawlay Ahmad al-Raysuni of the Bni ᶜArus, who had defected from or were unsympathetic to his cause, was far worse, as most of them were simply starved to death (ibid.: 391-393; also Hart 1987: 20-24).

Bin ᶜAbd al-Krim was out for a fullscale Arabization and Islamization both of the Rifian political system and of Rifian customary law. He stressed the importance of the legal system of Maliki Islam and sent other *qadi*-s, who had previously been scarce in the region, to administer the Shariᶜa in virtually every tribal market, each *qadi* having also his normal working complement of two *ᶜadul* or notaries public. Offenses and sanctions heretofore dealt with by the *imgharen* at the tribal or sectional *agraw* of the *aitharbiᶜin* were now either assimilated by the *makhzan* of bin ᶜAbd al-Krim, *r-hkam n-bin ᶜAbd r-Krim*, or by the Shariᶜa, such that by mid-1926 and the effective occupation of the Rif by Spain, the *qaᶜida* or *ᶜurf* of the region, its customary law, had to all intents and purposes become a dead letter. This situation stood in marked contrast to that prevailing in the Berber-speaking areas in central and southern Morocco, where the French were very careful to preserve custom under glass except in

matters of penal law which were decided by their own courts. The point is simply that because of the reforms of bin ʿAbd al-Krim, the famous 'Berber Dahir' promulgated by the French in 1930 in their own zone could not be made to apply in the Spanish one, much as many of the Spanish *interventores militares* in the Rif might have wanted it.

Bin ʿAbd al-Krim's reforms did not stop here. To the contrary, they reached down, in one way or another, to touch almost every Rifian social institution and almost every phase of social and ritual life. He made it absolutely mandatory for everyone to pray the required five times per day, which was definitely something new to at least some Rifian tribes: Aith ʿAmmarth informants admitted that before his time men hardly ever prayed, and women never. The Aith Waryaghar tend to be too self-righteous ever to make any such admission, but as any reformer must set his own house in order before trying to do the same for others, it is certain that bin ʿAbd al-Krim saw to it that the injunction was carried out with particular rigor in his own tribe. Any man who missed even one of the daily prayers, for instance, had to serve from fifteen to twenty days in a *harka* on the front. He also ordered women to pray, and any woman who did not comply was fined a chicken, while the *tulba* in the mosques were likewise ordered to attend strictly to their Qur'anic studies and to instruct the boys of the community in the Holy Book.

Reluctance on the part of anyone to pay small fines for theft of fruits or vegetables (as stipulated in a *qanun* of June-July 1925 from the Igzinnayen, when bin ʿAbd al-Krim was at the height of his power) was punishable by a week in jail in addition to the payment of the fine in question; and the same applied should a man's animals eat the leaves of trees belonging to his neighbors. Men were made to cut off their tribal scalp-locks, while the traditional marriage ceremony was also cut from seven to three days, and a prohibition was now placed on singing and dancing by all married women, widows or divorcees. Men were forbidden to go barefoot and had to wear sandals or slippers and to trim their beards; it was forbidden to chant the Muslim profession of faith, *La ilaha illa' (A)llah*, in the trenches, as the mosque was the proper place for this; and the smoking of *kif* (*cannabis sativa*), which affected the Jbala and the Ghmara far more than it did the Rifians, was heavily fined (Hart 1976[a]: 390-391); 1996[c]).

Bin ʿAbd al-Krim's treatment of his ultimately unsuccessful Jbalan rival Raysuni, whom his troops captured at the latter's home in the Bni ʿArus late in 1924 and who died in his jail in Thamasind on April 3 of the following year, affords us an example of his attitudes toward *shurfa'*, *mrabtin* and especially

religious orders (*turuq*, sing. *tariqa*), all of which, the last-mentioned in particular, he viewed with the deepest distrust. Bin ʿAbd al-Krim was a deeply pious and devout Muslim, but he made no secret of the fact that the orders were anathema to him. Membership in orders has in any case never been very strong in the Rif, but at the time of our fieldwork in the 1950s, a fairly significant minority of middle-aged to elderly men were affiliated either with the Darqawa or the ʿAliwa, the first of which came into prominence in Morocco in the nineteenth century, while the second arose early in the twentieth in western Algeria, whence Rifian labor migrants brought it back. (In other parts of Morocco, including the Jbala and the Ghmara, order membership is much more widespread, although among the Ait ʿAtta the orders count for even less than they do in the Rif.) But bin ʿAbd al-Krim was able to harness their support (particularly after threatening to strangle adepts by their own rosaries in the markets if they disobeyed him), while all religious tithes were directed toward the war effort and were paid into his coffers at Ajdir.

It seems that bin ʿAbd al-Krim even appropriated the proceeds from *habus* or endowed property belonging to the mosques for government expenditure, an act heretofore unheard of. The original basis of his treasury was the ransom money obtained from Spain early in 1923 for the release of the Spanish prisoners whom he had captured during his initial victories in 1921. Nonetheless, he was able to augment this with the proceeds of the *tartib* tax on property and on livestock and with heavy *haqq* fines levied on fractious tribes. This was especially the case in the Jbala, where the l-Khmas revolted against him in 1924 and were severely punished for so doing, and where the Bni Zarwal dragged their feet over following his summons in 1925, shortly after he committed his most fundamental error by invading the French zone in mid-April of that year, after the death of Raysuni. This brought about his defeat by combined Franco-Spanish forces and his surrender to the French just over a year later, on May 27, 1926. But his lasting achievement was a real transformation of Rifian society through the Arabization of that society's political system and through the thoroughgoing substitution of the Shariʿa for its *qaʿida*, its customary law, as a result of this socio-legal overhaul (Hart 1976[a]: 393-394, 401; 1996[c]).

Bin ʿAbd al-Krim's subsequent career and later years are not without interest, as he spent two decades in a French prison on Reunion Island, near Madagascar, then jumped ship in June 1947 in Egypt, where he became an elder statesman to younger Moroccan and North African nationalists until his death in Cairo in February 1963 (ibid.: 420-423). But they have little to do directly with the Rif itself, where his wartime reforms of 1922-1926 lasted

through the Spanish protectorate period and on through Moroccan independence in 1956. He evidently did not attempt, however, to put a stop to the annual pilgrimage (Ar. *ʿamara*, Rif. *r-ʿamarth*, and known elsewhere in Morocco as *musim*) by the Aith Waryaghar and some of their neighbors to the shrine of their patron saint Sidi Bu Khiyar (who was, perhaps significantly, not one of the local Imrabdhen at all but a stranger, probably from Algeria, who left no descendants) on top of the highest peak in the Jbil Hmam, the Adhrar n-Sidi Bu Khiyar, which at 1944 meters bears his name, near the Timarzga community of Bu Maʿdan on the day before the Muslim feast of the ʿAyd al-Kabir. However, although attendance at the shrine in question was impressive in 1955 (for details, cf. ibid.: 194-197), it evidently began to fall off quite sharply after independence. By this point, if we invoke Gellner's model and typology (Gellner 1969: 5-12), Islam in the Rif was becoming noticeably more a matter of the Book than of the Shrine. This major shift in emphasis was due in large part to Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Krim al-Khattabi, the Rifian reformer.

The Shariʿa and the Future of Customary Law in Berber Morocco: ʿAssu u-Ba Salam and the Ait ʿAtta

Nobody remotely comparable to Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Krim al-Khattabi was to rise up among the Ait ʿAtta or elsewhere in Berber Morocco, and still less so among the Afridi of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier. Resistance to colonialism in both these regions was prolonged and violent, and it was certainly enjoined in the name of Islam; but its leaders were cast in a considerably more traditionalist mold. Even bin ʿAbd al-Krim himself can be viewed as conforming to political traditions, despite his religious reformism, while ʿAssu u-Ba Slam of the Ait ʿAtta personified conservative Muslim tribal resistance in all senses of the word. Indeed, the biggest single point of divergence between bin ʿAbd al-Krim and ʿAssu u-Ba Slam, both of whom in other respects had resistance records that were beyond reproach, was in their attitudes toward customary law: bin ʿAbd al-Krim, as we have seen, wanted it to be swallowed up completely by the Shariʿa, not merely to exist as a complement to the latter, while ʿAssu u-Ba Slam was vociferously in favor, with respect to the Ait ʿAtta, of its total and integral retention (cf. Hart 1996[c]).

At ʿAssu u-Ba Slam's negotiations for surrender to the French once he had lost the epic Battle of Bu Gafr to them by mid-March 1933, in his own view because the Ait ʿAtta themselves were hopelessly divided by this time and

many of them were already fighting on the French side (for details, cf. Hart 1977; 1984[a]: 175-185), he imposed three conditions, which were all accepted. The first was that Ait ʿAtta customary law be integrally upheld, the second was that the Glawi's authority would never extend to ʿAttaland, and the third, surprisingly, was that there be no singing and dancing by Ait ʿAtta women at marriage ceremonies, or at least at those in the Saghru where his mandate held sway. In this last stipulation we may possibly discern shades of bin ʿAbd al-Krim. However, although the great majority of Ait ʿAtta keep any affiliation with religious orders at arm's length, ʿAssu u-Ba Slam was himself to become a member of the Darqawa order, which is very strait-laced and traditionally frowns on music and dancing.

ʿAssu u-Ba Slam's piety and devotion were in fact to lead him, much later and just after independence in 1956, to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and become Hajj ʿAssu in that same year; and he passed his Darqawi rosary on to his son Qa'id ʿAli on his death in August 1960. ʿAssu u-Ba Slam was also one of very few Ait ʿAtta known to me who have made the *hajj*, for to most of them as well as to other Central Atlas Imazighen groups the Prophet Muhammad is held to be buried not in al-Madina in Arabia but on Mt. Azurki. Hence they aver that the pilgrimage should be made there instead of Mecca at the time of the ʿAyd al-Kabir in the final month of the Muslim lunar year. The local legend in support of this belief is not without interest: for reasons which will no doubt forever remain obscure, it asks us to believe that the Prophet died in the territory of the Ait Bu Gimmaz and that his body was then transported by a white she-camel to the grave which had already been prepared by magical means on the cliff-face of the Awujja n-Uzurki. But as they arrived at the site, the tribesmen accompanying the camel started yelling to shoo away a flock of birds which had descended at the spot to eat grain. The she-camel took fright at the noise and thought that if they were not going to leave the Prophet's body here, she had best take it off to a faraway place where people would pay large sums of money to see it. So she took it to the Hijaz in Arabia, while Mt. Azurki in the Central Atlas, a near miss for the candidacy of the Prophet's shrine, became fused with al-Madina in the popular mind. It has therefore itself become a place of pilgrimage on the day of the ʿArafa, the day when the pilgrims at Mecca sacrifice the rams they have purchased in commemoration, as Muslim tradition runs, of Abraham's intended sacrifice of his son Ishmael when God sent down a ram in the latter's stead. This sacrifice is the pivotal act in the whole ritual of the *hajj*; and it is also the pivotal act at Azurki, where members of all the Berber tribes in the region congregate from miles around (Hart 1984[a]: 102-103).

Right after his surrender to the French ᶜAssu u-Ba Slam was made a member of the Ait ᶜAtta Customary Tribunal at Igharm Amazdar and then in February 1939 he became acting *qa'id* of the Ait ᶜAtta of the Saghru, a position he was to hold until his death. Pious and devout as he was, he had no time for the application of the Shariᶜa in ᶜAttaland, or more precisely, he had no time for those facets of it which were not patently in harmony with ᶜAtta Custom. After independence and the rescinding of the 'Berber Dahir', the customary law decree which had held sway throughout the protectorate, he was to oppose the Qur'anic notion of witnesses, one that he held the Ait ᶜAtta would never understand: if, for instance, anyone has the intention of robbing a house or having illicit sexual intercourse, he naturally does so alone – so where would witnesses be available? After the last French A. I. officer left the Saghru with his family (personally escorted to Warzazat and Marrakesh by ᶜAssu u-Ba Slam before any Moroccan Army of Liberation units should appear), he took this issue up to the highest levels at the Ministry of Justice in Rabat, as he did with the decollectivization of oaths, another matter with which he was in strenuous disagreement; but he never obtained satisfaction.

Customary law gradually became a near-dead letter, although under Hajj ᶜAssu's son Qa'id ᶜAli, who assumed his father's command in the Saghru in 1961 and held it until his retirement in 1974, it retained a longer life there than elsewhere in ᶜAttaland (Hart 1984[a]: 187-194; also 1977). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that since 1985-1986 and the activation at that time of local counsellors of customary law in 'bureaux' all over the country with their own links back to the Ministry of Interior in Rabat, local men who understand local problems and who are independent of the *qa'id*-al administrative network, the *qaᶜida* or *izirf* at the local sectional or tribal level is now beginning to make a comeback, albeit in a low key.

ᶜAssu u-Ba Slam also made certain that the links of the Ait ᶜAtta to the saints or *igurramen* of the Ait/Awlad Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn, both locally in the Saghru and at Tamsluht, near Marrakesh, where Mawlay ᶜAbdallah's shrine is located, were integrally maintained and reinforced, as did his son Qa'id ᶜAli, who in 1964 recalled to me his father's observation that the Ait ᶜAtta without their customary law to guide them are in a deep dark fog. Indeed, Qa'id ᶜAli kept expressing this point of view until his death in March 1992. To this day the Ait ᶜAtta insist on sending their annual *ziyara* offerings to the shrine and the descendants of Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn at Tamsluht every year in February or March (and in 1966 I recorded that this included the sum of DH. 4150.-, or about $830 at the time, and another white she-camel from the Ait Unibgi). They are emphatic about not doing so at the time of

Mawlay ᶜAbdallah's annual *musim* cin September, which they also make a point of not attending. In this way they emphasize their own special relationship to him and to his descendants (Hart 1984[a]: 105-106) by indicating that it is both temporally and, in part, physically separate and apart from whatever relationship the members of the main Tamsluht lodge (and not their brethren in the Saghru) may also have or claim with any nearby or surrounding local tribes, or with townsmen from Marrakesh. The mediating role of the Ait Mawlay ᶜAbdallah bin Hsayn in the socio-political life of the Ait ᶜAtta may be drastically curtailed today, but the link between them is still respected and is by no means dead.

We have already noted common tribal attitudes to 'muscular Islam' in the last chapter, attitudes as applicable to Moroccan Berbers as they are to Pakistani Pukhtuns. Neither the nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s nor the Islamic revival and fundamentalism which came to the fore in Iran in 1978-1979 seems to have made much visual impact in and of these tribal areas. Tribesmen make poor nationalists and palpably poorer fundamentalists. Their reactions to Islam are secular and lay reactions, ones of instinctive defense of their faith. It is a defense based more on cultural inculcation and respect than on intellect or understanding, a defense which invokes the notion of *jihad*, the effort and self-striving which may result in holy war should Islam be perceived as threatened, although it is also a defense which is by no means necessarily beclouded by fanaticism. The reactions in question are, in short, those of the fighter, whether he be the Afridi with the Darra-made Enfield .303 which was, until its recent replacement by the automatic rifle, such an integral part of the Khaybar landscape, the w-ᶜAtta transhumant with his curved dagger (*tuzzalt*) or even the dhu-Waryaghar plowman or goatherder with his billhook (*hadida*): for in Morocco today the flintlock is used exclusively for powder plays (*laᶜb l-barud*), generally enacted on horseback. Nonetheless, even rudimentary weapons such as these symbolize historically important cross-cultural similarities, as well as traits and institutions held in common, between Muslim tribesmen located at opposite ends of the Middle Eastern landmass.

Social Change in Independent Morocco

It is a matter of record that the *jamaᶜa* or tribal assembly or council under the French protectorate in Morocco became a pale imitation of what it had been in precolonial times, and its powers, particularly those relating to the penal

aspects of both customary law and of the Shari^{c}a, were truncated accordingly, once the French and Spanish administrations established the major tribal markets all over the country as direct points of tribal control. They became *Bureaux des Affaires Indigènes* in the first instance and *Intervenciones Militares* in the second. The market site, which in precolonial times was completely empty on non-market days, now developed not only a cluster of permanent shops around the market place but also buildings just off it to house the tribunals, or *mahkama*-s, of both the *qa'id* and the *qadi*, who were kept administratively distinct from each other as tribal leader and tribal judge. Overlooking all was the *Affaires Indigènes* post, filled by a French Army captain in Berber-speaking areas, or that of the *controleur civil*, filled by a civilian administrator, in Arabophone ones, or, in the Spanish zone, that of the *intervencion*, with the *interventor* in almost all cases himself a Spanish army captain: for in the Spanish zone tribal administration was almost entirely in military hands while in the French one this was the case only for Berber regions which had been 'pacified' forcibly and late and were hence held to fall into a 'zone of insecurity'.

It was this administrative infrastructure that a newly independent Morocco inherited in 1956, by which time many onetime tribal markets had become upgraded to the status of rural centers and in a few cases even small towns (cf. *Douars et Centres Ruraux*, in *Revue de Géographie du Maroc*, 8, 1965). Some of the infrastructure in question was retained, but the ideology behind it was discarded when almost the first thing that happened after independence was the rescinding of the Berber Dahir of 1930 (for this whole phenomenon and its various repercussions over much of the rest of the century, cf. Hart 1997[b]). The title of *qa'id* was still retained in the tribal areas, but the young man who now held the position was a Moroccan government employee from the Ministry of Interior in Rabat, just as the *qadi* was now an employee of the Ministry of Justice. Separation of powers on the French model became highly desirable. Aside from being, as a rule, not local to the tribe itself, the new *qa'id* took over the job of tribal administrator which the last French or Spanish army captain or civil controller at the post had held before him, once the transfer of power had been effected. Thus the highest purely local official now, in this new single-stranded chain of command, was the *shaykh*, who had in protectorate times been subordinate to the *qa'id* and who had been in charge, under him, of a specific tribal section – whether *taqbilt*, *tulut*, *rba*^{c} or *khums*.

This was one important administrative change. The next was the creation and implementation by the Ministry of Interior in 1960, after national unification by 1958 had finally joined the large southern ex-French zone with the much smaller northern and far southern ex-Spanish zones and the tiny ex-

international zone of Tangier, of some 800 rural communes (sing. *jamaʿat al-qarawiya*). The territorial boundaries of these communes corresponded as closely as possible – or, indeed, were identical – to those of the maximal sections (or 'fractions') within the tribes, just as did those of the tribes themselves within the administrative *cercles* or *comarcas* that had been established in the French and Spanish zones, respectively, during the protectorate (for full details, cf. Ashford 1961: 355-362, and 1967: 23-59; Ben Bachir 1969: 147-178; and Cherifi 1988: 60-68). Despite this territorial congruence, however, King Muhammad V, in a 1958 proclamation, had specifically dissociated the new communes administratively from the old tribal structures, which he decreed would no longer form a viable base for economic, social and political development (Ashford 1961: 357-358; Ben Bachir 1969: 149-150). The decision to activate the communes, evidently based to some extent on the revision and expansion of an earlier French-promoted *zahir* of 1951 (Ashford 1961: 355-356), has held good throughout the whole subsequent period of independence, even though at a higher administrative level the original eighteen provinces created as of 1958 had, by the late 1980s and because of population growth, considerably more than doubled to thirty-nine (Cherifi 1988: table, 103-104). As it happens, too, the commune structure had been set up just in time to coincide with the first post-independence communal elections and national census undertaken in May 1960.

As for the organization of the communes, Ben Bachir (1969: 150-151), for example, makes perhaps too much of the fact that the new commune was not to be confused with the former tribal section. What this amounts to is that territorially they are the same but in terms of administrative personnel they are not. Hence despite the fact that the *shaykh* who still heads that section – which has administratively as a commune become part of the *qiyada* or district under the responsibility of the *qa'id* – and the *mqaddimin* (sing. *mqaddim*), who still act as the headmen of the *duwwar*-s, the villages or local communities within that section – are all very much local men, they are nonetheless ineligible to hold elected office as members of the *majlis al-qarawiya* or rural commune council (who, along with their president, are also of course local men) if they are still holding down their present jobs or have done so within six months of the election (ibid.: 155). So far, so good; and it should by now be obvious that the communal council is a purely local body which meets once a week on market day to discuss purely local problems and to initiate those purely local projects (mostly connected with development of agriculture, irrigation or the like, as well as construction or repair of public buildings, such as mosques) which fall within its competence.

But in the three and one-half decades since independence, the communes have, in general, accomplished remarkably little. They have almost no power and their budgets are kept very low; but there are other factors involved as well. The principal of these has been, of course, the greatly increased centralization of power in the person of the king and in the institution of the monarchy, which, although it was labeled as 'constitutional' both in the first Moroccan constitution promulgated by King Hasan II late in 1962 – a year and a half after he succeeded his father King Muhammad V to the throne on the latter's sudden death early in 1961 – as well as in its successor constitution of 1972 – was in fact no such thing. It was absolute, and it has, if anything, become more so with time, while its wording in this respect is camouflage. An added testimony to this fact is that the efficacy of the multi-party system, which had been such a prominent feature of the Moroccan political scene in the immediate post-independence years, became steadily eroded by the time of the first of three attempted and unsuccessful military *coups d'état* in 1971: for the power remained in the hands of the palace.

Nonetheless, some lip service was paid to decentralization in the rural, and now no longer tribal, areas when in 1976 the base of the communes was broadened through a resuscitation of the now transformed *jmaᶜa* assemblies and of what Cherifi refers to as 'traditional collectivities' (1988: 63-64), with a certain increment of power awarded retroactively, so to speak, to the president of the council, and again in 1986 through the creation of a special communal fund for rural development (ibid.: 65-66). The 1985-1986 period also saw the activation of a new official in the communal structure, one who also depended on the Ministry of Interior, but directly so, and not sharing any links with *qa'id*-s of posts, super-*qa'id*-s (Ar. *qa'id al-mumtaz*) of circles or provincial governors. This man was a special communal counsellor chosen for his knowledge of the local scene to act not as a *qadi* of the Shariᶜa but as a *qadi* of customary law on a limited scale, *l-qadi n-l-qaᶜida* or *l-qadi n-izirf*, in order to apply the customary law of the locality to specific local problems. The need for such a local specialist, particularly in Berber-speaking regions, had become acute, and his installation has, by and large, proven very successful for the same reasons. Although collective oath, for example, has not been reinstated and is most unlikely to be, least of all among the Ait ᶜAtta, these local *de facto qadi*-s of customary law, through their proven ability to settle many trouble cases out of court, have evidently been able to reduce considerably the workload of the higher-level *qadi*-s of Islamic Law (who depend on the Ministry of Justice, not that of Interior). In this fact we find, once again, that the 'Little Tradition' of Islam continues to reinforce its 'Great Tradition'.

Moroccans seem to enjoy litigation in any case, and the presence of customary law specialists has certainly reduced its costs.

One partial result of this, although it has other roots as well, is that Moroccans, by and large, as of the late 1980s were beginning to admit far more openly to their Berber origins than they had ever done in the past. By the late 1990s this had accelerated very considerably, with the appointment of a sympathetic Minister of Interior, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusufi. 'Berber' is no longer quite the term of opprobrium or the dirty name that it had become in the immediate post-independence years as a result of previous French protectoral favoritism, because for at least the first two decades after independence, the Berber, whether Amazigh, Ashilhi/Asusi or Arifi, had become, so to speak, Morocco's Forgotten Man, with cultural and linguistic recognition accorded to him only in 'folklorique' festivals and the like. His ability as a fighter, however, had never been in any doubt, and it can be said that up until its massive reshuffling and restructuring following the two unsuccessful military coups of 1971 and 1972, the Royal Moroccan Army (FAR, or *Forces Armees Royales*) was largely a 'Berber club', and certainly so insofar as its officer material was concerned. Although it must be reiterated that neither Morocco nor the Maghrib in general has ever had a 'Berberistan problem' in the same way or to the same extent or degree that 'Kurdistan' and 'Pukhtunistan' problems have long been present as political realities in the Eastern Mashriq, I shall now consider some of the above points from a political perspective.

Although the rural commune system and its objectives of rendering tribal loyalties obsolete by focusing on territorial ones have already been commented upon, it still behooves us to see how it fared in different parts of the country. At best its success was only moderate, greatest perhaps in the Atlantic coastal plains, very slight in the Rif, and least of all in the Central Atlas, where Berber speech and many Berber values still obtain in force, even though tribal ties there too have now been reduced to a largely sentimental level, and even though collective oath has gone and customary law has lost most of its teeth. Nonetheless, these same Berbers were very pleased about the wells, springs and irrigation-improvement schemes which the communes began to generate in earnest as of 1964. When I revisited the Ait 'Atta of Usikis, over twenty years later, in 1986, they showed me with pride how well their homegrown potatoes and apples had been doing as cash crops all over southern Morocco, as the result of a project begun some six years earlier by an energetic and forward-looking *qa'id*.

Although the tribal revolts in the first four years after independence have already been discussed in Chapter II, the first major national-level eruption

did not come until the first coup d'etat, sanguinary but unsuccessful, by the army against King Hasan II at his forty-second birthday celebration at Skhirat in July 1971, in what was immediately dubbed 'the garden-party *putsch*' by the media. Ineptly carried out by army cadets from Ahermumu, most of the top-ranking generals in the army were privy to the plot, and no less than ten of them were publicly executed immediately afterward (for full details, cf. Waterbury 1973). The second attempted coup was staged by the air force just over a year later, when rebel pilots supposedly acting as escorts attacked the king's plane in August 1972 as it was about to land in Rabat on a return trip from Paris; and it resulted in the death of Gen. Muhammad Ufqir (Oufkir), the then Minister of Interior, who had been strongly implicated both in this coup as in the preceding one. The rebellious pilots were also executed early the following year, 1973, not long before the third attempt took place. This time civilian personnel were implicated as well as military ones, and at the time of writing (February 1991) almost all of them are still in jail (Perrault 1990). King Hasan's confidence in the army as the major bulwark and support behind the throne had become, at the very least, severely shaken.

But the king, whose staying power was as remarkable as his ability to outguess and outmaneuver his opposition, was firmly in the driver's seat again once this series of attempted coups was over. His power, popularity and charisma, furthermore, were greatly enhanced by his preemption of the issue of national recuperation of the Western (then Spanish) Sahara from the opposition, and by his planning and inauguration of the 'Green March' (*masirat al-khadra*) of 350,000 Moroccans from all over the country to the very edge of the disputed Saharan territory in October-November 1975. Although Ait ʿAtta support for the monarchy, for instance, continues steadfastly, as it does in many if not most rural areas of the country except for the Rif (for the Aith Waryaghar, after their uprising was crushed early in 1959, managed to achieve something of a negative political record in terms of abstention from elections of any sort for virtually the next two decades), the fourteen-year West Saharan war which ensued from the end of January 1976, when Spain evacuated the territory, until November 1989, between Morocco and the so-called Polisario Front (*Frente Popular para la Liberacion del Sahara Espanol y Rio de Oro*) certainly took its toll, for the war long appeared to be unwinnable. The eventual Moroccan victory came about mainly through a series of adroit political maneuvers and waning Algerian support for the Polisario than through any military victory, despite the impressive containment wall which the Moroccans built in the 1980s (with US advice and Saudi Arabian and US financial assistance) all over the territory.

In launching his country into this campaign, King Hasan played the card of irredentism very adroitly: if there are troubles at home – and in the Moroccan case, these were manifold, amounting to widespread underdevelopment and poverty, as well as serious dislocations at a number of different levels –, the idea is to keep them covered up by focusing the national attention on a big external venture abroad. This is precisely what the Western Sahara conflict proved to be, despite the fact that as of 1989 the region had unquestionably become a *de facto* part of the kingdom: for Morocco's historical claims to the Western Sahara seem, if not airtight, to be very much better than those of any other contender. This includes, ironically, even the claims of the local Sahrawa, and notably the Rgaybat, a large tribe of Arabic-speaking former camel nomads who came out most strongly against Morocco. They provided the Polisario with its main shock troops and having now lost the struggle militarily, many of them are currently languishing in refugee camps at Tinduf and other points just inside Algeria, even though they may not have given up all hope of a comeback.

I say 'former nomads' here advisedly because between 1972 and 1977 herds of livestock of all kinds, camels not excepted, were terribly decimated by drought over the whole of the Sahara and its southern savannah fringe the Sahil, a decimation which reached the point of forcing onetime nomadic encampments to move into new clusters of nomad shantytowns on the edges of the very few embryonic urban centers which the colonial presence had bequeathed to the region. This same drought as well as a later one in 1983-1985 also affected southern Morocco: indeed, we learned in March 1986 that in the previous year, certain Ait ʿAtta groups from the southern slope of the Central Atlas and from the Saghru were forced to go on transhumance as far away as the Sus Valley, to Awluz and Tarudant, a good 400 kilometers to the west-southwest of their normal pasturage routes, precisely because of this same drought which had deprived their sheep of grass at home in their winter quarters. They had, furthermore, to make this untoward and unprecedented move some two months prior to their normal and traditional move to summer pastures at the Agudal n-Tlmast near the Tizi n-Ilisi Pass in the Central Atlas, the very point where the annual inter-Ait Bu Iknifen brawl takes place, because there was, equally, not enough grass for their sheep along their regular route. Finally, there were quarrels between the local Swasa peasants in the valley and the encroaching Ait ʿAtta shepherds over the fact that the latters' sheep had strayed to graze in large numbers into agricultural land. In one such quarrel two peasants were killed before the Ait ʿAtta finally departed for their summer grazing grounds at Talmast, where at least pasturage was sure. Hence

grave dislocations in the economic base of livelihood of any transhumant or nomadic group can result in radical changes or alterations in the annual moves made by the group in question, from a total and enforced switch in locality to complete sedentarization through economic penury.

It may well be asked at this point how tribalism, or its vestiges, fits into the changing world and perspectives of modern Morocco. In one sense, certainly, it no longer does so at all, because it can now effectively as well as officially be labeled as 'historical', simply because it has ceased to exist as such. It has now in fact moved one or two rungs up the ladder to become regionalism instead, while the once effective agnatic lineage has turned into a mere collection of related nuclear families. Regionalism is, indeed, a considerably bigger issue in Morocco today than ethnicity is, although members of the three major Berber language groups still tend, and strongly so, to see themselves as somewhat apart both from each other and from the rest of the country.

Another major factor in the development of Morocco as a whole since 1970 has of course been that of labor migration to the countries of the European Economic Community (particularly to France, Belgium and the Netherlands), sparkplugged, of course, by the Rifians, whose own previous extra-Moroccan experience of working for French farmers in colonial Algeria goes back to the mid-nineteenth century. There is hardly a family anywhere in the Rif today which does not have at least one member working in Europe, and many, even the majority, have more than one man to send home remittances. Rifian workers have come back from France and Holland to invest in agricultural enterprises in northern Morocco, often outside their home territory, or in urban real estate in Tetuan and Tangier, while traditional agriculture at home has fallen off so much as to have gone almost completely by the board. On the other hand, some Central Atlas Imazighen workers seem to have developed a penchant for mining and metallurgy, probably from having worked in Belgian mines and winding up (in two cases known to me involving Ait 'Atta men from Usikis) with good jobs in the Bureau of Mines in Rabat. And for their part, the Swasa are still very much in control of both the wholesale and the retail ends of the grocery trade throughout the country. These facts can all be counted as plus signs.

Although certain indications of privatization in the economy have begun to appear (Joffe 1990), both the economy and the administration in Morocco remain, in general, very highly centralized: the royal palace is at the center of virtually everything. Party politics are currently at a low ebb and are securely controlled from Rabat, while the rural communes still appear to have little or no real power and seemingly never enough money allotted to them to be able

to finish up local development schemes once the latter get underway. An example, from one of King Hasan's numerous dam-building projects, which in the view of one authority have compounded all the original errors of the French in this respect and resulted in little save a heavy drain on the economy (Swearingen 1987): as of March 1987, the Sidd Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Krim al-Khattabi, the dam built several years previously above Bni Bu ʿAyyash in Waryagharland to catch and distribute more evenly the water of the Nkur River in the Rif, still lay in a state of suspended animation while awaiting a royal inaugural visit to al-Husayma from the king in September of the same year. In June 1989, on a subsequent and very rapid passage through the region, I learned that the inauguration had indeed gone off on schedule, but that most of the water was going directly at the provincial capital and municipality of al-Husayma, while the Aith Waryaghar and Thimsaman farmers, quite apart from disputes with each other over water rights, were feeling short-changed over getting the remainder. Water output was thus considerably less than expected, and the case in question can be regarded as symptomatic.

The patronage system is of course still present, and in force: it goes right back to Rabat, where the Great Patron himself sits in the Qasr al-Maliki, the Royal Palace. Since 1960, nonetheless, there has not been one single rural or tribal revolt, totally contrary to what happened in every one of the first four years after independence, an independence which, at its thirty-five year mark as of 1991, is now not only very much a reality but is also well beyond the decolonization stage. In addition, 'Berber' no longer seems to be quite the unspoken dirty word that it once was in the corridors of power in the capital. Both 'Berber', *Amazigh* (pl. *Imazighen*), and possibly even 'tribe', *qabila*, may conceptually, if only tacitly, come once again to occupy the front and center position that is rightfully theirs, along with that of Sunni and Maliki Islam, as the historical and sociological backbone of the Moroccan nation, rather than as the skeletons in the national closet, as had been the case at least until the mid-1980s, if not longer.

The main problem in the Rif today, however, aside from the endemic one of continued and fearful land erosion and loss, is that kif, or cannabis sativa, grown in profusion in the Sinhaja Srir region, and originally destined purely for local consumption, has now grossly overstepped all bounds not only to become converted into a hard drug, but also now to become Morocco's main export, while McNeill has explained why it has been to the advantage of the palace in Rabat to turn a blind eye (McNeill 1992: 258-259; Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues 1994: 28). Between it and the heroin produced in local laboratories in the tribal agencies from the opium poppies

in the Pakistan North-West Frontier and Afghanistan, there is probably rather little to choose from, as Pakistan has itself, with Burma, now become one of the world's two largest exporters of heroin (Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues 1993: 15). But since King Muhammad VI succeeded his father King al-Hasan II to the throne in July 1999, one hopeful sign for the Rif can be discerned in the reconciliation in al-Husayma, between the new king and the sons of bin ʿAbd al-Krim, and hence between the palace and the Rifians at large, in October of the same year.

Social Change in the Pakistan North-West Frontier

The bugbear of Pakistan ever since its creation in 1947 has been the centrifugal force of ethnicity, which is well reflected in the names of its four major provinces, Punjab (which has the heavy majority), Sind, Baluchistan and North-West Frontier – or, specifically, Punjabis, Sinhis, Baluch and Pukhtuns, although the last mentioned have also become the principal minority group in Baluchistan and have a community of at least a million in the country's largest city, Karachi, as well. In Afghanistan the major bugbear has always been the ethnicity issue, but the Pukhtuns have been able to stay on top of the ethnic and political heap throughout almost the entire history of the nation. Sectarianism exists, to be sure, but it makes a poor second, because in both cases the Shiʿa populations (largely Hazara in Afghanistan, while in Pakistan, some Pukhtuns but mainly urban and northern Ismaʿilis) are largely outnumbered by the dominant Sunnis, of which the Afridi, as tribal Pukhtuns living on the border of both countries, are an excellent example.

Although I cannot provide the same degree or depth of information on social change in the Pakistan North-West Frontier Province and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that has just been given above for Morocco, most of the salient points on this subject have already been touched upon in the preceding chapter; and I merely recapitulate them here. As noted, the Afridi, as well as many of their fellow Pukhtuns of other tribal affiliations (Mohmand, Wazir, Mahsud, etc.) in independent Pakistan, tend to become either businessmen or teamsters, the former largely by inclination (for, like Rifians, they are honest but drive hard bargains and seem to know instinctively where money is to be made) and the latter through the generalized control which Pukhtun tribals have managed to obtain, acquire or purchase of the internal bus lines and trucking and transportation concerns throughout Pakistan, both as owners and as drivers. Teamsterism is a profession now

dominated in Pakistan entirely by Pukhtuns from the various tribal agencies. Such domination has become noticeably more the case since the Bhutto administration (1971-1977), when, in a manner of speaking, Pakistan opened up to the tribal agencies as well as encouraging their inhabitants to leave their guns behind and come down to other parts of the country to look for work. In this sense, unlike Baluchistan, where a four-year separatist war was fruitlessly waged by the Baluch from 1973 to 1977 against the government in Islamabad, the North-West Frontier Province, although in no way as favored economically as the majoritarian province of the Punjab, is beginning to come into its own, a process which has not been hindered by the fact that the officer corps of the Pakistan Army numbers a significant percentage of tribal Pukhtuns.

As of just the same period, too, as also noted earlier, many tribal Pukhtuns – and Baluch – began to get into the labor migration scene in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Amirates. Their specific reactions to the ten-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and to the presence, resulting from it, of over three million Afghan refugees – themselves also largely Pukhtun tribals – in camps in the North-West Frontier Province alone, as of the early to mid-1980s, cannot be readily gauged, although it is almost certain that most reactions to both are at worst unfavorable and at best mixed; but their evidently enthusiastic participation in both the burgeoning trade in automatic weapons and in the contraband narcotics smuggling which has managed to accompany it is not a healthy sign. The colony of Pukhtun tribals in the city of Karachi has imported its values with it from the various tribal agencies and districts where its members originated; and they are hard to curb. Notions of *Pukhtunwali* among them and even among some of the younger tribals at home in the agencies seem to have broken down to a considerable extent, while interethnic strife with, in particular, the so-called *muhajirin*, those Muslims, and their descendants, who came to Pakistan from India immediately after partition, was frequently reported in the news media as of the late 1980s.

General Outlook for the Future of Tribalism in Islam

There is now little more to be said, beyond noting the inescapable fact that over most of the Muslim Middle East, the tribe, the *qabila*, especially as it existed during the precolonial era, is today very much on the way out or has already disappeared. As Cole has argued, even among Saudi Arabian Bedouins the tribe as such has ceased to have much importance: the major issue at

present is whether or not one is a pastoralist (Cole 1981). Government programs, whether along the lines of subjection or, more hopefully, along those of integration and assimilation, to say nothing of the overwhelming military superiority of national governments and their armies, have, in general, greatly reduced the military importance both of the tribe and, in some cases, of the ethnic group it may represent. The VCR and television as well as helicopter gunships have come to threaten the whole fabric of tribal society with its values of honor and bravery. In the cases under discussion in this book, a differential development of what Connor has labeled 'ethnonationalism' (Connor 1987) – which has long existed among Kurds, Baluch and Pukhtuns but which has not, or not yet, truly emerged among Berbers (except in Algeria) – has led to dim prospects for tribal survival in Morocco except at the 'folklore' level. Indeed, Tibi (1990), translating from German and French, has even labeled the same phenomenon as 'ethnie'. This may be balanced in part by slightly better prospects for tribal survival in Afghanistan and in the Tribal Agencies of the Pakistan North-West Frontier, where, as already stressed, the ethnicity factor is also stronger. The rifle (whether or not Darra-made) as a symbol of tribalism still holds good in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where indeed it has now been upgraded to the automatic weapon and the ground-to-air rocket launcher; but in Morocco, where the monarchy, the state and the army are perhaps more visibly the only legitimate repositories of force, it has given way, in former tribal hands and usage, to the work permit, as the image of the warrior-tribesman is defused and as former tribesmen take their place in the global market where they are forced to change their modes of production.

Even in Afghanistan one wonders how much longer tribalism will last: for the main point, the bottom line, so to speak, is that modern Muslim governments have, with only a very few exceptions, no use for tribalism or the tribal way of life. This is particularly the case if because of transhumance or nomadism tribesmen tend to refuse either to 'settle down' or to take cognizance of the clumsy international frontiers that were all a creation of colonialism and of the anthropological ignorance of those who drew them up. The same ignorance of and prejudice against both the facts of anthropology and of Islamic culture and civilization still persists in the West, more strongly today than ever, especially through the instant misunderstandings created by slanted television broadcasts, while to the Muslim national elites, who are themselves invariably and naturally of urban extraction, tribalism is a thorn in the cultural side as well as an embarrassment to the national social structure. Tribesmen are outsiders, and they must therefore go: for the marginalization process can be terminated only by their transformation or extinction. This is all part and

parcel of what Ahmed has recently referred to as the 'postcolonial paradigm' (Ahmed 1991). In addition, there is also the inescapable fact that the 'Great Game' is now over forever and that the West, having therefore lost interest in Afghanistan, has left the country to its own devices.

Although the major emphasis in this book has been more on tribal ethnographic profiles and tribe-state relations as seen in socio-historical perspective than on recent and especially on developmental issues, it is worth speculating whether the changes in these tribal societies investigated here have also led to concomitant changes in their adherence to Islam and to Islamic practices, or to the emergence of sectarian ideologies as a result either of their marginalization or of their gradual transformation, as the case may be. At this point in time the answer to such a question would appear to be: not yet. This is so even though the religious nature of the Moroccan monarchy as the centerpiece of that country's political system, for example, is not duplicated either in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. But we may also ponder another dichotomous issue as well: that of the low profile and 'invisibility', so to speak, of tribal segmentation and of the kinship-oriented ideology centering around agnatic descent, whether or not these involve necessarily a concomitant system of either segmentary lineage or factional network organization, as compared to the relatively high profile of patronage-clientage relations which are, after all, far more observable on the ground and may be seen and described by any anthropologist in the course of his fieldwork. As one Muslim tribesman seems to be on record as having said quite recently, with respect to the subject of tradition, 'If we don't know where we came from, how do we know who we are or where we are going?' For it is also clear that in the rapidly changing context of the present day, tribesmen have become the unwitting victims of their own self-perception.

Nonetheless, although my own liking, sympathy and, indeed, respect and admiration for those Middle Eastern Muslim tribesmen with whom I have come into contact personally makes me place a high value on them as human beings, any plea we might also make for the maintenance of tribalism and for the values it represents is almost certainly a cry in the wilderness. This seems to be particularly so in the kaleidoscopically changing circumstances of the present-day world order, where even at the micro-level both segmentation and even quasi-segmentation have observably given way to patronage and fully centralized state control, with the scaffolding, interstices and ties of the one becoming the links and networks of the other. As of the date of writing (August 1992), this process is one that the recent 'Gulf War' between the West and Iraq over Kuwait, and between one set of Arabs and another, will

only hasten, particularly given Saddam Husayn's continued brutality and butchery of the Iraqi Kurds now that the war is over. But the West, and particularly the United States, is to blame as well, for its supreme unawareness, self-absorption and lack of interest and concern, as well as for patting itself on the back now that, in its eyes, the task has been completed.

For there is no doubt at all but that Islamic Middle Eastern tribalism as known even through the first half of the twentieth century will be gone by the time that the twenty-first appears. *Ripublik*, *siba* and even *yaghistan* are now irrevocably finished. Whatever meaning the rubric of *qabila* may come to cover in the Arabic of the future, and in the new order which may come to emerge in the Middle East, its current generally recognized connotation of 'tribe' will no doubt come to refer to a concept which exists or existed only in the past tense, in historical time.



Ait ʿAtta. Notable of Ait Aisa u-Brahim at Igharm Adqim (1962)

Afridi. Notable of Malik Din Khayl Afridi, Peshawar, 1978

Glossary

Key:
A = Arabic (Classical/Literary)
MA = Moroccan Arabic
B = Berber (all dialects)
RB = Rifian Berber (Dharifith)
SHB = Tashilhit Berber (Western Atlas, Sus, Anti-Atlas)
TB = Tamazight Berber (Middle Atlas, Central Atlas, Saghru, Dra, Tafilalt)
P = Pakhtu/Pashtu
U = Urdu

abarrah (B, from MA *barrah*): market crier

adhrib (RB, from MA *tlib*, 'enemy'): enemy, anyone fleeing the consequences of his action in a feud

adhuggwar (RB, pl. *idhuwran*): affinal kinsman, in-law (i.e., wife's brother, wife's father)

aduku (TB, lit. 'slipper'): luck

afqir (B, pl. *ifqiren*, from MA *fqir*): member of Sufi religious order

agraw (RB, pl. *igrawen*): council meeting and site where it is held

agurram (SHB, TB, pl. *igurramen*): saint

aguryan (TB, pl. *iguryan*): one-year-old ram

ahl al-kitab (A): People of the Book (Christians, Jews)

ait (SHB, TB)/*aith* (RB, lit. 'people (of)'): prefix to most Berber lineage, sectional and tribal names; *aitarbaʿin* (SHB)/*aitharbiʿin* (RB): councillors, council members, tribal body politic; *ait ghurm udi* (TB, lit. 'people of butter-giving'): Ait ʿAtta nickname (pejorative) for Ait Murghad; *ait l-haqq* (TB, lit. 'people of the truth'): specialists in customary law; *ait l-khayr* (TB, lit. 'people of the good'): those who opt for peace; *ait l-ʿar* (TB, lit. 'people of the shame compulsion'): those who opt for vengeance

aitma (TB, sing. *iyma*)/*aithma* (RB, sing. *uma*): brothers, agnates; *aitma n-ughu*/*ait ughu* (TB): milk or foster brothers (with resultant prohibition on intermarriage); *ait umalu* (TB): people of the shade; *ait ʿashra* (TB, lit. 'people of ten'): agnates, lineage mates, co-jurors at oath; *aith ʿazizi* (RB, lit. 'people of the father's brother/paternal uncle'): agnates, lineage mates

ajmuʿ (TB, from MA *jmaʿa*): council

akhammas (B, from MA *khammas*): sharecropper who receives one-fifth of the harvest

alkum (TB): accusing oath

am ithran g-ugjinna (RB): 'like stars in the sky'

am tamttut, am ut-ʿAtta (TB): 'like a woman, like an ut-ʿAtta' (fem. sing. of Ait ʿAtta)

am uqzin (RB): 'like a dog'

aman (B): water

amazigh (RB,TB, pl. *imazighen*): Berber (Rif and Middle/Central Atlas)

amghar (RB, TB, pl. *imgharen*): chief (TB), big man, notable, councillor (RB); *amghar n-ait l-haqq* (TB): chief of customary law specialists; *amghar amqqran* (RB, lit. 'big chief'): top council member, chief councillor; *amghar n-igran* (TB): field chief; *amghar n-igudlan* (TB): chief of collective pasturelands; *amghar n-irahhalen* (TB): transhumance chief; *amghar n-s-suq* (TB): market chief; *amghar n-tirugwa* (TB): irrigation chief; *amghar n-tmazirt* TB, lit. 'land chief'): chief of local community or section; *amghar n-ufilla* (TB): top chief

amghugh/aghuwwagh (TB, pl. *imghughen*/*ighuwwaghen*): dissident individual

amgilli (TB, pl. *imgillan*): co-juror at oath

amkasu (TB, pl. *imkusa*): agnate. lineage mate

amir (A): commander, prince

amir al-mu'minin (A): Commander of the Faithful

amnasf (TB, from A *nisf*): half

amqqran (TB, pl. *imuqqrann*): big man, notable

amyisa (TB, pl. *imyisaten*): agnate, lineage mate

amzil (TB, pl. *imzilen*): blacksmith

amzttid (TB, pl. *imzttiden*): paid tribal protector of a traveler (see also *dhazttat*. *mzattat*, *tazttat* and *zattata*)

amzwug (TB, pl. *imzwagen*): murderer in exile

anafalman (TB): peace (derivation of name of Ait Yafalman confederacy)

anahsham/ anahkam (GTB, pl. *inahshamen/inahkamen*): lay judge, oath administrator

anibgi (TB): guest (Ait ʿAtta fifth of Ait Unibgi, lit. 'people of the guest')

aqaddar (TB, pl. *iqaddaren*): potter

aqbil (TB, pl. *iqbilen*): confederacy, tribal coalition

aqattaʿ n-ubrid TB, pl. *iqattaʿn n-ibriden*, lit. 'cutter of roads'): bandit, highwayman

aqibli (TB, pl. *iqibliyen*): southerner

arifi (B, pl. *irifiyen*): Rifian

ashilhi (B, pl. *ishilhayen*): Berber from Western Atlas/Sus/Anti-Atlas (see *asusi*)

asilham (B, from MA *silham*): burnous

asusi (B, pl. *isusiyen*): Berber from Western Atlas/Sus/Anti-Atlas (see *ashilhi*)

axarkur (B, pl. *ixarkar*, from MA *karkur*): cairn

awragh (B): yellow

awttu (TB): state of hostility

aʿaban (TB): white sheet with peace offering

aʿallam (TB): standard bearer

bab n-d-dʿawt (TB): plaintiff or accuser at collective oath

bab n-umur (TB, pl. *idbab n-imuren*, lit. 'owner of a share'): lineage head

badal (P, from A root *b-d-l*, 'to change'): vengeance, bloodfeud

badraga (P): escort for travelers through tribal territory

baraka (MA, lit. 'blessing'): miracle-working ability

barlaman (MA, RB neologism): bin ʿAbd al-Krim's Rifian 'Parliament', 1921-26

battu (RB): division (of land)

bayʿa (A): act of allegiance or fealty (to sultan, amir or king)

bilad al-makhzan (MA: *blad l-makhzin*): land under full government control

bilad al-siba (MA: *blad s-siba*): land under intermittent government control, or outside such control; *gi l-uqt n-s-siba* (TB): 'in the days of dissidence'

bu shfar (MA, B): flintlock gun

damana (A, RB, P): guarantee; *damin* (A, RB, P): guarantor

Dar al-Islam (A): House of Islam

Dar al-Harb (A): House of War (world outside Islam)

darwish (A, P): dervish, poor man

Dawla Jumhuriya Rifiya (A): 'Rifian Republican State', 1923-26, under bin ʿAbd al-Krim

daʿira (A): fine
dhaddarth (RB, pl. *dhudhrin*, from MA *dar*): house
dhafiddjahth (RB, from MA *filaha*): agriculture
dhamazighth (RB): Berber (Rifian) dialect (see *dharifith*)
dhamurth (RB): land, earth
dhaqbitsh (RB, pl. *dhiqbar/dhiqbaʾir*, from MA *qbila*): tribe
dharfiqth (RB, pl. *dharfiqin*): non-corporate agnatic lineage
dharifith (RB): Rifian (Berber) dialect (see *dhamazighth*)
dharga (RB, pl. *dhargiwin*): irrigation ditch
dhazttat (RB): protection money, bribe (see *amzttid*, *mzattat*, *tazttat*, *zattata*)
dhimssi (RB): fire
dhzaddjith (RB): (collective) oath
dim (MA, RB): blood; *d-dim ur irminzi ur itmarhin* (RB): 'blood is not to be sold or mortgaged'
diya (MA): blood compensation, bloodmoney, bloodwealth
diyit (TB)/*diyith* (RB): blood compensation, bloodmoney, bloodwealth
dshar (MA, RB, pl. *dshur*): village (MA), local community (RB)
duro hasani (MA): heavy Spanish silver coin in use in late 19th century Morocco, worth 5 pesetas

l-essence n-tumubil n-Ait ʿAtta (TB, neologism, lit: 'the gasoline of the Ait ʿAtta car'): reference to Ilimshan section of Ait Wahlim fifth of Ait ʿAtta

fatiha (A): opening chapter of the Qur'an
fqih (MA, B): Qur'anic schoolmaster
fqir (MA, B): member of Sufi religious order

gharb (A): west
ghayr ʿilaqa (A, lit. 'without attachment', also P): Pukhtun tribal areas (see *yaghistan*)
gish (MA, from A *jaysh*): army; *gish ar-rifi* (MA): Rifian troops which garrisoned Tangier, 1684–1912
grat illan (RB): lot drawing
gundi (P): alliance group, faction, league
hadida (MA, RB): billhook
hajj (A): pilgrimage to Mecca; *hujjaj* (A, B): those who perform it
hamsaya (P): non-Muslim client of Pukhtun tribesman

haqq (A): right, reason, truth; *(r-)haqq*: (RB): fine for murder in markets, payable by murderer to *imgharen* (see *amghar*) or councillors as their 'right'; *(r-)haqq nj-suq* (RB): market fine for murder;*(r-)haqq n-tqbitsh* (RB): (theoretical) tribal fine for murder

harka (MA): war party or expedition

(l-)hna (TB): peace

hujra (A, P): guestroom

huffaz (A, RB): guardians, bodyguard

hukuma (A, B, P): government

hurm (A, B, P): inviolable or sacrosanct zone

idhwiren nj-khudhmath (RB): agricultural association between two men for purposes of work

igharbiyen (RB, sing. *agharbi*, lit. 'westerners'): (non-Rifian) Moroccans

igharm (TB, pl. *igharman*): house-fortress (see *qsar*), collective storehouse

ighs (B, pl. *ighsan*, lit. 'bone'): agnatic lineage (TB)

imazighen (RB, YTB, sing. *amazigh*): Berbers (Rifian and/or Middle/Central Atlas)

imgillan (TB, sg. *amgilli*): co-jurors/agnates of accused individual at collective oath

(r-)imin (RB): (collective) oath

imluqten (TB): people or groups of mixed ancestry

iniyi (TB, pl. *iniyan*): witness

irifiyen (B, sing. *arifi*): Rifians

ishilhayen (B, sing. *ashilhi*): Berbers from Western Atlas/Sus/Anti-Atlas

istihurm (RB): exiled murderer who has obtained asylum and protection in another section or tribe

istinaf (A, TB): court, Ait ʿAtta supreme court

isusiyen (B, sing. *asusi*): Berber from Western Atlas/Sus/Anti-Atlas (see *ishilhayen*)

iyma (TB, pl. *aitma*): brother, agnate

izarzayen (TB): Berber porters in Fes

izirf (TB): customary law; *izirf-nnagh* (TB): 'our customary law'

izmaz (TB): fines imposed on malefactors

jajgu (RB, pl. *ijujga*): sublineage, branch of agnatic lineage

jamaʿa (A)/*jmaʿa* (MA)/*jmaʿth* ()RB)/*ajmuʿ* (TB): assembly, council, reunion

jamaʿat al-qarawiya (A): modern Moroccan rural commune

jaydad (P): cultivated land (see *zmaka*)

Jibha Rifiya (A, RB): 'Rifian Front', name given by some informants to bin ʿAbd al-Krim's wartime government, 1921–26

jillaba (MA): men's outer garment, of wool or cotton, with sleeves and hood
jirga (P): assembly, council, reunion

kafir (A, B, P): unbeliever, infidel
kashar (P): young tribesman
kbir mhalla (MA): head of military expedition
kilay (P): fortress-village
khalifa (A): deputy
khamsa akhmas (A)/*khams khmas* (MA, sing. *khums*, 'fifth'): five fifths (organizational indication that the possessor tribe is powerful); *khams khmas n-Ait 'Atta* (TB), the five fifths of the Ait 'Atta; *sh-shrut n-khams khmas n-Ait 'Atta* (TB), the regulations/customary law of the Ait 'Atta; *khams khmas n-Aith Waryaghar/khamsa n-tikhammasin n-Aith Waryaghar* (RB): the five fifths of the Aith Waryaghar
khassadar (P): paramilitary soldier
khattara (MA)/*l-khattart* (TB): underground irrigation ditch
khayl (from A, lit. 'horses'; P): Pakhtu denotative suffix for any descent group added to name of its patrilineal ancestor

lashkar/lakhkar (P): war party or expedition
la'b l-barud (MA, lit. 'gunpowder play'): 'fantasia', usually performed on horseback
liff (MA, RB, SHB, pl. *lfuf*): alliance group, faction, league see *saff*)

mahdi (A, lit. 'rightly guided'): mahdi
makhzan (A, lit. 'storehouse'): government (MA)
malatar (P): member of any group who will join its leaders in a fight
malik (from A, lit. 'king'): man of consequence, village or sectional headman (P)
mann (TB): indivision (of property)
mashar (P): tribal elder
masirat al-khadra (MA): Moroccan 'Green March' of 1975
maylmastiya/ malmastiya (P): (obligatory) hospitality
mhalla (MA): expeditionary force or troop
mhamya (MA): coalition
mkhazni (MA, pl. *mkhazniya*): paramilitary soldier
mithqal (MA): former Moroccan coin worth 10 *uqiya*-s
mrabit (MA, pl. *mrabtin*)/*amrabidh* (RB, pl. *imrabdhen*): holy man or saint whose holiness is achieved rather than ascribed
mudd (MA): measure of volume

mughal (P, U): ruler of Mughal dynasty in India; also, one of four categories of 'old' Muslims (i.e., those not descended from converted Hindus) in the Indian subcontinent

mujahid (A, pl. *mujahidin*): holy warrior, fighter for the faith

mukallif (TB, from A, lit. 'man in charge'): chief of local community or section

mulla (from A *mawla*): Qur'anic schoolmaster, 'mullah' (P, U)

mulk/milk (A, B, P, U): private property

musim (MA): annual pilgrimage to saint's shrine (see *ʿamara*)

mutshalga (P): amount agreed upon by *jirga* or council (see *jirga*) to be paid by anyone breaking a truce

muwajib (from A root *w-j-b*): annual government allowances or subsidies for Pukhtun tribes (P)

mzattat (MA, TB): traveler paying for protection in an alien tribe

nagha (P): tribal fines imposed on malefactors

nanawatay/ nanawati (P): (obligatory) asylum

nang (P): honor; *nangwali* (P): Pukhtun honor, Pukhtun custom

nikat (P, from *nika*, *nikoh*, 'grandfather'): amount of profit and loss that each tribe must bear

nisba (A): ascribed name denoting descent or origin

pakhtu/pashtu (P): Pakhtu/Pashtu language

pathan (U): Pukhtun/Pushtun; also, one of four categories of 'old' Muslims (i.e., those not descended from converted Hindus) in Indian subcontinent (see *mughal*, *sayyid*, *shaykh*)

pir (P, U): holy man, saint

plar (P, pl. *plaray*): father

Pukhtunwali/ Pushtunwali (P): Pukhtun/Pushtun custom

qabila (A, pl. *qaba'il*)/*qbila* (MA, pl. *qba'il*): tribe (see *aqbil*, *dhaqbitsh*, *taqbilt*)

qibla (A): direction of Mecca

qadi (A): judge of Shariʿa Law

(l-)qadi n-l-qaʿida/ (l-)qadi n-izirf (TB): modern judge of customary law

qalang (P): rent, tax, not paid by free Pukhtun tribesmen

qanun (A, B, pl. *qawanin*): customary law document

qa'id (MA): tribal chief; *qa'id at-tabur* (MA): *qa'id* of 500 men; *qa'id l-miya* (MA): *qa'id* of 100 men; *qa'id l-khamsin* (MA): *qa'id* of 50 men; *qa'id khamsa w-ʿashrin* (MA): *qa'id* of 25 men; *qa'id t-tnʿash* (MA): *qa'id* of 12 men; *qa'id al-mumtaz* (MA): super-*qa'id* (modern Moroccan administrative term; *qa'id al-quyad* (MA, lit. '*qa'id* of *qa'id*-s'): top chief, top *qa'id*

qaʿida (A, B): customary law (see *izirf*)

qsar (MA, pl. *qsur*): house-fortress, village-fortress (see igharm)

qubba (MA): saint's shrine, particularly its dome or cupola

ra'is (from A *ra's*, 'head'): president, chief, leader, headman

raʿaya (A, lit. 'flock'): protection, particularly of Haratin by Ait ʿAtta

(r-)rbaʿ (MA, RB, pl. *rbuʿ*; RB, pl. *r-urbuʿ*, lit. 'fourth, quarter'): tribal section

rifi (MA, pl. *riyafa/ru'afa*): Rifian

Ripublik (RB): in Rif, the period prior to the Rifian War and effective implantation of colonialism (1860/1880/1898–1921); *gi r-waqt n-ar-Ripublik* (RB): 'in the time of the Ripublik' (i.e., in precolonial times: see *siba*, *gi l-uqt n-s-siba*)

riwaj (P, U): customary law

rogha/rugha (P): settlement of dispute

rugi (MA): pretender to the throne

saff (Algerian A, lit. 'alignment'): alliance group, faction, league (see *liff*)

salih (MA): saint's shrine

sar aghu (TB, lit. 'mixing of milk'): milk or foster kinship

sarishta (P): executive arm of the *jirga* or council (see *jirga*)

sasbu (TB): 'Chassepot', 1874 French Gras single-shot rifle

sayib (MSA): dissident individual (see *sib*, *siba*)

sayyid (A, P, U): one of four categories of 'old' Muslims (i.e., those not descended from converted Hindus) in Indian subcontinent (see *mughal*, *pathan*, *shaykh*)

shahada (A): Muslim profession of faith

sharif (A, MA, B, pl. *shurfa'*): descendant of the Prophet

Shariʿa (A): Islamic Law

sharq (A): east

shaykh (A, B, P): elder, leader, patriarch (A, B); also, one of four categories of 'old' Muslims (i.e., those not descended from converted Hindus) in Indian subcontinent (see *mughal*, *pathan*, *sayyid*)

sib (MA): to enter into dissidence; *siba* (MA, SHB, TB): dissidence; *gi l-uqt n-s-siba* (TB): 'in the time of dissidence' (i.e., the period prior to French 'pacification' of Morocco: see *Ripublik, gi r-waqt n-ar-Ripublik*)

Sidi, Sidna (MA, lit. 'my lord, our lord'): term of address for a *sharif* (see *sharif*)

siyyid (MA, from A *sayyid*): saint's shrine

spin (P, lit. 'white'): honor

sulh (A, B): truce, peace

suq (A, B): market; *yarza s-suq/yarza s-sulh nj-suq* (RB, TB): 'the market is broken/the peace of the market is broken'

tabuqst (TB): Ait ʿAtta women's headdress

tada (TB): lifelong cross-sectional or cross-tribal sponsorship; *ait tada* (TB): individuals or groups in *tada* relationships to each other

tafargant (TB): milk or foster kinship

Tafrawt n-Ait ʿAtta/Tafrawt n-Igharm Amazdar (TB, lit. 'bowl of Ait ʿAtta, bowl of Igharm Amazdar'): inviolable zone of Ait ʿAtta capital and supreme court in Saghru

tagallit (TB, pl. *tigulla*): collective oath; *tagallit n-nhah* (TB): collective oath by ordeal, *tigulla ggant izuwran n-l-qaʿida* (TB): 'oaths are the roots of custom'; *irza tagallit* (TB): 'the oath is broken'

taggurt (TB, pl. *tiggura*): unit of irrigated land

tamaddiyt (TB): bloodfeud

tamazight (TB): Berber dialect of Middle/Central Atlas

taqbilt (TB, SHB, pl. *tiqbilin*): tribal section (see *aqbil, dhaqbitsh, qabila/qbila*)

tarahhalt (TB): transhumance; *irahhalen* (sing. *arahhal*): transhumants

tarbur (P, pl. *tarburan*): male parallel cousin; also, by implication, enemy; *tarburwali* (P, lit. 'cousin enmity'): agnatic rivalry

tariqa (A, pl. *turuq*): Sufi religious order

tashat/takat (TB, pl. tashatin/takatin): nuclear family

tatsaʿit (TB, RB): nine-shot repeating rifle, French Lebel 1886 magazine rifle

tayammum (A): pre-prayer ablutions performed with sand if water is unavailable

tazttat (TB): temporary protection paid by traveler (see *amzttid, dhazttat, mzattat, zattata*)

taʿaqqit (TB, pl. *tiʿaqqidin*): lay judge, specialist in customary law, member of Ait ʿAtta supreme court

taʿrqiba (MA): sacrifice of bull or camel by hamstringing
tiga (P, lit. 'stone'): truce
topak (P): gun
tshalwayshti / chalwayshti (P): tribal police force
tulut (MA, lit. 'third'): tribal section; *tilt tlat* (MA, B): three thirds
tuzzalt (TB): curved dagger

uma (RB, pl. *aithma/umathen*): brother, agnate
umma (A): the Muslim community; *umma muhammadiya* (A): the just community (of Muslims)
umam l-muttahida n-Ait ʿAtta (TB, neologism, lit. 'the United Nations of the Ait ʿAtta'): Igharm Amazdar
ur ibdi (TB): indivision (of property)
u-tikhsi / TB, pl. *ait tikhsi*, lit. 'he of the sheep'): naturalizee, anyone changing his lineage or tribe through sacrifice (of a sheep)
utma (B, pl. *istma*): sister

walu (MA, B): nothing

yaghistan (P, lit. 'land of rebellion'): Pukhtun tribal areas (see *ghayr ʿilaqa*)
yarza s-suq / yarza s-sulh nj-suq (RB, TB): 'the market is broken/the peace of the market is broken' (see *suq*)

zahir (MA): dahir, sultanic or royal decree
zawiya (MA): lodge of religious order or of *shurfa'* (se *sharif*)
zig isilman ar udaden (TB): 'from the fish to the mouflons'
zig tawkst s-taini (TB): 'from the holly oak to the date palm'
zattata (MA, from TB *tazttat* and B verb *z-t-t*, 'to weave'): protection money, bribe (see *amzttid*, *dhazttat*, *mzattat*, *tazttat*)
ziyara (MA): visit to saint's shrine for purposes of donation
zmaka (P): cultivated land (see *jaydad*)

ʿabid (A): slave, black
ʿadl (MA, pl. *ʿadul*): notary public, assistant to qadi (see qadi)
ʿahd (A, B): covenant between individuals

(r-)ʿadhawth (RB, from MA *ʿadawa*, lit. 'hatred'): hatred, bloodfeud, vendetta; *(r-)ʿadhu* (RB, from A *ʿaduw*): enemy; *r-ʿadhu nj-ʿadhu-inu dhamdukkar-inu* (RB): 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'

ʿamara (MA, cognate of MA *musim*): annual pilgrimage to saint's shrine (see *musim*)

(l-)ʿasimt (TB, from MA *ʿasima*): capital

ʿurf (A, B): customary law (see *izirf*, *qaʿida*)

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The Arabic word qabila is usually translated as 'tribe': it refers at once to a group of people who, often irrespective of their degrees of relationship to each other, make up an entity which is held to be at once social, economic and political. This is both an oversimplification and a stretching of credulity.

The essential theme of this book is: the Islamic or Muslim tribe, its internal relations, its relations with other, similar tribes, and its relations with the wider regional or national society of which it is a part. Manifested through three particular examples at the western and eastern extremities of the Muslim Middle East, two from Morocco and the third from the frontier region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
David M. Hart postulates that the Arabic-Islamic and Middle Eastern concept of qabila entails a great many paradoxes: it means different things to different people, to different actors in different situations.

Just before the publication of this book David Montgomery Hart (1927-2001) left us. It gives this book a rather sad and nostalgic dimension, because it marks the end of an impressive series of publications on Morocco and the broader islamic world over a period of nearly half a century.

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